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Abstract
What does a digital identity token have to do with medieval seals? Is the history of passports of
any use for enabling the discovery of Internet users’ identity when crossing virtual domain
boundaries during their digital browsing and transactions? The agility of the Internet architecture
and its simplicity of use have been the engines of its growth and success with the users
worldwide. As it turns out, there lies also its crux. In effect, Internet industry participants have
argued that the critical problem business is faced with on the Internet is the absence of an
identity layer from the core protocols of its logical infrastructure. As a result, the cyberspace
parallels a global “territory” without any identification mechanism that is reliable, consistent and
interoperable across domains. This dissertation is an investigation of the steps being taken by
Internet’s stakeholders in order to resolve its identity problems, through the lenses of historical
instances where similar challenges were tackled by social actors.
Social science research addressing the Internet identity issues is barely nascent. Research on
identification systems in general is either characterized by a paucity of historical perspective, or
scantily references digital technology and online identification processes. This research is
designed to bridge that gap. The general question at its core is: How do social actors, events or
processes enable the historical emergence of authoritative identity credentials for the public at
large? This work is guided by that line of inquiry through three broad historical case studies:
first, the medieval experience with seals used as identity tokens in the signing of deeds that
resulted in transfers of rights, particularly estate rights; second, comes the modern, national state
with its claim to the right to know all individuals on its territory through credentials such as the

passport or the national identity card; and finally, viewed from the United States, the case of
ongoing efforts to build an online digital identity infrastructure.
Following a process-tracing approach to historical case study, this inquiry presents enlightening
connections between the three identity frameworks while further characterizing each. We
understand how the medieval doctrines of the Trinity and the Eucharist developed by schoolmen
within the Church accommodated seals as markers of identity, and we understand how the
modern state seized on the term ‘nationality’ – which emerged as late as in the 19th century – to
make it into a legal fiction that was critical for its identification project. Furthermore, this
investigation brings analytical insights which enable us to locate the dynamics driving the
emergence of those identity systems. An ordering of the contributing factors in sequential
categories is proposed in a sociohistorical approach to explain the causal mechanisms at work
across these large phenomena. Finally this research also proposes historically informed
projections of scenarios as possible pathways to the realization of authoritative digital identity.
But that is the beginning of yet another story of identity.
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Overture
Ithaca, at last! ...
After long years of sailing, Odysseus (also known as Ulysses) can now see his native
shore emerge from the horizon. He returns home after a score of years, the first decade
fighting the Trojan War followed by another of tribulations at high seas on his way back
to Ithaca. Now he has to confront Penelope’s wooers and suitors rivaling to replace him
as her husband. In the face of their constant pressure, she has so far devised efforts and
tricks to put off marriage. And now after such a long leave of absence and all the
tribulations, there he is, Odysseus! Or is he? Under the guise of a beggar draped in a
halo of mist, by the favor of the goddess Athena, how to tell who that visitor is?
Repeatedly in his encounters over the course of his epic voyage, was that man of many
ways asked to reveal his identity, to no avail. Now that at long last he sets foot again in
homeland, his identity once without question across the realm now is yet to be
ascertained … by Penelope of all people! In order to regain his place by her side, not
only did he have to decimate the ranks of the young and arrogant princes vying for her
hand, but he now have to face her unwavering incredulity.
When the hero of countless feats reached for the prize of the bride, he is yet to face the
ultimate test. Penelope figures an impromptu and less spectacular probe for the man she
still doubts to be Odysseus. Only the two spouses knew that one leg of their bridal bed
was built – by Odysseus himself – out of the trunk of an actual tree. So when Penelope
ostensibly pretends to order the bed displaced, the returning hero cannot help but be
surprised by such request given the impossibility of the task, unless the leg of the bed was
xv

cut off from the tree. For Penelope, there eventually lies the unbreakable proof of the
identity of the presumed stranger: she can finally recognize and welcome back her long
awaited mate.
Odysseus, at long last! 1

There is no better place (topos) for our departure in this endeavor than the return of Odysseus.
Told very long ago, this story provides us with a narrative that the so-called Western world has
come to regard as a matrix for many of its self-defining narratives – a tale of origins as well as a
tale of identity. Only once during his epic journey did Odysseus make an attempt to tell who he
was: to the Cyclops who asked ‘who are you?’ he cryptically dropped: My name is Nobody2 (Ch.
IX, 366.) A person who is Nobody – for somebody. That’s where the identity quest begins.
Hopefully, it will lead to that person being something more than Nobody, being Someone – for
somebody.

1 From Homer’s Odyssey (Book XXIII), I first heard the story of Penelope and the bed test by the late Hellenist JeanPierre Vernant when he came to give a talk at my Philosophy department at the University of Lille in the early 1990s.
About Odysseus’s identity, see Vernant and Ker (1999) and Dimock (1956). Another variation on the theme of identity
and homecoming after a long period of absence is Martin Guerre’s story: see Davis (1993).
2 While ‘nobody’ is unambiguously a negative in English, its equivalent in many Latin-born languages is more neutral
(and can be used negatively as well as positively). For instance, from French ‘personne’ translates to English both as
‘person’ and as ‘nobody’ (i.e. ‘not any one person’), depending on the syntactic context. The Greek word translated in
Latin by persona originally means mask as worn by actors representing their character in the Greek tragedy. An important
conceptual development occurred in the post-millennium Middle Ages where the term is made to mean a facet of an
individual, as with the Trinity of the three persons in a unique God by the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.
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CHAPTER 1
General Introduction: Internet and the Identity Gap
Have we ever become artifacts, as the title for this thesis may suggest? I do not mean to imply
here the disappearance of the human race in favor of some advanced, human-like technological
species, or cyborg. But by all accounts, it has been a historical trend that humans have
increasingly been able to delegate parts of their agency to artifacts and machines. And if so far
humans have not been turned into a computing species, one may at least admit that over the last
half-century or so, there has been a dramatic increase of instances where artifacts speak for and
about humans, instances where human will and actions are carried out through artifacts. For that
to be possible, artifacts must have been made able to represent human individuals or to capture
and manifest across time and space their specific involvement in a given course of action or
events. That, I believe, is not conceivable without certain notion of identity enabled through
artifacts. In this work I will investigate how identity artifacts accomplish that and, in so doing,
the bases and mechanisms through which humans may become – or rather be effectively
represented by – artifacts. In this introductory chapter I provide a view of the object, context and
motivation of this investigation, by first stating the problem that triggered it. I then undertake an
overview of the literature closely related to identification challenges and identity systems in the
Internet in search of possible directions for investigating the problem. Based on the result, I
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formulate the questions that will guide this research further. Finally I outline the organization of
the dissertation.

1.1

Research motivation and problem statement

This is a thesis on one of the most fundamental challenges posed by the public and global
development of the Internet, the basic architecture of which was not necessary designed with the
potential empirical implications of its current scale and scope in mind. The volume of
communications and business being undertaken through that medium has grown dramatically
ever since it was made available to the broad public and to commercial activities in the early
nineties. And now with social networking platforms the share of time and life being spent in
online interactions has taken the Internet to the level of a basic utility for large swaths of
populations. Yet, it is not as if we can foresee the end of the innovations that may bring people to
spend even more time and do even more business on the Internet. To the contrary, common sense
suggests that the utility of the Internet could grow even larger if only it could be ridden of some
of the obvious flaws that make it an uncertain place. One of those flaws or problems is the topic
of this thesis. As a multidimensional medium, or a multi-medium, the Internet is less like a tool
to accomplish a specific kind of function or activity (like most previous media) but more like a
place where a person could accomplish a significant portions of their daily activities, a sort of
facility equipped with capabilities that can conceivably carry many people through their daily
occupations and routines for a significant length of time. As the Internet is designed however,
that is not to happen without challenges. In the course of its rather short lifespan so far, one of
those challenges has quickly appeared to be about how a user can know for certain who the party
she is dealing with through the Internet really is.
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The authentication methods known by most Internet users today are poor in conveying
identity information and weak from a security standpoint. The most common one is the set of
username (or user ID) and password, also known as “logins.” While it is more of a challenge to
convince the bulk of the users that digital identity technology may improve their authentication
experience and the handling of their personal data, the downsides (and frankly, the annoyance) of
“signing up” for an account that is defined by a username and password at every Web service
site are most likely clearer to users. Due to the lack of interoperability between online
information systems and applications, users need to create and to remember as many different
sets of logins as the number of accounts they have on the Internet (not practical), or write them
down and store them within reach (not secure), or still use one and the same set of logins for
several accounts (not secure, either).
Despite those downsides, the sign-up and log-in ceremonies on the Internet do still carry
on with no other protection, spreading the user’s personal data across web servers all over the
world to parties that are accountable only to themselves – and rather remotely and only after the
fact, to a government agency, if any – as regards the consequences of the security standards of
their data handling practices, or lack thereof. The resulting multiplication ad infinitum of
unaccountable data controllers (the parties collecting and storing user data) in the open Internet
further exposes users to the risks of data breach and misuse. Such state of affairs is due, in
significant part, to the fact that specification of identity capabilities in the context of an open and
global Internet was absent from the design goals of the Internet original architecture.
Not only is the discovery of the identity of communicating, interacting or transacting
users not readily enabled by Internet protocols, but we shall further note that the Internet identity
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problem goes beyond the identity of human users. It is a two-way street, so to speak, as deceit
can take place by “impersonating” not only users (to a Web service), but also websites (to the
user). In fact all types of entities or objects one may encounter or have to deal with using the
Internet can be “impersonated.” In other words, it is a universal problem on the open Internet, a
challenge to all ends in a communication or a transaction. In that sense, the so-called phishing3,
which may be as harmful to the user as a direct impersonation of her identity, is made possible
by this very identity gap in the Internet infrastructure.
In the brick-and-mortar world you can tell when you are at a branch of your bank. It would be very difficult
to set up a fake bank branch and convince people to do transaction there. But in today’s online world it’s
trivial to set up a fake banking site (or e-commerce site …) and convince a significant portion of the
population that it’s the real thing. That is an identity problem. (Cameron and Jones 2006: 2)

In addition to the possibility on the web to mislead with words, images whether of a
person or of any (protected) sign or visual can also be impeccably reproduced, thanks to digital
technology, and used to deceit or in ways that clash with the intent of the legitimate owners.
False claims can be made using misleading verbal assertions as well as nonverbal
misrepresentations such as images. The fact that both ends of the communication are clearly
potential points of vulnerability contributes to making of the Internet a fertile terrain for the
proliferation of entrepreneurs of deceit and “miscreants” of all stripes (Franklin et al., 2007).
This universality of the problem on the Internet explains why it has been suggested in the
industry that the core problem of the Internet is one of identity, that is, the lack of identity layer

3 The masquerading practice that consists of posing in a communication as a familiar and trustworthy entity in order to
lure the user into providing their account credentials or personal data after clicking a website link provided in that
communication.
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in the TCP/IP protocol stack as originally designed (Cameron 2005; Cameron and Jones 2006).
In effect, basic Internet protocols may well permit to trace communication traffic based on
identifiers assigned to every networked device it transits through, but they provide no means of
knowing the actual identity of the entities involved in the communication or manipulating the
machines. Therefore in addition to lacking the aids provided by all the material cues and clues
that simply are part of the fabric of social life in the physical world, the design of core Internet
protocols does not offer the resources needed to ascertain the identity of the end users or that of
any agents interacting with the network from the edges.
And yet, while all Internet identity challenge is applicable to all digital objects or
artifacts, this investigation is primarily concerned with human identity subjects and the ways in
which the technology might ultimately allow human beings to make identity transaction
decisions, whether as individuals or as organizations. From that perspective, it is as if the Internet
has created a new space – the so-called cyberspace – where the inhabitants are still not
identifiable with a comfortable level of confidence, unless based on largely unwarranted
assumptions.4 After all, it is the interactions of human users from the edges which materialize the
cyberspace with all its other digital creatures. Despite that vacuum, users go on everyday
providing their sensitive information to, and communicating at ease with, the party on the other
“end” of the network and whose identity they presume. We know, however, that for all the
panoply of fraud techniques that have thrived on the Internet, such belief is a leap of faith. In
reality, there is little ground for the technology to “deserve” that trust which is understandably a
practical solution for basic communications but exposes to serious risks once the stakes are high.
4 The unintended consequence of traceability enabled by features such as cookies and IP addressing, although facilitating
to locate the person who is responsible for the access point and maybe the device being used, do not by themselves
provide the identity of that person and much less that of the actual user.
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In a sense, the absence of identity capability in the native Internet infrastructure causes
cyberspace to assume the characteristics of a global “territory” that is lacking any authoritative
identification systems such as provided by passports or national ID cards or the driver’s license
in the physical world. How could that loophole and its consequences be addressed?
The potential gap between what the technology suggests on the one hand and the reality
on the other hand turns out glaringly actual, for impersonation and fraud have become routinely
part of our online experience. As more and more users conduct an ever increasing share of their
social and business activities online, so grow the value (or utility) of the Internet infrastructure as
well as the threats of which it becomes the target. At the same time that it provides people with a
range of resources enhancing their life and business, the Internet has also become an intricacy of
risks and dangers, notably including increasingly sophisticated criminal practices enabled by
identity usurpation or misrepresentations (Franklin et al. 2007). The explosion of online frauds
speaks to the potential in the opportunity as well as in the challenge of conducting business
online, albeit in unfortunate terms.
To the Internet identity challenge, the computer software and Internet industry has been
striving to respond. In 2006, the year my attention was first drawn to this problem, the phrase
“digital identity” had only recently become an explicit theme in related expert discourse. Another
phrase, “user-centric identity,” often appeared next to it then, which also was otherwise and
notably expressed by one of the notable participants in the digital identity technology
community, Dick Hardt, as “identity 2.0”.5 What I first understood then was that “user-centric
identity” was coined with the aim to emulate the way physical identity credentials (particularly
5

Hardt’s presentation materials used to be found at the following URL, http://www.identity20.com, but the site was no
longer available by March 2012.
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the ones granted by public authorities) behave with regard to the individual subject they refer to,
to the entities that issue them and to the ones that need to verify them or the identity of their
holder.
1)

First of all, the user keeps her credentials with herself and uses them whenever

and as needed.
2)

Secondly, while on the one hand there is a one-to-one relationship between the

issuing entity and the individual identity subject, on the other hand the relationship is one-tomany between the latter and the verifying entities.
3)

Third, identity transactions (and verification) with third parties do not necessarily

require the intervention or even the awareness of the issuing authority. This presents the virtue of
widening the usability scale of the identity credential.
“User-centric identity” or “identity 2.0” was the expressed desire to realize the same patterns on
the Internet so that the end user will be able to keep and manage digital identity credentials
which she may then use to make identity assertions, if she’s so willing, to whomever and in
whatever transaction require it.
In the face of that professed ambition, the first questions that came to my mind were as
follows: Who could possibly issue that kind of credentials to the Internet end users in general?
Who could have the status and the capacity to make credentials that will be confidently accepted
as proof of identity by the variety of entities that may have a legitimate interest in verifying
online the Internet user’s identity? Given business practices concerning personal data – the
compulsion to collect it at every little pretext and to trade with it – why would any online
merchant, which is used to collecting PII directly from its customers as part of its regular
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business, accept to change and now have an intermediary interfering with that by collecting and
maintaining the identity data instead? What would it take to replicate on the Internet an
experience most people only have of identity credentials issued by public authorities in the
physical world? I subsume that interrogation under one question which I identify as my research
triggering question and formulate as follows:
What are the social processes that will be required in order to bring about authoritative
identity credentials on the Internet for the general end user?6
The physical (authoritative) credentials that have historically so far shown the feature that
the designers wish to see in identity 2.0 technologies suggest that there is more than technical
components in play. Furthermore, when Microsoft experimented with the .NET Passport in its
initial design, the most daunting challenges it faced did not seem to be technical, but rather
related to the reluctance of other stakeholders to see this private party erected in online identity
authority between them and potentially all their customers owning an MSN account with
Microsoft. This suggests that the problem we are facing cannot be solved only in technical terms.
In that sense it is a sociotechnical problem, thus it is of total relevance to social science research
which is lagging behind the pace of technology evolution in that regard. Therefore, this thesis
directs a particular attention to factors and conditions beyond technical capabilities and
functionalities. In effect, the overall premise that underlies and shapes this research is as follows:
Understanding the circumstances and the steps taken by social actors in the past in order to
enable the ascertainment of individual identity through physical artifacts may shed a light on the
overall workings of large-scale identity mechanisms as well as the social processes required for

6

See the next chapter, section 2.2 for the definition of basic terms and concepts.
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their functional implementation. As a result, this might also help tackle some of the challenges of
widespread identity systems in the cyberspace.
To date, we still do not have in place the infrastructure contemplated for “user-centric
identity.” Some of the technologists may even have come to be less hopeful about the possibility
of its realization. In any case, while of less currency than in 2006 the term has not disappeared
from the digital identity milieu, certainly not the values sustaining the worldview that shaped its
discourse. To the best of my knowledge gained over about five years in researching this topic,
there has not been an in-depth inquiry into whether a user-centric digital identity for the Internet
end user is at all possible or not and what its enabling social conditions and implications might
be. In this dissertation, I seek to address that concern and to elicit the social mechanisms that
enable such identity architecture apparently centered on the user. But before I carry on and
complete the framing of this investigation, I now propose to take a first look at the literature with
regard to Internet identity issues and contexts for possible directions, if any.

1.2 Identity in Internet studies
The historical emergence of the Internet for the public at large was accompanied with libertarian
and even utopian views that it enables a space where traditional authorities and their ruling have
no place.7 As Goldsmith and Wu (2006) have pointed out, that utopianism short-lived and
nation-states were quick to find ways to assert their authority and their rule over whatever may
happen in the Internet. Nevertheless, the Internet remains a fairly opaque medium with regard to
the identity of interacting parties for one another. As it turned out in those early years of public
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See the resounding “Declaration of the Independence of the Cyberspace” by the cyberlibertarian and political activist
John Perry Barlow’s at http://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Internet_censorship_bills/barlow_0296.declaration
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use, users were able to lead perhaps a more fulfilling social “cyberlife” based on new and selffashioned identities which were distinct from the one they had in the socio-physical realm
(Turkle 1995). The default anonymity of the Internet, at least from the cross-perspective of
interacting parties, has opened up a virgin territory for users to experiment with their personal
identity and maybe to re-invent themselves, if only in their own imagination and that of the
person they are communicating with, and to have full control over their commitments and the
rules that govern the latter. The basic technology of the Internet has not changed since, at least
with regard to user-to-user identity. However, while it still possible for the users to play with
their identity (and potentially that of others) on the Internet, the public has grown over the last
dozen of years increasingly aware of the limits of online anonymity and freedom paralleling the
ever growing re-assertion of state power over the Net (Goldsmith and Wu 2006).
Within a few years, the Internet proved itself to be much more than an entertainment
medium and to appear an all-powerful stake for business and for government. As Internet
transactions grew in volume and in value, the identity problem emerges as critical as it is
instrumental, in every sense. It was no longer enough that users could play with their identities,
or even resolve in some cases their personal identity issues. The need to ascertain identity in
order to support and foster transactions that may have serious consequences on actual people in
their primary social life became quickly apparent.
Before the instrumental aspect of identity on the Internet became such an acute problem,
it appeared within parts of Internet studies concerned with electronic databases from the
perspective of growing online transactions across Internet era information systems. Noting the
paucity of investigations of human identification in that environment, Roger Clarke (1994)
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attempts to outline conceptual bases balancing the risks for organizations and the protection of
individual’s personal data. To that effect, he spells out the basic dimensions of formal
identification, notably: appearance, social behavior, knowledge, token, etc. It has been
mistakenly suggested (Harper 2006) that those dimensions articulated by Clarke provided the
notions that will be later on summarized in stating that identity is something-you-are, somethingyou-know, or something-you-have. It appears that those principles were already formulated
twenty years earlier in the context of computer security:
There are three generic approaches to authentication. They are often described as “something you know,”
“something you have,” and “something you are.” (Kent, Lynette and Millett 2003: 46, n. 19)

The authors add as a footnote:
The National Institute of Standards and Technology articulated these principles related to computer security
in the 1970s (D.E. Raphael and J.R. Young, Automated Personal Identification, SRI International, 1974;
National Bureau of Standards, Evaluation Techniques for Human Identification, FIPSPUB-48, April 1977).
(Idem)

Nevertheless, Clarke is one of the earliest researchers who made the question of identity
in electronic transactions more popular, relating it to organizational operation and management
and to societal concerns all at once. The privacy concerns linked to the multiplication of
electronic databases and their operation online also fed into the legal scholarship related to
identity and personal data as reflected in Daniel Solove’s monograph about The Digital Person
(2004) as well as in numerous of his law review articles related to this topic. Rather than
outlining configurations of the “digital person,” Solove (2003, 2004, 2006a and 2006b) is
primarily interested in information privacy – the protection of personal data in the digital
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infrastructure and its challenges as well as ways of improving on legal interpretations of privacy
laws at least in the U.S. Perhaps the notion of identity beyond personal data and privacy starts
emerging in that literature when he addresses the issue of reputation (Solove 2007) with concrete
instances of harm caused to embodied individuals due to information circulated about them on
the Internet. In any case, Solove’s interests, analyses and proposed solutions are mainly of legal
relevance to privacy law, including conceptual formulations based on the analysis of statutes,
court decisions and the history of legal thought.
It is only around 2005 that the fact that there is a structural problem of identity on the
Internet calling for a consequential collective action began to reflect in more direct terms in the
literature of Internet studies and related social sciences. However, the broadest stream of this
literature originates from authors who are closely involved either with the design of information
technology and systems or with their implementation and management in organizational settings.
Windley (2005) addresses digital identity from the perspective of its challenges and
management in organizational settings. Largely due to corporations’ needs as well as computernetworking industry interests in responding to those needs, identity management has emerged
practically as a field of its own to address authentication and authorization processes within
closed (e.g., corporate) computer networks. In accordance to its motivation, that streak of
identity research is generally confined to the organizational level of analysis, providing basic
concepts, procedures and operational requirements to designers and managers (Windley 2005).
Generous amounts of literature in that same vein have regularly been published since then.
Before this emerging generation of authentication and authorization technologies, PKI
and digital certificates were the most notable attempt to address related problems (trust, namely)
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at infrastructural level. PKI is based on key pairs, one private and the other public and available
to any potential counterparts to see, both mathematically linked in such a way that data encrypted
by one can be decrypted by the other and vice versa, without giving away by any means the
complex formula associating them. An entity called Certificate Authority (CA) plays a reference
role in providing some assurance regarding the ownership of the public keys. Specifically, the
CA issues digital certificates (or digital signatures) by which a public key is bound to an entity –
organization or individual – known through a set of attributes such as name, email address,
possibly physical address, etc. Arguably, those attributes constitute the identity of the entity as is
to be trusted by transaction counterparts who rely on the assertions signed by the CA and the
discoveries enabled based on the public key cryptography and infrastructure. There are no
specific requirements as to how much of assurance the infrastructure provides, as there are no
standard procedures for securing the legitimacy or veracity of the link between the claimed
attributes linked to a public key and the actual entity claiming those attributes.
A PKI provides a means for relying parties (recipients of certificates who act in reliance on those
certificates and/or digital signatures verified using those certificates) to know that another individual’s or
entity’s public key actually belongs to that individual or entity. Certification authorities (CAs) and
certification functions have been established to address this need. (Backhouse 2002: 217)

While PKI may still be relevant as identification mechanism in contexts of repeated uses
whereby the same entity listed as the owner of a public key has consistently proven to be in
possession of the corresponding private key, it still leaves room to the possibility that a false
identity may be relied upon from the start (and may have been so all along) just because the
CA’s assertions are trusted right away from the beginning without any solid verification. As a
matter of fact, one of the most prominent CAs, VeriSign, once was victim of a digital prank by
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an individual who, masquerading as Microsoft employee in a simple email request, managed to
obtain digital certificates from the CA in the name of Microsoft (Backhouse 2002).
Furthermore, as Backhouse points out, most PKI implementations are confined if not
within corporate boundaries at least within a single jurisdiction. Yet in order for this
infrastructure to make any significant difference for e-business, particularly e-commerce, it has
to be able to span across those boundaries globally.
In this scenario, PKIs must be able to interoperate so that the digital certificates which are issued in one
domain can be accepted in a foreign domain just as occurs with passport credentials. (Idem, p. 218)

He goes on to insist that explicit rules and policies, as well as consequential improvements on
trust and security, are needed in order to support interoperability while again drawing an analogy
on passports.
An analogy would be with globetrotters of today who can rely on the acceptability of their passports no
matter which foreign country they seek to enter. Although different authorities are responsible for the
issuing of their own credentials, interoperability means that, on the whole, those credentials are acceptable
throughout the world. (Idem, p. 219)

In order to enable interoperable CAs – subsequently preparing the terrain for the much
needed trust in and between them – three main mechanisms are potential candidates to choose
from (Backhouse 2002). They include international standards, cross-certification which involves
every pair of CAs certifying each other, cross-recognition via accreditation schemes whereby a
third party is mutually accepted by independent CAs to ensure that the necessary requirements
are met by participating CAs. A fourth mechanism will be added to those in the form of market
rating (Backhouse et al. 2006). None of these mechanisms directly addresses the challenge of
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identity assurance through PKI. Yet the standardization and regulatory challenges attached to
PKI are substantial, which is one of the reasons why it is deemed ill-fitted for high-value
business (Benson, Chin et al. 2011) These authors find the trust assumptions made about the CA
non-viable for the level of values traded in wholesale banking and propose instead the Partner
Key Management (PKM) model. This model has the advantage of resolving the inter-bank
liability challenge by relegating identity assurance and management issues to the corporate client
itself while managing (validated or non-validated) credentials only and enabling credential
interoperability globally. Still, the digital identity challenge is as yet unresolved when it comes to
the individual customer. In retail banking for instance, I can walk on to a bank for a first time in
a foreign country where I am stationed and open an account with my passport as identity
credential (and under applicable provisions of the local regulation for banking). On the Internet
however, there is no proper identity credential readily available enabling me to do the same
beyond the domain where pre-existing financial record (indeed a financial history) is available to
any service provider to tie my declared identity back to. Moreover there are plenty of other
sectors and types of online transactions for which there is no pre-existing identity-relevant
information such as the credit history for the financial sector. No research at this point provides
solutions for such proper identification mechanism online, not only for banking but for the whole
host of identity-sensitive services that can be offered online.
As suggested above, the Internet identity problem vis-à-vis the end user at large is of a
different nature from the problem of devising operational procedures to manage identity
information flows and exchanges in a controlled setting. While the identification concerns and
capabilities that are being considered by designers and proponents in this research context are far
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from a centralized authoritative and monolithic solution such as an Internet driving license
proposed by some technical experts related to commerce and law enforcement (Mueller 2010),
one still has to admit that:
What really matters is the association between an identifier, the identified individual or entity, and an
organization or set of organizations that have institutionalized authority over a specific domain of human
activity.

… What makes it [a driver’s license] an important form of identification is its relationship to a
system of government. Its issuance and use are linked to, and expressions of, authoritative institutions at the
state, provincial, or national level. (Mueller 2010: 180-1)

Noting how the emergence and evolution of the Internet requires and brings about a
process of mutual adaption between (territorial) states and (global) networks – as opposed to
either the latter taking over the former or the former reasserting itself over the latter – Mueller
fully recognizes the scope and challenge of the identity problem on the Internet.
Identity on the Internet is a hard problem – one that implies transformative changes in the relationship
between government and citizens. As the problem of a globally functional identity on the Internet gets
worked out, we can expect to see both new transnational governance arrangements and new technical
standards that require altered governance arrangements to back them up. Insofar as these standards create
authoritative and effective forms of leverage over Internet users … they create new kinds of hard power8
that will need to be carefully regulated and controlled on a global basis. (Mueller 2010: 183)

8

Hard power is one that the author ascribes to nation-states competing with each other in the traditional logic of
zero-sum game, while soft power is one that is ascribed to networks as well as related methods and regulatory
outcomes.
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This dissertation will document how the relationship between identifiers, individuals and
social structures has been historically constituted through three of the largest occurrences of such
phenomenon.
The question of identity on the Internet as a broader social problem began to emerge in
Internet studies and related social sciences just around 2005. Larry Lessig (2006: 45) observes:
“While in real space (…) anonymity has to be created, in cyberspace anonymity is the given.” In
the off-line world, at least the availability of self-authenticating facts about a person, by eye
witnessing, is a serious enough dent into anonymity. Although error still is possible (as would
tend to show judicial mistakes based on eye witness,) the fact of the matter is that once a person
is exposed to sight (whether by natural or electronic means), they do not feel anonymous any
longer, and for good reasons. Being able to ascertain individual identity is an important part of
regulating social exchanges. As Lessig puts it: “To regulate well, you need to know (1) who
someone is, (2) where they are, and (3) what they are doing” (Lessig 2006: 23). Presumably,
those requirements only apply to activity domains where regulation is warranted. However the
Internet as we know it today may well address the last two items but not the first one, perhaps the
most important of the three, certainly not in an organized and consistent manner that can be
leveraged for a variety of relevant transactions.
To the extent that the lack of efficient technologies for authenticating facts about individuals makes it
harder to regulate behavior, there are architectures that could be layered onto the TCP/IP protocol to create
efficient authentication. We’re far enough into the history of the Internet to see what these technologies
could look like. We’re far enough into this history to see that the trend toward this authentication is
unstoppable. The only question is whether we will build into this system of authentication the kinds of
protections for privacy and autonomy that are needed. (Lessig 2006: 45)
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The question still stands, unanswered. All to the contrary, identity and personal data is
meanwhile requested in many transactions where it is not in fact required for those transactions
to be effectively completed and without any particular protection. In that regard, Harper (2006:
4) deplores “the decline of practical obscurity” while recognizing that “identified people are less
of a threat than unidentified people” (p. 255). Yet identifying individuals in a computer network
is quite different from physical identity verification, as the former leaves a digital trail of data,
some of which may be virtually permanently valid about their subject. This may require different
ways of thinking about identity, which makes Harper argue that identity is overused and
recommends instead resorting to credentialing and non-identifying authorization.
More recent publications on the topic include outputs of large, interdisciplinary research
programs. ‘On The Identity Trail: Understanding the Importance and Impact of Anonymity and
Authentication in a Networked Society’ program brings together not only public policy, private
business, and nonprofit sectors, but also scholars from various subject areas such as: philosophy,
ethics, feminist studies, cognitive science, sociology, law, cryptography, engineering, policy
analysis, and privacy.9 Their outputs have been published on their website and in various outlets,
and more recently in an edited volume (Kerr, Steeves, and Lucock 2009). Their research
program tackles various topics including identity, anonymity, privacy, authentication,
cryptography, surveillance, digital rights management, etc. Put together, the contributions in this
volume largely elaborate on conceptual underpinnings of identity as well as these other identityrelated topics including related challenges and the societal implications of the way they are
addressed. Tensions and gaps are highlighted, for instance with regard to the protection of

9

http://idtrail.org/

19

privacy and the exercise of power, as well as the need for due process and judicial review in the
handling of citizens’ personal data.
The most imposing effort yet involving several academic institutions and researchers is
found in Europe with the project ‘Future of Identity in the Information Society’ or FIDIS.10
Tapping into a strong pool of researchers spanning more than a score of reputed academic
institutions from all over the European Union, FIDIS is a consortium that appears as a
powerhouse of digital identity research for the EU region. Its program is articulated around seven
main themes as follows: Identity of Identity; Profiling; Interoperability of Identities and Identity
Management; Forensic Implications; Privacy and the Legal-Social Content of Identity; HighTech
ID; and Mobility and Identity. They have established Identity in the Information Society, the
IDIS journal, publishing papers presented at their annual workshop, including thematic issues
dedicated to the FIDIS program and outputs. Most of these are the basis of the recently published
edited volume simply titled The Future of Identity in the Information Society (Rannenberg et al.
2009). However, the authors struggle to provide a clear and unifying concept of identity, noting
the complexity of the concept and reviewing different possible perspectives without much
critique or particular orientation. At the same time, one may take note of the chapter on “Virtual
Persons and Identities” which elaborates on the legal tradition of using abstract constructs to
define entities in a given capacity (personhood) to propose a model for new forms of identity,
including virtual persons.
It shall be further noted that the question of identity on the Internet potentially intersects
with many other issues. For example archiving electronic records in a way that enables trust and
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http://www.fidis.net/
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probative value will benefit from a mature digital identity technology. However, that aspect has
not been taken into consideration so far or they are only implied (MacNeil 2000 and Duranti et
al. 2002).
Overall considering ongoing efforts from practice as well as research, it is clear that: for
one, the research problem here at hand – at mind, I might write instead – emerged rather from
practice, not from scholarship or research, and for another social science research has not
brought decisive answers towards its resolution, indeed no research has even questioned whether
the objectives are attainable at this scale and if so under what conditions. In part probably
because digital identity technology is not yet fully deployed into a macrosocial phenomenon,
social scientists including historians and sociologists have rarely tackled the identity problem in
the context of standard mechanisms of identity proofing and verification in the online world.
They either address the concept with excess of abstraction or scarcely undertake to conceptualize
the terms “identity” or “identification” which they seem to take for granted as either intuitively
or empirically given phenomena.
[D]espite the fact that both these terms [identity and identification] are intimately connected with the
emergence of modern forms of public life, the issue of identification has been virtually ignored even in
recent scholarship on the formation and meaning of identities (Caplan and Torpey 2001: 3).

Understandably then, in order to try correct that imbalance they have observed, Caplan and
Torpey’s (2001) focus is on the history of identification (by the modern state) but not much on
the underpinning notion of identity. However, this only confirms the gap between those two
streams of study (on identification and on identity) which are yet to fully inform one another.
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In light of the above, new research effort such as the one undertaken in this dissertation is
needed to further address that gap, help bring the multiple relevant facets of the notion of identity
into focus, and establish a firmer and more comprehensive basis for the design of future systems
for managing identities. If the Internet is so largely used in all aspects of social life, and if the
Internet’s core problem is an identity problem as several technologists have pointed out, then it
may be time for social scientists to pay a much inquisitive attention to this problem. While social
science research will not build the technology itself, it may contribute to enlightening the path
for future design effort and systems starting with digital technology. In turn, the technical design
effort must include a variety of perspectives capable of yielding useful insights for building the
sound solutions needed, while being aware of the implications of any technological solution in
the broader society. In any case, it is time to understand digital identity effort not in isolation but
as an instance of a class of phenomena; then we can find out what it tells about the society as a
whole.

1.3

Research questions

Adding to the limitations of the literature and despite a few technology propositions already out
there, there has been so far no implementation-case of publicly available authoritative digital
identity services; technology solutions are still being developed and institutional arrangements
sought. Given that reality, I am led to seek for possible insights from a broader ground. While
currently the identity problem appears to be most acute in computer networks and with digital
technology, in its basic terms it might still have had past instances. By looking for those possible
instances in the past, I for one do not suggest that the problem has ever been perfectly resolved,
and for another, even in the best case scenario I shall take into account the differential of
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technological capabilities available to social actors in the different historical contexts. As a
result, the initial research question that triggered this thesis will be applied to other comparable
phenomena or different versions of the same phenomenon, keeping in mind the direction
suggested by the technologists themselves in their willingness to compare their design objectives
with some critical features of (authoritative) physical identity credentials. Our general question
therefore is: How do social actors, events or processes enable the historical emergence of
authoritative identity credentials for the public at large?
The historical trend of technology has been to complement, extend or enhance human
capabilities, or to address emerging needs – sometimes to the extent of replacing humans
altogether in the execution of some tasks. These include not only bodily capabilities understood
as what humans can actually do using their body, but any capabilities enabled by human
embodiment, including things that humans have considered so far as requiring their bodily
presence in order to get done and even their mental capabilities which are always rooted in a part
of the body, i.e. the brain. This ongoing transformation and augmentation of human capabilities
by technology also leads to new spaces opening up for human agency for which the materiality
of the biological body, certainly its physical presence, is less and less required while said human
agency itself becomes increasingly ubiquitous. Identity systems are tools that are necessary to
ascribe any actions resulting from those capabilities to human agency and, in so doing,
continuously extend the reach and redefine the scope of that agency.
Furthermore, it appears that the evolution of information and communication
technologies has reached a level where they have a transformative effect on the society, opening
up a different era that is generally referred to as “the information society.” The novelty that
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defines this era is the digital technology as form of creation, representation and communication
of information. It is typically understood that the older form of technology that is being
superseded by the digital one was brought about by the printing revolution generally symbolized
by the Guttenberg press of the fifteenth century (McLuhan, 1962). However, the Guttenberg
press only mechanized a technique whose elements had already been around for a number of
centuries by then, but mostly used manually. Those elements include, on the one hand, the
writing surface which, apart from naturally available surfaces, ranges from papyrus to parchment
to paper, that is, any thin and flat medium that can relatively easily be stored and retrieved11 and
which can absorb ink or retain the durable and stable imprint of drawings – whether of abstract
letters or concrete forms – as well as other inscriptions. On the other hand, comes the ink itself or
any other element that can leave such durable and stable imprints or inscriptions on such thin and
flat medium. McLuhan distinguishes that period of writing technology, which he calls
“manuscript culture,” from the predominantly oral culture that preceded it and from the print
culture or “Gutenberg galaxy” that followed it.
Table 1-1: Sequencing the general research question

General
Question

How do social actors, events or processes enable the historical emergence of
authoritative identity credentials for the public at large?
Historical Case I

Sequencing
the General
Question

11

In what circumstances did the
challenge of reliably
representing individual identity
within written records emerge
in the Middle Ages and how
was it resolved?

Historical Case II
How did identity credentials
issued by the national state
historically emerge and
become authoritative?

Historical Case III
How are social actors, events
or processes leading to the
possible emergence of
authoritative digital identity
credentials for Internet end
users at large?

As compared, for instance, to the Sumerian clay tablets or to the stone blocks of the Egyptian pyramids.
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In pursuing this investigation, I will be looking for clues as to how identity mechanisms
or systems have been related to relevant social changes over time. While we are more familiar to
authoritative identity credentials issued by the modern state (whose bureaucracy is a feat of the
Gutenberg galaxy), the McLuhan’s periodization above may suggest probing the manuscript
culture as well. To that end, I will consider two large past-historical sequences. This
periodization provides a versioning of the initial research question into three questions in
sequence, including the present history of digital identity. I suggest calling those three questions
not specific research questions12 but sub-questions (Table 1-1).
First are the Middle Ages: Did the challenge of representing individuals also occur at
some point in the pre-press era of the “manuscript culture”? Exploratory readings indicate that
this issue was once relevant in the medieval manuscript context, too. In effect, if digital records
have been preceded by another type of record, then the question is warranted as to whether that
old record type ever confronted the same challenge of enabling the representation and
authentication of the identity of people and how it was dealt with. I start the analysis with an
inquiry into possible medieval response to the need to make records that include the identity of
persons. In what circumstances did the challenge of reliably representing individual identity
within written records emerge in the Middle Ages and how was it resolved?
Then from the end of the medieval era onwards, I examine the modern state response to
its need to control people and therefore to document the identity of individuals. As a matter of

12 This is because there is no logical necessity that connects these questions to the general question (so that by addressing
the former, one automatically completes the answer to the latter). However, one may argue that these sub-questions are
chosen by historical necessity (which certainly is a relative one due to historical contingencies) in that they pertain to
clear instances in the past where social actors confronted and addressed at a comparable scale the practical problem of
making new forms of identity credentials. Specific questions will be formulated in the next chapter.
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fact, the experience of authoritative identity credentials most present to our mind and still the
most common at this beginning of the 21st century relates to credentials that are issued by the
government or public authority. The second episode in this investigation will then address
identity credentials devised and enabled by the modern state, particularly the passport which is a
fixture of our nationally-partitioned and yet now globally interconnected world. The subquestion here is: How did identity credentials issued by the national state historically emerge
and become authoritative?
Finally, I can turn the research focus back to the starting point and proceed with the
investigation of the contemporary efforts toward building authoritative digital identity
mechanisms online against the backdrop of the analytical insights thus gained. I reiterate the
question: How are social actors, events or processes leading to the possible emergence of
authoritative digital identity credentials for Internet end users at large? The aim is to elicit a
more cogent, socially-aware and sustainable response to the current challenges to building a
digital identity infrastructure.
By the end this dissertation will have:
i)

addressed to what extent an authoritative user-centric digital identity mechanism can

be implemented and what its societal requirements and implications might be;
ii) identified the basic factors that constitute the authority of identity issuers on the
subject matter;
iii) pinpointed the most socially critical challenges to adoption and sustainability, and
offer policy recommendations;
iv) outlined different potentially viable pathways to a widespread adoption;

26

v)

demonstrated that there are relevant lessons to be learned from the history of identity

systems;
vi) uncovered possible historical patterns between variance of identity systems and
social structures;
vii) illuminated several fundamental yet theoretically undeveloped aspects of identity
mechanisms.
viii) developed preliminary results, new concepts, ideas, or principles aiming to advance
and deepen our understanding of identity management systems.
ix) shed a light on the nature of the identity challenge in cyberspace.
Overall, this inquiry will provide us with analytical tools for a better understanding of the
formation process of large and widely relied-upon identification systems as well as related social
changes.

1.4 Organization of this dissertation
This document reports on the steps that have been taken in carrying out the investigation of the
above research questions as well as their outcomes, in the organized outline that follows.
In this first chapter, which is now coming to a close, I have recounted the research
motivation and articulated the research problem and its relevance. From the initial particular
question, I have also formulated the broader, general research question that holds this
dissertation together. Based on a periodization of the history of information technology, the
general question takes on three versions (sub-questions) each applicable to a different historical
period.
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Next, the core concepts shaping this inquiry are defined in chapter 2. Namely, this
chapter focuses on the relationships between identity, authentication and authority. It provides a
detailed explanation of those concepts and identifies linkages amongst them as part of the
constitutive processes of identifying individuals through artifacts, in general.
Chapter 3 articulates the bases and framework of the methodological approaches, locating
this dissertation in a historical and pragmatic (problem-driven) epistemology based on a
relational ontology whereby interactions, relations and exchanges constitute the matter of the
social phenomenon. It highlights the importance of history in macro-social phenomena to the
extent that these may be cast as mechanism-processes of a large scale, emphasizing the
sociohistorical framework of this inquiry. Moreover, this chapter sets forth the research strategy
used for this investigation and further develops the arguments for choosing and analyzing the
main three cases comprising this dissertation, as well as the different approaches taken in each
one of them.
Chapter 4 locates the beginning of the historical analysis in the Middle Ages. The
historical literature shows that particularly in the period spanning from the eleventh to the
thirteenth century, the medieval West also experienced the challenges of identifying individuals
within the realm of paper/parchment-based handwritten records on the rise. Questions were
raised and debated about the representation of individuals at distant times and locations,
featuring the themes of identity, authentication and agency. This chapter first outlines the
broader context of relevant medieval institutions. It details the capabilities of the record-making
technologies that were used, including artifacts such as diplomas and charters (used, e.g., to
record donations and transfers of estate properties), as well as seals, individual subscriptions and
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manuscript signs of various kinds, notably the autograph signature. Principal actors and
participating characters involved the king and an array of scribes. But most importantly, God was
the supreme reference in the ordering logic of seals as identity tokens. In addition of presenting
medieval practices, this chapter critically analyzes the medieval discourse that articulated this
logic.
Chapter 5 addresses the case of modern state-issued credentials as part of materializing
processes of national identity, with an emphasis on the passport as the most universal form of
identity credential to date. This chapter mainly focuses on the sequence of events and factors that
combined to bring about that quintessential modern identity credential, outlining the historical
mechanisms of its development up to its ultimate authoritative status. A particular attention is
paid to the basis for defining national identity (that is, identity by the national state) and the
claim to the identification of all citizens located in a territory controlled by the state, through a
process of nationalizing and naturalizing the state, as I conceptualize it, whereby the nation or
the people living on that territory is affiliated to the state apparatus, all individual members
included.
Eventually, I return in chapter 7 to the contemporary phenomenon that initially motivated
this research undertaking and the original research question. While this instance of the
phenomenon still is open, this chapter investigates the main activities undertaken thus far in
order to reach towards the goal of building digital identity infrastructure in order to provide
authoritative identity credentials. It describes a sample of technology cases illustrating the
emerging protocols that are shaping the design and capabilities of online identity management
systems, and outlines the current public-private partnership efforts to foster the realization of the
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goal set forth. Overall, this chapter offers a picture of the state of digital identity processes by
early 2012, along with a critical assessment of the challenges.
Finally, the purpose of the Chapter 6 is to integrate the insights gained from the case
analyses into a logical process framework that explains various dimensions in the drive toward
establishing identity systems and identifies the main factors that make them authoritative. While
I do not offer deductive predictions on the future of digital identity, I outline scenarios out of
pragmatic projections based on what my examination of history suggests; these projections also
include different pathways possibly leading to the desired outcome.
In the concluding chapter, the eighth, I summarize and discuss the main findings of this
inquiry. The conceptual or theoretical insights are fleshed out regarding the constitutive elements
of the formation of authoritative identity systems and related social institutional processes.
Relating to those insights, practical consequences and recommendations are outlined, particularly
with a view to building a digital identity infrastructure that could service globally, effectively
and in ways that facilitate rollout. Finally I point out the limits of this work and towards the
prospect of future related research.
Before diving into the analysis, let us now more systematically define and elaborate on
the core concepts of this research.
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CHAPTER 2
Concepts and Definitions

2.1 Introduction
The first and most basic concept in all the phenomena this research investigates obviously is
identity. This is a very simple word but less so a concept. At the very least it is multifaceted. It
would therefore be a Titanesque task and probably a useless one to try to integrate in this
research framework all the related perspectives available in the literature; if it were even possible
the result would probably not be very coherent. As a result, I shall insist that if identity is the
central concept of this dissertation, its understanding must however be qualified through the lens
of the notion of identity credential – not just ‘identity’ as an absolute and abstract concept. This
enables us to be more focused and to delineate a meaningful cluster of concepts in relation to the
phenomenon at hand. In this chapter I specify and define those concepts. These definitions are
supplemented by further discussions enabling a more elaborated characterization and a finer
understanding.
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2.2 Basic definitions
An identity credential is an artifact that serves as proof of identity. I have labeled ‘authoritative’
an entity that is able to issue identity credentials, which other parties that are not in any way
linked to those credentials or to the issuing entity recognize and accept as a means to verify or
authenticate individuals’ identity. Such credentials or identity mechanisms are authoritative, as a
result. The quality of being authoritative is not just based on intentions (e.g., by designers) or
decisions (e.g., by policymakers) but on the fact that the credential is effectively used by
stakeholders in the conditions described above to that effect. In other word, this is a relational
concept. An authoritative identity credential is an artifact commonly used as proof of identity
because it is largely deemed to accomplish the goal of accurately identifying its legitimate
holder, including in legally binding transactions.
Process: As I would define it, a process is the continuum of thought or action, or a series
of events, whether organized or spontaneous, which connects a state A of things to a different
state B. With a sociohistorical and societal orientation as is the case in this research, the elements
concerned – events, decisions or actions – are ordered along historical or large-time sequences.
Social process refers to any course of such events, decisions or actions that occur in the society at
large as requirements or enabling conditions for the realization of authoritative identity
credentials.
Mechanism refers to the workings of a structure or a system (e.g., a machine),
particularly a complex one which is made of more than one simple element. Its meaning
encompasses how something works or how something occurs by showing the behavior of its
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meaningful components, their changes of state or changes in the relations between them. This
term may occur in different contexts with further nuanced meanings; in this work, it is mainly
used in two ways. The meaning of the two terms ‘mechanism’ and ‘process’ overlap to a large
extent13, although ‘process’ arguably is broader – to include, e.g., an open-ended series of
happenings that may be related in some way or self-occurring sequential patterns – while a
mechanism is rather specific to an actual ‘doing’ or ‘making’ geared toward a purpose (as by
design, albeit not necessarily always). In the sociohistorical semantic, this specificity also applies
to the rationale of a temporal phenomenon.
Identity mechanism: The term ‘mechanism’ is used in a context that emphasizes its
technical and functional meaning whereby it generally refers to a series of articulated steps or
procedures that are followed using a concrete apparatus in order to get from A to B (where A and
B are not necessarily locations, and apparatus may be a tool, a technical system or an
infrastructure, etc.) Within the same semantic field and by extension, the term may be used as
synonym of the system itself whose workings are being referred to, or the tool by means of
which the change or series of changes entailed by the mechanism are effected. This is the case in
the phrase “identity mechanism” which I use as a generic substitute to both “identity system”
(mechanism as the system) or “identity credential” (mechanism as the tool or instrument).
Identity mechanism then is a series of tools and procedures required to enable the identity of
certain group of objects or subjects, from its assignment or acquisition to its discovery to its use
– in other words, to enable identity as an artifact, identification and identity transactions.
13 Charles Tilly (2008) also uses both terms combined in one: “mechanism-process.” For historical analysis purposes,
James Coleman defines a mechanism as “meaningful connection between events as the basic tool of description and
analysis” (Somers 1998: 726; see infra). While the explanation I am providing here may or may not be debatable from
some disciplinary or theoretical perspective, I did not intend to use these terms here as theoretical devices, hence my
effort to explain them is merely pragmatic and not intended to make claims beyond the context of this dissertation.

33

Causal mechanism: The second relevant repertoire of meaning for the term ‘mechanism’
in this work is social in general, and particularly sociohistorical. In its social meaning broadly
speaking, a mechanism includes a series of events, decisions and actions that cohere in leading to
a given outcome. I stated above that mechanism refers to how something works or occurs. The
concept of “causal mechanism” in sociohistorical research puts the emphasis on that ‘how’
dimension as a mode of causation. In that sense, causal mechanism is a mode of causation that
elicits the reasons why a change of state happens in a given type of phenomena based on the
contextual accounts of how exactly it befell in known occurrences of the said phenomena; how
certain elements or factors as well as their interactions with one another and with their
environment effect a change of state or a variance in the said phenomena. Those elements and
their interactions are not necessarily observable, while the change they are supposed to effect
is.14
In this thesis, the term ‘identity’ shall never be taken for an all-encompassing concept of
pure abstraction. Even when used as a noun without any qualifier and to the extent that it is
meant to refer to the object of this dissertation, the term shall always be understood as stemming
from the basic identity notion that makes possible such procedures as the legal identification of
an individual. In other words, ours is an empirical notion of identity, even if its manifestations
raise questions that go beyond that which is empirically manifest.
As a consequence in a number of instances throughout this thesis, identity may be used
interchangeably with identification which is otherwise a procedure for establishing or
discovering an identity. We may often find the following phrases used within the community of
14

In fact in the epistemological framework of this research, causal mechanisms are not observable. See chapter 3 for
further development on that framework and its notion of causal mechanism.
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practice designing the technologies this research is concerned with, and consequently in the
related literature: identity system or identity management system. A scheme that makes each and
every individual member of a given population consistently identifiable is an identity system.
Adding to that all the procedures and rules that govern the communication, exchange and
maintenance of identity information in the identity system leads to an identity management
system. Here too, the two phrases may be used interchangeably. As related to contemporary
contexts, they are understood and used in this thesis to mean a set of integrated tools, artifacts,
rules, procedures and mechanisms (in technical, functional sense) organizing the issuance,
maintenance and proper use of identity credentials. The notion of identifying any kind of entities
(generally humans, in the context of this thesis) implies that some identity schema applicable to
them is pre-defined somehow and pre-set in the system (thus, identity system.) The rules and
mechanisms in place for conducting various operations required for the use of those identities –
including the issuance of identity credentials supporting such use as well as their expiration time
– qualify or specify the goal of the system as being of management. Therefore, while the
following three phrases may be used interchangeably, ‘identity system’ is a broader formulation,
‘identity management system’ is more specific as to the intended purpose of the said system,
while ‘identification system’ narrowly focuses on its identification function allowing to match
accurately a defined identity with an actual entity.
Identity transaction designates any sort of exchange – even non-monetary – that is
enabled by, and can only be successfully completed as a result of, knowing or ascertaining the
identity of at least one of the parties, as relevant for the transaction at hand. The general end user
refers to the individual Internet user going about her own business through the Internet (notably
on the WWW) outside any particular enterprise solution or corporate setting.
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2.3 Identity and Identification
In this section I define and discuss the first set of basic concepts forming or defining the social
phenomenon investigated in this research and as pertaining to transactions in the physical world.
2.3.1

Identity family concepts

By that phrase I refer to relevant concepts that morphologically derive from the term ‘identity’ as
well as to concepts that are required for defining the concept of identity. The term ‘identity’ in
the context of this research is used as pertaining to the notion of identification. To identify a
problem is to be able to pinpoint that problem or simply to come to the realization of its
existence. It often implies however that one can cogently formulate the problem, clearly spell it
out so as to enable its clear understanding, effective consideration and possible resolution. More
generally, identification is a procedure the outcome of which is the creation, manifestation or
discovery of the actual nature of something, that is, its identity or what it (actually) is.
Identification is predicated on a notion of identity as well as on the existence of an identity, for
whatever means makes possible to identify a person in a given domain or for a given purpose
potentially constitutes identity in that context.
Furthermore, either primarily or ultimately, this thesis is concerned with identity as it
relates to the identification of human beings. In that regard, the concept of identity is commonly
assumed in the use of phrases such as ‘identity documents’ or ‘national ID.’ Generally, a
person’s identity in this context is simply understood as proof or verification of ‘who’ that person
is, based on some known facts or according to a pre-established record. Thus, the term identity is
also often used to signify the artifact that captures or presents the relevant set of facts, or points
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to the related record, whereas identification in this case generally refers to steps taken to verify
or discover the content of said identity in relation to the embodied subject to which it pertains.
For now and until I formulate the definition of the concept of identity, let us assume this
empirical understanding of the term identity.
I further note that in the context of human identification, the term of ‘identification’ is
more appropriate in impersonal contexts where prior personal knowledge is not required or not
even existent. Unless you are doing so to a third party or they are trying to hide from you, you
don’t generally identify someone you are already familiar with when you spot them in some
location: in straightforward interpersonal situations involving, say, acquaintances, friends or
relatives, ‘recognize’ rather than ‘identify’ appears to be a better suitable term to describe the
encounter of an individual bearing such identity (i.e., of acquaintance, friend or relative).
Recognition, in the sense of the obsolete “recognizance,”15 will be reserved for cases such as
these. If identification properly speaking occurs particularly in impersonal circumstances, then
how is it enabled? How does someone identify a person they didn’t personally know in the first
place? The Computer Science and Telecommunications Board of the US National Research
Council consider that: “Identification is the process of using claimed or observed attributes of an
individual to infer who the individual is” (Kent and Millett 2003: 19). This definition suggests
that attributes are the key element in achieving “impersonal identification,” as I would call it.
Therefore within the present framework, identification is the process by which an entity
endeavors to establish or check the identity of another entity through any form of identity record.
In that sense, identification may consist in verifying the status of one attribute or a set of
attributes.
15

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/recognizance
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Attribute is any property, characteristic or quality of an entity that can be associated
with it in a more or less stable manner. Depending on the scope of the purpose they are meant to
serve, attributes may variably be inherent/innate, acquired over time or assigned. And among the
latter, some may be more durable and others rather transient. Let us consider for instance, a
person of a certain height, with certain reputation, having a function or holding a title in an
organization and carrying a particular sign at a specific time: the attributes that may be
associated with that person at the time of observation include specific contents or values for her
height (inherent), reputation (acquired), title (assigned), and the sign held (transient), although
some of them may exceed the context at hand and be more durable, such as the height and the
reputation. However, in an effort toward standardized and therefore consistent procedures of
identification, identity attributes in the context of human-designed tokens (such as identity
credentials) are commonly shared among the relevant population of identifiable entities. Those
attributes are then documented with the corresponding particulars of each entity. In that sense, an
attribute is a piece of information that allows specifying or disclosing some fact about an entity.
I stated earlier that the notion of identification presupposes that of identity, and I just
argued that as an impersonal procedure, identification is enabled notably through attributes. It
follows that attributes may define identity. However, is there any definite number of attributes
that define the concept of identity, or in other words, constitute identity across contexts? The
answer is no, because identity depends on the dimensions along which any unit of a class of
entities needs to be distinguished from any other units and those dimensions vary across contexts
and with the applicable identification purpose. The formation of identities as well as their
discovery thus is contextual. While the direct observation of naturally occurring characteristics
may lead to identification (albeit in a random manner from case to case), the number or the type
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of attributes that constitute (more consistently) an identity in a given context is the result of a
decision or a series of decisions which may be embedded in human-designed artifacts. Implicit
or explicit to the context of identification are assumptions, knowledge, decisions and
expectations shaping the constitution and the representation of the relevant entities in that
context. They also provide the foundations for the types of attributes that may possibly be
ascribed to the class of entities to be identified.
One attribute may or may not define an identity; it may if the organizing principle of the
context at hand is predicated on that attribute alone. For instance, there are contexts where the
concerned entities may be defined just by their name, probably the most common of attributes. In
an identity context where identity is defined by the value of n attributes, knowing the value of
one attribute for a given entity only gets us every time one step (out of n) closer to discovering
its identity. On the other hand, if it is contextual (and thus, constructed one way or the other)
then identity does not require the inclusion of every bit of information conceivable about the
person no more than identification requires the total disclosure of all the information available on
that person.
Next to the notion of attribute, there is that of identifier which may also constitute or
define identity. In effect, the two are close in at least one specific way and yet differ in other
ways as I explain in the following paragraphs. But first, let me clarify how the notion of
identifier plays out in the process of identification. There are two options for the referentiality of
an identifier: it may refer either to an actual entity or to an identity (in some form of record about
that entity). Identification may occur either way, that is, when an identifier can reliably be linked
to a defined identity or to an actual entity. In effect, identifiers too may apply in a naturalistic
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context and refer to the individual entity itself: for instance if I persistently depend on a mole in a
specific spot to distinguish two twins, or because I need to see a particular mark or the license
plate number on that silver-colored model of Subaru sedan before I can be sure it is my
colleague’s and not someone else’s with the same apparent attributes, the mole, the mark or the
plate number are identifiers pointing to the actual thing16. However, for the agent in the
Department of Motor Vehicles, that same plate number entered into their information system
brings up one identity, or two in fact (the car’s and its owner’s.)
I have already noted that, depending on the context, a single attribute may define an
identity. In that case, that attribute may actually be used as an identifier because it is sufficient to
discern which single one among many possible entities it specifically designates in that context.
In other words, the question-test for a given attribute in that regard is: Does it enable us to
discover an identity fully as defined or presumed in the context at hand, that is, to support the
inference of an entity as a whole distinguishable from another through that attribute?
From the above, we begin to understand that by its function an identifier is more specific
than an attribute, as it appears to require a one-to-one match-up with an identity while attributes
are potentially many for (describing or representing) one identity. An identifier is by design a
particular piece of information or form of token that is uniquely associated with a single entity
among many, in a given setting. To the extent that an identifier is human-designed as part of an
identity system, its association with the entity is enabled through its association with the identity

16

I realize here that in some of the above examples a deeper conceptual argument may be leveled in support of the
notion that even in this case it is an identity, not entity itself, that is pointed to through those marks and clues, as they
evoke in the mind of the informed witness a full body of knowledge associated with the individual to whom those
tokens or identifiers belong. However, for simplicity as well as in recognition that natural identifiers (as opposed to
human-designed identifiers) may be encountered, I do not rule out the possibility that some identifiers point directly to
the identity subject itself (entity, individual), not just to an identity.
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record of that entity in the system. The aforementioned token may be material (physical) or
immaterial (abstract). Strictly speaking, an identifier is unique while an attribute is not
necessarily so; that is the first and main difference between the two concepts. Because this
research is concerned with human-designed artifacts and technological systems (and not so much
with naturally and therefore randomly occurring identity-relevant marks, signs or tokens), an
identifier in this context is generally a string of characters (letters, digits, symbols, or a
combination thereof) built according to a specific syntax whereby it points to a single known or
pre-defined identity in a given setting, or a string of characters which is understood by the parties
involved as having a specific referent in a given setting. In this context, common identifiers
include names, serial or ID numbers, barcodes, etc. Those identifiers are all abstract, despite the
possible ambiguity of human individuals’ names which may be perceived or interpreted in some
socio-cultural settings as having some material dimensions. The structure or the syntax of an
identifier is not always transparent to anybody (e.g., barcode or even ID numbers). Furthermore,
an identifier may become ambiguous from one domain or population to another (thus, becoming
less of an identifier, strictly speaking). For instance, a name alone could work well as an
identifier, that is, a self-sufficient token for identification purposes, if used in a population size or
a setting where it unambiguously designates only one individual (e.g., a classroom), and a
limited identifier otherwise, if at all (e.g., across the whole college campus.)
An identifier can be strong in the sense that it allows unique mapping to a specific individual in a
population, or it can be weak, in that it could be correctly applied to more than one individual in a
population. Whether the identifier is strong or weak will depend upon the size of the population and the
distinctiveness of the identifying attribute. (Kent and Millett 2003: 42)
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In a sense, notions of identifier and attribute are close to the extent that attributes may be
used as identifiers if they are singular enough, while some identifiers may lose their uniqueness
and become simple attributes if, for example, the subject they relate to is diluted in a larger
population. Other than the name (particularly human names) however, an abstract identifier is
designed to apply to a definite population of entities. Shifting the boundaries of the target
population should require redesigning that identifier in order for it to keep up with its function as
an effective identifier applicable to the new population. Short of that, if an identifier becomes a
weak one as suggested by the authors quoted above, I would suggest that it ceases being an
identifier to become simply an attribute. This is shown with the example (provided above) of the
name from a classroom to a campus setting, but this may also be the case for any other abstract
identifier which then ceases to be the token of a single whole entity itself or of a full identity to
become rather the token of a group of entities sharing a defined quality, that is, of an attribute.
Ideally an abstract, human-made identifier would have a uniform format capable of
issuing an amount of instances that can be consistently distributed across the target population of
the identity domain at hand while ensuring a unique mapping to every single individual member.
The particularity of human names is that not only they can accommodate a wide range of
variability, they also are not normally issued on the basis of a finite human population, every
member of which is meant to be distinguished from all the others by name. In other words, they
are not originally meant to be identifiers at the level of the whole society or the whole human
population; them becoming identifiers depends on special or random circumstances, as when
everybody in the classroom has a different name and the identity domain is the classroom. In this
regard, human names are a case of ambiguity located in the overlapping zone between attributes
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and identifiers, possibly being only the former or also the latter depending on the circumstances
at hand.
The development in the above two paragraphs lead me to the second main difference
between attribute and identifier, that is, attribute generally is substantive (it provides some
information about the actual entity) while identifier is generally is abstract. Stated otherwise,
whereas syntax might suffice to create identifiers it appears that attributes require some
semantics: identifiers point to, while attributes tell about an entity (again, keeping in mind the
particular case of the name which exemplifies the ambivalence there might be between attribute
and identifier.)
Finally, subsequent to the discussion of all the above ideas that compose the concept of
identity, I shall define such concept as follows. We have learned that identity may be formed by
one or several characteristics of an entity (also known as attributes), which express the defining
or distinctive status of that entity in a given population of similar entities. In other words, in the
context of identification schemes, identity refers to any aggregate of more or less structured
information relating to an entity in such a way that it can be consistently distinguished as a
specific unit or individual instance among a potential population of similar entities. Such
aggregate may take the form of an artifact that enables the attribution of further relevant
information to the same and the only entity to whom or to which that information pertains.
Ultimately, identity is a mechanism for binding any one of a collection of entities to data in
such a way that the result can point back to, and enable the discovery of, the specific entity
thus bound. Individuals exercise their agency through artifacts or media that are used to
represent such data.
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2.3.2

Commentary on identity as a medium

Most of the time in the physical world and particularly in the impersonal context of institutions, a
person is understood to have only one “true” or “real” identity, even over time, which for
instance is captured by government-defined identity or other legal identity credential. We’ve
come to accept such reification of the notion of identity, partly thanks to the now familiar
practice of official identity documents such as national identity cards or passports, and the
information they convey about us. Before the so-called “information revolution,” the basic
information conveyed by that official, hard-media identity would generally include the
individual’s full name, date of birth, place of birth, and nationality, as applicable. Sometimes the
place of residence and the profession may also be included. (The whole will most often be tied to
an abstract identifier, generally a number or a character string.) The public has become
accustomed with associating that set of frontend information to the notion of individual identity
in the context of identification procedures, and since the purpose of such procedures is to make
sure we are not taken for, and we don’t pretend to be, someone we are not, most people
eventually think identity is normally unique just as the physical individual it relates to.
Individuals themselves do not experience their own identity as limited to or even defined
by those pieces of information found in identity documents, official or otherwise. Nor do their
personal relationships and community ties, from family to neighbors to friends, colleagues and
allies. For those, there is a broader narrative behind each one of the data points included in a
typical identity credential, which better defines their identity than the discrete and abstract data
points themselves. Of this, one might think names are exceptions, and they may be in places. In
some other places however, it also happens that official names on documents are not necessarily
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the ones people are known by in their community. Furthermore, we may observe that in some
cultural contexts where the uniqueness is not the goal in accounts of identity but rather
connectedness, for instance, relevant practices will rather emphasize elements and narratives of
identity as a link in a chain of forebears and relatives than correlate fixed attributes with an
atomistic notion of the individual.
There are a number of reasons, I would argue, why officially-defined identity centering
on the body has so far appeared to be the only authoritative solution. First, human beings have
only one body which is the ultimate base originating their agency. Furthermore, the uniqueness
of the body for every human being makes it the best identifier and the primary source of
identifying attributes for the person hosted in that body. To the extent that actual individuals are
embodied, and that it is in their body that they live and eventually accomplish whatever they are
capable of – including carrying out their own will as well as delegating their agency to other
individuals or extending it through artifacts – the body can in effect be seen as the ultimate
marker of the substantive self, the anchor of identity, that which must be characterized or tracked
down in order to enable most accurate individual identification. Therefore efforts to both
characterize the body and keep track of its movements have historically been at the center of the
techniques of identification.
Second, thinking backward over the long arc of human history, one may intuit that before
human agency began to extend through increasingly complex tools (writing and various media
partaking in such increasing complexity), it was initially limited to the physical boundaries of the
biological body, or nearly so. While nowadays individuals may take actions without being
physically involved in the process, their biological body remains the single point of intersection
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of all the different identities that they may fashion or find themselves holding – that is, all the
roles or characters they may take on as well as all the courses of action they may involve their
agency in.
And third, the predominance of the official structuring of individual identity as the
reference derives from the claim of the nation-state to define the allowances and opportunities
afforded to individuals as well as to command their allegiance. By its capability to make laws,
the nation-state establishes and enforces rights and duties relevant to all the members of the
society, one nation at a time.
Based on those three sets of facts, an overriding need for legal accountability has made
the government-defined identity the core of nearly all consequential identity schemes we’ve
known since the emergence of the national state. Because in order to be effective any
accountability in the broad context of social transactions, as far as we know, must be legally
defensible and enforceable; and any effective legal accountability is ultimately enacted, upheld
and enforced by the state apparatus. The legal authority is backed by the power of the state to
enforce rules, if necessary by coercion. It just so happen, one might say, that governments have
found the typical attributes displayed in passports and national ID cards sufficient to help them
define and locate the embodied individual, or they have put a whole infrastructure in place in
order to reach that goal using those credentials.
Any accountability regime requires the capability to identify the possible sources of
agency available in its jurisdiction with regard to the type of action that is to be monitored for
accountability. In addition to that, it also needs a system of reward and punishment without
which it cannot sustain. Would any meaningful collective life be possible at all, if there is no
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way to ensure that people’s decisions and actions, hence their rights and obligations, be
consistently attributable to them and not to someone else? In a nutshell, an ordered collective life
needs accountability which is enabled by the capacity to enforce a system of reward and
punishment, which in turn required capability for accurate attribution of actions.
To the extent that the individual is increasingly capable of performing actions at distance
while those actions can accurately be attributed to nobody but that particular individual who
originated them, it becomes clear and normal that identity does not require bodily presence in
order to be effective.17 In fact, one may even argue that the more an identity mechanism can help
accomplish without the subject’s bodily presence (while retaining the capability to trace back to
that subject the steps taken in the process,) the more it fulfills its purpose as identity. In any case
while it may refer to an embodied entity, identity is not the body – understood here as the
ultimate form of an entity in its whole manifestation.18 If the body does not identity make,
meaning if the presence of an embodied subject does not necessarily give away her identity, then
clearly identity is a representation, that is, a form of mediation of a principal (the identity
subject) by means of information communicated through artifacts, whether physical, digital or
otherwise.
If identity were to have any heuristic or cultural value, if it were to mean anything
beyond a sterile isolation within oneness or the equally sterile circularity of sameness as self19

17

This conceptual gap between the actual individual and her identity, I would submit, has further conceptual as well as
empirical implications: it enables the development of concepts that define the type of entity we are dealing with, such as
personhood, while it gives room to accommodate more artifacts as identities or identity agents.
18 This definition is suitable to the fact that we may use the term to refer to the biological body of human beings as well
as the body of any other entity. Wherever I don’t specify and the context does not clearly suggest a human being, then
the term ‘body’ should be understood in this general sense.
19 About identity as one and the same thing in Aristotle, see White (1971).
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(everything is identical to itself, or it is itself, indeed), then it will have to be defined in
adequation with a purpose and in a given context. Therefore it is necessarily mediated and
oriented towards achieving a purpose as relevant to that context or set of possible contexts. This
leads to another, material form of mediation
It is precisely because of the mediation and representation nature of identity that it makes
any sense for anyone to ask a person “who are you?” while they have the whole of the embodied
individual herself standing right there before them. What they are trying to know with that
question is some relevant information attached to that individual, or a sufficient amount of it,
which defines somehow the entity that she is in the current domain. In other words, the verifier is
seeking some characterization or a number of attributes or facts concerning that individual which
he cannot generally discover for certain by virtue of simply seeing her: Where does she come
from? What’s her nationality? What are her rights and privileges? What can she do, what is she
not allowed to do, and on what basis? What are the duties and responsibilities we may expect or
even demand of her? etc. As a result, “who are you?” is not so much the actual question as it is
“what are you?” since the objective is to know some relevant facts or things about you (things
that may define your status, as relevant in the context at hand) rather than your personal history
and detailed knowledge of who you are as a person (personal identity, in the philosophical
sense).
Therefore, instead of leaving it to each individual to define and fill the realm of the
‘what’ by their own biographical narrative, standard formats will be required in order to
streamline identity verification (if only by the same authority over time) and to extend the utility
of identity to the maximum number of potential identity verifiers. As a result, identity schemes
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break down “who you are” into a series of “what you are” in order to enable standard formats of
knowing who a person is. Those standards will inevitably be predicated on partial
representations adapted to the accomplishment of certain goals – bearing in mind the
overarching purpose of ensuring accountability whenever necessary.
It is generally expected that the identity data – what a person is – will lead to who she is,
that is, the full manifestation of her embodied person or any of her manifestations or extensions
through which she can appropriate well-earned rights as well as be held accountable (e.g., bank
account). To the extent that a set of data may unambiguously lead to an actual individual, to the
extent that it reliably represents the person herself in such a way that she’s recognizable among
others, then it defines her identity – who (i.e., which member of the subject population) she is. In
fact “Who” equals “Which one” among the potential many. For transactional purposes, the
‘what’ might be a sufficient, albeit not exhaustive, determination of the ‘who’ to the extent that
what you are enables others to get to who you are. In the end, the ‘what’ and the ‘who’ are
conflated in this notion of identity. It should be no surprise then that in the process, the ‘who’
(whole person) is somehow spelled out in a series of ‘whats’ (discrete attributes).
When identification occurs over a physical encounter between the subject and the
verifier, the objective generally is to gain knowledge of the ‘what,’ i.e. of the information and
attributes that are relevant to define the subject’s capabilities, entitlements, duties and liabilities
as relevant in that context. In the other hand, attributes, credentials and claims may be presented
outside any empirical encounter – so the ‘what’ is known first – and the process will be to get as
closely as needed to the actual individual or to her surrogate manifestations or extensions (e.g.,
assets), as noted previously. Either way, identity requires the mediation of an informational
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infrastructure in order to represent the actual identity subject, to such relevant and necessary
extent as to complete the transaction at hand.
If identification links an identifier to a known identity or to an actual subject, it must be
clear that it will not be effective unless there is a comfortable level of confidence in that pairing.
Identification can only be conclusive when the linking is based on robust enough evidence. The
validation of such evidence is the object of authentication. Hence, in addition to a notion of
identity, the second most important dimension of identification is some form of authentication
whether weak or strong, informal or formal.

2.4 Authentication and Authority
I define and discuss in this section the second set of basic concepts forming the social
phenomenon of identification processes in the physical world; this set is articulated around the
concept of ‘authentication.’ Furthermore, I elaborate on and consolidate the central concept of
the main research question, that is, the concept of ‘authoritative identity’ as sketched in the
general introduction. Finally, at the end of the section I outline a broader discussion of relevant
notions relating to those two main concepts.
2.4.1

Authentication

While the concept of authentication may appear less abstract, and hence less tricky than identity,
it nonetheless has multiple facets, too. Various items may be authenticated: written documents,
art pieces, devices on a network, attributes, credentials, even human individuals, etc. In the case
of official documents, for instance, an official representative vetted by the relevant
administrative or juridical institution (hence, with the appropriate authority) authenticates a copy
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of a document by certifying that it is an authentic reproduction of the original document, and can
therefore stand for the latter. On the other hand, an original certificate of nationality is a
document that authenticates a fact, claim or assertion – that an individual is of a specific
nationality – provided that as an artifact the certificate itself is authentic (with the display of all
the appropriate signs, etc.) If I, looking and sounding like I do, state that I am a national of Palau
to someone who believes it is important for them to ascertain my nationality, they may not
believe me about that (assuming they have a clear sense of where that country is located, or at
least that it does exist, possibly with a rather definite idea about what the people living there are
supposed to look or sound like.) But if I exhibit what looks like a genuine certificate of
nationality from Palau, then he might be much more inclined to believe that unless he has some
serious reason to suspect my document is fake. In other words, the certificate authenticates my
claim that I am from Palau. A passport may accomplish the same thing, based on what it states
about my nationality.
For nonverbal, visual artworks where the value resides not in the similarity of content but
in the authenticity of the artifact itself in its unique instance of original creation, authentication
will have to establish whether the artifact is that unique piece, once a completely new creation, as
it suggests itself to be (based on a striking resemblance, for instance, in the case of previously
known artwork.) A claim about the value or status of any artifact, unless supported by
unquestionable evidence, may be met with doubts or opposing claims. So because the artifact
lends itself to be taken for one thing or another, which it might not be, authentication will be
necessary to settle the matter, using the most appropriate techniques and procedures (assuming
there is enough confidence in the latter themselves.) Any time authentication is required a claim
is being made, whether directly or indirectly. Both the aim and the outcome of authentication are
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to find out or to establish the truth about that claim – which may pertain to the content, form or
origin of the object being authenticated, or simply to a privilege or an attribute – and to establish
its reliability as a consequence. Authentication is “the process of establishing confidence in the
truth of some claim” (Kent and Millett 2003: 33).
‘Authenticate’ actually would be translated by two words in French: ‘authentiquer’ and
‘légaliser,’ which literally are for authenticate on the one hand and legalize (a document) on the
other. The former notably applies to, among other contexts, what I have explained above with
regard to the authentication of artwork, for instance: it establishes that something is veridical,
true, or genuine – therefore, authentic. When I am logging into my email account by providing
my username and password, I am not legalizing it or myself, but rather authenticating myself by
demonstrating that I have knowledge of the true or the right logins (ergo, that I am the owner or
a legitimate user of the account).
The second part of the dual meaning of authentication – ‘legalize,’ that is – generally
applies to a facsimile or the original copy of a document which has to be reviewed and properly
certified by an authority as legally valid; in the case of a facsimile this procedure shows that it is
conform to the original document and thus is as legally valid as the original may be. I “legalize”
a document means that I take the necessary steps or fulfill the necessary requirements in order to
give it a legal status or legal validity. For instance, when I take said document to the mayor
office or to the notary public to have them check it and declare that it meets the relevant and
required standards and that, for legal purposes, the supporting materials presented to them
constitute acceptable evidence of the veracity of the content (including that of the identity of any
person referenced in it), and finally have them sign and stamp the document with the official
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signs of their authority, as a result. If need be, that document thus “legalized” (endowed with a
legal force or authority) will be acceptable as evidence in any court of law of the jurisdiction
competent in the subject matter at the place of “legalization.”
The notion of authority plays out in both instances. For the outcome of the authentication
– of a piece of art as genuine, of a document as legally valid, or of a copy of a document as
accurate – to be accepted by the public, it must be carried out by an entity that has the stature to
make such claim or to determine the validity or invalidity of any competing claim made by
others about those artifacts. Their authority may be based on expertise or on their formal function
and official title. And when I log in to my online account, I am providing evidence that I have
authority over that account – as may have an owner or an author over the thing they own or have
authored. Either way, authentication involves verification and validation.
In the end, authentication is the procedure or the act of seeking or providing evidence in
order to establish the truth about a claim or the authenticity of an artifact. It entails some type of
verification and, if conclusive, leads to the validation of a claim in one form or another. In
particular, when the claim is about or in the form of an artifact, authentication is a procedure that
either validates said artifact for a given purpose (legal or otherwise) or establishes its true status
or “nature.” In legal or official contexts, authenticating an artifact implies that it acquires some
authority or efficacy as a result, giving it to the extent applicable a probative character as to its
content or inherent claim. At the very least, its authenticity is so established.
2.4.2

Authoritative identity

Because identity is a representation, as we have seen, which in this context materializes as a
token or a credential, it is enabled through certain procedures involving at least one actor other
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than the individual being represented. The identity token or credential is the outcome of such
procedures; it includes a number of assertions or enables the discovery of certain facts about the
individual. The notion of authoritativeness in relation to identity simply derives from the concern
as to whether the actors conducting those procedures and making those assertions (at least as per
their representation of the individual) are believable or trustworthy in the eye of the stakeholders
with regard to those assertions or facts. In other words: why should I trust assertions made by a
third-party entity about the identity of other entities or individuals that it vouches for? To the
extent that identity subjects depend on the vouching of such third party and to the extent that
their counterparts in identity transactions accept and rely on its assertions (via a credential), such
party is an identity authority and delivers authoritative identity.
The adjective ‘authoritative’ here indicates that which is accepted as a reference or a
basis for validation in the eye of a broad number of stakeholders, whether through a positive
procedure or an implicit belief. An authoritative identity credential is an artifact that is generally
viewed by both its individual holder and social entities needing to create, process or refer to a
reliable and binding representation of that individual within a record system as the most
appropriate mechanism by which to authenticate him or her for the purposes of such
representation. In most situations where the individual or social entities need either to create or
process a record that includes a reliable and binding representation of the individual or to verify
the individual’s identity or status regarding a given personal attribute, an authoritative identity
credential is largely viewed by both groups of actors as one of the most recommendable
instruments available enabling them to achieve that goal. That credential is considered among the
best formal or standard sources of evidence available in support of the identity of the individual,
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whatever way such identity is conceived of at any given historical period, and within that period
and conception, whatever way it is defined in a given domain.
As I have already suggested in the basic definitions above, an authoritative identity
credential is a reference instrument that provides the best available measure of truth, or at least of
substantive validity, for relevant identity attributes. It is accepted for that purpose and to that
effect by a broad number of stakeholders. To be more systematic, I develop that concept in two
steps as follows. On the one hand, an authoritative identity credential is one that is consistently
accepted by stakeholders seeking to verify the identity of individuals as a reliable instrument for
authenticating that identity. This may (but does not necessarily) stem from the fact that such
credential has been issued by an established identity authority or, in other words, by any
separate entity routinely regarded by most stakeholders as a reliable source of evidence for the
authentication of individuals. Either way, the experience of both the identity subjects and their
counterparts in applicable transactions makes them at least fairly confident that those credentials
effectively achieve the designed or expected identification functions and services.
The same concept may be preferably defined by the characteristics of the credential itself.
An identity credential is said to be authoritative when it meets the following three requirements:
(1) the identity subjects depend on it to make and support identity assertions or claims;
(2) other than the credential provider itself, counterparts in most identity transactions
and communications accept it as proof of identity; and
(3) it works satisfactorily enough so as (1) and (2) are routinely repeated.
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In order for an identity system architecture to sustain on the long run once all participants
are set in their respective role, not only the technical system needs to be reliable but the
transacting parties also need to be confident that their expectations will be reasonably and
securely met with regard to the role played by all the other parties. Just as authentication is said
to secure certain level of confidence in its object, likewise well exercised authority more broadly
has the effect to impart confidence in related social transactions.
It is safe to say that the larger the number of parties accepting the use of identity
credentials issued (if applicable) by a given entity, the greater the authority of that entity in
matter of identification; in any case, the greater the number of those parties, the higher the
authoritativeness of the credential. In that sense, a company or a university are identity
authorities for their employees and students in any claims predicated on their status as employees
of that company or students at that university, possibly even beyond the boundaries of those
institutions. However, the state or national government is a greater or higher identity authority
because the identity credentials they issue are accepted by many more third parties and for a
variety of purposes (regardless of the domain of transaction.)
2.4.3

Commentary on authenticity, reliability and authority

I propose here further discussion of the above concepts, by first arguing the need to recognize an
empirical complementarity between authenticity and reliability. I then proceed to articulate our
baseline notion of authority as a backdrop to the later analyses that will involve historically
situated notion of the same.
•

Authenticity and reliability
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Historically the notion of authenticity of documents stems from an institutional framework
including categories and hierarchy of documents, systems of evidence, and practices of
validation (Fraenkel and Pontille 2003). Back in the time of the Roman Empire, an act or
document was deemed authentic or authenticated only if it followed some well-defined
procedures, nearly ritual by some measures, regarding its confection and even its curation or
custody. The official and legal requirements in those times translate the belief that “authenticity
is not an intrinsic character of documents but is accorded to them by the fact of their preservation
in a designated place, a temple, public office, treasury, or archives” (Duranti 1989: 12).
In the field of record-keeping systems, the concepts of reliability and authenticity may
rigorously be distinguished. Authentication is only meant to address the form and materiality of
the document itself as opposed to the assertions being made through its contents: “a record is
authentic when it is the document that it claims to be. Proving a record’s authenticity does not
make it more reliable than it was when created” (ibid., p. 7). Authentication here is meant to
guarantee the integrity of the record or that of its relation to a master record through relevant
standard procedures, which provides the authenticated copy with some authority. The authority
of a document stemming from its officially or commonly recognized truth is its force, its efficacy
– the enforceable quality or the truth it brings to bear on what it states or is meant to accomplish.
On the other hand, a “record is considered reliable when it can be treated as a fact in itself, that
is, as the entity of which it is evidence” (Duranti 1994: 6). There are a set of elaborated
procedures to establish both authenticity and reliability of a record; in the field of record-keeping
they are distinct and separate.
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From identity standpoint, a record or a document cannot be fully authoritative if it is not
reliable, especially if one thinks about it from the perspective of what identity credentials are
supposed to accomplish. Identity credentials need not to be only authentic in themselves, but it is
vital they also correlates in a reliable way with the identity subject, i.e. the external entity whom
they are supposed to identify. With this kind of documents which make assertions about who a
person (or what an entity) is, the idea that those assertions may not be reliable would defeat the
purpose of those documents. The customs officer at the border control, for instance, is not just
concerned with making sure a passport is authentic as artifact, but also that its de facto bearer
also is its de jure subject, i.e., the actual person represented in the passport, since the officer has
to rely on the information included in the passport in order to determine what course of action is
required about its holder. An authoritative identity credential requires both authenticity and
reliability. Here authentication (procedure establishing authenticity) and reliability need to go
hand in hand, and the former may not be fully conclusive unless it leads to the latter one way or
the other. It is a demand that is proper to the nature of identity transactions.
When it comes to identity, the linking of the identity medium to its holder is an integral
part of the authentication value proposition.20 Before the introduction of biometrics, having
someone travel with someone else’s passport just because they are vaguely resembling enough to
claim roughly the same attributes, including photographical representation, is not a satisfying
outcome for passport designers and issuing authorities – and yet that was objectively possible to
an alarming extent in a not so remote past. As a matter of fact, that is part of the rationale to
increase the collection and use of biometrical data for the identification of travelers. As identity
20

This aspect of authentication may have been informal for centuries but it is less so with the verification of biometrics
at each passage across international borders. We may call that authentication ex post, as opposed to the authentication
performed upfront (ex ante) in order to establish the document.
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becomes a central issue for a growing number of institutions and for a variety of reasons, notably
security, the reliability of identity content becomes increasingly differentiated from and yet
equally necessary to complement the authenticity of the artifact bearing that content, and
biometrical data are used to address that. In the business of identity, closing the gap between
authentication of artifacts and the reliability of facts is a requisite and not an option, and yet the
way to do it has never been a given. If “[p]roving a record’s authenticity does not make it more
reliable than it was when created,” then the question is: how do we make sure the identity record
is reliable at the moment of creation? This is an everlasting challenge to identity authorities, as
we will see in the historical cases investigated in this dissertation.
•

Authority

At societal level, the concept of authority21 often relates to the political and to public policy
domain, two areas where it is prominently present. Whatever its applicable level, policy is one of
the instruments by which authority carries out its function and empirically manifests itself as
such. A policy is a set of norms, rules and decisions guiding the actions and behaviors of a group
or population. To the extent that policies are expressly formulated by policymakers they spell out
rules and decisions, part of which may be based on unwritten but shared norms. Those explicit
rules may in turn evolve and become ingrained as commonly shared norms guiding the group’s
behavior. In some ways, policy also defines the limits of possibility for change in applicable
settings in that the goal of policy is to ensure regularity where there may otherwise be chaos or
constant changes. The rules are defined and sanctioned by entities that have competence over the
target population in the related subject matter. Such competence as well as the area (physical or
21

I am discussing here our current notion of authority from relevant instances where it may be located. This may
prepare the discussion about authority where it still is to emerge (e.g., Internet) but I do not address that here.
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abstract) where it applies may be referred to as jurisdiction; it certainly is expressed
synonymously as authority in the matter at hand, thus the interchangeability of the expressions:
‘to have jurisdiction’ and ‘to have authority.’
Furthermore in political terms (as the past identity systems addressed in this dissertation
very much involved political institutions) authority may be defined as the ability to enforce one’s
will or decision over others without physical coercion, that is, the ability to carry out one’s will
or decision effectively so as to oblige potential and actual counterparts, stakeholders or
constituents. It then relates to ideas of power and legitimacy. However, in spite of Max Weber
(1978) who considers a distinctive feature of power to be the fact that it can be imposed onto
others against their resistance, power is less and less expected to manifest itself as a brutal,
‘naked power,’ making it empirically difficult sometimes to distinguish from authority. That is
all the more ironic since arguably, back to the origins of the term during the Roman Empire,
auctoritas – personal prestige as source of power – was precisely a constitutional innovation
meant to (and once did) oppose imperium as blunt autocratic and military rule (Grant 1946). As a
matter of fact, blunt power sometimes turns out to be an expedient way to secure authority,
which would be lacking otherwise. Authority is legitimized power, or the basis of any legitimate
power. It may also stem from a power accepted as necessary, or inevitable, by its customers or
the people it is directed to, and possibly against.
In order to explain why authority (or domination, in Weberian term) compels obedience,
Weber (1919) identifies three types of authority (Blau 1963). The first reason for obeying lies in
the traditions, the second in charisma of the exceptional man, and the third in formal rules based

60

on legal and bureaucratic rationality. Thus, Weber implies that there are three types of authority:
the traditional, the charismatic and the legal authority.
It appears that there is a cultural element involved in the constitution of authority and that
coercion and culture are the variables at the two extremes of the authority spectrum. Culture is
more prominent with the traditional authority and appears less so with legal authority.22 The
reverse is true regarding the salience of coercion. Coercion here includes not only force and
physical constraint but any form of constraint that compels someone to comply even if they
didn’t want to. In that sense, legal authority is very much enabled by the prospect of coercion
(legal liability) although it also gets acculturated over time. Legal authority ensures enforcement
and accountability, while cultural authority backing a certain range of social norms is the basis
for social legitimacy and consensus. For a population to recognize any authority as such and let it
take hold, there must be a cultural process of acceptance and appropriation of the premises, the
foundational and legitimizing narratives, as well as the symbols of manifestation of that
authority. At the very least, for authority to be effective in pursuing its purposes, its customers
have to make sense, the right sense I might add, out of its claims. It must have been predicated
based on a set of shared norms and, as much as possible, its stakeholders must have a common
understanding of its meaning, purpose, goals, and the collective good it could achieve.
In addition to (or underneath) formally structured authority, there is also a notion of
authority that seems to be missing from Weber, as a full category on its own right: one that
relates to ideas of truth and belief, keeping in mind that there often exists an overlap between
those two ideas. The authority has the last word when it comes to telling the right thing or the
22

Assuredly, legal practices also may eventually generate a culture, as well as culture may produce legal systems (the
existence of customary law may be an indication of this.)
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truth: hers is a word that the community or the constituents must resolve to and follow. This may
be so because there is a belief system that prescribes it, or because the said authority has proven
herself knowledgeable and expert in that subject matter and is considered (believed?) to be the
best positioned to know the truth in the matter. There is no authority if it is not recognized by
others as such.
In accordance to those nuances in the meaning of authority, there are two adjectives
coming out of it, which are: authoritarian and authoritative. Authoritarian retains the brute power
and coercive underpinnings of authority, at least as the concept has come to be understood. It
expresses in Weberian terms the power that can be imposed onto others despite their dissent, a
sense of authority stemming from an expedient power. On the other hand, in the face of what is
authoritative, one obliges with no need of coercion. At the very least, while the adjective may
not address the conditions in which the result is obtained, the latter (that which is said to be
authoritative) is generally effective and accepted as reference. What is more, obliging in this
sense is source of stability and predictability as one knows that virtually everyone else will be
held to the same standards and by the same rules, whereas there is a good deal of arbitrariness
and thus unpredictability involved in being authoritarian. “In its central meaning the authoritative
is what was made binding or reliable by an authority” (Raz 1990: 2, italics added). Ideally,
authoritative assertions in relevant issue areas invite trust and (subjective) reliability: Does the
endorsement by any particular entity give me assurance about the validity of the statement? –
Certainly, if I consider that entity to be authoritative in the matter. It follows that just as for the
concept of identity itself, the concept of authoritativeness is contextual and therefore relational:
an entity is only authoritative about something and vis-à-vis certain group of people.
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2.5 Conclusion
In total, the core concepts of this dissertation including identity, authentication and authoritative
identity have been defined and elaborated on in this chapter, among other related concepts. In the
modern world, the notion of individual identity for transactional purposes has come to focus on
individual bodies while mediating and representing it in ways that have grown increasingly
naturalistic as allowed by the technologies and techniques available. This might have contributed
to the expectation that identity is unique. However, in conceptualizing the problem at stake in
this inquiry, I have argued that identity is different from the actual individual of whom it is a
mediated (re-)presentation. In that sense, one entity or individual may have more than one
identity.
Furthermore, I have articulated three indicators that jointly form the requirements for the
realization of the central concept of authoritative identity mechanism. While one of the indicators
may be said to be empirically self-evident whenever present, the other two are not so and will
have to be specifically dealt with as I proceed with analyzing the phenomenon and addressing
the overall research question. In the next chapter I will focus on how this is going to be done
while using this conceptual definition to formulate specific research questions.
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CHAPTER 3
Research Approach and Method

3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will address the methodological framework as well as the research design and
strategy that have guided this investigation. I first lay out the foundations, starting with the
philosophical approach to knowledge, and I elaborate on the ontology – relating to the basic
conceptual and organizing element of social phenomena – and the epistemological commitments
underlying this dissertation as an exercise of sociohistorical inquiry. Finally, I address design
issues and choices as well as the strategy that has been followed and procedures applied in order
to carry out this investigation and address the research problem.

3.2 Philosophy of knowledge: a critical view
It so happens that interpretivism is sometimes – if not often – suspected to dismiss the objective
world, as it is repeated that the opposing view of positivism posits and believes that there is a
reality out there (Willis, Jost and Niklakanta 2007). I submit that such is not, in fact, the
distinctive feature between the two paradigms. The critical question is: what can we know about
the world out there? And then also how do we know it, considering that how we know something
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depends on what that is. The fact of saying that from interpretivism standpoint reality is socially
constructed is not a dismissal of the claim that there is an objective reality, but only a questioning
stance as to how objective our knowledge of that reality may be. I will first argue that there is, or
there must be, a world out there for constructivists (or tenets of interpretivism) as well, but it is
not only out there; the observer is also part of it in various ways. As a consequence, the
observer’s view is captured from a point that is in the world (Fig. 3-1); it literally depends on,
and is structured by, a point of view in the sense of visual perspective. That point of view needs
not to be a singular one; it can be constituted and framed by generally shared principles among a
community of researchers and about the conditions of truth. Those sets of principles constitute
what we would call general theories or paradigms. Those general theories articulate, in Kantian
terms, the transcendental arguments for knowledge claims proper to a disciplinary field: they lay
out the conditions of possibility of phenomena that are observable in any meaningful way within
a given area of knowledge.
For any given object of study, positivist procedures and claims would ideally lead to a
perfect closure (Fig. 3-1 [a]). This means if a knowledge claim is true about an object by
positivist standards, then there cannot be any other positivist procedure addressing the same
question about the same phenomenon, which leads to a different knowledge outcome.
Interpretivists are prepared to recognize the situated dimensions of their claims. The gap in Fig.
3-1 [b] is the cleavage that makes possible, and where are figuratively lodged, alternate
adjudications of knowledge claims about the same phenomena using interpretive procedures
albeit through possibly different theoretical lenses.
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Figure 3-1: Two Paradigms for knowing the Social World23

a. Positivism graph:

b. Interpretivism graph:

The closure of knowledge of the world

The defining gap of knowledge of the world in the
world

To use the lexical and conceptual repertoire of early system theorists, particularly of
autopoiesis (Lettvin et al. 1959), the frog may well construct its own reality, but that does not
mean the latter is completely unrelated to what lies beyond and before the frog, or that such
construction does not in any way depend on the structure of the external stimuli as its raw
material. It only means that the only way the frog can ever “know” something about its
environment is by using its own constructed image of it. However, the patterns of the world thus
constructed are interrelated to the patterns of the world outside – its model – so much so that
both remain consistent with one another through the frog’s actual experience of its environment.
In other words, there is certain level of correlation between the world outside and what the frog
perceives of it; the frog would construct a different image of the world if the world outside were
a different one, or was experienced by it differently, which means the same. The fact that the
frog is able continuously to interact with its environment, including other frogs, in an effective
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The line represents the trajectory of knowledge accumulation in those two paradigms.
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way (as demonstrated, e.g., by their sustained survival as species), tends to reinforce the idea that
the reality each frog constructs has certain degree of consistency over time and also across
different individual frogs – stated otherwise, that construction is shared by other frogs at least in
meaningful parts.24 In sum, things being the way they are, what the frog constructs is not only its
singular reality but the reality as far as frogs are concerned. Analytically speaking at least, and as
a biological entity and a sensorial system, the human being may be conceived of as a frog at a
higher level of complexity across the whole spectrum of the living (so far the highest level
known of a specific form of life). Positivists aspire to uncover the regularities of the world
outside, as we face it and by foreclosing the constitutive participation of the subject in the
process, while interpretivists attempt to expose phenomena of the world in a way that recognizes
and includes the different ways humans see them, that is, based on how they construct and
understand the world and its processes altogether. Both paradigms have their legitimate bases
whereby their claims are warranted and possibly conclusive. They generate different types of
questions and do not apply, with equal pertinence, to the same sets of problems about the social
world.
Like the frog, the world as we see it (thus, the data it provides for scientific inquiry)
always is already a construction, if only à la Kant. In the history of western (and particularly
modern) philosophy, Kant noticeably accomplished with his critical philosophy the tour de force
of providing a comprehensive account of scientific knowledge as the result of both a rational and
a subjective procedure – or more precisely as an achievement of rationality by means of
subjectivity. As a matter of fact, his reiteration of the “Copernican revolution” in philosophy
consisted precisely in placing the human subject at the center of the whole universe of human
24

Translated to human beings, this is also the basis of inter-subjectivity upon which science is built.
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experience, as rational being – not only in its cognitive and moral dimensions, but also in the
world of the “beautiful and sublime,” as expressed in the Critique of Judgment regarding taste
and aesthetics. In the master piece of his critical philosophy, Critique of Pure Reason (first
published in 1781 followed by an augmented second edition in 1789,) while shedding the
metaphysical dust that put him and the philosophical tradition in a dogmatic slumber, Kant found
a way to articulate the possibility of knowledge beyond sheer empiricism by showing the a priori
conditions under which subjectivity apprehends objects.
Against Hume, Kant holds that there are necessary concepts that are not related to any
sensory item (Pereboom 2009). Hume (to whom Kant once credited the wake-up call that pulled
him out of a dogmatic slumber) objects to metaphysical a priori concepts as being empty ideas
non-applicable to experience, for they do not relate to any object of experience as perceptions do.
For Hume, perceptions are the only sensory items that are applicable to experience. His theory
(associationism) is based on the relationships and the ordering of perceptions, and holds that
legitimate knowledge derives from, and requires no other concept or mental item than, the
association of perceptions. Ideas or mental items (e.g., causation) inferred from any source other
than perceptions lack of any objective validity, meaning they are not applicable to the objects of
human experience.25
In response, Kant sought to articulate not an empirical but a transcendental justification
for the use of a priori (metaphysical) concepts. His transcendental deduction argument consists
of showing that, from a premise that is modest enough to be commonly shared among all
reasonably rational participants to the discussion, such premise could not hold unless we assume
25

For a summary account of this debate, see the entry in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Pereboom (2009), also
at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/
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certain concepts. Once we accept the necessity of a priori concepts also known as categories, the
task is to understand their purpose and how they operate in general. Kant theorizes a mental
processing of sheer perceptions by means of those categories before any human conscious effort
to knowledge. Such process, which he calls synthesis, results in a priori synthetic cognition that
makes phenomena available in the first place for further inquiry and possible claims.
Kant agrees with Hume and the empiricist view that causality, for instance, does not stem
from any empirical object. But the mind strives to locate causal relationships because causality is
one of the synthetic laws organizing the manifold and resulting from a priori cognition, which
are deemed universal and necessary.26 The categories are tools that our mind a priori applies to
perceptions in order to construct (through that cognitive processing) observable meaningful
phenomena. The mind processes and structures the raw data into perceivable phenomena before
any further investigation can take place.
It should be emphasized that a priori cognition is meant to be universal and necessary,
for the categories that enable it are innate within any rational human mind. They are the
necessary and universal conditions of possibility of any further knowledge, which is why the
most compelling examples Kant uses to illustrate synthetic a priori cognition are from
mathematics. Nevertheless and without necessarily making of Kant the forefather of
constructivism, his demonstration that the data is more than simple perceptions is in fact, in my
view, the most solid foundation for that epistemological paradigm: if there is an a priori
construction at the root of all manners of knowledge, it suddenly appears crystal clear that
knowledge of the less deterministic social phenomena will require further conceptual
26

Mathematical entities chiefly are examples of a priori synthetic cognition used by Kant, the valid knowledge of which
is not contingent upon relation with objects of experience.
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construction owing to the fact that that knowledge is not expected to be as necessary and
universal as the knowledge yielded by the a priori concepts of the mind or that of mathematical
entities.
The realm of social sciences (hardly developed during 18th century27) lies on the
spectrum in between singular perceptions and universally necessary cognition; they only require
a meso-level generalizability, beyond mere perceptions and short of the universality of the basic
categories of human understanding. In sum, sociohistorical inquiry inevitably involves certain
perspective from an observer’s lifeworld. It is however a perspective that can eventually be
ascribed to a collection of observers as they have shared views on procedures of framing and
making sense of the social phenomena. That way it is still possible to account for claims to
knowledge in social sciences (even) using qualitative interpretive methods while recognizing that
“from someone else’s point of view, our own effort can be criticized as untenable” (Hall 1999:
9). After that philosophical framing regarding knowledge foundations in social science, I shall
now turn to the specific area of sociohistorical inquiry.

3.3 Approach to sociohistorical inquiry
Broadly speaking the epistemology sustaining this thesis espouses the views developed by
Charles Tilly, Margaret Somers, and John Hall, at the confluence of history and sociology, i.e.
historical sociology. However, these views also apply to social sciences and disciplines
concerned with large scale human phenomena the investigative domain of which Hall (1999)

27

References to psychology and anthropology appear in Kant’s works but the former is tightly related to his philosophy
of knowledge while the latter is as close as one can get to history. Those social sciences as we know them today were
largely developed during the nineteenth century.
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names sociohistorical inquiry.28 In the following subsections, I summarize the core ideas and
relevant directions that have guided this dissertation.
3.3.1

Ground assumptions

These assumptions address both the ontological and epistemological commitments of this
approach to research. As noted by Colin Hay broadly speaking, there are two approaches to
ontology:
The first, and more abstract, whether (and, if so, why) there exists something rather than nothing, and
whether (and, if so, why) there exists one logically contingent actual world. The second sense of the term is
concerned with the (specific) set of assumptions made about the nature, essence, and characteristics (in
short, the reality) of an object or set of objects of analytical inquiry. (Hay 2006: 80)

The first streak of ontology may clearly be recognized in the origins of western philosophy in
Greece. It is basically the question of being – the ultimate essence of all forms of being – which
philosophers had dealt with well before Aristotle and even before Socrates.29 However, the scope
of the question for social sciences is understandably less broad: in this case ontology refers to the
basic conceptual element of the logical structure of the social reality, along with any other
ground assumptions required in order to make theoretically or analytically sense of the social
data. In the realm of social science according to Charles Tilly,
major ontological choices concern the sort of social entities whose coherent existence analysts can
reasonably assume. Major alternatives include methodological individualism, phenomenological
individualism, holism, and relational realism. (2006: 6)
28

Sociohistorical inquiry is “a broad domain … that encompasses social sciences, history, the humanities, and
interdisciplinary enterprises such as historical sociology, feminist theory, cultural studies, critical theory, and the new
historicism.” (Hall 1999: 6)
29 See the fragments of Parmenides’s Poem in relation to the being at
http://classweb.gmu.edu/rcherubi/ancient/poem4.htm
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It clearly appears that the ontological choice in this dissertation is not any type of individualism,
whether methodological or phenomenological, nor is its object about individual behavior.
Furthermore, it would hardly qualify as holism in that I am not investigating a given society or
community as a whole, nor am I even assuming the society (any society) as a self-contained
structure, evolving organically by itself or homogeneously. Here the social structures and
processes are considered in relation to practices, techniques and technologies that ultimately
permeate various social identities and boundaries, and do not define any particular one.
This dissertation assumes that social outcomes are shaped by institutions, transactions,
interactions, mobilization and exchange of ideas as well as the co-variation and co-effectiveness
of structure and agency, the results of which are never totally determined by any pre-defined
rules. Critical events may open windows of opportunity to something never contemplated before.
Agents may still develop new and even disruptive practices within existing structures or settings,
although at any point they are as social beings already partly defined by those structures or
settings. As a matter of fact, structures are also an outcome of agential participation. Those oncenew practices may evolve into more codified forms (rules) more and more enacted by a growing
number of participants and become structures (institutions). The social is not merely the sum
total of the individual parts. Obviously, individuals have their own purpose and motivations for
doing what they do and individual behavior may be studied in autonomy. However when social
scientists endeavor to capture and comprehend the outcome that results from the interactions
taking place in a “relational setting,” (Somers 1994) they cannot, without further and careful
elaborations and justifications (whether methodological or theoretical), make definitive and valid
claims to knowledge at one level (e.g., collective) by simply inferring from findings at the other
level (e.g., individual). It appears the above basic postulates fit with relational realism which
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holds that “transactions, interactions, social ties, and conversations constitute the central stuff of
social life” (Tilly 2008: 7).
Margaret Somers reinforces the same idea in an attempt to elaborate what she calls
historical epistemology:
a relational pragmatist ontology takes the basic units of social analysis to be neither individual entities
(agent, actor, person, firm) nor structural wholes (society, order, social structure) but the relational
processes of interaction between and among identities. (Somers 1998: 766-7)

In a seminal paper revisiting Kuhn’s groundbreaking Structure of Scientific Revolutions and his
epistemological legacy (as will be further developed in the next subsection), Somers
distinguishes two realisms. Realism is the philosophical posture about knowledge which holds
that it would not be possible to make sense of the world if certain ideas were not considered as
real as sensorial or empirical objects, although they cannot be met in the empirical world, i.e.,
they are unobservable. Somers argues that there are two competing realist legacies out of Kuhn:
the theoretical realism and the relational realism. Theoretical realism treats its general theories
as formulations of the ontological truth: a valid epistemic statement or finding about any
(empirical) phenomenon must be deducible from and verifiable by the theory. Relational realism
considers a theory relying on unobservables (e.g., quarks or market forces) to be valid
vicariously, in a sense, through its observable effects. Theory is a generalization (however
modest or broad) from the effects of a number of factors, even when those factors are not
observable but only inferred as necessary to explain certain manifestations or outcomes.
Where the two realisms differ … is that while theoretical realism attributes an ontological truth to the
theoretical phenomenon (e.g., the theory of electron or the theory of market equilibrium), relational realism
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focuses on the relational effect of the phenomenon itself (e.g., the impact of the hypothesized electron on its
environment or of the hypothesized market forces on an observable outcome.) (Somers 1998: 745)

Understandably then, relational realism brings interrelations within the social setting into focus,
with the view that, not unlike in a system, “institutions within a society must co-vary with each
other” (Somers 1994: 626). In this line of thought, society is not an abstract idea hypostasized as
a definite material entity, constitutively and substantively fixed. Rather, it is a matrix or a
bounded set of matrices of patterned relationships: society is a “relational setting” as Somers
suggests, that is, “a pattern of relationships among institutions, public narratives, and social
practices” (Somers 1994: 626). The concept of relational setting enables transcending the
dualism of modern theory towards a more combinatory or modular view of “numerous matrices
of patterned relationships, social practices, and institutions mediated not by abstractions but by
linkages of political power, social practices and public narratives” (Ibid. p. 634). In other words,
a society is a large scale, multi-level and evolving social network of a sort, and as such it can be
disaggregated in parts and reconfigured in new temporal and spatial relations; new entities and
components may emerge as well from that combinatory of linkages and relations.
In all, those relations, transactions and interactions are the basic structuring logic of the
social data from the standpoint of relational realism. This idea in turn commands the
epistemological justifications and methodological approaches of relational realism as a mode of
knowing the social world.
In keeping with Kuhn’s (1970) own contention with the oblivion of history in the
constitution and discovery of scientific problems by the dominant epistemological frameworks of
his time, Somers sets out to reclaim and articulate a historical epistemology as a forgotten branch
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of that legacy.30 To that effect, we are reminded that the array of alternative or competing
theories addressing a phenomenon or a problem is historically bound, as Kuhn shows. Facts that
are relevant to scientific inquiry were once missed before they became even salient to the
inquiring observation. Likewise, evidence once accepted is later on disconfirmed or dismissed
due to the expansion of the theoretical field. That a question is warranted scientific attention is a
matter of the temporal configuration of science, the status of knowledge at some point in time.
A successful explanation, as Kuhn shows us, one intended to account for how and why scientific knowledge
developed could not be constructed through logical deductive entailment under universal law but only
through a causal historical narrative establishing causal chains and relational structures. A given theory not
only has a history, but is a history – at each stage it bears the sedimentation and residue of its previous
history, of a series of encounters with confirming or anomalous evidence. (Somers 1998: 737)

Historical epistemology is both pragmatic and relational: pragmatic because here theory
is driven by problems and not only by general logical rules; relational to the extent that it
accounts for actions and events situated in time and space using narrative discourse. While
espousing the realism principle that justifies theorizing based upon unobservables, relational
realism does not hold a theory to be a definite, a-temporal truth about social phenomena or
reality (as a universal necessary law would have it), which in fact would imply that a theory
basically is eternally true as long as the rules of logic obtain. Instead relational realism considers
and integrates the fact that any theory entailing those theoretical/unobservable entities (“such as
states, markets, or social classes”) to be time-bound and subject to change, and as such the
resulting theory is “historically provisional” (ibid.: 744). George and Bennett concur with that

30

Somers develops her argument in response to the positivist literature and research practice stemming from that same
legacy, including from the historical sociology field, which paradoxically rejects history as anti-theoretical and anecdotal.
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view and further recognize that, in this context, theory is not exclusively devoted to enabling
prediction but also to explaining social phenomena and patterns.
The changing and reflective nature of social subjects makes social science theories more provisional and
time-bound than those in the physical sciences, but does not prevent cumulative and progressive theorizing
over long periods of time in the form of middle-range theories. Theoretical progress in the social sciences
can consist of advances in puzzle-driven research programs, increasingly complete and convincing
historical explanations, and theories that are stronger at explaining social behavior than at predicting it.
Progress is not limited to the development of general theories or schools of thought with greater validity,
scope, or predictive capability – as desirable as these kinds of progress may be. (George and Bennett 2005:
148-9)

Commenting on Bruce Western, Somers adds that, instead of starting from theory, this approach
generally gives priority to the substantive problem to lead to theoretical insights, making “strong
use of substantive knowledge to guide assumptions” (1998: 773).
3.3.2

Practices and discourses of inquiry

John Hall (1999), also a proponent of pragmatic epistemology in the sociohistorical field, frames
scientific research in terms of communities of practice of inquiry making claims to knowledge
through different types of discourse. Those communities are assembled around a common set of
research interests, assumptions and basic rules which structure their discourse whereby claims
are made, contended, accepted or rejected by fellow members. Those rules and procedures may
be disputed by other groups of scientists, for as Hall recognizes, the actual practices of inquiry
present alternative pathways to sociohistorical knowledge each one of which is “subject to the
reflexive gaze of [the] other perspectives” (p. 19) as well as to their criticism.
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The different practices of sociohistorical inquiry are studied through the types of
discourse that they develop in the process of knowledge accumulation. Hall refers to them as
“forms of discourse” or “formative discourses,” with the following clarification:
I do not mean by “form” an entity having an autonomous existence. Rather, it is a zone where particular
discursive precepts and strategies help “form” practice. (Hall 1999: 25)

Another way of understanding forms of discourse in this context is to conceptualize them as
ideal type discourses, albeit initially resulting from research practices (which they in turn may
inform as they become explicitly reflected upon, discursively articulated or further codified.) As
suggested above, actual discursive practices are not of a single and pure form of discourse, but
possibly hybrids. One form of discourse can drive the ordering logic in a given instance or
practice of inquiry; it is then the dominant or ordering formative discourse for that specific
investigation or discursive practice. The same form of discourse may still be used in other
practices of inquiry where it is subordinated to (or it supplements) a different ordering formative
discourse. It is less a matter of exclusivity and homogeneity than a matter of the main, driving
logic. Four such forms of discourse are identified as follows:
•

Value discourse provides the basis of reasons justifying the purpose, legitimizing
methods and giving relevance to outcomes;

•

Narrative discourse emphasizes storytelling as form or part of the epistemic discourse
itself;

•

Social theory-driven discourse helps identify relevant sociohistorical phenomena for
inquiry;
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•

Discourse of explanation or interpretation helps formulate “proper strategies for
offering and adjudicating among accounts that attempt to make sense of
sociohistorical phenomena.” (Hall 1999: 26)

There are eight main practices of sociohistorical inquiry – four generalizing and four
particularizing – ordered by four forms of discourse. The four generalizing practices include
universal history,31 theory application, analytic generalization and contrast-oriented comparison.
The four particularizing practices include situational history, specific history, configurational
history and historicism (Hall 1999). Each discourse is formative for one generalizing practice
and one particularizing practice of inquiry. Value discourse may be formative for universal
history in building meta-theory of history as well as for situational history in order to understand
contemporary situation; narrative discourse may be formative for theory application in order to
explain cases as well as for specific history to enable the account of intrinsic phenomenon; social
theory discourse may be formative for analytic generalization by enabling to test hypotheses by
comparison as well as to configurational history by enabling the extrinsic analysis of
development; and lastly, explanation/interpretation discourse may be formative for contrastoriented comparison by accounting for unique aspects of process as well as for historicism by
identifying unique significance of events. For the purpose of illustration and also for their
potential relevancy in this research, I only present in Table 3.1 the role of discourse for two

31 To define some of Hall’s terminology that may not be self-evident to the reader, universal history aims at a
theoretically totalizing goal or tends to define its object (chiefly, the society) as a structural totality. Situational history
focuses on “current historical conditions, their sources, and culturally significant alternative paths to development” (Hall
1999: 183). Configurational history is when a specific history is shaped by a theoretical metanarrative whereby events
that might appear otherwise unrelated become theoretically and meaningfully connected. It differs from specific history
in that it seeks to theorize its object regardless of the deliberate purpose or intentions of the social actors involved, thus
proceeding by “extrinsic analysis of development” of the process or phenomenon being studied. Historicism treats its
object as unique and isolated, it “treats the origins, the genesis and unique character of specific sociohistorical
phenomena in empiricist, self-referential, and seemingly anti-theoretical terms” (idem, p. 220).
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particularizing and two generalizing practices of inquiry. Each discourse may still contribute to
all the other practices of inquiry by playing a somewhat secondary role as illustrated in Table 3-1
for the sample of practices represented.
Value, narrative and explanation/interpretation discourses are all present in this
dissertation in various measures, but the narrative discourse is the most pervasive across the
board therefore, I will spend some time elaborating on it. Whereas Hall seems to conceive of
narrative merely as storytelling without further detail on its epistemic workings, Somers is much
more specific about it. From her perspective, narrative is not just an instrument for representation
but the discursive image of the ontological structure of the social world: “social life is itself
storied and … narrative is an ontological condition of social life” (Somers 1994: 613-4). In other
terms, narrative is the lingua franca for the accounts of social phenomena before any further
procedure and more specialized “languages” apply. And yet, as one among several “languages”
or forms of discourse, narrative has its own regular procedures for making truth propositions or
claims.
Narratives are networks of patterned relationships connected and configured over time and space, and in
which meaning, causality, and truth are ascribed based on these temporal and spatial arrangements.
(Somers 2008: 261)

As elsewhere stated: “narratives are constellations of relationships (connected parts)
embedded in time and space, constituted by causal emplotment” (Somers 1994: 616). Criteria by
which narratives are evaluated as such pertain to the internal structure and arrangements, that is:
the internal integrity of the discourse, the absence of narrative flaw or unaccounted gaps in the
emplotment, and the ways actions, locations and sequences are woven together in a manner of
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Table 3-1: Practices of inquiry and role of formative discourses. Examples of four (out of eight) generalizing and
particularizing practices of inquiry described by how formative discourses contribute to each, with the role of the
discourse ordering each practice capitalized in the corresponding intersection cell (adapted from J. Hall 1999: 181
and 206)

Discourses

VALUE

Particularizing practices

SOCIAL
THEORY

EXPLANATION/
INTERPRETATION

UNDERSTAND
CONTEMPORARY
SITUATIONS

Axis of past
linkage to
present

Explicates
contemporary
forces

Locates causes of
present

Grounded in
“historical object”

ACCOUNT OF
INTRINSIC
PHENOMENON

Identifies general
features by
narrative parallels
and “laws”

Informs by “break
points”

Grounded in social
theoretical
configuration

Focus of “break
point” analysis

EXTRINSIC
ANALYSIS OF
DEVELOPMENT

Identifies
“accidents”

Grounded in
metaphysic of
process

Object of
clarified
chronology

General process
provided by
metaphysic

IDENTIFIES
UNIQUE
SIGNIFICANCE OF
EVENTS

METATHORY OF
HISTORY

Subsumes cases
under
sociological
theory

Derives theory
from universal
metatheory

Defines need for
theory revision

Knowledge by case
theorizations

APPLIES
THEORY TO
EXPLAIN
CASES

Subsumes case
variation via
theory

Incorporated in
narrative via theory

ANALYTIC
GENERALIZATION

Knowledge by
“bounded
generalization”

Basis of
analytical
comparisons

TESTS
HYPOTHESES
BY
COMPARISON

Controls or accounts
for extraneous
variation

CONTRAST
ORIENTED
COMPARISON

Knowledge by
“rules of
experience”

Basis for
developing
contrasts

Establishes foci of
narratives

ACCOUNTS FOR
UNIQUE ASPECTS
OF PROCESS

SITUATIONAL
HISTORY

SPECIFIC HISTORY

CONFIGURATIONAL
HISTORY

HISTORICISM

UNIVERSAL HISTORY

Generalizing practices

NARRATIVE

THEORY
APPLICATION
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explanation of the process or phenomenon at hand. As a result and to the extent that the facts are
as carefully and accurately documented as possible,
the success or failure of truth claims embedded in narratives depends less on empirical verification and
more on the logic and rhetorical persuasiveness of the narrative. (Somers 2008: 262)

On the foundation of spatiotemporal linkages, two main features are characteristics of
narrativity: “causal emplotment” in which those linkages are subsumed in meaningful storyline,
and “selective appropriation” of the materials, e.g. events and actions, that exhibit the plot
(Somers 1994: 616-7). Emplotment links separate instances and discrete elements in order to
provide meaning. By linking events, places and time sequences, emplotment manifests a
storyline. Causal emplotment is the justification why a storyline is chosen over possible others; it
is what makes a narrative the explanatory account that it is. Actual events may fit in or upset
causal emplotment, and in that sense the latter submits to the test of the former, and a plot may or
may not hold. Plot constitutes “the logic and syntax of narrative” and “it is emplotment that
permits us to distinguish between narrativity on the one hand, and chronicles and annales [sic],
on the other” (ibid.). Because narratives are not chronicles or annals, the narrator (whether the
social actor subject of research or the researcher) necessarily intervenes in the choices of
elements to use as materials for weaving the plot. However, the internal integrity of the narrative
produced based on a selective appropriation must also be able to stand the test against
documented record of events.
3.3.3

History and causal explanation

History arguably plays a necessary role in any meaningful account of macrosocial phenomena,
enabling to fully grasp the dynamics or mechanisms leading to the outcome. If anything, it brings
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about a wider range of interrelations and ramifications, which might enhance the questions we
ask and provide better insights into important aspects of the phenomenon at hand. As aptly
summed up by Tilly: “History matters to social science because history matters to social
processes: when and where a social process unfolds affects how it unfolds” (2008: 3). He further
argues that of all the logics of explanation used in social science, only mechanism-process
accounts pertinently integrate history,
because their explanatory program couples a search for mechanisms of very general scope with arguments
that initial conditions, sequences, and combination of mechanisms concatenate into processes having
explicable but variable overall outcomes. Mechanism-process accounts reject covering-law regularities for
large structures such as international systems and for vast sequences such as democratization. (Tilly 2008:
9, emphasis added)

History enables us to exhibit sequences and mechanisms that make up for a process, from what
may be considered, at least relatively, as initial conditions all the way to the outcome being
studied. It uses narrative as the most effective technique to bring forth spatiotemporal linkages
(Somers 1998).
Hall suggests that recent attempts at diversifying the logics of explanation result from
“dissatisfaction with the positivist model of scientific explanation, specifically, Carl Hampel’s
covering-law approach and probabilistic revisions” (1999: 154). Reinforcing the same view,
Somers reminds us that “[r]elational realism insists that ‘how’ questions of causality
(processes/mechanisms) cannot be deduced either from invariant laws (constant
conjunctions/relations)” or from the causal principles of a general theory (Somers 1998: 769). To
be clear, mechanism-process questions of causality are inevitably addressed as “how” questions
while law-like causality questions are simply addressed as “why” questions, that is, as logical
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causality without the need to deal with the “thickness” of time32. Each one follows a different
logic of discovery of causes. “The answer to a ‘how’ question ... demands explanatory and
empirically contingent causal pathways” (Somers 1998: 769). The answer does not lie in discrete
entities that can be manipulated in abstraction and independently by the researcher (such as in a
controlled experiment for example) but in “the pathways of agential interaction” which are
“contingent and empirically variable” (ibid. p. 768).
There are fundamental reasons why the distinction shall be maintained between law-like
causality and mechanism-based causality. First of all, the relational logic of causality does not
stem from necessary and universal principles applicable to whole classes of phenomena. In
sociohistorical inquiry there is no general and universal law of causality, neither is there any
abstract and universal principle of causation. Thus the need to look through the series of
contingents events forming the social phenomena at hand in order to get to a possible cause by
establishing how it actually happened via how events unfolded. Causality is tightly dependent on
the specifics of the process at hand, so the result is “contingent and indeterminate” vis-à-vis
abstract rules of deduction. Furthermore:
the adequacy of an explanatory structure depends upon why a question is asked: Different research aims
yield different explanatory demands. Laws may be feasible for prediction, but only causal mechanisms
accounting for variation and relational linkages can explain how and why something actually happened.
(Somers 1998: 769)

“How” questions call for a causal narrative, that is, a narrative exhibiting causal
mechanisms. Explanation of why by how something happened requires fleshing out connective
32

Tilly has figuratively qualified as thin the notion of history that is merely a “transparent medium carrying along more
substantial causes” and thick one that is “drenched with causes that inhere in sequence, accumulation, contingency, and
proximity” (quoted in Somers 1998: 739).
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mechanisms33 as opposed to predictive explanation that requires a general logic of deduction.
While the latter operates by correlations of empirical (observable) indicators, connective
mechanisms are not directly observable and measurable; it is the task of the researcher to find the
linkages that will bring them forth or demonstrate the necessity of their existence.
How do we exhibit cause? We tell a story, a causal narrative about the causal pathways by which one class
of events is actually affected by another. (Somers 1998: 770)

After this thorough exposition of the general research approach, I will now specifically
describe the design and strategy used in this investigation.

3.4 Research design and strategy
Here I follow up on the rationale of the three-case questions already outlined in the general
introduction in order to further detail research design choices and the strategy adopted as well as
the procedures executed in the conduct of this inquiry.
3.4.1

Design choices and case selection

The core of this dissertation is organized around three case studies which I call big cases, as they
may in turn contain small cases. As shown on Figure 3.1, those big cases include two (past)
historical cases (Cases I and II) and one contemporary case (Case III). The design choice for
those cases directly results from the rationale that I have provided in the general introduction,
which led to the formulation of three research questions instead of one exclusively based on the
initial research problem. In other words, rather than limiting the investigation solely to the digital
identity phenomenon, which still is an open and incomplete process, I seek reference points or at
33

Somers references James Coleman’s definition of mechanism as “meaningful connection between events as the basic
tool of description and analysis” (1998: 726).
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least some external points of comparison in order to enable as much as possible the elicitation of
findings with a broader scope and significance. Once it became clear that efforts to address the
Internet identity challenges are the subject matter which this investigation is primarily concerned
with, along with the realization that those efforts were in the early stage of development, the
decision was made to take a historical comparative angle in order to investigate the problem – as
it was clear then that we will probably learn more by broadening the scope than by focusing
narrowly onto a phenomenon that had been little researched from a social science perspective
and which moreover was and still is evolving.
The choice of a historical-comparative approach to investigate this research problem also
comes within a “world-historical perspective” (McMichael 1990) in that the research addresses
historical processes that have proven, or are likely, to have ramifications and significance at
world level or for world history. As a consequence and given the circumstances of the Internet
identity problems and resolution efforts, this dissertation does not compare processes regarding
the exact same object/credential across different geographic settings, within the same historical
period, or at the same stage of its development-implementation but in various locations. In other
words, it cannot carry out a straightforward, a horizontal-linear comparison (of the same object)
across different time-space settings such as, for instance, the passport in the UK, France and the
USA, at a given period in time, or at a specific phase of passport development-implementation in
those three countries. This would have provided for a straightforward comparison using the three
case descriptions under the same framework, theoretical or otherwise, albeit in different
empirical settings, but may not provide us with any useful insights to tackle the problem of
digital identity. Rather, it might be more useful to focus on the process and time sequence of the
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emergence – if not the first time when a relevant identity artifact appeared as such in the history,
at least the earliest stages of its development as documented. For instance, the traveler’s passport
that is known worldwide today is the direct and ultimate descendant of the artifact that was for
the first time called passport in late medieval Europe, well before the character of the tourist
traveler appears on the world stage. In addition, one may even argue that while seals belonged to
several civilizations millennia before the medieval Europe, the way their use developed by the
12th century pre-formed the bureaucratic practices of the future European modern state whose
model will be more or less forcibly exported around the world, especially since the 19th century.
Clearly there has been nothing in the past that was exactly similar to the Internet,
including its identity challenges. And since the Internet is global in scope, there is no instance
where the exact same problem has been resolved yet in a way that would enable controlled
comparison – where all variables but one are similar – across settings. Nevertheless, a
comparative study is only pertinent if the phenomena compared are different to some extent
while they can be categorized as similar by some aspects. Therefore and based on the argument
in the previous paragraph, it follows that the phenomenon of interest here overall must be
defined more broadly in order to include such various objects as digital identity credentials,
passports and medieval seals. How is that class of objects to be defined? The phenomenon of
this thesis is defined to be the historical process of emergence of artifacts which individuals use
to authenticate their identity, or to authoritatively and reliably represent themselves to others as
one specific individual. From that standpoint, the primary goal of this thesis then is to discover or
examine the conditions under which, as well as the paths through which, the different forms or
instances of the phenomenon materialize as an outcome.
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Contrary to Yin (2009) who, apparently focusing on organizational research, opposes
case study and history, broader social sciences such as political science, international relations or
historical sociology make allowance for historical case studies or building case studies using
history (George and Bennett 2005; Hall 1999; Bennett and Elman 2006; Burawoy 1998). In
Hall’s (1999) terms, the first two cases are specific histories and the third case is a situational
history (Table 3-1). Specific history is focused and detailed on a given sociohistorical
phenomenon, such as the medieval seal as identity medium and the historical development of the
traveler’s passport. Another way of calling situational history may be borrowed from Foucaultian
literature, i.e. “history of the present”34 (Roth 1981). Situational history is one that is
contemporary to the researcher and may even be unfolding. In effect, Case III is an attempt to
document history in the making regarding digital identity.
Each one of the three cases belongs to a particularizing practice of inquiry, designed to
provide, as much as possible, detailed and “comprehensive analyses of singular phenomena”
(Hall 1999: 205). Overall, this dissertation follows an inductive reasoning, which is the same
approach taken by theory-building case research. George and Bennett (2005: 111) emphasize
that “theory development via case studies is primarily an inductive process.” They recognize six
kinds of theory-building research objectives, one of which is heuristic.35 The main objective of
this research is heuristic in that from the thorough investigation/description of the individual
cases, I seek to uncover causal mechanisms and patterns, including elements of similarity and
variance, among a class of phenomena. “Heuristic case studies inductively identify new
34

I shall insist that this simply is a borrowing, to be understood in plain terms and without the implication that
Foucault’s method was necessarily a situational history.
35 The other varieties of theory-building research objectives include atheoretical/configurative idiographic case studies
(which might apply to the cases in this dissertation taken separately), disciplined configurative case studies, theory testing
case studies, plausibility probes and “building block” studies of particular types or subtypes (pp. 75 and 76).
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variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms,
echanisms, and causal paths” (idem, p. 75). While every
individual case does not draw on any theory, their accumulation is meant to enable some
discovery about a class of phenomena.
Figure 3-2: Research design

Case I and Case II are conducted with the aim to get insights from the past identity
mechanisms, especially regarding how they emerged as identity systems and the process through
which they became commonly accepted and used as reference identification mechanisms.
mech
Case
III documents ongoing efforts to build a digital identity framework, which are analyzed in light
of the rich history of previous systems. After the above considerations of the overall design of
this research, I will now further articulate the rationale for case selection with some detail.
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Case III: Digital identity
Case III was not a design choice because it responds to the original problem that
prompted this research. I will just argue here about the ways in which the object of Case III
fulfills the requirement of a world-historical level phenomenon in order to be potentially
comparable to the object of the other two cases. The Internet is unique in its architecture as well
as in number (at least the user does not perceive or experience the Internet as if there were many
of it, which is probably part of the reason why we use the definite article to name it, not to
mention the capital initial “I”). Related to the previous aspect is the fact that it has a global
scope, in addition to being relatively young so that the challenges at hand are being addressed for
the first time with that technology and in that space. The day the digital identity problem in the
Internet will be successfully resolved somewhere in the world by technology alone or blending it
with some institutional arrangements that are reasonably applicable to any Internet users across
the world, that day a digital identity solution will be available for any stakeholder to implement
anywhere in the world or in the global Internet, if they so choose. Just like once the
specifications and functions of the passport have been clearly defined and implemented by a
number of pioneering countries, any country new to its adoption only needs to implement the
existing specifications and all other related rules and requirements in order to join the community
of countries where a valid passport is accepted for the purpose defined. Once a technically sound
and reliable identity infrastructure is added to the Internet architecture in conditions that make it
socially viable and resilient, then the Internet per se can no longer be characterized as a place
where it is impossible to ascertain the identity of the user at the other end of the communication
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or transaction – and the problem that started off this inquiry will cease to be relevant as a
research problem.
Case I: Medieval seals
In line with McLuhan’s periodization which I referred to in the general introduction, we
may argue that after the press, computer technology has brought about a new era regarding
modes of writing and record creation (Bolter 1991, MacNeil 2000, and Duranti et al. 2002).
Precisely, that point is further borne out by the very fact that present actors are confronted with
the problem of creating identification capabilities applicable to computer records and networks.
The mode of writing that looms at the other end of the spectrum is that of the manuscript culture.
If we realize that identity media and artifacts have never been a given throughout all modes or
technologies of writing and record creation, then one may intuitively sense the need to ask
whether there ever was anything in the manuscript era that could parallel the challenge that the
computer-script is now faced with. As it turns out, at some point over the long history of the
handwriting civilization (and particularly in its abstract alphabet’s quarters), social actors also
had to confront the challenge of enabling the representation of people’s identity within written
records, thus the selection of the medieval episode of the phenomenon for this inquiry.36 In that
sense, the seal case is what I might call a mirror case relative to the digital identity case.
Case II: Passport and national ID card
Convinced that a third case would be much more enriching for this investigation and its
potential findings, a government-issued identity credential appears to be a pertinent choice of
36

I further explain at the beginning of the next chapter why I have chosen to focus on the medieval West for this
instance of the phenomenon.
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case for a number of reasons. First, the model of authoritative identity credential is found with
the most common credentials issued by the government or the state apparatus, whether it is a
passport, a national identity card or a driver’s license. They are the most widely used and
accepted by potential stakeholders as a mechanism for authenticating the identity of individual
users/holders without further communication or particular relationship between the verifier and
the government issuer. The fact that stakeholders can rely upon those credentials without further,
real-time assurance or confirmation from the issuer (and even without any prior relationship
between them and the issuer) precisely makes it easier for the greatest number of parties to rely
on them. This enables the use of these credentials to scale up significantly, which is part of the
desiderata shared by many concerned technologists for online digital identity. As a matter of fact,
government-issued identity credentials present the largest scale of use ever reached in history by
any standard physical identity token. Particularly the passport has reached the status of a
universal object with some dimension of interoperability enabling transit and transactions across
national boundaries. As a result, the focus of Case II is mainly on the passport.
However, I further extend and complement the analysis of the process that led to the
emergence of international-type passport by a small case of national identity card. There are two
substantive reasons that motivate this choice: the first is that I have come to realize in the course
of this investigation that the national ID card is the result of further differentiation of the passport
mechanism, thus both the ID card and the modern passport represent two facets of the same
phenomenon; the second is that, the previous observation notwithstanding, the history of the
emergence of one of the earliest national ID cards enriches our insights into authoritative
mechanisms of identity in the context of the modern state through the domestic process of
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implementation and acceptance, since the passport has become a requirement only for
international travelers and due to the near universal scope of that requirement, the concerned
travelers do not have much choice as to whether to carry a passport or not.
Addressing the specific research questions and causal mechanisms
Building on the case description and analysis, I integrate the findings from the three cases
into a framework of analytical explanation. As advised by George and Bennett (2005), it is
desirable to transform “a purely historical account that implies or asserts a causal sequence into
an analytical explanation couched in theoretical variables” (p. 225) and/or “causal hypotheses”
(p. 229). I outline the causal mechanisms in play as well as hypothesized relationships between
various events integrated into a causal explanatory discourse.
But before that, I first answer the specific research questions commanded by the
definition of the concept of authoritative identity (credential) and its component indicators, that
is, the requirements necessary for it to materialize as an outcome. In the previous chapter, the
definition of the concept of authoritative identity system or credential has led me to isolate the
following requirements:
(1) the identity subjects depend on it to make and support identity assertions or claims;
(2) other than the credential provider itself, counterparts in most identity transactions
and communications accept it as proof of identity; and
(3) it works satisfactorily enough so as (1) and (2) are routinely repeated.
Presumably, by uncovering the causal mechanism that may have led to the first two
requirements to be met – which will be the focus of the analysis – this will also enable an
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explanation as to why the identity mechanisms in play might have been consistently relied upon,
thus allow addressing the third requirement. Therefore I am going to focus on the first two
requirements to formulate the specific research questions of this thesis, initially in generic terms
as follows:
1) How have individuals come to use these mechanisms as a means to authenticate their
own identity in the public space?
2) How have third party entities come to rely on these identity mechanisms as a solution for
authenticating the identity of their individual counterpart in a transaction?
Combining these questions with the series of general research questions across three
historical periods as generated in the general introduction (i.e. general research question and subquestions), that leads to formulating and organizing all the research questions as well as the
general layout of the analytical pieces in this thesis as shown in Table 3-2.
3.4.2

Data and analysis

Before ending this chapter, I more specifically describe in the following the types and sources of
data that have been brought under this investigation, as well as the analytical procedures used.
Case I: Medieval seals
•

Literature/textual analysis
Here history is the data, albeit through secondary sources – that is, history as reported by

historians. As a matter of fact, that is what history exactly is: a record, written or oral, of the past
events deemed of certain significance from the perspective of the narrator or reporter (rather than
a comprehensive and exact view of events as they were unfolding at the time they did.)
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Table 3-2: Research questions and design

General
Question

General Q
sequencing

How do social actors, events or processes enable the historical emergence of authoritative identity credentials for the
public at large?
Historical Case I

Historical Case II

Historical Case III

In what circumstances did the challenge of
reliably representing individual identity
within written records emerge in the
Middle Ages and how was it resolved?

How did identity credentials issued by the
national state historically emerge and
become authoritative?

How are social actors, events or processes
leading to the possible emergence of
authoritative digital identity credentials
for Internet end users at large?

Specific research questions
Specific Q.1

Specific Q.2

[I.1] How were individuals led to use that
solution to authenticate their own identity?

[II.1] How have individuals been led to
use government identity documents as a
means to authenticate their own identity?

[III.1] How would Internet end users
come to use digital credentials to
authenticate their identity online?

[I.2] How did social actors come to rely on
that solution for authenticating the identity
of their individual counterpart in a
transaction?

[II.2] How have social actors come to
accept government identity documents as
a reliable way to authenticate the identity
of their individual counterpart in a
transaction?

[III.2] How would independent third
parties come to accept a given digital
identity technology or credential as a
reliable mechanism for authenticating the
end user’s identity online?

Causal mechanisms and pathways in the historical emergence of identification systems
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As such, history is the accounts that historians give of the past, or of the present but through
events or actions already past. To the extent that there are well established records of events and
actions as well as widely documented narratives thereof within the medieval history field of
study, the fundamentals of which are so far unchallenged relatively to the focus of this
investigation, I use those accounts as material for this analysis.
The two primary sources of this chapter’s material are found in Bedos-Rezak (2000) and
Fraenkel (1992). These works have been based on original medieval archives and artifacts. In
terms of the historical conditions surrounding those artifacts, the authors are consistent with one
another as well as with any other historical accounts and materials that I have come across
regarding medieval seals and practices of documentary validation or related to their institutional
context (not all of which are cited in this thesis.) Further literature has been harnessed in order to
flesh out the medieval context from which we today are the most remote, as compared to any
other historical context in this investigation. This is done in order to help the reader form a dense
and fine enough picture of the sociohistorical environment where the phenomenon of interest is
situated while providing him or her with a larger basis for the possible critique of my reading,
interpretation and later use of the insights gained in the course of this medieval study.
The medieval chapter is at its core articulated around four investigative essays. The first
one is a short essay expounding the sociopolitical structures that shape the medieval context in
which seals emerged as a common identity token. The second investigative essay fleshes out the
economic characteristics and interests of the organized medieval Church. The third essay details
the domain and practice of documentary validation and the panoply of artifacts that were used to
that effect, particularly the seal. The last investigative essay presents the legitimizing discourse
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and rationale of social actors regarding the seal as identity token and articulates a critique of that
discourse.
The method applied in this chapter is plain literature or textual analysis as common in the
humanities,37 but used here for social science purposes. This shift of purpose entails a major
difference. The literary type of literature analysis generally focuses on a single author and draws
its interpretations not only from the actual ideas and images explicitly deployed or referenced by
the author in the material but also from a variety of clues and hints from the style to the lexical
repertoire and other relevant dimensions and components of the textual artifact. Here, the
material of the analysis includes a variety of authors and texts that are only related by the interest
the textual contents may present to this inquiry.
In practice, I have collected a stack of texts that I have identified as relevant to
investigate seals in the Middle Ages (see below for my initial reading entries to this literature).
References on the final list of materials have been accumulated from intensively using the rich
footnotes or endnotes as well as the bibliographies and references gathered from the initial core
readings. This has been complemented by free searches of the Syracuse University Library’s
collections, online bookstores such as Amazon.com as well as the Web in general (notably on
Google Scholar and Google Books), using key words and phrases. All of this was done
iteratively until the different parts that may provide a coherent medieval tableau are in place.
The analysis has consisted in reading and critically analyzing the stack of texts thus
gathered about western medieval history, with the aim to outline that tableau as clearly as
possible while bringing out, as much as possible, the coherence of the whole from the presumed

37

This analytical method in other words pertains to hermeneutics.
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standpoint of the historical actors involved. In the same time I point out challenges and possible
inadequacies from our present research standpoint, and propose plausible interpretations that
may close the gaps. Such interpretations are based on the cumulative understanding gained from
the totality of the relevant literature and are guided by a rigorous, evidence-driven inference or
reflection – such was, at least, the intention.
Case II: Government ID
In this case, I seek first and foremost to elicit the genesis and evolution of the passport
from its origins to its rise as an international credential in the contemporary world. But rather
than being fixated on the search of the origins for the sake of it, I particularly follow the
evolution paths that led from the first document called passport and its function then to the nearuniversal document we know today as an identity credential specifically for the purpose of
traveling. Case II particularly qualifies as a process-tracing. Process-tracing is a within-case
method that allows documenting in more or less fine detail (depending on the variety) a
particular process, i.e. a phenomenon that has unfolded over a time sequence, and to make
“inferences about causal mechanisms within the confines of a single case or a few cases”
(Bennett and Elman 2006: 459).
•

Literature and documentary analysis
Case II addresses the phenomenon of the historical advent of the passport in two parts:

the early history – the genesis, in another word – and the latest part which has produced the
passport as we know it today. Just like the seal in the previous chapter, the former is addressed
through existing literature, as it has also been largely accounted for by historians. However, as
we move closer to the present context, the latter part is mostly based on near-contemporary
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archives and documents, referring to relevant proceedings of the League of Nations (between the
two world wars) and, later on, the United Nations and ICAO regarding the development of an
international type of passport and its subsequent uniformization. In the main, those documents
contain conference proceedings, expert committee reports and government feedback regarding a
series of passport-related issues, guidelines and recommendations. The case description consists
of a thorough reconstitution of the sequence of events, decisions and actions in order to trace the
process of that emergence.
George and Bennett (2005, chapter 10) distinguish four varieties of process-tracing:
detailed narrative, use of causal hypotheses and some limited generalization, analytical causal
explanation in theoretical forms, and more general explanation which is the opposite of the first
variety in that it is least detailed on the process. At this point, the documents are used to build a
detailed narrative of the process of emergence of the international passport all the way to
machine readable passports.
As I mentioned above, Case II is complemented by a small case on the development and
early implementation of the French national identity card, which is drawn from a secondary
contemporary source (a scholarly one that has thoroughly investigated historical reports and
original materials on the topic). This addition has the opportune purpose to enlighten the
investigation about the process of establishing a government-enabled identity schema
domestically in the context of the modern state, and in conditions where citizens still have a
leeway to choose whether to adopt it or not. Finally, I close the chapter with a more analytical
piece on what I call identity primitives. In that section, I reflect on the so-called breeder
documents and trace the process of emergence of ‘nationality’ as a legal concept and a formal
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category in the institutionalization of the national state, which is also key to government
authority to identify individuals.
Case III: Digital identity
For the investigation of this case, I will mainly use industry and government documents,
complemented by interviews with a number of key individual participants and
observation/reflection.
•

Observation
This data source includes any background knowledge that has been gained prior or

parallel to the active investigation period but without necessarily and explicitly using a particular
data collection mechanism. The period of observation started in May 2006, which was the month
I attended for the first time the semi-annual Internet Identity Workshop (IIW) in Mountain View,
California only at its second iteration. It has been carried through subsequent meetings,38 but
most importantly on discussion lists.39 The main list was launched by the IIW organizers. For the
first phase of its existence, the list was a closed one. It became public when its management was
transferred to the “Identity Commons” group in 2009. During the observation I was able to
identify the actors in terms of the roles that they play and the place they occupy in the design
community. In addition, information about every happenstance related to digital identity (e.g.,
relevant conferences, reports, other document releases, notable developments or initiatives) most
likely circulates at some point on this list, rather sooner than later.

38

The IIW 2006 took place on May 1 – 3, 2006 followed the next month by the Identity Mashup Conference at
Harvard’s Berkman Center on June 19. I attended subsequent iterations of IIW and finally the Privacy Identity
Innovation conference in 2010 (pii2010) in Seattle, Washington on August 17 – 19, 2010.
39 The main list which I joined on April 30, 2006 (email on the record with the present author) was
idworkshop@googlegroups.com. It became community@lists.idcommons.net from mid-2009.
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•

Documents and institutional records
This part of the investigation expressly refers to the unfolding process in the United

States, which is led by the industry joined later on by the government, directed towards enabling
user-centered digital identity management within a trust framework for the cyberspace. The
records created in the process, particularly documents that are deliberately released as part of the
process, are given primacy above the interviews and anything else, as positive sources of data for
this analysis. This aspect really needs to be strongly emphasized, as expectations of empirical
research may pre-dispose the reader in favor of non-pre-mediated exercises of data collection40
as being the first and most important ways of getting empirical data. That is not the case in this
context. The reason for this is simple. This is not a behavioral research, and individual
perspectives (as per the interviews) are only expert views reflecting individuals’ experiences and
sometimes opinions which are undoubtedly better informed than the random individual’s, but
they are still individual perspectives. Whilst the documents are the outcomes of collective efforts
and the results of negotiations which reflect the different points of equilibrium reached so far in
the collective process and deliberations. It is already abundantly clear that digital identity is not
going to happen by the feat of one company, let alone a small team of individuals like in a startup. It is at the very least an industry effort, which has just recently come to the realization that
the involvement of government may be instrumental. The main materials I analyze in this
chapter are the ones that document best these collective efforts, as their drafting involves main
industry players and stakeholders – self-selected, and interested enough to join the discussion –
along with active individual participants and the government, and their contents reflect either the
common (or at least the predominant) wisdom or agreement reached at that point, or a challenge
40

Meaning that it is expected that the data collection be mediated by tools designed by the researcher, but not (premediated) through written documents from other sources.
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the whole industry has to reckon with. I have identified those documents through my
participation in meetings, in mailing lists where reports and links to resources as well as
progress, challenges and various issues are routinely shared and discussed. By all accounts, none
of those materials referred to in this investigation went unnoticed by the industry or the design
community, elements of which led or were involved (if only as commentator) in their
preparation. They include industry white papers, protocol descriptions or specifications, vision
papers, design principles, policy formulation, strategy papers, etc. mostly from both industry and
government.
•

Interviews and individuals’ records
This category of data only comes as a complement to the documentary data referred to

above. The interviews have been conducted with individual members of the digital identity
community of practice by using a semi-structured interview protocol, with mostly open-ended
questions (see Appendix B). It is important to note that this was not a survey and therefore the
results of this exercise were not meant for aggregation around specific and common variables.
This interview approach is also different from behavioral research interview in that the
conversations carried out were as much a process of further educating the researcher about what
the respondents know and are doing, as opposed to the other type of interview where the
respondents are truly subjects being studied. In effect, the interview was designed in order to
check my own understanding of the process which was formed during the observation phase and
from the documentary materials, to discuss further questions that I might have on important
points or unresolved issues, and to make sure I become aware of anything of interest to this
research, which I might have missed, given the fact that I could not attend all the meetings or be
present at all the forums where these actors discuss these matters. That purpose in mind, I only
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targeted a handful number of respondents who appear to have a substantial and sustained
involvement with the ongoing efforts and based on the presumption (formed during the
observation process) of the quality of information they might offer. In total sixteen interviews
have been carried out with fourteen respondents out of twenty potential respondents contacted. I
would further characterize them with regard to the selection criteria as follows. The respondents
targeted or selected are individuals:


Due to whom I first learned about the very existence of this community because

of something they have accomplished on digital identity account which got the word out;


Regarded as leading some relevant initiative within the community;



Who are contributing to drafting specifications or are actually building pieces of

software for identity management in the Internet, or have been involved in previously noted
efforts at identity management systems;


Who have given regular conference presentations on some aspect of online/digital

identity management, as a result of being involved in some digital identity-related business
whether through the technical or via the entrepreneurship avenue;


Referred to by another respondent at the end of our interview conversation as

being someone worth talking to about those questions;


Holding a prominent identity-related position in a corporation, a foundation or an

industry association that has a stake and is involved in the building efforts of a digital identity
infrastructure;


Holding a position in a government agency or department with the responsibility

to work with the private industry on these efforts, or having some experience with government
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protocols and policies regarding digital identity credentials of public employees and
government’s contractors.
Obviously, the above categories may overlap but anyone of the respondents belongs to (at least)
one or more of them.
While the protocol lays out the main questions I needed to discuss with members of the
expert and practice community for further clarification on aspects that are relevant for my
investigation, the conduct of the interview was flexible enough to adapt to the expertise or
experience profile of each interviewee: different questions may have been developed further with
different interviewees while some questions may even have been left out when it became
obvious that a particular interviewee was not in position to give a cogent or well-informed
answer (or that within the time allocated, the research will gain much more in spending more
time on some of the questions and less or not at all on some others, with a given interviewee.) In
addition, the interview protocol went through two iterations with improved questions after the
earlier interviews (Appendix B).
By individuals’ records, I am referring to sources such as participants’ web logs, recorded
presentations or other identifiable materials of theirs which are publicly on the record. In the
course of this investigation, I have used a number of these sources for complement of
information, in order to update myself with the latest news on digital identity, or even as tutorial
about some of the technologies.
Finally in closing, I would draw the reader’s attention to the fact that it is not the
assumption of this inquiry that there is a linear history linking successive large scale systems for
individuals’ identification across ages, nor is it the intent to reconstitute a teleological narrative
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eventually revealing digital identity systems as an inevitable or necessary denouement of an
evolution. While I agree that “the more history we understand, the more we understand the
present” (Abell 2004: 299), this research perspective acknowledges that no matter how valuable
it might be to know about past experiences, “the past is only contingently related to the future”
(Wendt 2001). I do not share a deterministic assumption to history. Involved in retrospective
research, the researcher (chiefly the historian) reads and seeks to understand the past inevitably
in light of the present. As Tilly (1975) claims, and has, to some extent, shown with his coauthors, historical outcomes may once have been the least likely. In the face of the proportions
and importance that writing has taken in the rise and expansion of sovereign authority as well as
in the increase of private transactions over centuries, any past event that might have prefigured or
enabled that outcome, no matter in how tiny ways, becomes significant once we are faced with
such consequential outcome, even if it wasn’t so at the time of occurrence of that past event. The
goal in this research is rather to understand the logic, the driving forces and the mechanismsprocesses that led each historically distinct system to come about and take the shape it took – or
is taking – while gaining further insights into interactions between identity management systems
and society. Perhaps in the end – at least I would hope so, – the various insights gained from
each system and era may integrate into a coherent framework with some heuristic value.

3.5 Conclusion
I this chapter, I have provided a view of the research paradigm framing this investigation, from
the relevant philosophical perspective on knowledge to its basic assumptions and constitutive
commitments. I have highlighted the main models of explanation and forms of discourse at work
in this dissertation. Next, I have also articulated the rationale for designing this inquiry around
three big cases before I set forth the material or data that has been analyzed and the way it has
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been so. After this set of preliminaries laying out the conceptual framework and epistemological
foundations on which this scholarly endeavor is built, it is now time to launch the investigation
properly speaking with the analysis of the social phenomena at hand as manifested through
medieval seals, modern government ID and contemporary digital identity technologies. I shall
start with the identity medium of the Middle Ages.
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CHAPTER 4
Seals and Identity in the Medieval West

4.1 Introduction
Writing is a technology that has historically occurred to humanity. Both its emergence and its
evolution have spanned dozens of thousands of years, if one considers the earliest rock and cave
engravings, drawings and paintings such as those in Lascaux caves in southwestern France or in
the so-called “Apollo 11” cave in southwestern Namibia. In effect, to the extent that those
drawings are physical forms of verbal expression, they are the earliest forms of writing. The
drawings of the Tassili N’Ajjer Mountains in southeast Algeria as source of information about
changes in patterns of animal migrations, climate and human inhabitation are evidence of that.41
It has been a very long way from the most rudimentary marks and from those prehistoric
drawings to Sumerian cuneiform script to alphabets and other surviving systems of graphemes.42
However, the evolution of that technology called writing has not been only that of scripts and
other signs representing human languages; it has also been the evolution of the material media by

41

For Apollo 11, see the Metropolitan Museum Web page http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/apol/hd_apol.htm;
Lascaux: http://www.lascaux.culture.fr/#/fr/00.xml; and the Tassili n’Ajjer: the UNESCO Web page dedicated to the
conservation of the World Heritage sites: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/179
42 “There are other systems such as logographies [sic], in which each character represents a word, morpheme, or
semantic unit, and syllabaries, in which each character represents a syllable.” Entry: Alphabet in http://en.wikipedia.org
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and through which writing is done. While they may be related at some high level, those two
evolutions are separate phenomena. For instance, presently we still use the same scripts as many
generations before us while the material media for writing – inscribing or transcribing language –
are radically different as compared to just two or three generations before.
As writing tools and techniques evolved to become more and more sophisticated or
complex, so grew their capacity to support an increasing share of the human experience and
activities. While available forms of writing technology are used to support more and more
human activities, evidence suggests that a particular challenge emerges inevitably. That
challenge is about reliably linking human beings to written artifacts, for this would enable further
use of writing, in turn furthering human and social activities. This first stage of this investigation
deals with that challenge in the early manuscript culture of medieval Europe. Its point of
departure is provided by a historical account focusing on medieval documentary artifacts and
record-making practices. Bedos-Rezak (2000) observes from historical archives that the number
of sealed charters dating after the turn of the first millennium (A.D.) significantly increased and
that proved to be the beginning of a pattern.
In the decades following the year 1000, the number of charters produced and preserved in the northern
France increased by several order of magnitude, setting off a trend toward written documentation that was
never reversed. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1505)

In effect, the observed phenomenon of sealed charter was part of a larger context of increasing
use and dissemination of written records across Europe, particularly official documents including
deeds, titles, acts, diplomas and the like, as people increasingly recorded material transactions,
land gifts, land tenure, etc. The penetration of written records in various social processes only
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grew deeper and larger over the centuries since then, enabling the emergence of more complex
social relations and even that of western modernity (Weber 1978).
The above mentioned transactions have significant long-term consequences. Their
outcome affects parties’ rights and may even effect the transfer of full propriety rights. If we are
brought to believe that the content and status of written documents may significantly affect the
actual distribution of those and other rights in the society then clearly, the need to record those
transactions presents a case with this paramount question: how does one link human actors (in
fact any kind of agents that can manipulate any meaningful aspect of the type of record at hand)
to the written document, accurately and reliably represent them within the parameters of this
writing technology? In what circumstances did the challenge of reliably representing
individual identity within written records emerge in the Middle Ages and how was it resolved?
According to Bedos-Rezak (2000) the answer to that question ultimately lies in a sign-object, the
seal.
The solution achieved centered on the seal, a sign-object standing in, substituting, for its owner or user, and
conceived and created so as to produce a duplicate presence, a presence not actual but nonetheless real. (p.
1505)

[S]eals were successful as objects denoting both identity and authority. They produced identity as a
foundation for documentary authorship, authority, and, ultimately, authentication. (p. 1531)

However, we are still to grasp the mechanism and the rationale that led to such outcome,
which is the object of this chapter. Furthermore, the above answer may invite more questions.
The kind of transactions we are dealing with here was not totally new to the humanity, even in
the medieval west. And yet, they were dealt with differently before then. Why did it become so
important at a particular point in time to record transactions? Something must have changed or
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surfaced in this social context which would lead stakeholders to engage in these new practices in
their time.
Eleventh and twelfth-century lay elites came to be the subjects of representation in the explicit sense that,
in situation requiring authority and commitment, they evolved from immediately present agents to
represented actors. Persons absent in time or place were substituted by seals, which operated as alternates
for those who were absent, acting in their place. It is intriguing that personal identity came to be signified
just as people began to project their authority and accountability beyond their own actual, empirical
presence. It was as if absence were required for the question of identity even to become conceivable. (p.
1490)

The whole of this chapter is devoted to exploring the broader historical, cultural and
institutional contexts where those changes occurred with specific practices enabling documentary
authority. I first outline the institutional profile of that era in the region at hand. This leads to
recognizing the power of the Roman Catholic Church at the time as well as the antecedents of
that power beyond spiritual concerns, both in the political arena and in the economic domain. I
then delve into the documentary practices produced by that institutional environment whereby
the conceptions about signs and their efficacy are put to practice in the manipulation of
documents to convey agency and authority. From that well-documented context I will finally cointerpret, following but also extending Bedos-Rezak, the antecedents and assumptions as well as
the implications of the seals emerging as a commonly reliable marker of identity. But first of all,
let me clarify the basis for choosing the medieval west as a starting point.

4.2 Why the Medieval West?
While in the Middle Ages individuals, families and corporations may indifferently possess a
crest, a coat of arms or a seal, seals have come over time to be used only by constituted corporate
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bodies (as is the case today in most parts of the world) rather than by physical/natural
individuals. Along with crests and coats of arms, the figure represented on the seal is part of
those emblems that constitute the object of heraldry – whether as the art of blazoning those
armorial bearings and emblems or as their domain of study.43 From our contemporary
experience, we can see that seals bear the representation of an emblem symbolizing an agential
entity. They are printed on letterhead and other official documents as a symbol of officialdom or
authority. By affixing its seal to an item or exhibiting it in certain circumstances, a corporate
entity conveys its authority together with the said item or asserts it over said circumstances. A
material replica of a seal may also be hanged to a desk or a lectern dressed to host an official
representative (e.g., the seal of the President of the United States when he signs a bill or delivers
a speech). Any official representation of a seal is meant to be an accurate replica of the original
and official seal – a master seal of a sort historically referred to as the “great seal of…” – so that
it carries the highest force as an instrument of assertion and authentication of officialdom.44
Chiefly among all bodies corporate, the national state as a whole has a standard seal just as it has
a national flag, both forming probably the most known emblems of a republic or a nation.
National state seals may be observed on documents such as government-issued traveler’s
passports or visas. Its embossed design may be replicated on a writing surface by printing,
impress, watermark or other reproduction techniques. While various branches of any given
republic or various departments of the state apparatus may have their own seals, the seal of the

43 To be more specific, the science of seals is called sigillography (from Latin: sigillum,) or sphragistics (from the Greek
word) but to the extent that the coat of arms for an entity that has one is more often than not the same as the symbol
represented on the seal, heraldry and sigillography overlap in some ways. Another way of saying it is that seals are
relevant to heraldry more as figurative objects while they are relevant to sigillography more as material cultural objects.
44 The great seal of the United States is in custody of the State Department while in France and most francophone
countries it is in custody of the Justice Department (or Attorney General). Historically, the workshop that crafts the
official seals has been the same to be in charge of official coins whether as money currency or other official medallions
of various sorts (notably, medallions of official awards from the military to the arts), which can only be replicated under
the appropriate authorization and with extremely accurate techniques.
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national state as a whole supersedes in authority those other seals, just as the state authority and
jurisdiction does its departments’.
Now that we have recognized the contemporary existence and use of seals, “Where do
seals come from?” one might ask. For a dissertation starting with the examination of medieval
seals and claiming to shed a light on the way tokens have been used to represent identity in
general, it may be necessary to make explicit a few basic facts regarding the above question in
order to avoid unwarranted or false assumptions. I do not mean to suggest that seals originated in
medieval Europe or that it was there that they were first used to represent an entity or even to be
affixed to a record artifact. Certainly not, and nor is this the claim of any medievalist historiansigillographer. Not only the use of seals has been evidenced in different civilizations, but there
also appears to be a significant overlap between usages across different cultural settings.
Originating alongside if not actually preceding the invention of writing, sealing remained, in most
civilizations, a valuable mechanism for marking and protecting ownership, signing commitment,
designating identity, representing authority, and authenticating documents…. Mesopotamian and biblical
texts, Platonic and Aristotelian treatises, patristic and early medieval commentaries all incorporate the
imagery of seals as a conceptual tool. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1511)

Fraenkel (1992) is less ambiguous about whether seals preceded the invention of scripts, and
suggests that at their origin, seals were not at all related to writing and that they were previously
used to lock a closed space or a container.45 Seals appeared in a variety of civilizations and
cultures around the world and across the ages (Smith 2002; Sun 2004; and Collon 2006). They
were used in ancient China to represent dynasties and their authority (Sun 2004). Even long
before that, they were used to support ownership-related claims and for accountancy purposes
45

Citing Tassin and Toustain’s Nouveau Traité de la Diplomatique (Fraenkel 1992: note 2, p. 292) she writes: “In
Mesopotamia, seals as pre-existing writing were first used to close a space or container.” (This author’s translation)
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(Collon 2006). As far back as archeological artifacts can show, seals were at least contemporary
to the earliest meaningful and durable marks that humans have made on solid surfaces.
Man has always sought to make his mark – to show that he was here by carving his name on a tree or at the
top of the Pyramids, to show that certain piece of property belonged to him or came from him, to indicate
his authority. The rubber stamps of officialdom, the sealing-wax and lead seals of custom and excise or
post-office, the royal or state seals attached to important documents have their origins in the carved amulets
used by Prehistoric man. (Collon 2006: 5)

Admittedly, writing one’s name is only a very recent and rather sophisticated practice in human
history. But the fact is this: the technique that consists of carving signs, symbols or figures in a
solid material and then pressing such tool upon a soft surface in order to leave those marks,
invariably and repetitively, for deliberate purposes and specific meanings is at least as old as the
oldest systems of writing known to date.
Sumerian tablets, the oldest written materials found so far, date back to the 4th
millennium before this era, and so do the oldest seals known. Both were found in the region
known as the Mesopotamia, that is, an area irrigated by the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers,
covering the contemporary Iraq and eastern Syria. Those earliest records show characters of a
cuneiform script (nail-shaped) developed from the Sumerian pictographs. The characters were
inscribed by means of a stylus on damp clay tablets, reportedly much more resistant than the
papyrus, the parchment or wood tablets, which were used at later periods (Collon, 2006). Apart
from a cuneiform script, impressions of drawing have been found on those tablets and a variety
of other supports dating from the same period. As it turned out, those drawings came from the
impress of cylinders – mostly in lead – that had been carved with shapes and figures distinctively
representing familiar objects and situations. Those cylinders are a different form of seal. The
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images impressed by cylinder seals show a variety of scenes reflecting various functions and
aspects of daily life, evidencing ways in which the society was organized. By their cylindrical
shape, those seals are markedly different from the seal-die or seal-stamp that we have come to
know from a more recent past, which are flat and therefore are straightforwardly pressed on wax
or a writing surface.
Cylinder seals were rolled across the tablets and on lumps of clay used to seal vessels, consignments of
goods and the door latches of storerooms, so that it could be ascertained whether or not the contents had
been tampered with. (Collon, 2006: 13)

Even in the medieval west, seals did not at first operate as sign of validation but rather and
simply as a sign of sheer affirmation of the king’s prerogative, as a sign of kingship, “an
apparatus of the office of kingship” from Merovingian to Carolingian kings46 (Bedos-Rezak
2000: 1512). In other words in the medieval west, seals were first used by rulers in order to
convey the authority attached to their functions and therefore, to their decisions, and later to the
documents that recorded those decisions.
From the seventh century onward, seal impressions had been affixed to royal documents exclusively, by a
chancellor who had custody of the royal seal and was responsible for the production and the validation of
royal diplomas. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1512)

As we will see throughout this chapter, it is much later, between the 11th and 12th centuries, that
the notion and the practice of sealing documents as a way to authenticate both the written record
of a transaction and the identity of the actors involved in the said transaction spread among the
populace.

46

The Frank and later French ruling dynasties include: Merovingians from around mid-5th century to 751, the
Carolingians from 751 to 987, and the Capetians from 888 to 1498 all branches included. (Kibler and Zinn 1995: xi-xii)
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Therefore, contrary to later identity tokens I investigate in this thesis, seals were not
invented in the setting under consideration here. In the context of this thesis, I am focusing on
the medieval west for a number of reasons. Aside the opportunistic and cultural reason of having
easier access to European historical records and studies, there also is a logical (and retrospective)
reason for this focus. In our contemporary experience, we have to give credit to the national state
(as will be shown in the next chapter) for having achieved the epitome of what I have termed
authoritative identity credential. It is reasonable to presume that despite possible historical shifts,
there might be a certain level of continuity or connection (possibly cultural, logical or otherwise:
see, e.g., section 4.7 in this chapter) between, on the one hand, the said national state which
begun to emerge at least from the 16th century, and even more clearly so in the 18th and, on the
other hand, medieval experiences of sociopolitical structures, including competing sovereigns
and claimants for a number of valued resources, which have shaped the conditions of emergence
of such state (Tilly 1975; Sassen 2006, and for more cultural aspects Kantorowicz 1951 and
1955).
Furthermore, in the course of my investigation I have come across evidence that,
preceding the printing culture, the manuscript culture confronted in its own context basically the
same problem as that which 21st century actors are confronting about digital records and
transactions: how is a person to be effectively represented through the record medium and
technology at hand?
As a consequence, I can see three factors converging in support to a medieval case:
1) When writing technology, at its manuscript age, began to spread through the west like
never before since the disintegration of the Roman Empire, and to be used increasingly to
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support transactions among ordinary people, the experts in that technology were concerned with
the question of representing identity while using the said technology;
2) As a result a practice of using an “identity system” existed before the modern state, in
the very geographical and cultural context where such state emerged; and
3) Last but not least, that practice was accompanied by a discourse explaining the views
of the actors, indeed the makers of that system, as to how such system was to be reliable for
achieving its objective to effectively represent and convey the identity of the human person.
Therefore, I have determined that there were enough supporting arguments for a medieval case
that fits the research question this thesis is concerned with.
Obviously, it is much better from a scientific standpoint to draw any generalizing
framework from the study of two or three historical cases than from only one. Furthermore, the
two cases represent two distinct eras: one is the era of manuscript technology and the beginning
of the generalization of written records, and the other represents more the era of printing, an era
of a mechanized technology of writing. Even if the mechanization aspect was not present from
the beginning at the emergence of passports, it will be so by the time the “passport technology”
was matured enough to be universalized. Still the biggest novelty in this second era is an
institutional one, that is, the formation of the national state.
Following this clarifying preliminary regarding the assumptions that have guided the
choice of this case or its framing, I will start the case itself by describing next the basic
institutional and historical contours of the environment where the phenomenon of interest
occurred.
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4.3 Socio-political structures and the Investiture Controversy
Studying medieval history uncovers three basic forms of political organization: feudalism, the
church and the empire (Sassen 2006). Let us examine the context provided by those institutions,
particularly regarding the buildup to the changes that will occur at the turn of the millennium.
4.3.1

Feudalism

Feudalism is a regime of social organization where the main form of propriety consists of fiefs,
that is, estate properties temporarily used for a fee by a person or a group of people who are not
the landowners. More concretely in the medieval Europe where this regime was prevalent,
feudalism is characterized by a particular landholding system where a peasant is granted the use
of a piece of land in return for rendering homage, fealty, or some service or good. The landowner
was the lord and the person or group of people exploiting the land were his vassals. Most often in
addition to their allegiance, they paid their fee in kind, which in this case meant a portion of the
land produce. De facto, the lord commits to their protection and security at least within the
boundaries of his properties. The authority or rather the power of lords was central to the
structure of the medieval society, even more than that of the king against whom they competed
for resources (Tilly 1975). Lords had property rights over lands that they either conquered or
inherited from a long lineage and where they lived or maintained some activity. They exercised
their privileges and prerogatives over the people living on their lands and possibly some
influence in the surrounding areas. In return they assumed the responsibility of ensuring the
safety of the area.
Military obligations added to landholding obligations to form the main two dependent
variables of the feudal order, that is, of the feudal system of authority and rights (Sassen 2006:
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chapter 2, citing Bloch’s 1961 Feudal Society). By military obligations, the powerful provided
protection while the weaker offered military service whenever necessary. While one’s
geographical position may be a differentiating factor with regard to what resources and
particularly whose protection (a vital resource at the time) one could enjoy, land was a collection
of estate properties and not at all a unified notion of collective territory. Less than the spatial
position by itself, the linkages generated by that system of exchange in obligations and services
completely defined the resources (including rights) available to people:
…inclusion in the feudal order was not defined by physical location, nor did territory determine identity
and loyalty. An individual’s or group’s specific obligations and rights depended on position in a system of
personal ties, not location in a particular area even when those personal ties might be concentrated in that
locality. (Sassen 2006: 35)

As a consequence, there were no territorial borders to political authority or institutions
per se; authority was rather based on allegiance of classes of people to rulers of various scopes:
the pope, emperors/kings or lords. Obviously those people lived in certain areas, but what
defined their rights and obligations with regard to the sovereign (kings or pope) was not because
they lived on a territory that was a priori delineated as the exclusive territorial domain of one
particular sovereign. That absence of territorial fixity led to what Sassen (2006: 32-33) calls
“multiple crisscrossing jurisdictions” with mutual “territorial insertions.” In other words, there
was a more or less well defined area where people identifying themselves as Franks lived, and as
such they were part of the Frankish kingdom ruled by the king of Franks; and there were
territories known as German lands from where people not only shared significant cultural
features but also their allegiance to the same sovereign. However, people sharing affiliation and
allegiance to the same sovereign did not necessarily live on contiguous lands forming one
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territory, and the papacy, for example, was still able to exercise sovereign authority on some
institutions and some people within the same areas. Likewise, the Frankish or the German rulers
could do the same outside the areas regularly inhabited by Franks and by German folks. It was
personal ties, affiliations and allegiances that defined the borders of sovereign authority.47
During the 8th century and in that context of weak territoriality in political government, a
new and large institution of sovereignty started emerging in the shadow of the defunct Roman
Empire. It takes two forms: the Roman Catholic Church and Holy Roman Empire.
4.3.2

The Church and the Empire

The Holy Roman Empire indirectly originated from the treaties established between the Frankish
king Pepin III (r. 751 to 768) and Pope Stephen II (r. 752 – 757). In effect, following the help
Pepin received from the previous pope (Zachary) in his accession to the Frankish throne, he was
given the opportunity to return the favor a few years later when Stephen’s papacy was threatened
by the Lombards in Italy. In the immediate, those treaties on the one hand contributed to
legitimize the Carolingians while, on the other, they propelled the papacy as a regional political
power instead of being confined to Italian local politics. After defeating the Lombard king, Pepin
retroceded the lands conquered to the papacy, whilst
Stephen granted Pepin the title of ‘patrician of the Romans,’ thus investing him with an imperial office and
commencing a process which will culminate in the establishment of an empire in the west less than half a
century later. (Powell 2004: 505)

47 This is not to say territorial sovereignty was only discovered by the modern national state, as history is not a linear
progress. In note 4 on page 33, Sassen (2006) observes: “Early discussions of territorial questions pertained to Greek
city-states, to Roman cities, and then to medieval Italian cities such as Florence, Pisa, Genoa, Milan, and Venice. The
territoriality of these city-states also entailed sovereignty. Theirs was a territorial sovereignty whereas the sovereignty of
kings rested on allegiance of individuals and organized bodies, not territory.”
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In effect, that process will reach its peak with Charlemagne who ruled the Frankish kingdom
from 768 to his death in 814. His coronation by Pope Leo III in 800 formalized the birth of the
Holy Roman Empire by making him the Emperor of the Romans. This set in stone the alliance
initiated by Pepin, Charlemagne’s father, between western European secular rulers and the
papacy. These developments set off a trend of increasing entanglement between ecclesiastical
and secular authorities and functions. Kings of the Latin west came to be considered no less than
“heavenly kings” and seen like an eminent category of priest in this feudal environment
dominated by networks of personal ties, as we saw previously.
Therefore, governmental order comprised an intricate and ever-changing pattern of personal loyalties,
generally secured by property given in fee tenure. The intended result of fee tenure was to establish mutual
obligations, in which, however, the recipient of the benefice was beholden to the giver for the duration of
the tenure. The bargain was commonly sealed by a ritual through which the giver “invested” the recipient
with the fee. (Morrison 2004: 530)

Originating from the Carolingian era, a benefice was “a grant of land that the kings made
to their counts to hold as long as the counts held office” (Bouchard 1995: 109) and more
generally, it refers to any estate property that is temporary conceded to anyone in return of some
services. In that sense, it is a concept that is practically synonymous with fief, at the difference
that generally benefice involved not a peasant but a person of status.
In that period of its expansion, the Church will be confronted to this reality of the
feudalism order, and will find itself somehow captive of that institution for a while. In the first
couple of centuries of the project of a Holy Roman Empire, it will be a challenge to clearly
define the institutional boundaries between the religious and the secular orders, even more so in
this medieval context of fiefdom.
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Ecclesiastical and secular affairs were closely intertwined; bishops were endowed with comital rights,
including secular jurisdiction; and the predominant form of property consisted of fiefs, in the hands of both
the spiritual and the secular nobility. (Blumenthal 2004: 219)

As a matter of fact, many of the feudal lords or other laymen were abbots, bishops or
archbishops appointed by monarchs. Their authority was equally related to God, regardless of
their source of appointment. God was believed to be the ultimate and the highest authority as
well as source of any earthly authority. In effect on behalf of God, authority was managed on
earth not only by the pope through the government of the Roman Catholic Church but also by the
rulers of an empire that was deemed holy. The ambiguities between clerical and the secular
spheres of authority and functions led to situations of quid pro quo involving transactions of land
and ecclesiastical offices for the purpose of shoring up the power of the secular rulers and the
political ambitions of lords and other members of the nobility (Morrison 2004). The investiture
transaction that Morrison alludes to in the quote above did involve monarchs appointing lords in
ecclesiastic offices with a “package” of estate rights – or benefice – in order to secure political
allegiance and loyalty, blurring the lines between two domains of government.
Ultimately, once by virtue of the Holy Roman Empire secular rulers became chief
soldiers of God – commanders in chief on behalf of God, one might say, – their realm became de
facto that of the church and their subjects potentially an army of believers. In effect, kings raised
armies to fight battles in the name of the Catholic faith. Inevitably, the question was soon to arise
as to who, between the secular rulers – particularly the “Holy Roman Emperor” – and the pope,
must have pre-eminence over the other. If the political realm is also the earthly realm of God,
which one between those two primi inter pares would actually be the prime minister of God, the
one that ultimately would have the privilege of the exclusive audience of God, taking his
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instructions first hand in order to command the earthly order? That was ultimately the issue at
stake in the investiture controversy. Starting circa 1049 with the pontificate of Pope Leo IX (r.
1049 – 1054) it will progressively put an end to three centuries of harmony between the papacy
and secular rulers (Morrison 2004). What probably was a latent conflict of authority between
secular rulers and the papacy began to manifest in the open.
The Investiture Controversy (ca. 1049 – 1122)
The investiture controversy was a series of disputes that lasted about a century. The gist
of the conflict was a competition between secular rulers and the papacy on matters of the church
government. It wasn’t completely new to the 11th century but reached then a defining point for
the political order in the medieval west.
Secular and ecclesiastic governments actively competed for the right to appoint and oversee clerics and
Church administrators between the ninth and the twelfth centuries. Despite attempts by some earlier popes,
such as Nicolas I (856 - 867), to overturn the practice of lay secular investiture, the papacy was unable to
enforce its “independence” until the twelfth century, when Pope Gregory VII successfully wrested from the
secular monarchs the authority to appoint bishops. (Ekelund et al. 1996: 18)

Particularly, the so-called investiture controversy started off by a dispute between Rome
and German monarchs over the authority to appoint the clergy as well as “the right of a king or
emperor (a layman) to bestow the symbols of clerical office on abbots and bishops” (Morrison
2004: 530). It is telling that a dispute over such stake of power had to be settled with arguments
about signs and symbols, which had ramifications I shall return to in more detail. For now the
debate was about material signs of power, that is, it was political.
They [secular princes] also used emblems of spiritual office – such as the bishop’s ring, symbolizing his
spiritual marriage with his church; and the crosier representing the rule of souls. Church law had long
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forbidden the sale of ecclesiastical office as the crime (or heresy) of simony. Beginning with the pontificate
of Pope Leo IX (r. 1049 – 1054), the constitutional and ceremonial aspects of lay investiture came under
attack. (Morrison 2004: 530)

According to Morrison it was the symptom of a profound social change from a tribal to a feudal
organization of the society, at a time where money was not yet the main currency of exchange
but “other commodities, including the use of property and prerogatives, such as the
administration of justice.” (Idem)
In the same time, let us take note that by the years 1000, the church was already facing
internal dissensions regarding its “moral and disciplinary failings” (ibid.) as well as a growing
movement for reform. This will lead to the growth of monastic orders and monasteries across
Europe (Ekelund et al. 1996: chapter 3). The reform movement still grew louder leading to the
divestiture of Pope Gregory VI in 1046 with the help of the Emperor Henry III (r. 1039 – 1056).
The controversy will subsequently have important episodes in France and England as
well. It resulted in secular and ecclesiastical rulers – particularly Pope Gregory VII and King
Henry IV – claiming supremacy over and deposing one another, at least by synodal decrees. In
addition, Gregory excommunicated Henry.
In 1076 and 1080, Pope Gregory VII deposed and excommunicated Henry IV, the son and successor of the
Emperor Henry III, over the question of royal investiture of bishops and abbots; this episode, too, reflects
the assertion of leadership in the Christian world by the reformed papacy. When Henry IV capitulated at
Matilda’s fortress of Canossa in 1077, theocratic kingship as it had been known in the early Middle Ages
came to an end. (Blumenthal 2004: 220)

From the late 11th century, the papacy grew stronger: obedience to the authority of the
pope became a dogma; the papal bureaucracy (the curia) grew in size and more centralized; the
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financial base was consolidated in a more effective structure; the canon law became the object of
academic attention and systematic study. The power of the papacy reached its paroxysm towards
the end of the twelfth century with the pope Innocent III (r. 1198 – 1216). The papacy regained
prominence on the international stage reaching out to its eastern counterpart, the Byzantine
church, with concrete propositions to support crusades against its enemies, in an effort to resume
amicable relationship with Constantinople.
“…Innocent III… formulated the canonical thesis that imperial dignity originated in and depended on the
papacy… The Fourth Lateran Council, an ecumenical council held in 1215, was the high point of
Innocent’s pontificate, and of the standing of the papacy in the medieval Latin west. Constantinople had
been occupied by crusaders in 1204, and a healing of the schism with the Greek Orthodox church could be
hoped for. One of the Lateran decrees formulated the doctrine of transubstantiation with regard to the
eucharist. Another sacrament addressed by this legislation was penance: the Council imposed on all
Christians confession at least once a year before Easter in preparation for communion.” (Blumenthal 2004:
220)

At the same time as the obligation of penance, appeared the possibility of exemption in form of
“indulgences;” these allowed the faithful to be liberated of such obligation against payments. The
Church put in place a number of other policies or regulations that reinforced its financial base
while making it the largest single owner of valuable estate properties including monasteries and
cathedrals (see the next section, 4.4).
In the competing claims that the Church and secular rulers made against each other, the
Church appeared at first to get the upper hand despite the period of instability facing both parties.
This assertion that kings were accountable to popes for their official conduct marked the beginning of a
long and stormy contest for dominance between church and state. (Morrison 2004: 531)
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However, this conflict did in some ways force these institutions to clarify their governance
structures and lay the groundwork for transformative changes in political governance of the
western Europe.
Pope Nicholas II decreed that future popes should be elected by the College of Cardinals from among their
own number. … after 1059 the Church and the papacy rapidly gained autonomy. (Ekelund et al. 1996: 22)
Furthermore, the constitutional principle of the right of resistance came to be applied to popes as well as to
kings. While popes used deposition and excommunication as weapons against kings in the investiture
conflict, kings retaliated with the same weapons against popes and indeed promoted the elections of two
antipopes. The papacy was indisputably an electoral office. (Morrison 2004)

In some (unintended) ways the investiture controversy, promoted ideas of legitimate
representation and political accountability. It made room for intermediary bodies to expand their
role as counterweight to popes and kings. The role of the council and the College of Cardinals
grew in prominence and as a way to curb papal autocracy.
Thus in the church, as well as in the secular rule, the investiture conflict resulted in the formulation of ideas
of constitutional and representative government. (Idem, p. 531)

On the other hand and in ways that were more ambiguous to “democratic” ideals, the weakening
of the kingship, particularly in Germany, strengthened the power of lords while a free peasantry
gradually evolved towards a predominant system of serfdom.
The new configuration of sovereignty will not have territorial fixity up until late Middle
Ages with the progressive emergence of the national state. However, it may be argued that both
the Church and the Empire set in motion a process that will lead at least to a project of
centralized authority which will then require a clear and consolidated territorial base, not the
least because there were many rivals to compete for the (universal) center, or at least one
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sovereign center. So much so that the transaction costs could have been too high and perhaps
unbearable to try and maintain a unique, imperial-universal center that will govern everybody
else as opposed to having multiple centers in order to reduce frictions amongst otherwise
competing potential sovereigns in one and the same space. The political alliance and tensions
between the Church and secular rulers fundamentally shaped that evolution.

4.4 The Church as an economic organization
In this section I consider the Roman Catholic Church through an economic lens. In that I take
guidance from two sources involving partially the same authors. First, the main source is the
book published in 1996 by five authors, Ekelund, Hebert, Tollison, Anderson and Davidson
titled Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm. In that book, they analyze the
Church as a corporation – a multidivisional firm – with different branches and field offices,
which is headquartered in Rome for most of its history. Second, I use the chapter sixteen of the
Oxford Handbook of Economics of Religion, authored by Ekelund, Hebert and Tollison and
published in 2011. Here the authors qualify the Church both “as an economic and political firm”
(p. 306). However, they fall short of providing any further macro-analytical insights (pursuant of
the ‘political economy’ label claimed in the chapter title) in comparison to what they already
provide in the book, which is purported to be a micro-analysis of the medieval Church as one
particular organization – focusing mostly on its inner workings. I will be using a shorthand
citation format in this particular section referencing only the publication year (either 1996 or
2011) and adding the page number after a colon when I quote or want to point to a particular
passage.
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Well before secular governments, the medieval Church leveraged and built on the juristic
legacy of the Roman Empire to establish a system of law and courts. In the meantime, secular
monarchs only sought to resort to God and the Christ as the legitimate basis for their allegedly
hereditary authority and then to ensure the acceptance of that narrative through the submission of
the local warlords, with the support of armed forces if necessary. In that sense, as a “kind of
surrogate government, the Church provided a number of social and public goods to medieval
society” (1996: 25). The canon law was central to the public service provision aspects among the
different functions of the Church. Canon law is a corpus of rules made up of the compilation of
decretal letters (decisions and directives issued by the pope), as well as their commentaries and
exegeses which are part of the jurisprudence. The ecclesiastic courts operated at the diocese level
under the jurisdiction of bishops.
Regardless of the motives of the Church, the actual operation of canon law helped provide a consistent
system of property rights’ enforcement at a time when governments were unable to supply similar public
services in some areas. (1996: 77)

Furthermore, the Church certainly had political clout and was a significant political
player. This state of affairs was the outcome of both the three centuries of alliance and cooptation between the papacy and the Carolingian dynasty since the late 8th century in their
project to establish the Holy Roman Empire, and paradoxically the end of that alliance.
Following the formal end of the investiture controversy, which was marked by the Emperor’s
concession of the authority claimed by the Church to make clerical appointments (Concordat of
Worms in 1122),
the pope emerged as the supreme judicial and legislative authority in western Europe. From the twelfth
century on, all matters pertaining to the ownership, use, and disposal of church properties came under his
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authority. All testamentary cases were adjudicable in Rome, meaning that in the long run, the pope
determined the allocation of most property rights in Europe. Henceforth, bishops (who served as heads of
regional franchises) were subject to papal approval before assuming their duties, and all monastic orders
and new monasteries likewise required papal approval. (1996: 18)

Among the factors that might have tipped the balance in favor of the papacy at that
particular time while previous efforts to keep the Church government from secular interference
resolved in failure, Ekerlund et al. (1996: 18-19) see elements of economic relevance. First the
means of communications, including transportation by land routes and waterways, improved
substantially (compared to the period of previous attempts to secure papal independence from
secular rulers), decreasing travel time and the cost of centralized control of the church. Second,
the subsequent development of trade and towns at the turn of the millennium weakened the
power of European monarchies over local warlords and emerging bourgeoisie, particularly when
it comes to protecting Church assets and personnel. The third factor is particularly important to
note as it refers to the economic strength of the church itself, in significant part due to the central
role it played in the life of the faithful.
Over the many centuries of its existence, the Church steadily accumulated property, so that by the eleventh
century it owned, directly or indirectly between 30 and 40 percent of the cultivated land in western Europe.
Predatory attempts to gain control or possession of this property by local or central governments increased
during the tenth and the eleventh centuries. … By the twelfth century, considerable movable wealth had
also accumulated in Church coffers, mainly due to Church-encouraged bequests made by the faithful who
believed that transfers of wealth to the Church upon their death would ease their way to heaven. (1996: 19)

The Church had to ensure that such important and still growing wealth was protected. The fourth
and last economical motivation was that the Church sought to protect itself and its wealth against
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the threat of anarchy rising in Italy due to local politics by shoring up its central authority vis-àvis secular governments.
Once secured against its political contenders – both locally in Italy and regionally in
Europe – the Church could fully project itself across the West as an autonomous, well-structured
and transnational organization as no other, with consistently the same universal purpose. Despite
its status as a monopoly in the market of religions however, the medieval Church was structured
as a rather nimble organization just as might be a global corporation or firm in this twenty-first
century.
It consisted of a confederated group of cooperating branches that shared common theological premises and
goals. (1996: 29)
It organized itself in a sophisticated manner that centralized long-term, strategic policy (in the Vatican) but
decentralized authority over day-to-day decision-making (in dioceses and parishes). (2011:307)

As such autonomous entity with its own purpose, the medieval Church behaved like any
other economic organization protecting and maximizing its self-interest. Ekelund et al. portray
the Church as an economic monopoly whose product or service is the salvation of the soul in the
afterlife, or “assurances of eternal salvation” (1996: 60). This is not to say that the raison d’être
of the church was to make profit on any product or service, but only an acknowledgement shared
among economists that while some behaviors or even some institutions may have not been
economically motivated in their origins, they still may be fulfilling several objectives at the same
time (1996: 4). As a matter of fact, the areas of competence claimed by the Church’s court
system are clearly related to its institutional interests.
Throughout Europe generally, and in twelfth century England particularly, ecclesiastic courts claimed
jurisdiction over (1) all civil and criminal cases involving clerics, including disputes over Church property;
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(2) all matrimonial cases; (3) all testamentary issues; (4) certain infringement of doctrine perpetrated by
nonclerics (heresy, sacrilege, sorcery, usury, defamation, fornication, homosexuality, adultery, defacement
or destruction of religious property, assault against clerics); and (5) issues involving contracts, property,
and perjury (violation of a sacred oath). (1996: 63)

To the extent that the Church as one single organization and body of rules succeeded to
penetrate the medieval society and to set up structures in order to uphold its rules, it had the
potential to play a crucial political role. This in turn also enabled it to protect and maximize its
particular interests as provider of private goods – and a monopolistic one at that. Virtually every
single individual stood to deal with the Church as the provider of the necessary guidance and
services for the salvation of their soul, that is, the attainment of eternal life after death. In that
regard, “the clergy provided a vital kind of ‘brokerage’ service for the faithful.” (1996: 26)
Most people in medieval Christendom accepted the fact that the Church of Rome had a major influence
over the disposition of their immortal souls – in other words, whether they went to heaven or hell. This
belief is crucial to understanding the medieval Church as an economic organization. By virtue of this fact
the Church was the monopoly provider of pure credence good. The credibility of Church courts, the
validity of canon law, the acceptance of the Church as divinely sanctioned arbiter of earthly disputes and
the ultimate trust in the Church’s various commercial commitments, all derived from the credibility of the
religious doctrines promulgated by the Church of Rome. (Idem)

The particularity of credence good is that the customer lacks of the knowledge or resources
required in order to assess upfront the actual quality of the good. Generally in such case,
reputation is the main determinant of the quality of the good as it derives from customers’
satisfaction through their actual experience not with the product but with its provider, or lack
thereof. In effect, no customer can offer testimony after experiencing eternal salvation. Therefore
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in this particular case, credence is accorded out of faith, that is, deliberately free from any
evidence or burden of proof regarding the ultimate effectiveness of the Church’s services.
With the papacy securing the authority to appoint or oversee the appointment of Church
officers in all the locales where it was implanted, the channels of revenue flows from
downstream agents to the corporate Church were now clearly in place and under good control.
The economic weight and financial size of the Church will keep growing from then on. All
proceeds generated by ecclesiastic courts (fines and court fees) as well as the tithes levied
directly benefited to the diocese. However, part of all diocesan revenues made it to Rome in the
form of the franchise fees (manners of tax imposed on the local clergy) every diocese and
monastery owed to the papacy (1996: 70). Not only dioceses and parishes, but also monasteries
were treated as franchises and had to pay franchise fees to the corporate Church (1996: 36).
Clearly, the Church was also an economic power.
As a corporate entity in the medieval economy, the Church controlled enormous wealth. Its sources of
revenue included tithes, land rents, donations, bequests, fees charged for judicial services, proceeds from
the sale of indulgences, and income derived from the monastic production and marketing of agriculture
produce. Bishops themselves often owned large estates. The pope was the ruler of a major portion of Italy
known as the Papal States, deriving revenue from his subjects in the same fashion as other secular rulers.
Periodically, the Church succeeded in securing direct transfers of (secular) governmental tax revenues,
particularly for the ostensible purpose of funding the Crusades. The Church also controlled most of the
liquid capital in the West, and with the exception of Byzantium in the early Middle Ages, its annual income
greatly exceeded the annual revenues of any government in Europe. (1996: 33-4)

In addition to the revenues mentioned above there are various fines, service tax for archbishops,
census on monastic properties and penance. The tithes paid by parishioners mainly served to
sustain the local priests. The sacrament of penance ambiguously served both as a remedial and as
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a (mild or symbolic) punishment. It prescribed the sinner to accomplish a number of ritualistic
procedure or practical actions. It was possible to arrange for a payment of fines when one could
not carry out the penance due to some practical impediments. From 10th century onward, it
became a common practice to substitute the original, non-pecuniary form of penance with a
monetary fine, each prescribed penance having a specific equivalent in money amount. Bequests,
tithes and other (non-testamentary) donations of estate property are the major sources of revenue.
The faithful made donations at various occasions, including for services rendered by local
churches and clerics.
The two major forms of donation were bequests and tithes. Of these, the bequest was the largest source of
income. Through testamentary means the Church became the single largest landowner in western Europe
during the Middle Ages. The importance of bequests to the Church is affirmed by the explicit allocation of
Church resources to administering testamentary law, as such testamentary cases constituted the bulk of
litigation administered by ecclesiastic courts. (1996: 35)

And the not so faithful – at least judging by their failure to behave well by the Church’s
standards – still ended up making donations as a way of repentance.
A major source of the donations of land to the medieval Church derived from excommunicants seeking
absolution at death. Partly from such gifts the Church became the largest single landowner in Europe by the
thirteenth century, owning as much as one-third of the land in the West. (1996: 70-71)

In fact, as surprising as that may be, excommunication was not used mostly in cases of
disagreement with the Church doctrines or matters of faith, stricto sensu. This may be that
conflicts regarding an article of faith were more likely to be faced with accusations of heresy
than anything else (see infra). Instead, failing to meet payment and/or contractual obligations or
any other form of perjury mainly constituted the ground for excommunication.
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By far the most common transgression leading to excommunication, however, was for nonpayment of debt--and not even debt owed to the Church. (1996: 67)

Any such failure qualifies as a perjury. Before the 11th century any fraudulent business with the
Church constituted a perjury. Since the latter half of the 11th century with the Gregorian reforms
however, the term progressively came to mean a failure to honor a contract, particularly a debt.
The fact is: contracting or the “signing” of contracts was carried out during a ceremony that
involved sealing the agreement under oath taken over some sacred item. Contracting was erected
into a sacred commitment.
In the Middle Ages a contract was almost always based on a mutual oath between the participants, sworn
on some sacred object (e.g., the Scripture or a sacred relic). Thus, a typical contract included a sacred oath
that was sinful to break. (1996: 65)

Excommunication was probably the most profitable of the deterrent tools that the Church
had in its enforcement arsenal. Excommunication did not only isolate one from the Church but
also from other social resources. The excommunicate (or excommunicant) loses what we would
call his citizen’s rights: harm could be done to those in that position without the benefit of a legal
recourse in court and anyone who was caught associating with them in any way (even for help)
was exposed to the same threats. Their heirs may bear the burden of the ostracism, especially if
the excommunicate still owed the Church some payment (Ekelund et al. 1996: 68ff). As a
powerful deterrent, Ekelund et al. argue that it helped the Church maintain its market power. In
the same time, it was a profitable source of income should anyone fail to comply with the rules
that are sanctioned with excommunication.
As the “big stick” in its enforcement apparatus, excommunication played an important role in the
generation of revenue. It was a legal sanction the pope could impose against the clergy for nonpayment of
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taxes. Not even abbots and bishops were exempt. Default in payment of the census, a tax levied against
monastic property could result in excommunication of all members. An archbishop who failed to pay their
visitation tax or service tax (servitia) on time could be excommunicated. (1996: 70)

Apart from excommunication, the Church safeguarded and even consolidated its market
power by accusing of heresy anyone within its boundaries who would challenge or make
competing claims about its views or teachings. When the accused heretics were sentenced to jail
or to the stake, the Church was most likely to confiscate their wealth. At a global level outside its
boundaries, crusades or military expeditions were the solutions the Church resorted to in order to
keep a competing religion such as Islam at bay.
I have mentioned above the organizational structure of the Church which reminds us of a
model applicable to contemporary transnational or global corporations. The comparison doesn’t
stop there. Just like in a modern firm, there was an incentive-disincentive system in place so as to
protect the Church against inefficient and rent-seeking behaviors, and to secure its assets and
reputation. In order to reward managerial behavior that “increases the value of the firm, and to
discourage shirking and other forms of malfeasance” (1996: 31), the papacy used residualclaimant arrangements comparable to what is practiced in modern firms (whereby beneficiaries
receive additional and variable streams of income or perquisites).
In particular, rather than place its cleric-managers on salary, the medieval Church assigned them temporary
rights to portions of revenue flows from common-pool assets under their supervision. This was the case of
particularly all the clerics outside the papal bureaucracy. Such residuals were termed “benefices,” in the
vernacular of the medieval Church, and they constituted a major element of internal control against
malfeasance. (1996: 31-32)
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In the hierarchical environment of the Church, the pope supervised payment of benefices to
bishops, while the latter supervised the benefices of priests in their diocese. The camera was the
papal treasury helping with the collection of Church’s revenues. Initially dedicated to the
intendance of the pope’s household, the camera grew to become a highly organized structure
serving as treasury, bank and “as a court of law – with civil and criminal jurisdiction over papal
debtors and all matters affecting papal finance” (1996: 34). It had field agents, known as legates
and nuncios, in charge of enforcing the payment of rents and taxes and transferring them back to
their headquarters in Rome (1996: 36). As such, the camera ensured that payments are made
appropriately through audits which it outsourced to other private parties and bankers.
Among different guises of malfeasance, the sin of simony received particular attention
from the Church authorities. The simony consists of charging for sacraments and Church
services or, more gravely, selling Church offices such as the positions of bishop and abbot (more
rarely archbishop). Professional simony is distinguished from proprietary simony (based on the
terminology proposed by Rodes in his 1977 Ecclesiastical Administration in Medieval England:
see Ekelund et al. 1996: 32).
Professional simony regarded only clerical services, that is, any service that clerics were
expected to perform or render to the faithful as part of their duties as Church officers. This form
of simony was tolerated within certain limits. Particularly, there was a price cap on the allowed
fees and a prohibition from withholding services, chiefly the administering of sacraments, in
order to enforce the payment of tithes or of any fees for other services. In sum, a diocese or a
parish could advertise capped prices and expect payments for a range of services they provided
to the faithful but they could not, or at least should not, deny any service on the basis of nonpayment for whatever services or non-payment of any taxes. To the extent that the prohibition to
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withhold services for payment did not necessary imply that fees were to be waved – certainly not
that debts or consumed credit could be canceled – for customers who did not pay what they
owed, this was much likely to create situations where the church (the parish) might need to keep
credit records or the record of any unpaid dues.
The proprietary simony was apparently the most troublesome for the Church.
This practice involved the purchase and sale of all manner of Church assets, including land, offices, relics,
and consecrated vessels. … it was a pure drain on Church resources, in short, theft of Church propriety.
Some cases involved simple theft, such as the sale of a blessed relic on the open market. Other cases were
more complicated, such as the sale of a presiding bishop of his holy office to a noncleric. (1996: 32-33)

This form of malfeasance was the most dreadful for the Church as it can substantially undermine
the Church’s assets especially when the clergy itself engaged in that depredation. For that reason
it was severely punished with heavy penalties and excommunication. Even the change from
married clergy to priestly celibacy had an economic argument to it, as in early medieval Church
benefices were inherited by the family and, possibly with them, misappropriated Church assets.
Celibacy presented the advantage of maintaining the cost of monitoring for proprietary simony
as heirs were no longer.
It was in that context of the ascendance of the Church as both a political and an
economical force that the other transformations we are particularly interested in here took place.
This sheds a light on some of the reasons that led to the multiplication of charters and diplomas
in the records of the medieval Church. Before I get to the discourse and the rationale developed
by the “chancery-scholars” as Bedos-Rezak calls them – at once churchmen, schoolmen and
chancery staff – I am going to focus on those material elements such as documents and seals as
well as the graphical signs that shaped their practice.
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4.5 Documents, Signs and their Authority
Before discussing signs as well as their importance, functions and uses, let us define some basic
terms in this context. Charters and diplomas are documents that assign or transfer rights. In this
medieval context they were mostly used to record estate transactions, that is, land granting with
full property rights or in tenure. However, they may also be about financial grant (e.g., awarded
by a sovereign for some particular reason or just as a favor), recognition of debt, license or letters
patent, etc. The term “diploma” comes from the fact that they generally came in the form of
folded paper or, more precisely, parchment. Before diploma came to mean essentially a
certificate of a particular level of educational achievement, they simply were certificates of some
right(s) or status issued by the king. Both diplomas and charters are particular deeds. A deed is a
writing executed under seal, or a signed and witnessed formal legal document, which is issued to
effect a transfer of property, or to create a legal obligation or contract. In the Middle Ages, royal
chancellors as well as notaries were generally responsible for drafting those documents and
affixing all required elements to make them authentic, which was required for them to be given
the value intended. In that process, those scribes made annotations and marks using some
conventional but very uncommon writing called Tironian notes. They are so called because they
have been attributed to Marcus Tullius Tiro who was Cicero’s scribe.48 He reputedly created that
shorthand script for the purpose of transcribing full speeches as the orator spoke. It was then
used by medieval scribes to make notes that are legible only to a few professionals in the process
of authenticating documents.
As the investiture controversy would indicate, signs are of a crucial importance in the
medieval thought and practice. Perhaps because of the importance and omnipresence of religion,
48

See “Tironian Notes” entry in the Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org
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particularly in the political as well as in the intellectual life – a religion that teaches that the
ultimate good commanding everything else rests beyond this physical world – it appears that
every bit of the visible world was seen as the sign of something else which is not visible.
Therefore, it is not surprising that there is something of a power at stake to try and be a master in
signs, be it in their manipulation or in their conceptualization and definition. This will again
manifest itself in the course of this section and the next. Here I am going to expound the western
medieval basics when it comes to making or manipulating records, literally empowering
documents to convey agency, carry institutional value and have an impact in the society. It is
within that “ecosystem” of signs that we will have to understand the operational mode of seals as
markers of identity and authority.
4.5.1

Authority and its apparatus of signs

Writing requires the use of a script which is a system of signs. Still within the same linguistic
and cultural setting, there may be different categories of signs, some of which not intended for
verbal expression even though they may have meaning or represent some value. For instance
beyond the literal content of a document, non-linguistic signs may add a layer of meaning or
provide the document as a whole with some intended effect. In the early medieval manuscript
culture when writing was still an ability only shared by the literate few, nonlinguistic signs were
highly visible in written records and record-making (or record creation) was accompanied with
some ceremony. This may have been necessary for the literate to convey to a not-so-literate
audience the right sense of gravity that should be attached to the intent and meaning of the
document within the cultural framework of writing that was only emerging then.
In that emerging practice of making and signing records of personal transactions, the
emphasis was on the physical presence of the parties and their participation in establishing and
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executing the document (see the contract signing ceremony I refer to in section 4.4). The fact of
recording transactions in writing (instead of oral ceremonies only, as it had used to be previously
the case) may at this point be read as a complementary “security” measure taken by the main
beneficiaries of those transactions, the desire to ensure some permanence by creating an
objectively retrievable memory of the actual transaction. I stop short of calling such written
record a piece of evidence, because it appears that this merely was the beginning of a transition
that will lead eventually to ascribing higher evidentiary force to written information and
testimony over their oral form which had previously been favored. At the time of the Roman
Empire up to relatively late in the Middle Ages (roughly 14th century) oral testimony was the
ultimate way of establishing evidence in judicial proceedings (Clanchy 1983; MacNeil 2000). In
the 11th and 12th century notably, the written record of transactions was still conditioned by the
oral culture. Otherwise put, there was not yet an autonomous evidentiary regime of writing; the
written word was mostly an appendix to the oral performance of commitment or transaction. As
a consequence, in case of challenge or litigation, it was not the written record that most
decisively determines the outcome, but rather oral testimonies and direct negotiations of a sort.
This framework rested on the primacy of empirical presence in the assertion of authority; it construed
power to emanate from character, to be the effluence of personality. Thus, when gifts of land were
contested and resolved by charter, as often happened, such disputes were not settled by considering the
parties as donors and recipients, and by applying legal rules appropriate to these categories, but rather by an
agreement through which the status and self-esteem of both parties as particular individuals might be saved
and a social relationship between them created or renewed. Behavior was remembered and inscribed in the
form of statements about particular persons and their actions. The attention was to individual will and
responsibility, to a personal examination of the implications of one's actions, which were understood as
involving, beside terrestrial and social consequences, merits capable of saving (or losing) one's soul in the
afterlife. In short, the legal realm conjured up by the charters was equated with the realms of ethics and
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theology. The “subjective” and “personal” in the law, far from diminishing legal authority, in fact
constituted it. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1509)

The belief system as well as the culture imparted by churchmen led to think and to trust
that God was “the most reliable traditional agency” (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1507) and as such, his
authority was the best guaranty possible for taking any assurance on the future, or for ensuring
validity, effectiveness and permanence to any human commitments, especially but not only those
made in a procedure intended for the salvation of one’s soul. Just as the Holy Scripture holds the
terms and promises of the alliance and commitment between the Christ and the Church, likewise
writing down the intention and act of donation in a charter (and then swearing it on a sacred
object) was an opportunity to achieve or approximate the same level of sacredness as the
Scripture for the benefit of the donor. This however had to be done with the appropriate signs
and rituals.
Documentary writing derived much of its power from a visible affinity with Holy Scripture, an affinity
established both by graphic logic and by liturgical manipulation. Graphic logic involved such methods as
the inscription of a Chrismon, a Trinitarian invocation, the use of Latin, biblical preambles (arenga), and
divine maledictions and threats of excommunications against anyone who might challenge the gift being
recorded. Liturgical manipulations included the charters’ production by priestly scribes and their placement
in altars or in Gospels. A manuscript charter was kindred to Scripture and, as such, was a space of sacred
and secure inscription. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1507, emphasis added)

Still regarding the provisions of the charters and the efforts of their designers to secure the
commitment being made, Fraenkel (1992), too, notes the same features. A variety of signs
referring to God transformed the concerned documents into a sacred space whereby the persons
involved in the matter being settled within them were warned of the risks and penalties that any
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perjury would entail. There were clauses that made explicit threats, spelling out the possible
punishments in the temporal as well as the eternal realms.
… chartres et diplômes visent à s’instituer comme espaces sacrés privilégiés, archives de la voix de Dieu.
Ce constat résulte de l’examen des clauses dites comminatoires qui comportent les menaces proférées à
l’encontre des violateurs éventuels de l’acte. Ces menaces, fréquentes dans les actes jusqu'à 1150, sont de
deux sortes : menaces de peines temporelles, le plus souvent d’amendes, et menaces de peines spirituelles
telles que l’anathème et l’excommunication, énoncées selon les formules empruntées aux épitaphes gravées
sur les marbres funéraires menaçant les profanateurs de sépultures, lieux sacres par excellence. (Fraenkel
1992:69)

I suggest the following translation:
… it is the aim that charters and diplomas be instituted as privileged sacred spaces, archives of the voice of
God. This observation results from the examination of the clauses known as comminatory which include
threats made against potential violators of the deed. Those threats, frequently found in deeds up until 1150,
are of two sorts: menaces of temporal penalties, most often fines, and menaces of spiritual penalties such as
anathema and excommunication, stated in formulas that were borrowed from engraved epitaphs on
gravestones threatening the profaners of sepulchers, sacred places par excellence.

Clearly, signing a deed or a contract in those conditions for a Christian went hand in hand
with taking an oath on the Scripture or other sacred object, which probably had much more
weight in the 11th century Europe than we can imagine today a millennium later. In addition
these latest two authors confirm what we saw in the previous section, to wit, that failure to honor
such contractual commitments thus sealed qualified as a perjury and put one at risk of
excommunication. By all accounts, the name of God was intended and understood to increase the
power of any deed – securing efficacy, permanence and assurance, – and it was believed and
expected that the most reliable source of guaranty for any contract was God, as afterlife salvation
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was the most powerful incentive for compliance: there was no better protection to any business
than the one that comes from God.
In official deeds the signaling of God was encompassing, and certainly ubiquitous. The
signs referring to God were scattered in the body part as well as the protocolary parts (header and
footer) of the document. Fraenkel (1992: 59) distinguishes two types of signs referencing God:
1) the verbal and explicit references (e.g., “In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti”
and quotes from the Scriptures), and
2) the coded, semiotic or iconic marks.
The latter may be pictographic, ideographic, symbolic or otherwise, the only constant and
constraint being to refer to God or the Christ. The central theme for those nonverbal marks was
the cross, which was represented through various Christic signs and monograms including the
plain cross manually signed and the chrismon.49
Apart from God, the king and scribes are the other important players intervening in the
enablement of documentary agency and authority. God is the ultimate source of authority, the
“absolute referent,” as Fraenkel puts it. The king is the highest wielder of that authority in his
realm, at least regarding secular matters (the pope may be seen as another wielder regarding
matters of the Church.) And last, scribes – first the royal chancellor and the referendary,50 later
followed by the notary – are the agents tasked with giving the proper form to the documentary
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The sign of the chrismon is made up of the Greek letters chi and rho, the first two letters of the name “Christ”
transcribed in Greek, superimposed one on top of the other. The corresponding entry in the Wikipedia
(http://en.wikipedia.org) signals that the term is a portmanteau word derived from the Latin phrase “Christi
Monogramma.”
50 At http://dictionary.reference.com/ it reads that a referendary is, among other things: “An officer who delivered the
royal answer to petitions” or “Formerly, an officer of state charged with the duty of procuring and dispatching diplomas
and decrees.”
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expression of authority. The capability for any writing to enact some change in the social and
physical world, to assign or transfer rights, requires the participation of all those three entities in
one form or another (Fraenkel 1992). In addition to the signs of God, official documents
included the king’s monogram and seal, subscriptions51 or endorsement formulas, Tironian notes,
autograph signatures or other signing marks. Those were the vectors used by scribes to manifest
the value and authority of royal charters and diplomas, and in so doing, to validate them.
The king’s scriptoria officers (royal scribes) attending to the manipulation and inscription
of those signs in the process of establishing official documents as early as the 5th century
included the chancellor, the referendary, the chamberlain (the officer or steward who managed
the household of the king), plus lower-level scribes as relevant. The most salient figure in the
king’s scriptoria is the chancellor who generally was the keeper of the official royal seal and
oversaw the production of the royal documents by the other scribes. The position of chancellor
historically evolved up to being an influential member or even the top officer in the king’s
cabinet; with Philip the Fair (r. 1285 – 1314) he ranked, in the hierarchy, next after princes
(Fraenckel 1992: 27).
The church used notaries as early as the 4th century. Bishoprics, parishes and monasteries
had their own. They were mostly clerics or church clerks, and will serve later on as notaries
public when literacy was still limited in the rest of the society. In effect, outside the church,
notaries reappeared in the 12th century with the resurgence of the Roman law in the secular
domain. For nearly two centuries (14th and 15th), there will be an ambiguous coexistence of
51

I shall draw the reader’s attention here about possible ambivalence of this term in this context. In this whole chapter
and in reference to medieval deeds, I will be using the term “subscription” as a translation from French (souscription).
However, instead of “subscribe,” it may be useful to think of “underwrite” as the verbal form of what it means (which
indeed is the literal meaning.) That said, I’m not quite prepared to subscribe to, much less to underwrite, a decision to
equate ‘writing a subscription’ in this medieval context to ‘underwrite’ in our contemporary context, as the latter may
have legal meanings and implications I am not aware of.
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apostolic and royal notaries. Such ambiguity was otherwise entertained by the fact that in royal
courts across Europe, starting with the early Capetian kings,52 the royal chapel clerks were the
ones that were in charge of establishing diplomas. It resulted from that a tradition of linking the
royal chanceries to royal chapels and by extension to the ecclesiae in general. In France
particularly, two dates marked the emergence of notaries: in 1302 Philip the Fair retained the
right to establish notaries, as an attempt to regulate entry in that profession, and at the end of the
15th century Charles VIII took an ordinance in order to ensure that lay people deal with notaries
appointed by secular rulers as opposed to apostolic notaries (Fraenckel 1992: 28-29).
Charters and diplomas – those specimens of official deeds – had a precise organization
and distribution of signs in the space of the parchment, following a general protocol as well as
protocols that were specific to every chancery. The general protocol follows a tri-partition
organization of the document: the body where the specific transaction was described lies
between the opening and the closing protocolary parts.
Tout acte solennel, en effet, est doublement marqué par le protocole : en son début, il s’agit du protocole
initial comportant invocation, subscription53 [sic], nom, titre, qualité de celui au nom duquel l’acte est
rédigé, adresse, salut ; à la fin, il s’agit du protocole final composé de la date, l’« appréciation » ou
formule pieuse, les signes de validation, souscriptions et sceaux. Le texte, encadré par ces deux protocoles,
contient préambules, notification, exposés, dispositif (objet de l’acte) et clauses finales. (Fraenkel 1992 :
39)

In translation:

52

See supra, note 40.
This word as spelled out here being nonexistent in French to the best of my knowledge, I will presume based on the
context that this is a typo where the author meant to write, and maybe actually wrote on her manuscript: “suscription,”
(without the ‘b’) which in French is the opposite of “souscription” although the former is very formal and rarely used.

53
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Every solemn (highly official) deed, in effect, bears the mark of two protocols: in its beginning, there is the
initial protocol comprising invocation, superscription, name, title, quality of the person on behalf of whom
the deed is written, address, salutation; at the closing, there is the final protocol made up of the date, the
“appreciation” or pious formula, the signs of validation, subscriptions and seals. The text, framed by those
two protocols, includes preambles, notice, exposés, the provision (the object of the deed) and final clauses.

Beyond that, every notary or chancery was able to apply, at a more detailed level, its own
specific protocols made up of particular signs and graphical style. In effect every scribe
(chancellor or notary) had ways of interspersing the documents with cryptic signs and writing so
as to render them authenticable, that is, difficult to forge. It appears that in those illegible notes,
the scribes replicated sometimes in different scripts (e.g., Tironian or Greek) certain specific
elements of the current deed, including names of participants and producers of the actual
document, etc. With a technique like this, what appears to be a signature, thus a replicable sign
of validation, may in fact incorporate some variable parts which only the author or an expert
could determine. One may argue that this is a space that accommodates the development of
private as well as privatory54 scripts or ways of writing.
Every seal has a matrix (also known as the seal die) which is the original cast of the seal
image into a solid object such as, for instance, a ring. The waxen seals are (the inverse) replicas
produced by pressing the matrix upon wax or any other soft matter, serving to validate or to
authenticate – to attest or bear witness to the truthfulness and authority of – the content of deeds
and other official documents. The seal matrix of a seal owner was considered as a relic and was
buried with him. Only the waxen seals survived the seal owner along with the artifacts they were
appended to, and so did the validity they conferred to those artifacts.
54 In the juridical sense of depriving others from understanding and using those scripts. In that, those notes operated as
cyphers and such ad-hoc scripts were instances of cryptography. I shall mention that Fraenkel (1992: 47) does suggest
the notion of private writing.
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Throughout the Middle Ages there had been different types of seal. The king’s official
seal was considered the earthly sign of supreme authority. As such, it was regarded with
reverence.
In early Frankish times, under the Merovingian kings (sixth to mid-eighth centuries), the royal seal affixed
to diplomas did not function as a means of documentary validation. Its use imitated the usage of the
Byzantine imperial chancery; to seal a document was, for the Merovingian kings, to behave as a ruler. The
seal was a sign of the king, the only person who could issue documents thus marked. This linkage between
documentary seal usage and royal status was maintained upon the ascension of the Carolingians (751);
royal seals came to operate as an apparatus of the office of the kingship. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1512)

The seal went with the title; it was the proper sign of the person who was de jure the head of a
kingship. The royal seal was not even used when a non-royal nobleman assumed the function
and acted in lieu of the king. Bedos-Rezak also notes that a ruler’s seal followed him even if the
territory he was ruling over changed, which happened with Charlemagne’s empire in the 9th
century. In other words, while an attribute or a token of kingship, the seal was also strictly
personal, i.e. attached to a particular royal person. The stable identity of a seal only included the
name of the ruler and his title (king or emperor). A ruler’s seal matrices will be altered only if
there is a change of status as per one of those two attributes. (Idem)
Over time, seals became more differentiated and the king had different kinds of seals.
The most official seal came to be known as the “great seal of the Realm”55 – that is, the seal of
the highest officialdom as far as the kingdom was concerned. Going forward, the great seal of the
realm will be the one expressing the will or the manifestation of the king as king in every

55

While today the ‘great seal of the realm’ is known as the great seal of the United Kingdom, that phrase would be the
adequate translation for the highest official seal of any kingdom, as in the Middle Ages there were several of them apart
from the UK. Note that non-kingdom states do also have their great seal (which is not referred to as ‘of the realm’).
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respect, imparting the highest authority of kingship to any circumstances or procedure where it is
exhibited.
The king had other seals, some of which were reserved for his personal communications.
Fraenkel suggests that Saint Louis (r. 1226 – 1270) introduced the use of personal or non-official
seals by a king and that further differentiation occurred with Philip the Fair (r. 1285 – 1314).
With him, a kind of seals was reserved for the king’s personal and confidential communications
(“seals of secrecy”) while there was yet another sort of seal for communications of financial
interest. In any case, a differentiation occurred at that period between the great seal which is
unique and what probably was a variety of privy seals (as opposed to a single one) used to stamp
documents of less importance, or less official. One should take note that the use of non-official
seals by the king for personal communications concurs to some extent with the use of seals by
the commoner as identity token. In effect, non-royal individuals also privately used seals before
the 11th century, generally in order to materially represent themselves or authenticate their
identity in correspondence papers and not for validation or authentication of documents per se.
For the latter, one might have used the services of a handful number of clerics exercising
independently from the king as notaries and using identifying seals, among other procedures, in
order to authenticate deeds (Bedos-Rezak 2000; Fraenkel 1992).
A partir du VIIe siècle, le fait que seuls les rois usent de l’anneau à signer pour authentifier les diplôme et
chartes indique qu’entre les lettres privées et les actes juridiques une différence s’instaure. Les nombreux
anneaux à signer découverts dans les cimetières merovingiens prouvent que leur usage s’est maintenu chez
les particuliers, mais en se limitant aux écrits épistolaires. L’identification du scripteur, source du message,
et l’authentification d’un acte juridique deviennent deux notions formellement distinctes. Le roi seul
maintient, par son sceau, cette coïncidence des fonctions, et il faut attendre le XIe siècle pour que les
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particuliers retrouvent l’usage juridique des sceaux dont l’importance va s’accroitre comme jamais avant
qu’ils ne disparaissent définitivement à l’époque moderne (Fraenkel 1992 : 83).

This would translate as follows.
The fact that from the 7th century onward, only kings use the signing ring (or sealing ring) for the
authentication of diplomas and charters indicates that a distinction occurs between private letters and legal
deeds. The many signing rings found in Merovingian cemeteries show that private individuals also used
them but only for their personal correspondence. The identification of the writer, source of the message,
and the authentication of a legal document became two formally distinct notions. Only the king maintains,
by his seal, the equation of those two functions, and one has to wait until the 11th century for private
individuals to start using seals for legal purposes. Such uses will keep growing like never before until they
completely disappear in the modern era.

All seals were not meant for authentication, not even the royal seal which in the early
medieval times was, as I already mentioned, a pure manifestation and affirmation of kingship
even when affixed to a document.
In fact, when late twelfth-century canon lawyers began to reflect on documentary validation, they assigned
the power of authentication only to the sigillum authenticum, the authentic seal. The meaning of authentic
here does not derive from a concern about counterfeits but from the desire to establish the capacity for
authentic seals to confer full validity on documents devoid of witnesses. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1513-4)

Who then had the authority to use the authentic seal? Bedos-Rezak does not indicate a possible
answer. In the Studies in Medieval Legal Thought by Gaines Post (1954), we find some hints for
answering this question. Once the secular realm, too (after the Church), started embracing the
legacy of the Roman law from late 12th and during the 13th century, a number of structures in the
medieval society stood to become subjects by law, or legal agents. The legal notion of
corporation developed during that time so as to enable a collective of individuals to have legal
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autonomy and agency – in other words, the status of legal person, as subject of rights and
obligations just like individuals (natural persons). Of particular interest initially was the question
as to whether such collectives can be represented by an individual agent (namely, a procurator in
the context of legal proceedings) acting on behalf of all individual members, so that any legal
outcome deriving from the action of the agent would be legally binding for every one of them.
Corporations had the authority to establish their own rules and regulations, and admission is
subject to the incoming member pledging obedience of those rules while the corporation in
return commits to seek justice for its members. Corporations in that sense were also known as
universitas, probably because the earliest one to be recognized by the papacy was a group of
teachers and apprentices called the “masters at Paris” and will come to be known as the
University of Paris.
In the first half of the thirteenth century the masters in the schools at Paris won measurably in a struggle for
corporate freedom from the direct control of the cathedral chapter and the bishop. (Post 1964: 27)

In order to sue or stand a trial, a corporation will need to appoint a representative in the
role of procurator (as opposed to having all the individual members petitioning and suing.) It is
interesting that in this medieval society, the possibility of appointing a procurator or any agent,
for that matter, was seen as dependent on the possession of a seal.
Could the masters have appointed procurators …, could they have acted as a legal corporation, when they
had no seal…? The procurator of a corporation, in presenting petitions and appearing in courts as plaintiff,
must show a mandate from his dominus [i.e. the principal], and the mandate was valid only if drawn up by
a public notary, or if sealed with an authentic seal. (Idem, p. 50-51)
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It was in that context of the legal status and privileges for corporations that the authentic seal
came to be defined as a specific means of documentary validation, in the possession of a limited
number of actors.
Who could possess a sigillum authenticum? Petrus Hispanus held that a universitas could have one.
Trancred, his contemporary, names chapters, prelates (abbots, archdeacons, provosts), secular princes, and
judges delegates as having authentic seals, while the Chancery Ordinances of the time of Innocent III
recognize the seals (…) of kings and nobles, of archbishops, bishops, deans, archdeacons, and other
persons of this kind. (Idem, p. 52)

Bedos-Rezak also signals that her sources (see note 69, p. 1514) imply that an authentic
seal is predicated on its publicity and familiarity for the target audience.
By the late thirteenth century, when jurists attempted to provide the authentic seal with a broader
sociopolitical conception, they insisted that for a seal to function as an authenticating device it must be well
known. Even when finally producing such imprecise and relative definitions, jurists did not conceal the fact
that viewpoints in the matter of seal validation differed widely; they recognized that the meanings and
agency of seals depended on local custom. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1514)

Alternately, again, documents could otherwise be validated through a notary in presence of
witnesses.
In this sub-section I have reviewed the basics and general practices of formatting
documents by the use of a variety of signs and according to specific protocols in order to achieve
some effect in the world. Among all those documentary signs and protocols, there is a particular
class of signs which are meant to represent individuals and as such they, too, are identity signs in
their own way. The following will describe practices of naming people and then signing one’s
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name or simply representing an individual in written records by an abstract sign starting from the
chrismon to the king’s monogram to the symbolic cross and to signing actual names.
4.5.2

Names and autograph signature

A change occurred over time in the use of the chrismon for signing deeds. Towards the middle of
the 10th century, deed subscriptions (the manuscript endorsements at the bottom of the
document) were particularly abundant in Tironian notes: they generally opened with the
chrismon sign, followed by a transliteration of the signatory’s proper name from the Latin to the
Greek script, and then a series of Tironian signs making a statement about or in the name of God
and ending with the sign that denotes the formula: “Has subscribed.” A stylized cross sign is
sometimes added discretely (Fraenkel 1992: 102). However, the chrismon progressively subsided
from the king’s superscriptions and subscriptions of deeds where it used to feature right in front
of the king’s name (generally the first character). From the 11th century onward it was
progressively replaced by the king’s adorned initials or monogram and then by his armorial
bearings by the 14th century. At that point, the chrismon only survived in deeds established by
ecclesiastic notaries who still had the quasi-monopoly of administering last wills as a prerogative
function of the Church (Fraenkel 1992: 73; Ekelund 1996: 63). The substitution of the Christ’s
monogram by the king’s monogram is also indicative of a more profound change in the medieval
culture, that is, the evolution in the genealogical conceptions of identity, from a period where
people generally only had a single name and would readily claim their (af-)filiation with Christ –
as an invisible, default family name – to an era where a household name, literally speaking, was
emerging as patronym to be added to the first name of every individual.
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The Romans legally prescribed and routinely used a system of three names – the socalled tria nomina (Wilson 1998: 4f.) – while their official record included additional name tags
reflecting affiliations that were deemed significant under the Roman sociopolitical order.
Roman citizens were officially registered in this [three-name] style [e.g., Marcus Tullius Cicero], together
with the all-important filiation indicating their fathers and even grandfathers or great-grandfathers, and the
tribe or voting district to which they belonged. So Cicero’s full official name was Marcus Tullius Marci
filius Cornelia Cicero, Marcus being also his father’s name and Cornelia his tribe. (Wilson 1998: 4)

That practice subsided after the end of the Empire, and the early medieval custom was to
name people with a unique name, a role largely to be filled by the baptismal name as a growing
Christianity widened its coverage and deepened its penetration of the western medieval society.
This became even more systematic across the board by the 9th century when Latin progressively
replaced the vernacular languages of the different peoples that formed the European population
(Fraenkel 1992: 101). Then the practice changed progressively with the adding of nicknames and
surnames, as the population grew and more and more people borne the same names from the
limited repertoire of Latin names. It became a common practice for both rulers and regular
people to add qualifying supplements to their name: e.g., Carolus Martellus (Charles Martel or
literally, Charles the Hammer); Carolus Magnus (Charlemagne or Charles the Great); Pepin the
Short, Philip the Fair, John Smith, etc. The trend will never be reversed with the steady
demographic growth, particularly from the 11th century onward when a second name became
common practice. As a consequence, the practice settled on adopting a family name which was
then appended to the name every family member has been individually assigned (Fraenkel 1992:
98ff.; Wilson 1998: chapters 7 and 8). Initially, the handling of first names suggests a
classification scheme. The family was a specific group of individuals all wearing the common
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label of the group, that is, the family name, and each family had a pool of names or sub-labels to
assign to every new individual member.56
In the generalized practice of authenticating deed, the objective of the signature was to
stamp or affix a personal sign, which came to mean the handwriting of one’s name. According to
Fraenkel, the western medieval practice of hand writing the endorsement statement “I have
subscribed” (subscripsi) as well as the notion of signature evolved out of Roman practices for
recording particular deeds, namely last wills. For one, a Roman citizen recording his last will or
any other relevant deed would, along with his witnesses, write his name followed by the formula
“subscripsi” as a way of validation. For another, deeds were recorded in a diptych, which is a set
of two bound wax tablets, with one copy of the record outside and another one inside. The
committing party(ies) in the deed as well as their witnesses will then press their signing ring,
followed by the formula “signum of X” where X is the name of the corresponding signatory. The
set of tablets was then sealed at the opposite edge to the bind edge. Obviously, the quality of the
signatory individual – whether witness or principal – was explicitly stated in the document.
As the parchment superseded wax tablets and became more commonly used as writing
surface, signing or making one’s mark on a document also evolved. First, the seal of the source
or signatory of a written material was imprinted in wax and then attached to the scroll of
parchment via a lace or in some other fashion. The evolution of the writing surface material from
parchment to paper (in combination with other factors such as the increasing popularization of
writing and the trend towards the simplification of procedures) probably contributed to the
fading of the medieval seal as a signing and validating instrument for written records. However

56

In France, the principle of hereditary transmission of patronym or family name became regularized during the 1789
revolution (Fraenkel 1992: 98).
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the autograph signature emerged more directly out of notarial practices. Scribes or notaries in
charge of producing and validating official documents made a number of handwriting notes on
the said documents, including some signs illegible to others, albeit meaningful to themselves as
we saw previously. When the seal appended to a document broke, this voided the validity of the
said document. Only the close examination of the notary’s notes and proper signs included in the
document could provide the evidence of its authenticity, warranting the reissuance of another
sealed copy of the initial document. Therefore official documents bore the handwriting signature
of royal officers or notaries public who validated them. This, which was a general practice, was
made compulsory by the 14th century (Fraenkel 1992: 93f.) Finally, I might add that the
onomastic evolution, that is, the change in naming formats with more than one name, to the
extent that it was expected to increase the granularity of names as possible identifiers, must also
have reinforced the idea that an individual’s autograph could be distinguished from others’.
Generally though, individuals who could not write, not even their name, while it was required of
them to sign a document were given the possibility, throughout all those phases of the evolution
of signing, to simply draw a manual sign which was the cross by default.
As written records progressively gained higher evidentiary status in courts of law, the
autograph signature due to its indexical nature emerged as more probative than simply written
name. A name, said or written, does not by itself imply any certainty as to whether its referent
exists in substance or not: a name can be a fiction, that is, it may be referring to a fictional
character. It is the signature, not the name, which provides the assurance that there was an actual
being who performed the act of signing in which resides the enforceability of any contractual
document. “The signature ‘proves’ the name” and as such it is a demonstrative sign (Fraenkel
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1992: 110). The autograph signature is not like any other written word, including a name, but the
result of an act that only a particular individual was supposed to have made.
Elle [la signature] est formée d’un mot, le nom propre, d’un geste, celui du scripteur qui autographie son
nom, et d’une chose désignée, le scripteur lui-même qui, en signant, présente son propre nom mais effectue
en même temps une sorte d’autoprésentation. […]
Le geste de la signature est, au moment de son inscription, pure ostension. Il est spectacle
éphémère de l’adéquation entre son signe et son référent, de la coexistence du scripteur à son inscription. Il
incarne l’idéal recherché en vain par les logiciens. (Fraenkel 1992: 112)

To translate:
It [the signature] is made of a word, the proper name; of a gesture, that of the “scripter” (the writing
individual) who autographs his name; and of a designee, the scripter himself who, by signing, presents his
own name as well as himself. …
The signature gesture at the time of signing is pure manifestation. It is the ephemeral spectacle of
the adequacy between sign and referent, of the coexistence of the “in-scripter” with his inscription. It
incarnates the ideal sought in vain by logicians.

Referring to a problem confronted by logician philosophers such as Russell and
Wittgenstein with regard to the value of an assertion made about a character that is designated by
her proper name versus by a demonstrative pronoun in said assertion, and taking into account the
fact that a proper name can designate a fictional character, Fraenkel sheds a light in similar terms
on the difference between proper names and signature. In other words, signature has at least the
same pragmatic, indexical and probative value as the demonstrative pronoun, both in comparison
to a written name which does not prove the existence of an actual individual bearing that name.
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What makes the case of the medieval seal appealing from the outset is that the social
actors involved in practice with sealing deeds not only clearly spelled out their rationale in using
seals as identity tokens but they even sought to articulate that practice within their own
conceptual frameworks and belief system. Now in closing this large loop encompassing the
institutional contexts of authority, identity and signs, and just before I conclude this case about
the medieval seal, I propose to outline and analyze in the next section the gist of their reasoning.

4.6 Seal-identity: A semiotic analysis and challenges
As we saw in the previous section, in addition to private use of seals in correspondence, nonroyal, lay people across Europe caught up on the practice of sealing both official and private
deeds by the 11th century. Clerics were chiefly involved in establishing those documents where
the use of seals in official capacity clearly shifted from royal prerogative and authority to
commoners – while not only the notion of validating something but also that of specifically
representing someone were maintained in both contexts. Seals were used to represent identity
within a document in the process of authenticating the latter. Subsequently, the identity therein
represented was deemed authenticated. As this practice expanded, those churchmen strived to
articulate a discourse in order to both justify and ensure, within their thought and belief systems,
the effectiveness of the emerging and generalizing use of seals in the society at large. I am now
going to expound the thrust of that discourse following Bedos-Rezak (2002) who has offered
thereof an extensive reading.
As I stated before, the medieval artifacts in question are charters and diplomas dating
from 11th and 12th centuries. Most of them were records of transaction granting tenure or a
transfer of propriety rights over land, generally albeit not exclusively as a donation to the
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Church. In most of these transactions then, the ecclesiastical parties were not only recipients and
beneficiaries of the donations but they were also in charge of the production and the custody of
related records. Understandably, they were keen not just on securing the transaction, but also on
protecting the rights they gained as receivers against any possible future challenges. Those
clergymen were heads of schools or teaching in cathedral chapters, and as the literate minority
(compared to the society at large) they often staffed and directed the chanceries, including royal
ones. As such, they had enough authority to set the standard for record-making/-creation or
documentary back-up procedures, if not for what counts as documentary evidence of transaction.
As we previously discussed, the investiture controversy will set off a crisis of multiple episodes
and facets, not the least of which implicated the conceptualization of signs and their efficacy or
power. The challenge for the schoolmen was then to fashion a doctrine (or theory) of signs that
could accommodate their practice as well as a number of fundamental beliefs.
If signs were brought up in a controversy that was about prerogatives and functions of
authority it was because the prevailing worldview at the time implied that signs were
instrumental, even decisive, in the enactment of authority. By mobilizing the tenets of that
worldview, the controversy also opened the doors for various implications beyond politics,
possibly including revisiting the foundations if not for a re-alignment, at least for clarifying their
coherence with the pragmatic consequences they were supposed to lead to. While it might have
been prompted by a political contest, the debate had theoretical impacts in semiotics, linguistics
and sacramental theology.
The whole issue may be thus summed up: What is in a sign? How does a sign signify?
What kind of efficacy can be attributed to a sign, and what operations does that require?
Politically (and here I separate theology from religion which can be political), what authority and
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legitimacy can one draw from signs, especially material signs? For let us remember that the
controversy opposing two sides was about the authority to appoint and invest bishops and abbots
with the powers of ecclesiastical officialdom. The papacy then claimed that in and by themselves
signs, including material signs, signify nothing and therefore they have no force as such.
The papal party believed that the symbols of ecclesiastical office, the ring and the crozier, possessed no
intrinsic capacity to cause any effect but that the valid possession and application of them effectively and
irrevocably established an ecclesiastic’s right to both office and its associated power. (Bedos-Rezak 2000:
1492)

According to that position, the value and virtues of signs come from a covenant that also defines
the proper procedure whereby they can channel those attributes. The two competing positions
were driven by equally competing theories of signs with metaphysical assumptions and
theological ramifications. On the one hand, the view was held that material symbols and, by
extension, signs in general derive their meaning from a common agreement among users; on the
other hand there was the belief that signs, particularly symbols, have an inherent value and
meaning.
Because for the actors involved, as was generally the case in this era, God is the ultimate
source of authority, any attempt to conceptualize the
efficacy/authority/value/meaning/signification at work in signs must cohere with the related
views regarding the manifestations and signs of the invisible God. In fact in the Middle Ages, it
is the latter views which determine any theory or doctrine of signs in general. When it came to
conceptualizing signs, the following relationships were of paramount interest to these
schoolmen:
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between language and reality, between Eucharist and real presence, between Trinity and the related
subjects of person, image and resemblance, and between writing and authority. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1498)

Ideally, a satisfying concept, theory or doctrine of sign should coherently be able to account for
those relationships.
On the other hand, not only should the understanding of how signs operate provide
humans with a grasp on the foundations of the possibility of making any sense at all through
discourse (referentiality of language), but it should also clarify how the written word may
compensate for the authority that is presumably lost in the absence of the speaker. While
medieval Christendom knew of writings by lay authors from the past (e.g., Greek philosophers)
writing was still seen either as something of a special status in keeping with the sacredness of the
Scripture, or something that in any case required a special expertise which was only held by a
few. By all account we are dealing with a period where the practice of writing represented only a
very small part of people’s life and daily business. By the 11th century, it still required a shift for
the technology of writing to become part of people’s business.
The authority of written documents, in a fundamental shift, moved away from immediate dependency on
God and the supranatural, coming increasingly to derive from and depend on human persons. At issue in
this shift was a need to project the authority and accountability of human beings beyond their natural,
empirical presence, so as to impart to charters a level of permanence previously expected only from God.
(Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1505)

However deep the shift was to be, the cultural foundations were not to be shattered. Any
principle of explanation regarding the way signs operate, in writing or otherwise, must still
accommodate fundamental notions and beliefs of the day into its frame. At the core of that frame
of thought and that belief system were matters of God, such as the Eucharist and the Trinity. Any
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discourse on signs was confronted with questions about presence and representation, person and
personhood, incarnation and identity, image and resemblance, as related to those notions either at
the foreground or in the background.
What then was the predominant conception of signs available at that time, the one used as
reference? The dominant paradigm of signification turned around an Augustinian dualism. In
Book 2 of De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine distinguishes two categories of signs: natural signs
(signa naturalia) and human-made signs such as language and money (signa data.) The first
ones have necessary causal relationship with their referent while the second ones only receive an
arbitrarily given signification (Table 4-1). Under the Augustinian dualism, any sign that does not
occur naturally but is created by humans may have meaning only by convention. Human-made
signs (including seals, words, etc.) only imperfectly refer to their objects which are ideational
things. Because ideational referents fully comprise their own reality of which human-made signs
are no more than attempts at material representation, the former hold more reality than the latter.
At the same time, one needs to bridge the gap between signifier (sign, word) and signified
(referent) in order to make communication possible – in order to make sense, truly.

Category of sign

Referent

Relationship to referent

Signa naturalia (Natural signs)

Material things

Necessary & causal

Signa data (Human-made signs)

Ideational (more real than
their sign)

Conventional

Table 4-1. : Classification of signs by Augustine
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The Augustinian solution for connecting word and thing … is communion with pure presence, that is,
incarnation… In Augustinian theology, the incarnation of the Logos became a model that, while still
limiting linguistic expression, promoted sacramental signification through presence. (Bedos-Rezak 2000:
1499)

To the extent that words are not the incarnation of the ideational things that they are meant to
express, human language is flawed or at least limited in bringing up full signification. On the
other hand, there are signs that are the thing itself as in the model of incarnation, signs that are, in
relation to their referent, “communion with pure presence.” Sacraments constitute a model within
this framework. In effect, sacraments, chiefly the Eucharist, involve a particular class of signs
that actualize the presence of their referent. While leaving all non-natural, human-made signs
helplessly imperfect in terms of their ability to mean something real, the Augustinian view
opened up the possibility that signs may be more than just media, indeed they may be the
embodiment of their referent, even if for now that possibility is only actualized in sacred signs.
Such was the backdrop against which the revived debate about signs took place throughout the
period of the investiture controversy.
Now the Augustinian dualism signa naturalia vs. signa data (with its appendix of
sacramental signs that realize the pure presence of their referent) is doubled with another
opposition stemming from language signs: universals vs. particulars. Universals are general
categories labeling qualities that are common to a class of individuals and generally empirical
entities. The latter are called particulars. For example “human” is a universal shared by
particulars (individual instances of human being) such as Aristotle, Abelard, Augustine, you the
present reader, and I the author of these lines. During the second half of the 11th century, two
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schools of thought opposed each other on the question as to whether universals existed, the
extent to which they are a reality. They are called nominalism and realism.

Universals
Nominalism

Non-existence

Referents
Other words
(human mental constructs)

Realism

Existence

Ideational formations in God’s mind
(templates of empirical things)

Augustinians

Existence

Ideational formations in God’s mind
(immanence & participation of universals
in particulars)

Abelard

Non-existence

Concepts or images of things
(mode of signification in human thought
processes)

Table 4-2: Perspectives on universals

As one of the most renowned dialectics scholar of the time, Roscelin of Compiegne
reputedly originated the system of ideas that will be known as nominalism. Nominalists held
that universals have no reality whatsoever – neither objectively, nor subjectively. They are
mental constructs (with corresponding verbal forms) and they make sense only because they are
derived from the experience of empirical and particular entities. The antithesis to nominalism,
particularly on that point, is realism. Realists contended that universals exist outside the human
mind albeit not in the empirical world. In effect according to realists, universals exist in God’s
mind. As such, they are a-temporal and immutable, serving as source and template for spatiotemporal things (Table 4-2).
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Nominalists tended to think that names are arbitrary human conventions. Realists, their
opponents, held that if properly used, different names designate different things or persons – the
latter distinct from one another by different sets of properties although they may share a common
nature which is expressed through universals. For nominalists such as Roscelin, the referents of
universals are merely other words denoting general mental constructs of the human mind, but no
empirical reality. For realists and Augustinians on the opposite side, though referents of
universals are nowhere to be found in the objective world, they do exist independently of the
human mind: they are divine ideas, immutable ideational formations in God’s mind serving as
template for their corresponding particulars in the spatio-temporal world. However, instead of a
strict dualism between word and thing as Augustine appeared to posit six centuries earlier, his
11th-century followers sought to nuance that with his theory of ontological immanence and
participation.
This theory argued that things guided the properties of signs, that, inhering in the spatio-temporal realm,
universals created similarities among objects. To be sure, participation in the transcendent was not a matter
of identicality but only of resemblance; only God, uniquely, possessed true identicality. (Bedos-Rezak
2000: 1500, emphasis added)

According to that stance, universals are inherent to empirical reality as they impart to
related particulars their commonalities which bring them under the same universal category. In
other words, particulars can only be particulars of a universal, which defines them as elements of
the same grouping. Universals may not exist separately in the empirical world, but they are real
by virtue of the fact that particulars can be meaningfully clustered into categories defined as
universals. The fact that the very notion of particular is predicated on that of universal implies
the reality of the latter. The reality of universals is defined by the traits of resemblance that
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qualify a set of particulars as individual instances of a given universal. Universals have reality
because particulars of the same universal resemble that universal, which in turn enables us to see
the resemblance between those particulars (from that same universal.) With that “neoAugustinian” take, so to speak, the operative concept for the relationship between sign and
referent, signifier and signified, is no longer “identicality” or sameness, but resemblance. This is
what I would call the first shift in this re-litigation of the question of signs post-millennium. With
that perspective, a stark dichotomy requiring identicality as condition of truth or reality was no
longer needed between what is in God’s mind and what is out there in the world. Rather the
status of reality became a matter of ontological participation predicated on the degree of
resemblance with divine ideas.
Considering that the Augustinian position is a variant of realism, Peter Abelard will
formulate a third position at a distance from both nominalists and realists while still retaining the
(nominalist) view that nothing exists but particulars and the (realist) notion that a collection of
particulars may share a common nature. But for Abelard, the resemblance between particulars is
not good enough basis to claim or justify the existence of universals
Disagreeing with both his teacher Roscelin and with Augustine and his followers, Abelard denied the
existence of anything that is not a particular. While retaining the notion that the common nature inherent in
things of the same species made them similar, he argued that such similarity fell short of constituting them
as universals. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1500)

It appears that in what I call here the neo-Augustinian stance (or the resemblance
stance57) the mode of signification proceeds from the word or the underlying human perception
matching, as an image, either the thing in the spatiotemporal world or its ideational template in
57

A simpler way to refer to the theory of ontological immanence and participation.
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God’s mind. In other words, the only progress achieved since Augustine was to move from signs
as incarnation (pure presence or communion), if they were to reliably mean anything substantive,
to signs as image of the referent (resemblance or likeness). In that context, the novelty of
Abelard was to say that words take their meaning from the way the human mind operates with
concepts. For Abelard, words – and particularly universals – are concepts, not images as by
reflection of physical things on the mirror of the human mind. For Abelard, the human mind does
create likening copies or images of things, but the meaning of a word is not the image of its
object; it does not stem from the mental image of its object matching that object itself, or from
matching that word as an image with its object outside the human mind. The meaning of word
derives from the thought processes applicable to those images that the mind initially forms of
things in the world – the human perception, that is. Therefore, thoughts and understanding
proceed from the way the human mind operates with those images within it, not from the
accuracy of the images themselves in relation to presumed models outside the human mind
(whether in the nature or in God’s minds.)
For Abelard, words were universals, concepts of things, not images of things. Yet words functioned by
means of images deriving their meaning, not from the things themselves but from the mode of signification
at work in the human mind. Abelard held that the mind creates at will images or copies for configuring
absent things. These images are the proper objects of thought and understanding, which thus operate on a
likeness that the mind creates. This likeness has neither substantial reality nor the underpinning by
transcendent universal that, for Augustinians, accounted for the similarity between things… By pointing
out that thoughts and understanding are not the same as their objects, Abelard … located the act of
understanding in the mind as the active inventor of universal concepts... (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1500-01)

As I suggested earlier, in this specific cultural setting this debate about signs could not
but be framed within parameters of sacramental theology. In effect, while on its face the debate
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first appeared to be about linguistic signs, doctrinal questions of Trinity (personhood) and
Eucharist (presence) were being settled at the same time. We may recall from the section 4.3.2
regarding the Church and the Empire that it was the Fourth Lateran Council of 121558 that
defined the doctrine of transubstantiation pertaining to the Eucharist (Blumenthal 2004).
Protagonists in this debate also authored texts where they articulated their views, one of which is
Abelard’s treatise about the Unity and Trinity of God titled the Christian Theology.
The conundrum with the question of Trinity is the logical difficulty to equate ‘One’ with
‘Three,’ in other words, to assert unity not just as the union of many but as actual “oneness” of
many: one God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit all at the same time. The emphasis put by
nominalists on the individual as opposed to universals made it difficult to articulate the divine
unity of the Trinitarian entities, unless these are only three different utterances about one and the
same entity. And yet, implying that they are not different to begin with does not really address
the problem but rather suppress it – which, according to Bedos-Rezak, led to Roscelin being
accused as a “dialectical heretic” and having to explain himself about the Trinity at the Council
of Soissons in 1092. As one might expect, a discussion about the correspondence between signs
(signifier) and referent (signified), which involved sacramental signs, questions of the
incarnation of God (or the “incarnation of the word,” to borrow a title from Anselm of
Canterbury) and of the Trinity, eventually requires or leads to clarifying notions of identity and
personhood59 – of Christ, initially. With the third path taken by Abelard vis-à-vis realists and
nominalists, comes a different understanding of incarnation.

58 That is a few decades after this exchange between Abelard, Roscelin of Compiègne, Berengar of Tours retrospectively,
Anselm of Bec (a.k.a Anselm of Canterbury), and others.
59 Bedos-Rezak notes that the term “persona” as related to personhood emerged from that 12th century debate about the
Trinity, and the theologian Richard of St. Victor contributed substantially to its definition and dissemination (p. 1505).

165
The incarnation of God was no longer to be elucidated by an image, as had happened when the notion of
God as the original and of Christ as living image made it possible to see them as one and the same God,
though not the same person. Rather the image was now held to be the realization of form in matter and
came to be understood as an actual incarnation. Images were promoted to quasi-personal beings. The
language of analogy seeped into the language of ontology: “to be like” became “to be part of.” (BedosRezak 2000: 1502-03; emphasis added)

Here, I would argue, intervenes a second shift. The first one, as we might recall, went
from Augustinian incarnation as pure presence of (or communion with) the referent to
resemblance with divine ideas. At work in that sense of incarnation was the notion of image as a
replica of an original model, the notion of sign as a reflection of its referent. Now the second
shift goes from resemblance to incarnation yet again, but of a different kind: that of a form into a
matter. In the face of the challenges encountered with using the previous framework to account
for the unity of the Trinity, the notion of image as operative concept for understanding the
incarnation (and by extension the unity of the Trinity) shifted toward image as “realization of
form in matter,” or as Bedos-Rezak puts it, “actual incarnation.”
Addressing the issue of the Trinity in his Theologia Christiana, Abelard distinguishes
among different ways of identity – and thus, of difference as well – by at least five dimensions.
According to him, identity may occur by essence and number, by property, by definition, by
likeness, or by immutability (McCallum 1976: 75). Two entities may be identical in essence and
number and yet differ by their proper character or function. Abelard applies that framework to
the Trinity of God: Father, Son and Holy Spirit are designations referring to attributes of the
divine substance – such as “omnipotent, and wise and good to the highest point” (Abelard via
McCallum 1976: 46).
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To confess these three Persons in the divinity, namely, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is to admit the divine
Power, generating; the divine Wisdom, begotten; and the divine Goodness, proceeding. When these three
things are stated, the perfection of the Highest Good is defined. (Idem)

By confessing a unique God as three persons, the Christian faith “affirms a single identity of
unity, except as pertains to the discrete attributes of the three persons…” The latter are “diverse
in respect of their proper functions” (idem, p. 70) by which they are defined as Father, as Son
and as Holy Spirit. God is one and the same entity but three persons by proper character.
The proper function of the Father is that He exists of Himself and eternally begets or has begotten the coeternal Son. The proper function of the Son is to be, or to have been, eternally begotten of the Father. The
proper Function of the Holy Spirit is that He proceeds from Father to Son. (Abelard via McCallum 1976:
70)

In these discussions about Christian sacraments, Abelard along with a number of his
fellow schoolmen resorted to the metaphor of seal, a material sign, in order to make their point
clearer with regard to signs and signification. This resulted in a series of analogies that might
have helped with the comprehension of the most debatable term of the analogy if, and only if, the
second term of the analogy was established without question. However, as we will see later, the
heuristic of the analogy is limited when its two terms remain challenging to the audience to
comprehend. For the time being, let us consider what Abelard says about seal components and
their relationship.
We can predicate of the wax that it is the image, and of the image that it is the wax. Nonetheless, it is also
true to say that the waxen image is from the wax. But the wax is not from the waxen image. The wax itself
is, however, the material of the image. The waxen image is not the material either of the wax or of itself.
(Abelard via McCallum 1976: 85)
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The species is the same as the genus, as a man is the same as an ‘animal,’ or a waxen image is the same as
wax. The waxen image is from wax as man is from animal. I mean that in so far as it is a wax image, it
must be wax, just as in so far as a man is a man, he must be animal. But the contrary is not true. (Abelard
via McCallum 1976: 86)

Abelard considers conceptually similar the relation between Godly Father and Son, between wax
and waxen image, and between species and genus. The Son comes out of the Father just like the
waxen image comes out of the wax, and like species proceed from a genus. Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit are three property-based variations of the same substance of God. In other words,
Abelard conceives of the relationships within the Trinity, between God on the one hand and (at
least conceptually) on the other hand Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as similar to the relationship
between a genus and its related species. The overall point of Abelard’s conceptual framework is
that two identical things are not necessarily so in a monolithic way; they may be identical in
some respect while different in some other, identical on a level while differing on another. I must
say however that his explanation of likeness among the five manners of identity between two
things is so broad that one may suggest that it encompasses the other four manners: if anything is
identical to any other thing in any way, wouldn’t that be enough to say the two things are alike in
some way?
Likeness in identity may be seen where things differ in essence and number, but are similar in some
respect. Species resemble their genera; individuals their species; anything which in some respect falls in
line with another is like it. (Abelard via McCallum 1976: 76)

Complementing this analysis of the Trinity, are commentaries on a relevant passage of
the Scripture. These exhibit the importance of analogy in the operation at work in this medieval
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notion of identity as per the use of seals in charters. Using analogy, this notion emphasizes the
difference from a genealogical notion of identity: “to be like” vs. “to be (part of)” something.
Commentaries on Genesis 1:26 (God made man in his image and likeness) from the School of Laon, from
Abelard, and from the canons of St. Victor contemplated just how human beings might be said to be “in the
image and likeness of God” when they have no common property with God. Using the seal metaphor, the
commentators determined that the human soul in God’s image is different from the Son who is in God’s
image, in proportion to the difference between the king’s image on a seal and the king’s generated image in
his son [emphasis added]. Only the engendered image (the Son), which shares properties and is
consubstantial to its model, may be equal to it: only the Son is the image of God. The created image (Man),
on the other hand, bears only an analogy to its model: the human being is in the image of God. (BedosRezak 2000: 1525)

The Son being the image of God entails that he is engendered or begotten of God and is
consubstantial to him. The human being in the image of God only entails that he carries God’s
image within him, imprinted on his soul (as the king’s image imprinted on a seal). As a creature,
but not begotten, of God the human being may well be “in the image and likeness” of God, but
he does not share the same divine substance. To paraphrase the sentence emphasized (italics) in
the quote above, the likeness/resemblance of the engendered image with its model (or referent) is
different from the likeness/resemblance between that model and its created image (Fig. 4-1). In
both cases there is a relationship of likeness, but the difference is that the likeness of the begotten
entity is reinforced by it being consubstantial and commensurate to its model or referent while
the created entity is not. This analogy of proportion, as I might call it, exhibits simultaneously
the divergence of those two relations while showing the parallel between God and Human taken
in turn as referent.
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Fig. 4-1:: Relation of the referent to engendered or created image

In other words, the identity implied in the Genesis phrase “in the image and likeness”
(emphasis added) applicable to the human proceeds from analogy, not from genealogy.
genealogy Among
the five dimensions of identity distinguished by Abelard, the above passage of the book of
Genesis and the commentaries suggest tha
that:
t: 1) the human being is not identical to God by
essence and number; 2) there is identity by likeness between God and the human being, but not
quite on the same level as the likeness between God and his begotten Son. This may be a
manifestation of the pointt I made earlier about this notion of likeness being perhaps too broad.
At this point we cannot (and do not have to) draw a direct conclusion regarding the other three
modes of identity, that is, by property
property, by definition or by incommunicability/immutability
/immutability
between God and humans.
The parallel evoked by Bedos
Bedos-Rezak between the Son of God and the son of a human,
human
such as the king, only serves to clarify the scale of – and the differential with – the other
likeness, that is, the likeness between G
God
od and humans and between humans and seal imprint,
respectively. However, formulated that way the comparison is somewhat truncated from the

170
perspective of clarifying the mode of signification of seals which enables identification of the
seal owner. Evidence of that may be seen in the fact that in fig. 4-1 there is no necessary relation
between the king’s son and the imprint of the king’s seal – certainly not a relation that could
parallel the one between God’s Son and the human being. A complement to this metaphor is
needed, and we find it in the following.
Abelard and the School of Laon were concerned, however, to reconcile transcendence and immanence, and
so insisted on the presence of God within the begotten Son, and through the Son, within the created human
being as well. Here again, Abelard and the Laon scholars resorted to another seal metaphor, this time
involving the die, its image, and its imprint. God is the seal’s inherent material (the substance of its die or
matrix); the Son is the figure of God’s substance, the image of God engraved in the matrix, which in turn
imprints itself on the human soul (reason, heart, memory), enabling that soul to be configured as the Son. In
this sense, the human being is created as an image, imprinted through the medium of divine substance but
sharing no substantial affinity with it, unlike the Son, whose image is consubstantially figured of divine
substance. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1525)

Now the analogy is more complete and symmetrical (Fig. 4-2). The relation of likeness between
God and the human being is not direct but is made to transit through the divine substance of his
Son in whom his image is defined (as begotten of God, the Son both combines the substance of
God and the outlines of his image.) In other words, the human is in the image and likeness of
God only by virtue of the imprint of God he has received on his soul through the Son. I propose
to sum up the whole of these analogical linkages in one diagram (Fig. 4-3). The top series of
linkages is the model pattern. The bottom one is the series of relations that is being explained,
that is, the identity at play in the human use of seals. The process that takes place in those two
patterns is captured in the two-fold sequence in the middle. In this three-step flow, Abelard and
Laon scholars presuppose that a seal’s matrix (second instance) proceeds from an “inherent
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material” or a “substance” (first instance) and then replicates itself through the imprint it leaves
on waxx (third instance.) This duplicates the divine process that underlines the creation of the
human in the image and likeness of God.

Fig. 4-2:: Revised relation of the referent to engendered or created image

God is present within the human person through his Son. Through his seal-matrix
seal
the
human person is present in the related waxen seals. T
To
o the extent that the human being is in the
image and likeness of God (the “absolute reference”), likewise a human’s waxen seal is in his
image and likeness. In the former,
ormer, God is the referent and in the latter, the human person is.
This scheme raised a number of questions. To start with the broader ones which I cannot
address on behalf of medieval scholars: Are humans to be considered identity tokens of God, as
waxen seals are supposed to be of humans? Are their actions to be accounted to God – and under
what conditions, if at all? Clearly, humans have an autonomous agency, based on the fact that
they enjoy the faculty of free will, which is not the case of a seal, a material sign. In other words,
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while humans can make decisions, move around by themselves and act, seals have no effect
whatsoever unless someone uses or exhibits them with some intent and in a specific context.

God

Son

Divine Substance

Divine Substance figured

Seal owner’s substance

Matrix engraved image

Human

Seal-matrix

Human
Imprint on human soul
Imprint on wax

Waxen seal

Fig. 4-3: God, humans and seal analogy sequences

Let us pause for a while and evaluate the implications of this framework. Our priority
here is to figure out the identity relation between the human seal owner and the seal die or
matrix, leveraging the external perspective offered by the divine analogy. From a Christian
doctrinal standpoint, the discourse about the first triad (God – His Son – Human soul) is
acceptable as an article of faith or as a postulate of a system of thought. From discourse analysis
standpoint, it does not matter if we think a discursively constructed phenomenon is not rational
in itself as long as it is possible to provide an intelligible account of whatever it is purported by
the speaker(s) to be – and here Abelard has done most of the job beforehand. The question is: to
what extent does the analogy helps us understand, if at all, the way identity operates between a
seal and its owner?
We have learned that it is by and in the Son that the divine substance takes figure, which
is then impressed upon human soul. If we should replicate that pattern for the seal triad, there
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should also be an essential identity between the human substance of the seal owner and the
substance of his seal-matrix. This analogy seems to require that somehow the human person be
the “inherent material” of the seal matrix even though the object ‘seal-matrix’ is not of flesh as
human beings. While this whole arrangement (fig. 4-2 and fig. 4-3) suggests such essential
connection between the human person and his seal-matrix, it appears that the specific terms of
the operation that relation requires for it to be comparable to the relation between God and his
Son is left unspecified. Any possible response to that concern shall start with the following
clarifying points.
First, I shall recall that as we saw above Bedos-Rezak argues that Abelard’s intervention
in the debate about signs resulted in the image becoming part of its referent by materializing its
form, therefore the signifier appears to be the incarnation of the signified in that sense (not in the
Augustinian’s). Secondly, within his proposed framework of identity and in the context of the
Trinity, Abelard articulated the unity of Father and Son through the identity of their divine
substance. This does not mean that the first instance of the two triads in analogy (God & Human)
and their second instance (Son & Seal-matrix) are of the same matter in the plain sense of the
term. The fact that God has assumed humanly body through the Son does not imply that Father is
also of a human substance or that the divine substance is of flesh and blood. Substance is
different from matter (even though Bedos-Rezak calls it “inherent material” as well.) There are
two basic variants for the definition of substance60. First, substance (sub-stantia) here is
understood in classic philosophy since Aristotle as the ontological substratum in any given thing,
which does not change across time or space; the notion of what makes that thing what it is

60

There is more with further elaboration but these basic two are the most relevant to this historical and conceptual
context. One may learn more on this by referring to the entries “Aristotle’s Metaphysics” and “Substance” in the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://plato.stanford.edu/ (next two citations)
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independently of any variations of qualities, modes or attributes. As a consequence it is not the
physical and perishable/changeable appearance of a thing or a human. The second basic variant
is that a substance is a composite of form and matter, both of which every individual thing is
made of (Cohen 2009 and Robinson 2009).
Now to resume the discussion of Abelard’s analogies: Is it or is it not necessary that the
seal-matrix be consubstantial to human person as the Son is to God? If so how is this supposed to
happen? Is there a common substance to humans and seals, and if any, what is that supposed to
be? What does the engendering of a seal matrix from human beings consist of? Or did Abelard
mean to parallel two different modes of identity: essence and number on the one hand and
likeness on the other? After all, “in the image and likeness of God” were the biblical terms that
led to this analogy. While this may not be the most straightforward solution in the sense of the
symmetry that might be expected from an explanatory analogy, nothing prevents that from being
the case. The fact is we have no evidence of that in the literature, neither can we find any clear
basis there to infer this. Should we then just take the analogy literally and replace each term by
the corresponding counterpart? Alas, as the saying goes, comparison is not reason. In this case,
comparing something that is to be explained to something else that is rationally inexplicable does
not bring much light.
Perhaps the specific resolution of any of the above questions did not really matter for
these medieval exegetes, for it was already so embedded in their culture that seals do represent
the identity of their users that the rest may have just been simple rationalization. For the
literature does not dwell over whether and how human may be of the same substance, “in
essence and number,” as a seal matrix. Abelard and his companions do not seem to question or
want to explain further the rules that govern the human process of “becoming a seal matrix.”
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Abelard implies that by analogy – from the biblical use of the term “image” to characterize the
resemblance between God and the human – but does not tell us exactly how – other than by
composing that analogy with his explanation of the Trinity. After all, he and his peers did not set
out to explain identity by the way seals operated but identity as it operates within the Trinity. The
seal metaphor was a given, which was used to help understand the Trinity, not the other way
round.61 Precisely, by so doing, this doctrinal undertaking sheds a light back onto the metaphor.
If nothing else, the fact that these medieval schoolmen had to resort to an analogy with seals in
order to explain a topic as important for them as the Trinity show that the seal as identity token
was either self-evident or taken for granted based on the most common beliefs.
In the context of the Trinity which is overarching when it comes to the identity of the
three persons of God, Abelard clearly stated, more than once, that the divine substance in the
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is identical “in essence and number,” (McCallum 1976: 76
and passim). While he also states that “man and animal” are identical in essence and number
(idem, p. 75 ff.), in his subsequent analogy with seal Abelard never spells out directly that the
human individual and his seal die (matrix) are identical in essence and number, nor does he
explicitly claim that they have the same substance (and again, nor does he specifically explain
how the substance of one gets transformed into the substance of the other, or how there might be
another notion of substance that they share – as humans and seals are not of the same substance,
a priori.)

61 Furthermore, Abelard clearly warns us about the potential limitations of his analogies with regard to his own objective:
“Men use words to describe created things that they understand, and to make their own intelligence clear through them.
Man can do this: but he cannot adequately describe in terms God and ineffable goodness. Everything, then, which is said
of God is spoken by transferences of language and parable-like codes. By means of similitudes we get partial guidance
and are enabled to conjecture rather than to grasp that unspeakable majesty.” (McCallum 1976: 74, italics added)
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Fig. 44-4: Identity by transfer of substance and image

At the core of this whole assemblage is a belief system that comprises two levels. First,
there are dogmas which are discrete propositions or statements enunciating rules or the Church
positions as exclusive truths on a number of specific questions. Exampl
Examples
es include the dogma of
the Trinity. Secondly, comes the sphere of doctrines which are potentially competing ideologies
or discourses developed by various individuals or groups of individuals among the Church elites.
elites
Examples of that include the Augustinia
Augustinian doctrine of signs or the doctrine of transubstantiation.
transubstantiation
To the extent that they develop rational arguments, albeit on the basis of religious beliefs, they
may loosely qualify as “theories” the validity of which is sometimes based
ed on arguments of
authority or the power structure within the Church more than it depends on rational rules
(different rationalities, let alone a mixture of rationality and beliefs, can still rationally lead to
contradictory conclusions.) In other words, doctrines may benefit from an institutional
acceptance or imprimatur, unlike outcomes of rational argumentation only. It is the core of
dogmas and doctrines that I consider here as forming or expressing the belief system. Around
that core remains
emains the possibility of developing fully rational arguments, albeit mostly very
abstract (as common with scholasticism) and possibly including basic assumptions or postulates
– which is not uncommon with any other rational discourses – with the particularity
particula
that these
are ascribable to their authors’ Christian belief and are plausible in that context (fig.
(
4-5).
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Because of this the boundary line may be fuzzy between rational and theoretical argumentation
on the one hand and the doctrinal and ideological one on the other hand. Generally however, the
behavioral features of proponents and supporters are more prominently those of believers and
followers at the center (dogmas) and progressively less so toward the periphery (rational
discourse).
Following are the different possible options for reading the three-node parallel flow
above, using either the language of incarnation (form and matter) or the language of identity of
substance.
1)

God is (the equivalent of) the form of the divine incarnated in the Son. Likewise,

and by virtue of the analogy, the seal owner is a form relatively to the seal, which then gets
realized in the matter of the seal die (matrix). The problem here is that there is no philosophy or
theory, not even in the 12th century, to support the idea that the individual instance of human
being is a simple form devoid of substance. At the very most, one may argue that while the seal
owner is not a form per se, it behaves like a form relative to the seal in that he is the referent
originating this sequence.
2)

Father and Son are identical by the divine substance. To the extent that the latter

is begotten of the former, one must understand that the Son receives the divine substance from
the Father by way of that engendering. How is the seal-matrix begotten of the seal owner? How
does it take on the substance of the latter? This is really a camera obscura which is only given a
label such as “incarnation” based on the model of the analogy without clarifying the actual
mechanism itself. However, since neither the seal owner nor the seal matrix are divine entities, it
is legitimate to think that one should be able to describe the mechanism substantially linking
those two empirical entities, which would be the human counterpart to divine incarnation.
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Fig. 4-5: System of belief and rational discourse in the medieval West:
dogmas, doctrines and rational arguments.

Dogmas (1)

Doctrines (2)

Rational argumentation (3)

3)

Alternately, instead of claiming that the seal owner is a form or form-like, one

may argue that the human seal owner is just as the first instance of materialization of his form
(which, in its posited pure state, would be a separate entity.) In the process of representing
himself through appropriate symbols and figures in a seal die, the seal owner invests the latter
with his substance or that there is transference of his substance to the seal die, which then
becomes another materialization of that owner’s form. Then the notion of transubstantiation
surreptitiously enters the framework (fig. 4-6). Although this has nothing directly to do with the
Trinity, the rationalization of the discourse concerning seals may be represented here in the
shape of a triangle.

179

Fig. 4-6:: Model of the propositions and issue deriving from Abelard’s analogy, using the concepts of form, matter
and substance.

To the extent that substance is a complex of form and matter, and to the extent that
incarnation is conceived of as the realization of a form in a matter, the embodiment of the seal
owner is a first substance and the seal matrix a second substance deriving from the human
individual form. And to the extent that the seal matrix proceeds from the seal owner,
owner the form of
the latter is transferred from its first instance substance in the aspect of human embodiment to its
second instance substance in the asp
aspect of seal die.. In that regard it could be said that a
phenomenon of transubstantiation takes place, and that the
he identity relationship of an individual
human to his seal matrix and then to his waxen seals is to be understood within that category.
Incarnation as “realization of form in matter” and transubstantiation have the same type of
outcome, which is a complete substance of form and matter. The difference between them is the
itinerary: one gets to the outcome directly from a pure form while the other one transits by a
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distinct complete substance before reaching the finale one. Here I take the term of
transubstantiation not in the sense of the sacrament but literally as can be derived from the
Aristotelian language. There also is another significant difference between the literal meaning of
the term here and its doctrinal meaning in the medieval Church: here a material object is used to
produce another material object; there the same material object remains but takes on the
substance of another entity.
In the cultural and historical setting of the medieval Church, the exemplar for this process
or phenomenon of conversion between substances is the sacrament of the Eucharist conceived of
as “being in, and of itself, what it represents” (Bedos-Rezak, p. 1499). That during the
consecration the Eucharist altogether becomes the body and the blood of Christ, which it is
meant to represent, was not to be considered merely as a metaphor, but the result of an actual
transubstantiation.62
According to the theory of transubstantiatio, the substance of the bread and wine, or more precisely, the
substantial form as distinct from the material substratum of the bread and wine, undergoes a transformation
or formal conversion and becomes, in the consecration, the true body and blood of Christ. The
transformation, however, is only a transformation of substance, not of the incidental properties or accidents
of the bread and wine. The appearance of bread and wine therefore remains. (Muller 1985: 305-6)

Hildebert of Tours (c. 1055–1133) also known as Hildebert of Lavardin is reputed to have been
the first to use the term “transubstantiation” in Christian theology.63 As far as the papacy’s

62 Although the institutional Church will back away from that term centuries later, in part due to opposition against the
blatant intellectualism of the Latin Scholasticism favoring this language of 13th century Aristotelianism. The reception of
most of Aristotle in the Middle Ages spanned from 9th century, with an amount of distrust partly due to the fact that
some of his works were transmitted to the West through Arabic translation, to mid-13th century when it became more
openly accepted or even prevalent among schoolmen. “… but the elaboration of the doctrine [of transubstantiation] was
not achieved till after the acceptance of the Aristotelian metaphysics later in the 13th cent., when it founds its classic
formulation in the teaching of St Thomas Aquinas.” (Cross and Livingstone 2005: 1648)
63 See “Transubstantiation” in the Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/
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official documents are concerned, the term occurred for the first time in the proceedings of the
Fourth Lateran Council64 of 1215 which can be consulted on a non-Vatican Web site dedicated
to papal encyclicals.
His [Jesus Christ’s] body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the forms of
bread and wine, the bread and wine having been changed in substance [or transubstantiated], by God’s
power, into his body and blood …65 [Italics added]

As it turns out, Abelard uses the seal metaphor, again, in order to illustrate the process of
the Eucharist. The matter of the wax and that of the waxen image (with the imprint of the seal)
are the same – “in essence and number” – and yet the two things, wax and waxen image, are
different because the former is only the plain material which can be figured differently, or can
take in different forms, resulting in different images or “identities.” Likewise, the Host and
Christ may well be two different things (in different matters) but they become the same
substance as the form of Christ infuses the Host and takes its material aspect. Just like Christ is
present in the Host, the seal owner is present (through the seal matrix) in the waxen seal. In the
end, it is not surprising that the physical device of seal being also used as a conceptual device to
help comprehend Catholic sacraments, its understanding becomes caught up in theologicometaphysical terms that speak very little to the material processes of the seal becoming an
identity token.
Within the identity framework laid out by Abelard himself, either seal image is to be
understood as identical to the seal owner and the analogy with the godly persons of Father and
64

Innocent III himself proposed the seventy-one decrees on the agenda, all of which were adopted by the Council. The
first of those decrees also known as constitutions formulated the new “Confession of Faith” which included statement
about the belief in the Trinity of God (very much in Abelardian terms) as well as the next quote below (within the body
text).
65 See http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Councils/ecum12-2.htm#Confession. The editorial contexts are specified at the
end of the introduction along with references to the codices that have been taken into account.
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Son is not symmetrical (meaning, as shown in fig. 4-2, the two relationships are not strictly
identical unless the identity of substance between human and seal die is addressed), thus it is
limited in its heuristic, or the analogy is meant to be symmetrical in which case the solution of
incarnation by realization of a form in a matter need be complemented by the hypothesis of
transubstantiation. Part of the discrepancy is that the figure of the seal matrix is not created or
assigned by God. Its production or association with the seal owner/user mainly depends on the
latter himself posing as the referent, one who has the substance of an individual human being.
Therefore the analogies identified from Abelard would suggest one of the following: i) the
philosophy of substance as the incarnation of the form in a matter also explains the mechanism
by which Christ (Son) is an incarnation of God (Father), which in his time would have probably
earned him a place next to Roscelin as a dialectical heretic; ii) a transubstantiation intervenes
from the seal owner/user to the seal matrix since the unity of the Trinity requires that Father and
Son be of the same divine substance; or iii) the form of the human substance of the seal
owner/user gets captured some other way in the matrix figure during the casting process or in the
seal imprint during the signing/sealing ceremony. There is no evidence to support the latter
hypothesis despite numerous descriptions of sealed documents from the period this thesis is
focused on. From the remaining two, the hypothesis of transubstantiation seems to me more
plausible (Fig. 4-6), taking into account the ascendance of that concept at the time, than the first
hypothesis which would have most certainly provoked at the very least some serious controversy
in Abelard’s own institution, that is, the Church.
In the end, whatever happens to substance, the seal was believed by 12th century to be an
instance of the individual seal owner, or at least the person using the seal to represent himself in
the process of recording a transaction or communicating at distance. The seal was used to
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produce replicas of a graphic representation the sealer identifies with. Seal owners called that
their image and the public generally accepted those waxen replicas as standing for the
individuals themselves, in a sense that lies between symbolism and incarnation (basically, by any
other matter but flesh.)
Seals were signs that encoded the concept of medieval identity as replicable resemblance. (Bedos-Rezak
2000: 1533)

In the charters themselves, authors refer to their seal as their own image, imago noster, which reveals that
seals and their depictions incorporated elements meaningful to self-representation. (Idem, pp. 1528-29)

In a more philosophical language, the presence gained through that kind of incarnation
may be characterized as ontological similarity, to paraphrase Bedos-Rezak, between the sign
(seal) and referent (seal owner). In other words, based on their broader institutional context
shaped by their belief system and enacted in the ceremonies surrounding sealing, people believed
that a seal could capture and convey something of their inner being. At least both the seal and the
seal owner partake in that same being.
The Eucharist debate produced the idea that reality was capable of being perceived through an iconic
convention. In such a cultural crucible, the sign became representative less because of its relationship to a
conceptual ideal than for its capacity to embody its referent’s ontological characteristics. In semiotics
terms, the represented object (the signified) became a constitutive part of the sign (the signifier), because
for the sign to stand for its object, the sign had to incorporate a representation of that object; it was the
expression of that incorporated representation that came to be seen as the sign’s meaning. (Bedos-Rezak
2000: 1503, italics added)

This is a significant shift whereby, while God still remains the absolute reference, he is no longer
standing right in the middle of the sense-making process of all signs; whereby not just God or the
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king can be truly represented with signs but all humans as well. The medieval society then was
trying to find a way to legitimize in their own worldview the idea that a human person could be
represented as identical through a sign, a token. They found that legitimacy in a narrative that is
commensurable and agreeable (literally) with their system of belief and thought. The
referentiality exhibited in the triad God-Son-Human was the perfect model for that. This
represents a shift from transcendence where truth and signs’ meaning only originated from the
God above to immanence where humans are also enabled to be the actual authors of the meaning
of signs, indeed (themselves) to be the authoritative meaning of signs they identify with through
certain protocols.
Seals and sealing also display a number of features that are determinant of the way seals
were understood in practice. First, just as it was believed that a human carries the imprint of God
in his soul, a seal must carry by any means possible the imprint of the sealer in its matter. A
number of concrete features were included in the act of sealing, as if to shore up (or compensate)
the too abstract notions of form, matter, incarnation, substance and the ontological resemblance
they are supposed to enact. In effect, this search for a material anchoring was manifested by
leaving in the waxen seal the sealer’s “toothmarks, fingerprints, bits of hair or beard” (BedosRezak 2000: 1527) plus possibly a variety of items representing the piece of land being given,
such as a clod of earth or a stick (Fraenkel 1992: 67), all elements appended to the charter.
The seal, thereby participating in an existential relation with the sealer it represented, became an efficacious
sign, a power. Thus was the seal enabled to confer on the document its own authority, transforming the
document into a monument, which is the name by which sealed charters came to be known during the
twelfth century. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1527)
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There are probably several reasons why those documents were called monuments, some of which
may be linguistic, social or cultural, etc. However, one reason that appears to me to be highly
plausible is the fact that seals were considered as relics and their matrices were most of the time
buried with their owner. If that was so then the place waxen seals are meant to remain, that is,
where they were originally affixed, is also a sort of mausoleum where the memory of past
decisions and wills are kept.
Secondly, while one may claim in theory that the seal encapsulates the ontological
characteristics of the sealer, the relation of the graphical representation to that ontology is not
simple to establish. Setting aside the fact that what the moderns may call “realistic
representation” wouldn’t probably make sense then, as one might expect, a seal the size of a coin
or a medallion was most probably not enough room for 12th century technology to realistically
and uniquely represent every single individual involved in a relevant transaction, assuming their
ontological characteristics (whatever that meant) individually vary. In themselves, the seal
images were not individualizing; their identifying logic was not based on realistic representation
of the individual seal owner.
Realistic physiognomy was not privileged; emblems of function and symbols of kinship were. Kings were
shown in royal garb and posture, nobles as warriors, and bishop in episcopal array. Heraldry, from the midtwelfth century onward, served as an iconographic rhetoric that expressed the identity of a kindred in
relation to other groups, to its own land, and to its separate sub-branches. (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1529)

The elements of the seal graphism (heraldry as system of emblems) may well have just been one
category of attributes among others. The ritualistic aspect of sealing, including of course the
witnesses, would have been another category of information which the identification process is
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predicated on. In addition to written signs, the concrete marks of bodily parts and other natural
elements affixed with the waxen seal may also have played the same role.
The stylization imposed by the materiality of the die converged with cultural constructs
of social stratification and roles, forming a constrained language of iconographic representation.
This transformed the seal into a stereotype – both as simplified (but not necessarily disparaging)
social perception of groups of people and as a printing technique.
The graphic logic of seals established a crucial distinction between the individual of flesh and character and
the individual as an impersonation of social roles specified by codes. The particular living individual of
earlier oral ceremonies came to be increasingly abstracted as an incarnation of a particular social group.
Formulas of identity on seals predicated the notion of individuals as archetypes. (Idem, p. 1531)

Formulaic icons thus suspended individual referentiality, conferring on seals the status of a system. The
text of the legend particularized a given seal, giving it the status of instance. Thus seal graphism generated
personal identity through a grammar that articulated the organizing principles of society. In this way,
personal identity was defined and produced as an instance of social order, and thus produced itself as the
verifier of the system it substantiated. (Idem, p. 1529)

Consequently, both the framing of seals as a variation of ontological materialization of
the seal owner and the graphical economy of the cramped space of the die have meaningful
practical implications. The latter implies that there only is room for signs that are the most
significant to frame identity in the society. The former implies that whatever is (culturally)
determined to be relevant in the identity graphic is de facto elevated to ontological status
(meaning it is ascribed to the unchangeable nature of the person’s being.) That tension between
ontology and culture shaped authoritative identity around the practice of sealing at the turn of the
first millennium A.D.
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4.7 Conclusion
Historically in the context of the medieval west, seals first and foremost served to capture,
convey or manifest authority. In that sense, a material was said to be authenticated or authentic
by the mere fact that it borne the actual seal of the appropriate authority that either is the
enunciator of what the document states or is backing it up. That authority in the secular realm
was first the king and whomever the king allowed to seal and authenticate charters and diplomas
on his behalf. In this context, authority as ascribed to, and conveyed through, the document
essentially meant that what is written is good for enforcement or has force of law. And the seal
was both evidence and a determinant of that authority and its force. However, it can actually be
such determinant only if it is recognizable as the manifestation or expression of an actual entity
that is known to be the legitimate or de facto entity to wield that authority or to be entitled to
make decisions over the matter at hand. Only when the official author is recognized or identified
– as the subject originating the discourse – then the proper efficacy will be ascribed to the
discourse based on his actual authority as reputed. Authentication in that sense implies first
some process of identification, if only an implicit one. The same logic ran through the early use
of seals in personal communications by non-rulers and will by the 12th century be given an
official status through an apparatus of authentication of private deeds where seals were
recognized and used to authenticate the parties’ identity.
By the 12th century, individuals from all strata of the medieval society were using seals as
identity tokens in their personal and transactional records. The thorough analysis of the literature
has led to the following explanation of how seals, from unique signs of authority, became
authoritative identity tokens in both practice and discourse. To the extent that people participate
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in a culture that is used to recognizing a sign as the sign of authority embodied in a person, even
if that person is surrounded by a royal apparatus; to the extent that the main implication of
having that sign appended to written words is that those words shall be given the same value as if
they were uttered in person by that person (e.g., the king who, in absentia, is effectively
recognized as the king precisely thanks to his “sign” appended to the written document); then the
idea might emerge that outside bodily presence, any person could be recognized, or make
themselves recognizable through a seal. Therefore individuals (the few literate) started using
seals in personal correspondence in order to claim and evidence authorship of the written word,
that is, to self-authenticate as the actual subject expressing and meaning the words therein.
Obviously personal letters do not a priori have the purpose to enforce any decision or provision
regarding any other party; they are not generally meant to have any legal implications. As a
result they need not to be ascribed any further authority than the “authority” of authorship as can
be self-authenticated.
Then the Church as the reference authority that defined the standards of documentary
validation (as well as a central participant in estate transactions) also adopted the practice of
sealing transactions. In the same time, churchmen and chancery scholars involved in that practice
discursively articulated its conceptual foundations and rationale. The discourse proceeded from
doctrinal stances on sacramental signs, particularly in relation to the Trinity and the Eucharist, to
conceptualization of signs in general and their mode of signification, involving related concepts
such as personhood, image, sameness, resemblance, incarnation as realization of form in matter,
and transubstantiation or change of substance. It sustained the general belief that images,
symbols or any signs may be an inherent part of an actual entity which it materializes otherwise.
That discourse and endorsement legitimized across the board (including in the eyes of other
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potential parties to similar transactions) the practice of creating and sealing records of contracts,
transactions of goods or decisions transferring rights where natural individuals were in effect
materialized by the seal, a sign-object bearing their symbols or image. Hence, seals durably
became a common instrument to represent and authenticate individual human beings in official
and private deeds in order to assume related roles and responsibility and to ensure proper
attribution and accountability.
Either way, one basic function of the seal is to convey the following message: “this (the
‘ego’ that is source of the enunciation) is such particular person (as designated by the seal)
speaking and making the statements herein and these will be accounted to him as meant by and
in their contents” – no more, no less. Whatever that person writes, which he had the “right” to
command or dispose of, will be considered as effective as if he had said it in person. Such
conceptualizing enables to encapsulate both the personal use of seals as identity token and their
official use for authentication.
Seals as identity tokens largely remained however mostly the prerogative of the identity
subjects (the individuals) to define or choose. They were self-assigned as well as self-asserted.
Seals were only known to be associated to their authors by people who were exposed to them in
their social contexts or have some relationship to them. Their scope and force of projection
extended only as far as go the prior knowledge or assumptions held by their target or potential
audience. They are less helpful as identity token outside of their context of repute. Therefore,
seals hardly resolve the question of the identification of an individual spotted among a crowd of
anonyms.
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A medieval postscript: Institutional consequences
This postscript to the medieval part of this investigation is intended to indicate not all but a few
institutional changes brought about by the tumultuous period of the Investiture Controversy and
its aftermath. The choice of highlighting these changes is guided by the notion that the national
state and its apparatus did not suddenly emerge from a blank slate (or a tabula rasa) thanks to the
18th century revolutions – not only political but also intellectual such as the Enlightenment. The
retained following changes relate to the constitution of the state as a corporation and as a national
territorial unit later on. A few fundamental ideas and practices developed from the late 12th
century to the 14th century, which will enable the constitution of the national state (Canning
1988) and much later the very notion of nationality. As we know, there is no more defining
attribute for the modern state than its national boundaries, and no more justifying attribute than
that of nationality for the national state to claim the authority to identify all citizens on “its”
territory. Without getting too deep into the intricacies of theological and juristic exegeses, it is
perhaps worth noting that there is a whole body of scholarly works that trace and analyze those
transfers and lineages between the two spheres under the title of “political theology,” including
authors such as Ernst Kantorowicz and Pierre Legendre66.
In the wake of the Controversy, a number of institutional changes began to take place.
Starting in the 13th century, European princes engaged in a process of transfers of the Church
authority concepts and attributes to their own reign and institutions. It appears as if the
Controversy not only ignited a power struggle between the religious and the secular order, but it
66

Among other works, the latter is the author of a monograph non-available in English, but whose title and subtitle may
be translated as: “The Political Desire of God: Study on the assemblages of the state and the law” (Legendre 1988).
Legendre also calls his approach “dogmatic anthropology” or rather, the anthropology of institutional dogmas as he
studies human (western) society through the lens of the founding values (dogmas) of its defining institutions through its
legal history and across the genealogy of contemporary institutions.
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set in motion a process of reciprocal assimilation between the two spheres by the end of the 12th
century. On the one hand, the church focused a great deal of its attention on the legal and
political dimensions of its organizational structure, on the other hand secular rulers began to shift
from a Christ-based kingship to a law-based kingship by riding the wave of the revival occurring
in Roman Law studies. Kings sought to harness the contribution of a number of genius jurists,
emerging from the 13th and the 14th centuries, in order to perpetuate their attributes as absolute
and sacred rulers. In the following, I shall pinpoint a few main themes around which those
developments crystallized.
Absolutism and the principle of sovereignty: judge of all but judged by none
Monarchs, probably learning their lessons from the Controversy, resolved not to rely on
the established Church as basis for their legitimacy. Instead they turned to the apparent success
of the Roman law as an instrument of government, and then invested the law with such
solemnity and gravitas that match the Church’s own as they had experienced.
This legalism began in the twelfth century when the king’s quasi-sacerdotal character no longer was
legitimized exclusively as an effluence of unction and altar, but as an effluence of the gravity of Roman
Law which styled judges sacerdotes iustitiae, “Priests of Justice.” (Kantorowicz 1955: 72)

In effect, while taking some distance from the institutional Church, secular princes gladly tapped
into the latter’s symbolic and discursive resources in order to try and build an alternate order of
legitimacy. Notably, they retained the symbols of high-priesthood and elevated judges and
lawyers to a rank that assimilates them to ecclesiastical ministers of Justice,67 or at the very least,
priests of the law. Kantorowicz identifies King James I of the kingdoms of England and Scotland
(r. 1603 – 1625) as an outcome of that process, who was the personification of “pontifical
67

As Kantorowicz (1955: 72) reminds us that at the time ‘Justice’ stood for ‘Government’ or ‘State.’
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monarchy” in his assertion of the absolute state as part of the “mysteries of state” exercised by
the monarch and which shall not be questioned. It is otherwise considered a sacrilege to
challenge what the king calls, “my Prerogative or mystery of State” (Kantorowicz 1955: 68 f.)
Concurrent to the absolutist view, the supreme commander in the realm came to be
defined with variant formulations of the same principle, from 14th century Baldus’s statement
“ruler because he rules others and is ruled by none” to 17th century Salmasius’s “He is a king in
the proper sense of the word, who judges all and is judged by none” (Kantorowicz 1955: 75 f.)
Those statements were not foreign to the universal jurisdiction previously claimed by the papacy,
particularly Popes Gregory VII and Boniface VIII, itself connected, according to Kantorowicz, to
the first epistle to Corinthians 2, 15.68 (Idem)
Corporation
One of the most significant conceptual transfers and institutional transformations that
occurred at the time relates to the concept of “corpus mysticum.” The phrase corpus mysticum
was a hardly secularized echo to the Pauline concept of Corpus Christi.
Whereas the concept of the church as the corpus Christi goes back to St. Paul (I Cor., 12, 12), the term
corpus mysticum has no biblical tradition. … Corpus mysticum first appeared in Carolingian times, and it
then refers not at all to the church, or to the oneness and unity of the Christian society, but to the Eucharist.
It designated the consecrated host, the mystical body of Christ. This, with a few exceptions, remained the
official meaning of corpus mysticum until the middle of the twelfth century, that is, until well after the

68

“The spiritual person judges all things, but is himself to be judged by no one.” (English Standard Version 2001) at
http://biblos.com
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dispute about transubstantiation which is connected with the name of Berengar of Tours.69 (Kantorowicz
1951: 484)

There are two separate storylines here: the first one which is as old as the Roman
Catholic Church consists in representing the living Church, meaning the collective of Christian
believers, as the body of Christ (Corpus Christi); the other one underlines the mystical
dimension of the so-called “real presence” of the body of Christ in the Eucharistic host (Corpus
mysticum). During the hundred-year Investiture Controversy and its debates about signs, there
was a tension between, on the one hand, those like Berengar “who tended to spiritualize and
mystify the Sacrament of the Altar” and, on the other hand, those driving the institutional Church
“to stress most emphatically not the spiritual or mystical but the real presence of the human
Christ in the Eucharist” (idem). One advocated for the restrain of rational explanation and for
considering the Eucharist as one of the legitimate mysteries of faith; the other obstinately sought
to rationalize the mystery of this sacrament through the Aristotel-ish concept of
transubstantiation. As part of a push back against the mysticism party, the Church resorted to
alternate phrases.
The Sacrament now was termed the corpus verum or corpus naturale, or simply the corpus Christi, the
name under which also the feast of Corpus Christi was instituted in the Western Church, in 1264. That is to
say, the Pauline term originally designating the Christian church, now began to designate the host, whereas
the notion corpus mysticum, hitherto used to describe the host, was gradually transferred, after 1150, to the
church as an organized body. It was finally through Pope Boniface VIII [r. 1294 – 1303] and the bull Unam
sanctam that the doctrine of the church as “one mystical body the head of which is Christ” (unum corpus
mysticum cuius caput Christus) was defined and dogmatized. (Idem, p. 484-5)

69 I am adding here the biblical passage referenced, 1 Cor. 12, 12: “For just as the body is one and has many members,
and all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ.” (English Standard Version 2001).
One may also take note of 12, 27 in the same Corinthians book: “Now you are the body of Christ, and each one of you
is a part of it.” (New International Version 1984) all retrieved at http://www.biblos.com
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Along with the issue of absolutism (sovereign and universal jurisdiction) the question of corpus
mysticum defines a field where the reciprocal assimilation I refer to earlier plays out most
clearly, as related changes went on in parallel from both sides. The Church began to find itself in
the position of counterpart to the emerging political structures, that is, as “body politic or a
political organism on one level with the secular bodies politic which by that time began to assert
themselves as self-sufficient communities” (idem, p. 485). Being a conceptual category based on
mystical thought, the notion of corporation became a powerful tool for the legal rationalization
of the world of social aggregates or collectives.
While the lofty idea of the church as corpus mysticum cuius caput Christus filled itself with secular
corporational and legal contents, the secular state, striving after its own exaltation and quasi-religious
glorification, itself adopted the term “body mystical” and used it for its own justification and its own
ends… The lawyers began to distinguish five or more corpora mystica – village, city and province, realm
and universe. Baldus defined the populus not simply as the individuals of a community, but as “men
assembled into one mystical body” (hominum collectio in unum corpus mysticum). And in England as well
as in France the terms corpus politicum and corpus mysticum were used, without clear distinction, to
designate the people and the state. (Kantorowicz 1951: 486)

Once it took off from its roots in the theological sphere, the construction of the legal
concept of corporation as applicable to the state proceeds with a number of metaphors, starting
with a moral and political marriage between the king and the realm, between the prince and the
republic. That metaphor became prominent in the legal discourse about kingship during the 16th
century. According to Kantorowicz these references originated from the Commentaries of
Justinian Codex by the Neapolitan jurist Lucas de Penna (ca. 1320 – ca. 1390).
There is contracted a moral and political marriage between the prince and the respublica.
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Also, just as there is contracted a spiritual and divine marriage between a church and its prelate, so is
there contracted a temporal and terrestrial marriage between the Prince and the State. (Lucas de Penna via
Kantorowicz 1955: 78)

This legal thought will progressively become institutionalized through a number of practices,
notably the coronation rituals where in the 16th century symbols of the king’s authority will be
integrated in a wedding narrative.
On the accession of Henry II of France, in 1547, there was introduced into the French Coronation Order a
rubric before and after the bestowal of the ring, saying that by this ring “the king solemnly married his
realm,”… (idem, p. 76)

This metaphor of marriage builds on a long-running theme whereby the bishop is thought
of to be married to his see or the Christ to the Church, on the basis of Ephesians 5, 25.70 A
variation of the same idea was originally expressed by St. Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage (3rd
century) and quoted during the 12th century in the Gratian’s Decretum as follows: “The Bishop is
in the Church, and the Church in the Bishop” (idem, p. 79).71 The transference of this as a
metaphor into the secular realm will generate a discursive evolution that clearly comes off from
the following quotes (Kantorowicz 1955: 78 ff. and passim) which I have selected and lined up
in a roughly chronological order.
1.

70

“The Bishop is in the Church, and the Church in the Bishop.” (St. Cyprian and Gratian’s Decretum)

“Husbands, love your wives, as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her,”… See also Eph. 5, 23 (the part
that states: “…as Christ is the head of the church, his body, of which he is the Savior.”) and 5, 30 (“because we are
members of his body.”) From the English Standard Version (2001) of the Bible available at http://www.biblos.com
71 Another variation of a biblical verse at John 14, 10: “Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in
me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own authority, but the Father who dwells in me does his works.”
(Idem)
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2.

Two are the bodies of Christ: the human material body which he assumed from the Virgin, and the
spiritual collegiate body, the college of the Church. (Teaching of 12th century Simon of Tournai,
among others, p. 90)

3.

“Also, just as the church is in the prelate and the prelate in the church…, so is the Prince in the
respublica, and the respublica in the Prince.” (Adaptation of St. Cyprian to secular sphere by Lucas de
Penna; other 14th and 15th century jurists will do the same.)

4.

“And just as men are joined together spiritually in the spiritual body, the head of which is Christ …, so
are men joined together morally and politically in the respublica, which is a body the head of which is
the Prince.” (Lucas de Penna, quoted p. 81)

5.

“The king in his body politic is incorporated with his subjects, and they with him.” (Saying attributed
to English Crown jurists under Queen Elizabeth)

6.

The king is “a body corporate in a body natural, and a body natural in a body corporate.” (Sir Francis
Bacon: 1561 – 1626)

7.

“The king, as a King, never dies.” (English jurists of the 16th century)

8.

“The King never dies.” (End 16th century France)

The above quotes comprise a dual thematic: one thematic dimension that is of union
(between a head and a body) and the other dimension is one of duality (of a mortal body and a
non-mortal body.) The latter came to be known as the doctrine of the king’s “two bodies” –
albeit in one individual – in the juristic discourse of the late Tudor period, toward the end of the
16th century. It was believed that behind any individual king, rests the virtue that makes him
kingly – the source of his dignity of kinghood. This is known as the Dignitas of rulers, which
justify that the king “never dies,” even if the particular individual holding that office at some
point in time may die as any human.
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The commentaries and works of Lucas de Penna were instrumental in that development
toward the state as a corporation in legal sense.72 With that notion, the state was set to become
increasingly a collective political entity rather than the realm over which reigns the will of one
absolute sovereign. As a result of a progressive judicialization of the concept of corpus
mysticum, the realm or the respublica is now discursively articulated as a body politic, the head
and the members of which are the king and his subjects, respectively – what Kantorowicz (1951:
483) calls the “organological concept of the state.” The doctrinal developments brought about by
the revival of the study of the Roman law in the 13th century reached their full expression by the
middle of the century when
the great lawyer-pope Innocent IV [r. 1243 – 1254] introduced or elaborated the notion of the persona ficta,
the fictitious or (as we would call it) juristic person, that abstraction of any aggregate of man – corporation,
community, or dignity – without which modern society could not easily exist. (Kantorowicz 1951: 486)

This brings to completion a series of conceptual innovations that will fully enable the legal
codification of any business involving a collective of people and institutions as one.
The Patria and the Fisc: rediscovering the fatherland
Another transference operated by secular rulers was that of an antique notion which had
disappeared from the medieval secular politics so far – the notion of patria – following a pattern
set out by the crusades as wars in the defense of the Holy Land. Kantorowicz argues that the
ancient saying “pro patria mori” which celebrates in the Greek and Roman antiquity the capital
sacrifice of a man in the battlefield for his community or his fatherland was not referenced in the
72 The corporational dimension, starting from the view of the church as corpus Christi and leading to the organological
concept of the state, is illustrated (and somewhat evidenced) by the frontispiece of Hobbes’s Leviathan (published in
1651) by Abraham Bosse. The etching represents the bust of a giant overhanging the valley and the realm, wearing a
crown and holding in one hand a sword and in the other a crosier. A closer look reveals that the torso and arms of the
giant are composed of hundreds of human beings (see “Leviathan” at http://en.wikipedia.org).
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political discourse of early Middle Ages dominated by the personalization of authority. Before
the end of the 12th century, knights and warlords could sacrifice their life for the person of the
sovereign, not for a notion such as “the eternal” France or Spain or any other land.
As we have seen, personal ties and allegiances preceded the physical space and were
overarching in the structuring of the political one in most of the Middle Ages. At the turn of the
first millennium they were central to the medieval political institutions, much more than formal
territorial boundaries, and they will remain so for about the following three centuries. The
medieval Christian notion of patria is one that was defined in Augustinian terms as a heavenly
land – the “City of God” or patria aeterna, which in that context was the only one worth dying
for (while pagans and miscreants from Athena to Rome were consumed with the vanity of dying
for an earthly piece of land.) During the 13th century, that will begin to change. That change will
be driven by two related factors: the need to levy a tax to fund non-religious wars and the
justification of such wars.
The feudal aids which were due on three occasions – ransom for the feudal lord, knighting of his eldest son,
dowry of his eldest daughter – were personal lordly taxes which had nothing whatsoever to do with the
country, nation, or patria in either an ancient or a modern sense. (Kantorowicz 1951: 477-8)

Kantorowicz identifies the emergence of a fourth type of tax at the end of the 13th century, which
is more related to one of the functions for which the modern state will later claim monopoly.
Citing Joseph Strayer’s 1949 opuscule titled “Defense of the Realm and Royal Power in France,”
Kantorowicz reminds us that in the 12th century, Louis VI of France facing an imminent attack
from his neighbor across the Rhine made gifts to the church in order to secure divine favors and
protection. The king
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went to St. Denis, took the Oriflamme from the altar, offered prayers pro defensione regni, and made grants
to the abbey dedicated to St. Denis, the patron saint of France and the dynasty. That is to say, “for the
defense of the realm” divine help was needed, and it was secured by giving to the church. At the end of the
thirteenth century, however, the proportions were definitely reversed. Pro defensione regni the king no
longer gave; he took. He imposed a tax to meet the emergency of the realm, and pro necessitate regni he
imposed the tax also on the church. (Kantorowicz 1951: 478)

Not only did this new tax follow the patterns of the crusading taxes but the secular rulers
adopted the same rhetoric used by the medieval church in the framing and the justification of the
crusades. The secular rulers figured that if the papacy was able to frame the crusades as
defensive wars for the protection of the Holy Land, they themselves should be able to apply the
same to the “native fatherland” as well. This even went to the extreme where some of the clergy
assimilated France to the Holy Land in the bellicose enterprise of Philip IV (Kantorowicz 1951:
483).That is how the term patria, with its ancient, “patriotic” bend, re-emerged in the medieval
political context and will subsequently be reclaimed as the defining, territorial substratum in the
construction of the national state.
The theme of the union of a head and a body and the metaphor of the political and moral
marriage between the Prince and the state elaborated on by Lucas de Penna (as we saw earlier)
actually emerged while he was discussing issues of land propriety and the fisc (idem, p. 78). This
theme will then be used by 16th century French lawyers to frame the relationship of the sovereign
to the demesne. As patrimonial estate, the domain is now being interpreted to be the dowry of the
state in the marriage of the king to the realm (Kantorowicz 1955: 71), with statements such as
this:
the king’s power over the domain and the fisc was only that which a husband had over the dowry of his
wife: “The domain is the dowry inseparable from the public state.” (Kantorowicz 1955: 77)
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It used to be said the domain belongs to the fisc as well as to God and as a consequence any
piece of land that did not have declared property rights was by default owned by the fisc and
God. The notion of an association between God and the fisc appears as early as St. Augustine
who refers to the fiscus of Christus. Then later in response to questions regarding the opulence of
the Church, particularly the papacy during the time of Pope John XXII (r. 1316 – 1334),
arguments were made about the Christ having a fisc and therefore the legitimacy of the Church
to own property (idem, p. 84 f.)
Starting from late 13th century however, legal theorists will take their cues out of the
Gratian’s Decretum where it is inscribed that “What is not received by Christus, is exacted by the
Fiscus” (idem, p. 84). By the 15th century, this statement became like a proverb.
In 1441, in a law suit tried before the Court of the Exchequer, John Paston, then a Justice of the Court of
Common Pleas …dropped quite casually a strange remark: “What is not snatched by Christus, is snatched
by the Fiscus.” (Kantorowicz 1955: 83)

The perpetuity of the two institutions, the ecclesiae and the fiscus, was emphasized as a
significant common feature in this legal thinking, which commanded “the inalienability of both
ecclesiastical and fiscal property” (idem, p. 85). Furthermore, the ubiquity and omnipresence of
the fisc endows it with a godly nature, in the eye of some jurists such as Baldus. To that extent
and particularly based on its perpetuity, lawyers considered that “the fisc never dies” just like the
ecclesiae and the king.
With the metaphors of marriage and dowry, the king emerges more distinctly as the head
of a household. While it may be true that “what is not received by Christus, is exacted by the
Fiscus,” the domain now falls under the responsibility of the fisc only, which Baldus calls “the
soul of the state” (idem, p. 86) due to its immortality, and as such it no longer belongs to God but
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to the king (this was to be expected due precisely to the distance secular rulers had started taking
vis-à-vis the Church as a power.) The latter may use the patrimonial estate as a landowner but he
is also expected to exercise a duty of care over it.
He [Lucas de Penna] interpreted the fisc as the dowry of the respublica, and maintained that the husband
was entitled only to use, but not to alienate, the property of his wife. He further paralleled the vows,
exchanged by groom and bride at their marriage, to the oaths, taken by kings at their coronation and by
bishops at their ordination, by which both promise not to alienate property belonging to the fisc and to the
church respectively. (Kantorowicz 1955: 82-83)

These legal – both discursive and practical – assemblages of authority and institutions
coming straight from the medieval church will shape the circumstances from which the national
state progressively will emerge. Meanwhile at the term of that process of reciprocal assimilation
between the church and the state, both institutions eventually took on something of the other one.
The reverse side of the application of theological language to secular institutions was, on the one hand, that
the fisc and the state machinery eventually did become godlike, whereas, on the other hand, God and Christ
were demoted to mere symbols of legal fiction in order to expound the ubiquity and eternity of the fictitious
person called Fisc. (Idem, p. 87)
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CHAPTER 5
The National State and Government ID

5.1

Introduction

In this chapter I am going to analyze the historical accounts of the origins and evolution of the
government-issued traveler’s passport up to its international stabilization as both a travel
document and an identity credential. This is done with a view to addressing the following
question: How did identity credentials issued by the national state historically emerge and
become authoritative? Starting with the early occurrences of identity records in the medieval
west and practice of letter of safe-conduct, the narrative moves through the emergence of the
notion of passport as a way of authorizing and documenting movements, then to its international
standardization. Then I pay a close attention to the premises and related documentary practices
which the reliability of the international passport itself is based on. In the process we will see
how the formation of the modern state became intertwined with the emergence of the nation as
formative of a quality or attribute of individuals, in other words, the emergence of the concept of
nationality. I argue that nationality is the locus of a reciprocal process whereby the state
“naturalizes” itself as a nation while (the) people are ascribed to the institution of the state. The
transition towards the territory as the ultimate basis and one of the primary determinants of the
authority to define the configuration of obligations and rights, in opposition to personal ties as
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we previously saw in the early feudalism, also signifies that impersonal procedures had to be put
in place to reflect and sustain a similar mode of affiliation. This requires objective facts such as,
for instance, ‘place of birth’ or ‘place of residence,’ which may lead an individual to different
identity pathways with different institutional configurations. Lastly, the history of the passport
thus sketched is supplemented by a case study of the emergence of the French national identity
card with a view to adding a national perspective to an international standardization process both
towards the similar outcome of establishing an authoritative identity credential.

5.2 Emergence of Written Identity and the Passport
A basic way people may identify a person to other people who are unfamiliar with the target
individual is through description. And as we may imagine, oral descriptions must have been the
most common way before the adoption of writing as technique of administration and more
importantly the expansion of literacy in the society at large. Descriptions may be offered by
anyone who just saw even once the individual being looked for. The development of towns
following that of trade in the 13th century most likely increased the mobility of populations as
compared to the earlier medieval peasantry and fiefdom. As more and more people gained the
capability to move at further and further distances,73 wouldn’t there be a need for potential
counterparts to be able to ascertain their identity in order to avoid deception and frauds?
Identification requires that there is enough information available in a context so that the subject
to be identified would most likely be the unique one matching that information. Outside any
standard format enabling that achievement, descriptions of individuals in a free format, whether
oral or in written, would have to get longer and longer, adding more traits in order to refine their

73

We saw in the medieval chapter that the Church itself developed as a transnational organization thanks to the
improvements of transportation and communication infrastructures at that time.
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granularity and increase their specificity, thus the likelihood of accurate identification. That is
what eventually happened.
Detailed descriptions began appearing only slowly in very late fourteenth-century and early fifteenthcentury texts” (Groebner 2007: 75).

It was then a common practice to associate a person to some categories or attributes on
the basis of their appearance and visual cues. Clothes were still treated as identity attributes, just
as any bodily signs or marks.
These descriptions of outward appearance blur the distinction between clothes and bodies. It was the
outward appearance that made the person. (Groebner 2007: 76)

Not only were the styles available to any given individual not so many or diverse but
furthermore, clothes were an apparatus and an indication of the class orders. As such it was not
unusual for clothing to be “regulated by municipal and territorial dress codes” (Ibid.).
Written records then improved identification procedures in some ways: they provided a
stable reference point, and could be consulted or retrieved at a later time; they were less
dependent on any particular individuals, in local or transient contexts, at every instance of use;
and fairly accurate copies could also be made to keep or displace.
A standardized system of identification and recognition (...) is distinguished therefore both by the stability
and replicability of its operations and by their relative invisibility, in contrast to older more public regimes
that were sustained by the distinctively clothed and marked body and by individual face-to-face encounters.
And (...) this new system of identity documents represented the addition of official authentication and
verification to recognition alone. This was a crucial development in a society of increasing size, mobility,
and anonymity, and it was also part of an older and much broader movement toward a culture of
documentary proofs in official and judicial transactions. (Caplan 2001: 50-51)
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With that, identity was set to become a document and an entry in a register, that is, more
about recording and record keeping, which in the same time increases the potential geographical
reach of its effects, with the desire and the expectation to be able to control the corresponding
social space and maintain order.
These identification documents gave rise to a new fiction: the surveillance and ordering of a chaotic world
by a nearly total administration mean to enable identification via record keeping. (Groebner 2007: 12)

With regard to ascertaining individuals’ identity, however, written records quickly raised
problems, too. The standardization involved in individual identity systems includes some
paradox, given the fact that a system cannot account for the evolving subjective identity of the
individual (unless subjective traits can be captured in impersonal terms, as commonly
understandable attributes, and updated fairly regularly.) As Caplan (2001: 51) points out,
in virtually any systematics of identification, everyone is not only ‘himself’ but also potentially the
embodiment of a type, and in an important respect the history of identification is a history not so much of
individuality as of categories and their indicators.

Thus, to establish identity, which relies on uniqueness, the system designers have to capture the
individual through general categories while making sure (or hoping) that the pieces of
information they collect on each individual in relation to those categories, bundled together,
provide a precise enough picture pointing to that exact individual, not anyone else. By providing
or documenting for each individual the specific value of each one of those general types, identity
systems, it seems, rely on the triangulation of those categories documented in order to
authenticate the presence or agency of each individual concerned, that is, literally, of each and
every given body. As Beatrice Fraenkel aptly puts it,
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One ends by granting that identity is at the same time that which distinguishes an individual from others
and that which assimilates him to others. (Fraenkel 1992: 197, transl. J. Caplan in Caplan and Tortpey
2001: 51)

As we saw in the chapter on medieval seals, identity artifacts or records have not always
been in the custody of a central authority. Even before the Renaissance portraits (ages before the
photograph), laypeople of all status owned seals, and various insignia (a few others could add
coats of arms,) along with some form of related family records, all of which were considered
reliable identity tokens, at least in the local context of direct knowledge and social reputation.
However, the increasing institutionalization of social structures and authority required some
collective and legitimate entities to safeguard the validity of the identity processes and data. The
earliest registers started doing just that on behalf of social and political institutions of the time:
compiling indexes and administering registers served highly specific political interests: to affirm the
judicial power of institutions and individuals striving to fashion tools to bolster their own legitimacy.
(Groebner 2007: 72)

The late Middle Ages bequeathed to the following eras the practice of compiling lists of
names to be associated to a series of persons, in two instances. The first one was related to the
Church’s rite of confession. “The oldest indexes of names were religious,” Groebner writes
(2007: 69). In 1215 the Roman Catholic Church required that all believers fulfill the duty of
confession at least once a year so that they can receive the Holy Communion. In order to monitor
the observance of that provision, parishes maintained records and issued a document as a proof
that a believer completed his or her duty. The second instance, related to the same religious
authority, was the legal domain which was, as we saw, in the hands of ecclesiastical courts. The
oldest records of criminal proceedings, establishing a list of offenders and the charges against
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them, go back to mid thirteenth century (Groebner 2007). Emulating the metaphor of the “Book
of Life” meant to contain the names of the redeemed, the Inquisition also recorded the names of
heretics as a counterpart. Later during the same century, municipal registers were created
primarily to enable courts authority to identify and sentence the right individuals while keeping
records of decisions and outcomes.
The practice of listing and registering went on increasing and expanding to new domains.
That was the case of the tax registers, with the example of “the famous Catasto” in 1427
Florence. “In the 1440s, cities north of the Alps compiled, mostly in situations of armed conflict
new and ambitious population tallies” (Groebner 2007: 77). Efforts were then made to count all
the inhabitants of the city at one point in time, as opposed to a headcount of citizens or male head
of households only. Registers were also established for specific categories or subsets of the
population – e.g., “groups below the threshold of citizen’s rights,” including transient
populations -- who were then “required to swear an oath attesting their acknowledgment of
municipal authorities and were registered by name.” (Ibid.)
At the time, only some categories of personnel, such as diplomats, royal envoys or
messengers, and merchants, were issued letters of safe conduct or introduction letters for their
trips. However as the history of Europe moved into its modern phase, the practice was soon to
evolve from a privilege to an obligation. As a document of passage, bearing the proper
credentials to be checked at borders before granting access to a different territorial jurisdiction or
another authority, the precursor of the passport was designed to authenticate both the travelers
and their goods. It will then evolve into the passport or the laissez-passer, focusing uniquely on
human individuals.

208
The practices of register (listing) and safe-conduct or any travel document came together
to effect that change. First, the management of military contingents relied on the use of registers
as needed to monitor the population of subcontractors and mercenaries and their claims of
service completion and payment. Outside the privileged categories that previously were issued
letters of safe-conduct, military was one profession that early started carrying identity-related
papers, as a way to address the problem of desertion or soldiers leaving their duty station and
returning on their own initiative. “In 1462, Louis XI issued regulations that required all soldiers
on leave to carry a document made out by their superior, bearing their name and confirming their
proper discharge” (Groebner 2007: 174).
Second, before the fifteenth century the profession of courier was one that both enabled
and harnessed the mobility of written records.
A delivered document and its bearer authorized and authenticated each other. From the late fourteenth
century on, envoys and couriers played a particular role in this development. They were required to swear
an official oath, were bound to a strict code of professional discretion and secrecy, and were recorded by
name in special envoy registers. (Groebner 2007: 172)

Later in June 1464, the king of France Louis XI issued an order that is considered a landmark in
the genesis and development of the passport. That order was meant to redefine and regulate the
royal messaging system, and required that identity papers known as passeports be issued and
handed to the couriers in sealed envelopes. Along their itinerary and at the border checks
between provinces or relevant regions, the royal postmaster was required to check, stamp, and
then resealed the documents with the proper official seals.
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On arrival at their destination, couriers had to submit their passes so that they could be forwarded to the
central passport office, where they were deposited in the registre de passeports, ensuring that every
courier’s journey could be retraced after the fact. (Groebner 2007: 171)

Finally, the new regulatory regime of messengers apparently proved satisfying enough
for the practice to be extended to the public and any moving human subjects. From the 1460s, a
traveler needed not to be a royal envoy or a diplomat to bear a passport. In fact, the new system
was so successful that it spread to the neighboring Italy and Germanic countries where it was
adopted, as Groebner (2007) notes, with the exact transliteration of the French term passeport
into passaporti, passzettel and bassborten, all meaning literally: ‘go through the door’ or
‘passing the gate’ (in modern French, the term ‘port’ also means the same in English, as in
‘airport’ or ‘port’ of entry to a country.)
The notion of passport emerged with the obligation for anyone away from their
residential location to bear travel papers that can identify them. In the same time, we know that
“identity papers (…) have raised the issue of reproduction and authenticity – that is, of verifiable
resemblance – ever since they were introduced” (Groebner 2007: 12). In effect, those papers also
became a powerful focus of interest for pilgrims, merchants and all sorts of travelers, giving rise
to the proliferation of “doppelgängers” and doubles. The history of identity documents is also
one of metamorphoses, not the least of which is the initial authoritative act of transforming a
person into whatever the documents attest, provided that they carry the proper signs:
These documents transform whoever could produce a sealed letter as proof of personal identity into
whomever and whatever the document ‘certified.’ (Groebner 2007: 171)

The passport will face the exact same dilemma as, before it
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all written forms for registering identification (lists, wanted circulars, descriptions) (…): what was
committed to writing was immutable, whereas the person described continued to change, not least through
the process of registration itself: once a person's description was out in a search warrant, that person had to
change. (Groebner 2007: 90)

The reasoning may not be the same for passports as for some lists which were not related
to incrimination, but the result was roughly the same in many cases where if the person did not
have to change, the document did. From the perspective of the population of subjects (or users,
shall we say today) identity documents were nothing more than the token for a right, or the
realization of an aspiration -- the right to move around freely, as much as possible, without
hassle. There was not much relevance to the holder whether the information in the documents
actually refers to him or not, as long as the agents of authority might think so. As Terence Cave
(1988: 245) puts it: “The recognition sign is a synecdoche. Without this synecdochic sêmeion,
difference cannot be resolved into identity; the token proclaims as unique an individual which
cannot on its own sufficiently make good its uniqueness.” In many instances, it was the authority
that had an interest in establishing that uniqueness while the subjects were comfortable with
keeping their profile blurred in the eyes of the authority. The institution then risks becoming its
own dupe, and always has to manage that risk in every effort of identification. Moving
identification from a live but varying description of persons based on immediate experience to a
depiction that is immutable but mediated through representation in and by a document, subjects
of flesh and bones were in a sense ready to become subjects of papers – as long as the papers
bear the proper signs, – whereas the intent was to have the papers bear witness of “who” the
former were, in the first place.
This (…) is the function of the identity document: it is the portable token of an originary act of bureaucratic
recognition of the 'authentic object' --an 'accurate description' of the bearer recognized and signed by an
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accredited official, and available for repeated acts of probative ratification. The experience of self-sameness
is thus never unmediated, either subjectively or objectively; it operates through a system of signs and
recognitions that intrudes alterity into the heart of identity. (Caplan 2001: 51)

It quickly became clear that just recording and registering could not suffice to address the
possibility (and the fact) of a discrepancy between the documents and the actual person. As
Groebner (2007: 91, italics added) clearly points out, the question becomes: “how then could
individuals be identified, named, and denoted reliably and authoritatively beyond written
registration?” The above mentioned dilemma leading to this persisting paradox of written
records invited to devise mechanisms of authentication, that is, to secure processes of recognition
enabling a strong “act of probative ratification.” For those records could defeat the purpose of
the identity document which apparently was predicated on the unwarranted expectation that each
person will hold on to their legitimate papers and, equally unrealistic, that the information
included will be singular enough to pass muster as proof of uniqueness for only one person, in
other words, to serve as basis for the accurate recognition of the intended subject. Early
administrative practices acknowledged the same challenge:
“Late medieval bureaucracies authenticated the legal documents they composed and duplicated by using
the scribe’s token or colophon. In its simplest form, the token consisted of the scribe’s signature. The
colophon could also include graphic signs, anagrams, or puzzles, or even more protracted messages, as with
the anonymous fifteenth-century Florentine copyist who added his motto ‘Omnium rerum vicissitudo est’ -'all things are subject to change' -- to the words he had copied.” (Groebner 2007: 90)

The issue could only amplify with a generalization of identification documents such as
the passport. In the meantime, different reasons threatened the very existence of the passport.
Even when all citizens and other subjects were required to carry identification papers, their
meaning still differed depending on the social status of the bearer: for some, it was still a mark of
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privilege that gave them the right of passage (quite literally, a laissez-passer) while for others it
was an instrument of subjugation and control as well as a source of harassment. At that point, it
was obvious that the French revolution could only get rid of that instrument of domination of the
people by the most powerful. However, the revolutionaries will quickly learn the virtues of
identity papers for maintaining social order, and thus their appeal to whoever turns out to be in
the seat of the prince.
“By the late eighteenth century, the regime of identification and the identity papers it enforced had come to
symbolize an arbitrary and bureaucratic coercive state: the French revolutionaries of 1789 abolished the
detested royal passport of 1623 and 1669 and proclaimed every citizen’s right to come and go as he or she
pleased. Their enthusiasm, however, was short-lived. With the republic under threat, new and stricter
passport legislation was enacted already in 1792. With the establishment of the “état-civil” on September
20, 1792, a person was no longer registered in the local parish registers under church jurisdiction, but by a
state registration system subject to central administration.” (Groebner 2007: 228)

Furthermore, new legislations put into effect in 1794 and 1803 forbid to change one’s
name as assigned and recorded at birth, at risk of harsh sentences. Gérard Noiriel (1993), French
historian, argues that the birth of the état-civil on September 20, 1792, was also that of
centralized administrative registration, identification, and modern citizenship (see also: Noiriel
2001 for a translation in abridged version). It is remarkable that since the high Middle Ages,
when priests were in charge of the civil registration, only information about Catholics had been
entered in the registers, which were treated as an appendix to religious prescriptions and rituals.
It became clear, though, that it was necessary to register everybody at least for the purpose of
civil order, and consequently, that it would be self-defeating to continue to exclude categories
such as Jews and Protestants, or any other for that matter. So shortly before the French
revolution,

213
an edict of 1787 authorized non-Catholics to affirm their civil status to the local judge or priest. Even
before the Revolution, the secularization of civil status was widely considered to be crucial to the order and
welfare of society. (Noiriel 2001: 29)

This clearly indicates that as far as identification is concerned, the figure of the citizen –
an individual by and with civil status – then took over the figure of the believer, and a shift
occurred from the religious claim to define boundaries and identities to the political one. This
preluded the rising profile of the civil status and nineteenth century’s flourishing municipal
administration as the secular successor of the medieval officium or ministerium ecclesiasticum
(Wolter 1997) and the embryo of the bureaucratic modern state.

5.3 Expansion of the modern passport
In this section, I provide a view of the situation that prevailed in most of the 19th century Europe
and at the beginning of the 20th century, characterized by heterogeneity of passport policies or
lack thereof. Then I reconstitute the processes and decisions that led to an internationally
recognized type of passport.
5.3.1

Multiple passport policies

During the nineteenth century, the adoption of the passport was still sketchy; in fact it was a
rather minor phenomenon at the world scale. At the time, the granting of a passport was not
necessarily predicated on citizenship or nationality – as the rise of the nation-state to political
pre-eminence in terms of individual allegiance leads to the overlapping of both these terms.
Martin Lloyd describes in his book The Passport: The history of man’s most travelled document
how an attempt of assassination on the person of the Emperor Napoleon III on January 14, 1858
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in front of Paris Opera set in motion a number of events that will impact the ways passports were
issued going forward.
The individual identified as having committed that assassination attempt was Count
Felice Orsini, an Italian – or more precisely a Piedmontese – revolutionary fighting for the
unification of Italy. He escaped prison and fled to England (via Switzerland) from where he will
enter France with a British passport. Here is how the author describes the passport of the time:
The passport of the day was not the neat modern booklet complete with photograph and description with
which we are now familiar. It was most likely to be a single sheet of paper, headed by a coat of arms and
printed with an ornamental script requesting in florid language that the owner be allowed to pass
unhindered in the name of the monarch or state. It would be issued to any applicant who was able to
provide an acceptable reference and the requisite fee. The ‘Passport System’, as it was referred to in the
nineteenth century, has as many detractors as promoters.

In Britain, the system was generally reviled by the public. They resented the bureaucracy involved in
acquiring a passport, even though it was usually issued within twenty-four hours, and they resented the
affront to thir dignity in holding a document whose very existence implied that the bona fides of an English
gentleman could ever be put in doubt (Lloyd 2003: 6)

While England did not require passport for entry to its territory, unfortunately for English people
they most likely have to carry one while traveling to continental Europe because their main
neighbors across the Channel did. While France already had a detailed set of identification
requirements and a complex bureaucratic infrastructure74 for checking the passport of foreigners
arriving in its ports, the English passport would include for the description of the bearer as little
information as ‘British Subject’ or ‘English Gentleman.’ Other particularities of the British
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As we saw earlier in section 4.1, this is inherited from a long practice dating before the 1789 Revolution.
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passport was that it was expensive (by comparison foreign passports were generally free of
charge) and it required to “either know the Foreign Secretary personally, know someone who did
or have a recommendation from a banking house of repute” (idem, p. 10).
In preparation for his travel to France, Orsini applied for passport to the Sardinian
Consulate General in London – the jurisdiction of which he depended on due to his place of birth
in the Principality of Piedmont then part of the Kingdom of Sardinia. His application was
declined due to fears related to his revolutionary recent past, although the travel destination he
provided was on the territory of Sardinia his home country.
A modern day traveller would be scandalised to be refused a passport by his own country, especially if the
passport were intended to permit him to return home to visit his family. No doubt Orsini was incommoded
but this was not the only route to a passport. Strange as it may seem, it was quite legal for any person to go
to the French or Belgian consulate and obtain one of their passports for travel. The applicant did not need to
be a national of the respective country. (Idem, p. 10)

Eventually, Orsini arranged for a British passport in the name of one of his accomplices who
was a British Subject – a passport which ironically was signed by then (at the time of the
assassination attempt) Prime Minister Lord Palmerston as it turned he was the Foreign Secretary
at the date of issuance of that passport. This incident led to an uproar between the two countries,
with on the one hand French people pointing the finger to England for harboring “terrorists” (as
we would have probably said today) and letting them run loose with travel documents, and on
the other hand the English upset that France is trying to tell them how to run their country.
On 5 February 1858, the French government announced that it was ceasing immediately the arrangement
whereby it issued passports to British subjects. The Earl of Clarendon, the British Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, indicated that he welcomed this move and wished other countries would follow suit. Two
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days earlier he had enlarged the group of people who could recommend an applicant for a Foreign Office
passport to include mayors, chief magistrates and justices of the peace. This measure was necessary to
absorb the greater demand expected from the increase in the number of applicants. (Lloyd 2003: 16-17)

On the diplomatic front, nothing was resolved despite the Prime Minister’s effort:
Palmerston’s efforts at conciliation were almost doomed to failure from the start by the differing
administrative backgrounds of the two countries. The French people were accustomed to having to prove
their identity upon demand and could not understand how such dangerous exiles and conspirators could be
allowed to walk the streets freely unless there were some tacit indulgence on the part of the British
government. (Idem, p. 19)

In addition however, France also suspended a passport waiver measure that was previously in
place in order to facilitate visits between the coastal towns on both sides of the Channel: Dover
and Folkestone on Britain’s side and Calais and Boulogne on France’s side. The result was
enough chaotic for the Prime Minister to attempt to pass a Conspiracy to Murder bill, hoping to
appease France by making such conspiracy punishable as a crime and not as a simple demeanor
like any other conspiracy for minor things. In the end, the attempt came under heavy criticism.
The Conspiracy to murder bill was defeated … on 19 February 1858, as a consequence, Palmerston’s
government was forced to resign, which it did on the 22nd. As a result of the Thomas Allsop passport used
in the assassination attempt, the protocol for issuing a passport was permanently changed: there was never
to be a return to the situation where one state could issue a passport that claimed the authority to identify
the holder as a national of another state. No longer could an Englishman travel on a legally issued Belgian
or French passport. (Lloyd 2003: 22-23)

By the end of the nineteenth century due to the industrial development, the subsequent
progress in transportation (railroad particularly) and the resulting acceleration of population
movements, most of the passport laws were relaxed and passport requirement were not strictly
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enforced. The prevailing situation has come to be known as “the laissez faire era in international
migration” (Torpey 2000: 112).75 However, as is always the case at times of unrest or
violence/war, the means of controlling who’s who and who goes where reappeared prominently
at the top of government concerns when the First World War broke out in 1914. France, Britain,
Germany and Italy, all took new measures more or less adapted at their particular context but
with two shared goals: tighten for security reasons the control of foreigner populations on their
soil while in many cases making sure of the availability of nationals of appropriate age range for
the war efforts.
In France, two decrees taken in April 1917 required foreigners above the age of fifteen to
carry identity cards. Germany enacted and extended to all foreigners certain “emergency clauses
of the liberal 1867 law” implementing by July 1914 what was supposed to be temporary passport
restrictions for embarking from and disembarking in Germany. The British government was
authorized to take the same type of restrictions by the 1914 Alien Restriction Act. While nonexplicitly on any passport requirements…
…the law put the onus of proving that a person is not an alien on that person, making documentary
evidence of one’s nationality largely unavoidable, particularly if one did not look or sound ‘British.’ It also
provided for the possibility of requiring aliens to live, or of prohibiting them from living, in certain areas,
and of registering with the authorities their place of domicile, change of abode, or movement within the
UK. (Torpey 2000: 112)

At implementation and as the war progressed, identity documentation requirements grew
more and more detailed. Germany required that the passport include:

75

Unless otherwise indicated, the remainder of this section draws on Torpey (2000).
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a personal description, photograph, and signature of the bearer, along with an official certification that the
“bearer is actually the person represented in the photograph.” (Idem, p. 113)

The visa requirement went from all foreign entering the German territory to all people, national
or foreigner, entering or leaving the territory by mid-1916.
An … order detailed, with stereotypically German precision, by and to who German passports could be
issued, the information they were to include, a standard passport form, the acceptable form of a foreign
passport (which was supposed to conform to all the criteria of a German passport, including photograph,
etc.), the form of a personal identity document (Personalausweis) acceptable in place of a passport, and the
terms and conditions for the issuance of visas, depending on whether these were for exit from, entry into, or
transit through German territory. (Idem, p. 113)

Italy having been a regular supplier of workforce to more industrialized countries, the
first move in terms of controlling migration flows was to void all the identity documents in
circulation and issue new ones under new policies. On August 6, 1914 a decree made it illegal
for certain segment of the population susceptible of military service to leave the country. Given
the social background of the population of conscripts and in the fear that they may find more
incentives in fleeing the country, the government made the passport requirements harder for
Italians intending to cross the borders outbound. Passport and visa requirements were also
enacted for foreigners entering the kingdom.
The severe law went on to require foreigners to present themselves to public security officials within
twenty-four hours of their arrival to explain the circumstances of their sojourn in Italy, as well as any
military obligations which they might owe to the state of which they were nationals. A copy of this written
declaration was to be sent to district officials responsible for public security; the declarants received a
certificate attesting that they have fulfilled the requirements of the law. The papers necessary for moving
around within Italy as foreigner began to multiply. In addition the law made residents of Italy part of the
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apparatus for keeping watch over foreigners. Anyone, citizen or foreigner, sheltering a foreigner had to
submit to police officials a list of such persons within five days of their arrival, and within twenty-four
hours to inform those officials of their departure and ‘the direction they have taken.’ In an indication of the
growing reliance on modern technology to control movement, the Italians, like the Germans, demanded that
such passports include a photograph and a signature authenticated by the issuing authority. (Torpey 2000:
114-5)

As for the Italian citizens themselves, passports requirements only got more stringent as
the war went on. In 1916, the government suspended issuing passport at all while nationals were
required to show their passport for both leaving and entering the kingdom. Even internal
passports, the policy of which was previously provided for in a public security law of 1889, were
reenacted in August 1916 by a government order.
In the United States,76 the same pattern manifested itself starting with an executive order
of December 15, 1915 requiring a passport before leaving the country. The Congress also
attempted to make new laws restricting or barring from entry some categories of foreigners. On
May 22, 1918 the Congress took a law that provided statutory basis for the earlier executive
order giving the President the power to restrict departure from and entry into the US by
foreigners.
In all those countries these measures taken in time of war were meant to be temporary
and to expire with the exceptional circumstances that commanded them. However, history shows
that most of them were kept in place after the war, renewed with a June 1919 order in Germany,
the 1920 Aliens Order in the UK, a decree of May 1920 in Italy. For instance, quoting from the
UK’s provisions, Torpey writes:
76

In addition to Torpey (2000) who covers the history of passport in most countries where there was one by the 19th
century, see also Craig Robertson (2010) for a more detailed account specifically focusing on the United States
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Henceforward, anyone entering or leaving the UK was required to have ‘either a valid passport furnished
with a photograph of himself or some other document satisfactorily establishing his national status and
identity.’ The passport became the backbone of the system of documentary substantiation used to register
and keep watch over the movements of aliens in the UK. As in Italy during the war, foreigners in the UK
were now subject to extensive reporting and documentary requirements, and keepers of inns in which aliens
might happen to stay were drawn into the apparatus of surveillance over foreigners. The Order also
mandated the maintenance of a ‘central register of aliens’ under the direction of the Secretary of State.
(Torpey 2000: 116)

In the US, too, the Congress updated the 1918 Act the following year by dropping any reference
to war time and the requirements for leaving the country – while maintaining them for entry.
5.3.2

Towards a uniform passport worldwide

While every one of the countries reported in the previous section required a passport for entering
their territory, including Germany even requiring a specific passport format, provision was
generally made for alternate solutions – such as “some other document satisfactorily establishing
[the applicant’s] national status and identity.” There was no conscious effort to harmonize
passport requirements and formats between countries.
Between the two World Wars (the League of Nations)
The earliest attempt at international guidelines for passport occurred with the
“Conference on Passports, Customs Formalities and Through Tickets” convened by the League
of Nations in Paris from the 15th to the 21st of October 1920 and focusing on international travel
issues. In the early 20th century, the common way of long-distance transportation was the
railway. The first paragraph of the 1920 Conference resolution makes it clear that railway was
the transportation infrastructure to keep in mind when it came to regulating about passports and
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visas as the Committee set out to examine “the methods necessary to facilitate international
passenger traffic by rail” (League of Nations, 1920: 3). And while doing so, the Committee still
expressed hope for a return to the pre-War period, lifting all travel-related restrictions enacted
during wartime. Meanwhile, the Conference made recommendations and provided guidelines
with regard to travel procedures and documents as applicable to the international passenger and
customs. In the main, the propositions of the conference include, among other items, the
following:
-

Universal uniformity of format for the ordinary passenger passport referred to as

“international-type passport” (to be distinguished from diplomatic passport left to each country
to define.)
-

Validity term is either per single journey or two years;

-

Passport fee was not to be considered a tax, and both passports and visas should be issued

on non-discriminatory basis regarding the nationality of the applicant and the destination country
(paragraphs 3 and 8). This provision of the article 3 related to the nationality of the applicant
suggests that in the eye of the drafters of the resolution, a government could issue a passport to
nationals of any country, if it chooses to. In addition, the issuance of visas shouldn’t discriminate
between the port of entry into or exit from the country issuing the visa (para. 8).
-

It abolishes the exit visa for all non-nationals, and establishes the validity term of a visa

to the validity of the passport for single-journey passport or to one year;
-

It set a price cap for the entry visa fee to 10 gold francs, while it is 1 gold franc for a

transit visa. (para. 8 and 11). In general the resolution recommended the application of a
principle of “equality, reciprocity [between countries for the privileges and rates availed to each
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other’s nationals], the abolition of individual reductions and total exemptions” regarding passport
and visa fees. (p. 7, para. 11; see also para. 8).
The description of the booklet format of the passport is provided in the first annex to the
resolution. The passport shall contain 32 pages, it reads. The first four pages will include
information about the issuing country (name and coat of arms) as well as the passport details
(e.g., passport number, expiration date and countries of validity), the potential number of
travelers to whom the passport is issued (possibly adding spouse and children to the primary
holder), their personal information and description, including nationality and photograph(s), etc.
All of this must be written in two languages: French and the national language of the issuing
country. The remaining twenty-eight pages are for affixing visas and recording extension of
validity period, as provided for in the resolution. At issuance, the passport is stamped and signed
both by its holder and the issuing authority. The dimensions of the document are indicated to be
“15 ½ x 10 ½ cm.”
The 1920 resolution also defined the categories of personnel to be granted diplomatic
passport. These concerned members of government including the officials of Foreign Office, the
President and Vice-President of legislative bodies, diplomatic and consular officials, all with
their families, plus Cabinet couriers and government envoys in official mission to other
governments or public international organizations, and “the high dignitaries of the household of a
Head of States” (League of Nations 1920: 19).
Twenty-two governments were represented at the 1920 Conference. All but three (China,
Japan and Uruguay) were European countries’. The Secretary-General of the League forwarded
the resolution to member states and a number of other countries, inviting them to provide
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feedback as to their position on the recommended measures and where they stand with regard to
their implementation if relevant. Some thirty governments replied to this inquiry. Canada, India,
New Zealand, Siam, South Africa and Venezuela were the non-European countries and nonparticipants in the 1920 Conference that replied (League of Nations 1922: 5). Most countries had
implemented some of the measures or were willing to do so; others invoked reciprocity as a
requirement for implementing relevant measures; yet a few others (particularly in Eastern
Europe) “indicated that at the time it was too difficult to make any substantial modifications to
their existing regimes” (Turack 1968: 232-3).
Regarding the equality between nationals and non-nationals in the issuance of passports
by a given government, the paragraph 3 about the “Fee to be collected,” specifically stated:
The fee charged shall not be of a fiscal character and will be collected without any discrimination between
countries for which the passport is issued, and with absolute equality as between “nationals” and “nonnationals” in the event of a passport being issued by a Government to persons other than its “nationals.”
(League of Nations 1922: 4)

The policy of the British Empire in that regard informed that of the Commonwealth Government
overall, which Australia formulated as follows in its feedback response.
In regard to the question of the issue of passports to “non-nationals,” the Commonwealth Government
proposes to follow the principles adopted by the British Government and not in any circumstances to issue
passports to persons other than (a) British subjects; (b) persons the protection of whose interests abroad
have been entrusted to His Majesty’s Government or the Commonwealth Government by a mandate of the
League of Nations; and (c) bona fide natives of British Protectorates and British-protected States. (League
of Nations 1922: 8)
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Table 5-1: Early international conferences addressing passport issues (including the number of participating
governments or countries).

Dates, Place

Event

Other details

15 – 21 October 1920,
Paris

Conference on Passports,
Customs Formalities and
Through Tickets

Conference of Experts, a.k.a. First Passport
Conference
22 Governments

16 January 1922, Graz

Graz Conference: on the
recommendations of the 1920
Conference

Succession States (to Habsburg Monarchy)
including Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Romania
and Yugoslavia.
5 Governments

15 May 1924, Rome

International Conference of
Emigration and Immigration

46 Governments

12 – 18 May 1926,
Geneva

Passport Conference

Second Passport Conference
38 Governments

2 September 1927

Third General Conference on
Communications and Transit

June 1929, Geneva

European Conference on
Cards for Emigrants in Transit

Convened by the League of Nations
Agreement to abolish transit visas for emigrants

1944, Chicago

Conference on safety and
viability of International
Travel

Birth of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) as an NGO.
54 Countries

21 August – 5 September
1963, Rome

Conference on International
Travel and Tourism

United Nations,
87 Governments

1968

Creation of ICAO’s Advisory
Panel

Task: Passport Standardizing activities

1978

Release of the optical
character recognition standard

Outcome of the Advisory Panel enabling to
automatically obtain traveler information from the
passport.

1984

Technical Advisory Group on
Machine Readable Travel
Documents (TAG/MRTD)

Standing committee

Sources: League of Nations’ archives at http://www.indiana.edu/~league/conferencedata.htm, League of
Nations (1920, 1922 and 1925a), ICAO (http://www.icao.int/pages/foundation-of-icao.aspx and
http://www2.icao.int/en/atb/Document%20Tranfer/SGM/Passport_concept.htm) and Turack (1968).

Among the other respondents (and to mention only the members or likely members of the
Commonwealth among them), New Zealand aligned itself with the same Commonwealth policy

225
verbatim but not Canada which stated nothing about the non-discrimination clause concerning
the nationality of the passport applicant, while the Union of South Africa contented itself with
declaring that it issued passports only to British subjects. The British Empire itself wrote that
they agreed on that para. 3 of the resolution but…
At the same time, the British Government would point out that it assumes that in principle a passport
should constitute a definite official proof of the nationality of its holder, and, for this reason, while
accepting the resolution, it does not intend to issue passports to persons other than … (League of Nations
1922: 14)

And it went on to state the exact policy spelled out by Australia above. As a general trend,
governments have had tendency to reservations regarding issuing passports to non-nationals77
even though the League itself appeared to presume that a passport was not a nationality
credential. As an alternative they may however issue a different type of document to aliens with
no consular attach within a given country or with no documented nationality, such as the “Permit
to leave Australia” in the case of that country or an “Emergency certificate” for South Africa.
On that particular question, one noted recommendation of the International Conference of
Emigration and Immigration in Rome in 1924 (Table 5-1) was to call on all states to develop and
agree on a specific format of “identity book” intended for immigrants (Turack 1968: 234-5). An
ad hoc committee of experts set up in the preparatory process towards the Second Passport
Conference in 1926 (League of Nations 1926) collected a status report from many countries as to

77

That option has never been formally foreclosed and appears to be left to the discretion of each government which
might therefore exercise its prerogative to issue a passport to whomever. One may note that there are institutions other
than national governments issuing passports such as the ‘Laissez-Passer’ of the United Nations or the travel documents
that it may provide to refugees (see infra, note 70). Anecdotal evidence might also show that governments may provide a
passport to a foreign individual as a prerogative or because of an exceptional situation (for instance, a prominent political
dissident who is being denied a passport by his or her national government while they have a life-threatening health issue
that could not be treated inside their country.)

226
where they stood regarding their implementation of the 1920 conference outcomes (League of
Nations 1925a), and studied among other relevant issues the proposals of the Rome conference
of 1924, particularly the “identity book” proposal (League of Nations 1925b). Those experts
supported the latter recommendation.
The experts felt that an identity book, based on the model attached to their report would prove of a greater
assistance to the emigrant than a passport, and would be indispensable to the emigrant in his own interests
particularly with respect to: (a) easy and certain proof of his identity; (b) assistance to consuls; (c) facilities
for establishing a domicile in the country of immigration; (d) drawing-up of official documents for the
emigrant and his family such as birth certificates, a marriage certificate and a death certificate; (e) entering
into labor and other contracts; (f) participation in social insurance and workmen’s compensation for
accidents; and (g) traveling facilities. One might say that a passport could render the same result, however,
in their experience the experts preferred to endorse the identity book concept rather than the passport for
emigrants. (Turack 1968: 235)

However, the conference did not agree with the experts and shut down the idea of an identity
book for immigrants as a responsibility for the immigration country to take. For the trouble does
not all stop with issuing a card or a booklet, or a passport for that matter; it also includes
requesting and verifying the quality of all appropriate information necessary to establish identity
as well as any reasonable steps needed to protect against forgery and other forms of abuse.
Furthermore, the German delegation drew the attention of the Conference to the case of
persons without nationality, which was to be distinguished from that of refugees78. As a followup to that proposal, the expert committee was charged to study the question and prepare it for a
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This proposal was concerned with part of the immigrant population in time of peace, while refugees are a result of a
state of conflict or insecurity and as such they are dealt with by the League issuing them a particular passport known as
the Nansen Passport. See “Nansen Passport” at
http://cultureandcommunication.org/deadmedia/index.php/Nansen_Passport
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future conference. This in effect was one of the agenda items of the Third General Conference on
Communications and Transit on 2 September 1927. Eventually, the question of “persons without
nationality” evolved into that of “persons without national passports” (ibid., p. 239). The
difference is that the ensuing measures will also apply to persons who, while they have a known
nationality, could not for some reasons get a passport from their government. The Conference
adopted to that effect four recommendations as presented by the expert committee in their report
(League of Nations 1927). The type of document adopted in these recommendations is called
“Identity and Traveling Document” and will present a few more differences in its format by
comparison to the passport. The holder of such document was by default allowed to return to the
country of their usual residence which can extend, renew or discontinue the said document.
On the fourth page of the identity and travelling document beneath the statement mentioning those
countries for which the document is valid, a statement would appear to indicate that the bearer was
authorized to return to the issuing country during the validity of the document. States adopting the
recommendations will accept the document as valid for the journey with or without the return clause and
will notify the Secretariat of the League of its intention to do so. (Turack 1968: 240)

If need be however (e.g., expiration during visit and difficulty to get renewal from the original
issuing country), it was also possible for the visited country to issue another identity and
traveling document to the same individual. The validity period of the document was set to six
months. Finally, the recommendations made it clear that they were not intended to supersede
existing regulations with regard to immigrants – neither by creating new rights for the
immigrants nor by imposing new duties on the immigration countries.
In 1928, two inquiries were launched in order to assess the action taken by governments
with regard to the 1926 Passport Conference and the 1927 General Conference on
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Communications and Transit, respectively (League of Nations 1929a and 1929b). The first
inquiry reveals a general consensus among the thirty-one governments that replied to the survey
on the latest recommendations. From the thirty governments that replied to the second inquiry,
all but one (Latvia) recognized the Identity and Travelling Document. Half of them either
already issued it or was prepared to do so. For the rest, either they had an equivalent solution
already in place for immigrants without national passport or they did not encounter the need so
far (Turack 1968: 241).
There are a number of recurrent themes in most of these early international conferences
discussing passports. First of all, it should be noted that passports were not intended to be an
internationally-valid version of a national ID card. As shown by the feedback provided by
governments I mentioned earlier, they tended to see it that way or to relate to passport as a
privilege reserved to their nationals. However, it is clear that the drafters of the relevant
recommendations and resolutions, who are in a sense the designers of the international-type
passport thought otherwise. That is probably the reason why nationality has always been one of
the basic data entries describing the passport holder (indicating that this information is not
presumed based on the issuing government) and also why, when the need arose, “a passport was
accepted as only prima facie proof of nationality and not a conclusive proof of this status” (ibid.,
p. 232). The phrasing of the relevant resolutions always and probably intentionally left open the
possibility for governments to issue a passport to non-nationals if they chose to, particularly
those living within their territorial borders. The non-discriminatory principle as per the
paragraphs 3 and 8 of the 1920’s resolution precisely means that if a country chooses or feels
compelled to issue a passport to a non-national, then the conditions (fee and other requirements)
must be the same as for nationals.
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Second, emphasis regularly appears to be put on “democratizing” access to passports.
The price caps for passport and visa fee as well as the principle of non-discrimination between
applicants were recommended in that spirit. In fact, it was explicitly and repeatedly stated in the
different resolutions that the passport fee should not be given a fiscal character (or treated as a
tax) and should only cover the cost of producing it. Furthermore, the passport conferences called
several time for decentralizing the government service of issuing passports in order to lessen the
burden of applicants who otherwise might incur far greater cost due to domestic traveling for the
purposes of attending to government inquiry as part of the application process, which then would
be inevitable for many.
Apparently, it was standard practice in most countries to interview passport applicants for the purpose of
establishing positive identity and obtaining answers to supplemental questions regarding their proposed
trip. (Turack 1968: 234)

Third, one may be struck by the persisting recurrence, right from the first conference in
1920, of the hope to return to the pre-1914 situation when traveling and international border
crossing required no passport as a standard practice. Over these early years of the
internationalization of the passport question, this seemed to have been the prevailing view of the
League’s officials and successive expert committees involved in preparing the relevant
conferences and drafting the materials for the proceedings. To such extent that at its Sixth
General Assembly, the League recommended that
steps be taken towards suppressing the passport regime to the widest extent possible, in order to mitigate
the disadvantages and expenses perpetuated by that system. (Ibid., p. 236)

Just as in the 1922 feedback regarding the resolution of the first Passport Conference, the
League’s member states then reiterated during the process of the 1926 conference that the current
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situation did not warrant suppressing the passport requirement for international travel altogether
(ibid., p. 236 and 238). Clearly since then, that position was never to be discontinued as the
default standard and expectation for international travel among the League’s members, and
exemption from passport has become possible only in cases of bilateral or regional integration
arrangements.
Instead, and this is the fourth salient theme, the early Passport Conferences repeatedly
expressed support for bilateral and multilateral agreements intended to suppress passport
requirement reciprocally between neighboring countries or within blocks of countries. As a
result, the number of these agreements has increased over the years since then between various
countries and in different regions of the world. Examples include the agreements between
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Monaco and the Netherlands; between Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway and Sweden; between Canada, Mexico and the United States79; etc. (ibid., p.
242)
The last pattern I shall draw attention to is the way the Organization operated with its
membership moving the passport question forward. The relevant bodies of the League prepared
the different measures to be examined and adopted by an appropriate conference as a set of nonbinding recommendations. Then these were forwarded to individual governments by the
Secretariat General of the international organization with a view to eliciting their position both in
principle and in practice against said recommendations as benchmarks. This was a coordination
scheme marked by cycles of propositions and feedback, over the repetition of which a set of
common (and maybe best) practices emerged as standard. International norms related to
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Please note that some of these arrangements might have changed or gone through some variation over time, as the
conjuncture and security concerns of countries changed.
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passports were thus set through this iterative or cyclical coordination loop of proposed
resolutions and feedback.
After the Second World War (the United Nations)
In the wake of WWII and the creation of the United Nations was created in 1945 and the
Economic and Social Council overseeing the Transport and Communications Commission
became the body in charge of passport matters within the UN. A committee of experts set up by
the Council and tasked to prepare a world conference on passports and borders formalities
reported back in 1947 (United Nations 1947a) with the
recognition that the pre-1914 conditions simply did not exist at the time to warrant a return to the nopassport-for-travel concept. However, it was felt that on a limited basis the suppression of passports was
feasible, and the Committee of Experts encouraged bilateral and multilateral agreement along these lines.
Full support was given to the use of the international-type of passport recommended by the 1920 and 1926
Passport Conferences or an improved version thereof as long as it incorporated the international-type
characteristics. The aim, in this context, was to achieve a universally recognized type of document which
would defy any unauthorized alterations, contain a suitable description of the bearer and a clearer definition
of his national status. (Turack 1968: 244)

A survey initiated after this report was released permitted to gather information about
countries’ current practices and position with regard to the implementation of the experts’
recommendations. Feedback that had been provided over the next few years (United Nations
1947b, 1948, 1949 and 1951) showed a growing compliance to the current passport guidelines,
while the trend of bi- and multilateral agreements regarding passport (and, for that matter, visa)
waiver kept growing. In those cases, “each State would accept and recognize identity cards or
tourist cards as a suitable travel document” (Turack 1968: 245). Eventually, the United Nations
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Conference on International Travel and Tourism was held in Rome from 21 August to 5
September 1963.
On the subject of passports, the Conference found the most suitable international travel document to be the
passport, and therefore could not find it feasible to recommend its abolition on a world-wide basis.
Nevertheless, all governments were invited to examine their passport laws and regulations periodically with
a view to minimizing the requirements for issue of the passport which would be compatible to their national
interests and security. (Idem, p. 247)

Another report will be requested of the Secretary-General surveying member states about their
acceptance and implementation of the conference recommendations (United Nations 1963). The
report of the survey was delivered to the Economic and Social Council in January 1966 (United
Nations 1966), showing that while the international guidelines were still largely and increasingly
accepted and agreements made for enabling traveling without passport within various regions
were in progress, the standardization of the passport as such remained a challenge.80
While the UN directly took over the question of the passport and its continuous
international standardization process, another organization that will later play a crucial role in
that regard was being set up. As the war wound down and before the UN was even inaugurated,
representatives of 55 nations convened in Chicago in 1944 in order to initiate regulatory
requirements and control mechanisms aiming at the enhancement and maintenance of the safety,
efficiency, and commercial viability of international air travel. As a consequence, the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a non-governmental agency was set up to
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Passport fees also were still an issue but right from their first feedback in 1922 with the League, several governments
notes that this was a national policy question (League of Nations 1922).
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serve as organizational home for those international cooperative efforts.81 Two decades later,
ICAO became a prominent structure actively leading the international process of standardization
of passenger travel documents. In 1968 notably, the organization established an advisory panel
which was charged with the responsibility of standardizing passports in order to make them
machine readable. (Stanton, Chango and Owens, 2007)
In 1978, the Advisory Panel set up by ICAO in order to address standardization of the
passport released their optical character recognition enabling to obtain essential traveler
information from the passport document. The advisory panel expired after completion of its
mandate and was replaced in 1986 by a standing committee called the Technical Advisory Group
on Machine Readable Travel Documents, abbreviated as TAG/MRTD. More and more
governments were issuing Machine Readable Passports (MRPs) by the early 1990’s based on
technical specifications that were set forth in the document ICAO Doc 9303.82 The concept of
“one passport, one person” emerged around the same period following the release of the standard
for MRPs in the late 1980’s, starting a transition towards the total suppression of the family
passport and basically of any collective passport.
Since the start of the internationalization of the passport with the League of Nations,
collective and family passports had been promoted by the successive international organizations
and bodies in charge of the question and throughout their recommendations. In 1969, the latest of
those organizations, ICAO, included in Annex 9 – “Facilitation” – of the Chicago Convention83 a
recommendation for states not to require a separate passport for a child of age 16 or younger
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See “Strategic Objectives of ICAO,” available in the Specifications and Guidance Material (SGM) section on the
ICAO’s website at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/strategic_objectives.htm (as of March 2012)
82 See http://www.icao.int/Security/mrtd/Pages/Document9303.aspx
83 See http://www.icao.int/Security/FAL/Pages/Annex9.aspx
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when accompanied by a parent or legal guardian as long as the child is designated and
appropriately described in the passport. The inclusion of such children and the spouse
(presumably the wife) in one passport issued to the head of household (generally presumed to be
the husband) as the primary bearer defined the family passport. Prior to the eighties, the family
passport thus defined was the norm for a married woman (except when widowed, in which case
she was considered head of household) and for duly accompanied children 16 or younger. In
fact, requiring separate passports for those individuals was clearly perceived negatively in the
relevant international policy arenas at least until as late as in the 1960’s when the passport
requirement overall was still considered in those venues as a necessary evil.
The practice of some States requiring children under 16 years of age to possess an individual passport for
entry to its country was emphatically discouraged if the child was entering in the company of a parent or
guardian and was adequately described in the passport of such accompanying adult. (Turack, p. 247)

Following a period of the promotion of the notion of single identity passport, it became in
1997 a requirement for states to issue separate passports to spouses.84 A survey undertaken by
ICAO showed both the challenge of standardizing the passport in the face of the variety of state
practices regarding the number of persons that may be designated in one passport and the
necessity to move away from the family passport in order to achieve the goal of machine
readability for all passports: “The standard format specified for machine readable passports
contemplates only one person per document” (idem, note 74). In this regard, the requirement of a
single identity passport will grow stronger with the introduction of biometrics in the passport at
the next stage in the standardization process of the passport. Furthermore, other supporting
factors towards the realization of “one passport, one person” concept included the rights of the
84
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child, notably his or her “nationality and identity rights” from birth, and the duty of the state to
respect those rights as well as the need to protect children against abduction, particularly, which
was a real risk in international traveling (idem, note 74).
The preceding sections have gone over the history of passport throughout its development
until it became a widely recognizable and acceptable artifact that is used both as travel document
and as identity credential. As we could see, actual people – the individual users – had little to
contribute, even indirectly to that history and the process I have just traced. As the opportunity
presents itself, I will analyze in the next section an additional case of the national identity card,
again tracing the process of its emergence and acceptance by the populations and stakeholders.

5.4 National ID Card: the French experience
There is a case to be made for the relevance of national identity documents in this context. First
of all, we might need to remember that the early passports did not emerge in a historical and
political context where notions of national territory and boundaries were politically as significant
as today. Initially the passport was designed to track people’s movements or to control whether
someone was in a place they were not supposed to be. And to the extent that there was no
international framework for its use, the passport was first an instrument of domestic interest and
jurisdiction. Furthermore, as the international relevance of passports appears, so comes the need
to differentiate between internal and international passports. Lastly, I would argue that in the
countries where a national identity card exists, the value of their passport for identification
purposes is only as good as the bureaucratic infrastructure and procedures they put in place for
their national identity card system.

236
The question of a national identity card has to be framed in the context of the emergence
of the police as the main arm of the national state in charge of public order and law enforcement
on the national territory and from a domestic standpoint. As such the police had to develop its
capacity to know the people and to process information about them, through a process of
rationalization and increasing efficiency using written records, figures, graphs, maps, etc. In fact
a core component of police work is to build a knowledge base about the people within its
jurisdiction and their physical environment. In a country such as France, the national identity
card was a central achievement and a primordial instrument of that endeavor. However, except
under the Vichy regime during WWII, French people were never legally forced to carry or even
possess the national ID card. And yet, this became most widely the custom. How did France get
there? In the following, I use Pierre Piazza’s 2004 non-translated monograph titled Histoire de la
Carte Nationale d’Identité [History of the national identity card] in order to begin to address that
question.
Before the development and growth of urban centers and the subsequent demographic
mobility and pressure on those centers, the social order could be characterized as a world of
“interconnaissance,” in Piazza’s word (2004: 24), meaning a world of inter-knowledge85
marked by traditional community, family and neighborhood relations, within the boundaries of
which everybody knew everybody. The police administration itself was part of that culture and
operated on the basis of direct knowledge, visual memory and recognition of suspect populations
in general (Piazza 2004: 32, 64, 74 ff.), as well as oral communication in order to establish
“testimonial proof” (idem, p. 83). Under that law enforcement regime of direct surveillance, the
police directly knew the subjects with a criminal record or reputedly dangerous, and kept an eye
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– a human eye, so to speak – on them in their effort to maintain order in the public space. In that
environment, “the testimony, the renown or the mere physical appearances constitute sufficient
guaranties for establishing or revealing the identity of individuals.”86 Those conditions did not
require of them to elaborate an objective identification process that is systematic and codified.
The material and social changes brought about by the above mentioned developments, as well as
progress in transportations, made that direct surveillance approach unpractical. It then became a
necessity for the police to resort to third-party references for establishing identity, reputation and
respectability of a person as the population grew and the size of communities expanded.
5.4.1

Worker booklet and internal passport

Throughout the 19th century, it increasingly became a requirement and a common
practice for people to use documents in order to support procedures and transactions involving
specific information about them. Until WWI, a multiplicity of documents emerged as a result,
which people could use to demonstrate or to substantiate assertions about who they were. Those
documents differed by their format, their primary purpose, and their source. They include the
internal passport, the worker booklet, the military booklet, the family booklet, the hunting
permit, the birth certificate, and a variety of other certificates issued by local authorities such as
the mayor or district police offices. Even certificates of membership issued by private
associations were used as identity documents.
A partir du début du XXe siècle, d’autres types de papiers sont de plus en plus employés par les citoyens
pour décliner leur identité. Il s’agit de cartes, comprenant une photographie de leur titulaire, que les
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Translated by the present author from « … le témoignage, la renommée ou bien les seules apparences physiques
constituent des garanties suffisantes afin d’établir ou de révéler l’identité des individus. » (Piazza 2004: 26)
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Compagnies de Chemins de fer établissent pour leurs usagers ou que les organismes privés, comme les
associations d’étudiants, délivrent à leurs adhérents. (Piazza 2004: 125)

That is, in translation:
From the start of the 20th century onward, other types of papers are more and more used by citizens to
disclose their identity. These are cards including a photograph of the bearer, which the Railroads
Companies set up for their users or private organisms such as student associations issue to their members.

Of particular interest among those documents are the internal passport and the worker
booklet. The origin of the worker booklet goes back in 1749 when it was first established by an
edict, and then abolished in 1791 before it was reestablished again under the Consulate (1799 –
1804). In this latter occurrence, it was compulsory for the worker to carry the booklet while
initially it was kept by the employers as a token for the workers to fulfill their contractual
obligations. In effect, a law dating in June 22, 1854 required that the booklet remain in the
possession of the worker and served as an internal passport. (Idem, p. 34)
According to Piazza, the first attempt at legislating about identity documents as a
requirement for traveling domestically occurred on February 1st, 1789 (art. 17) whereby any
individual traveling outside the area of the usual residency was required to carry internal passport
(idem, p. 33). That provision will subsequently be complemented by two laws in the spring of
1792 and then on October 2, 1795. To some extent, the internal passport played the role of a
police certificate for one’s good standing in respect to the law. It became so much so that by
1822 the police were authorized to refuse to issue such passport to anyone whose morality they
doubted. And by 1850, a circular of the Interior minister enabled the police to detain anyone who
failed to present this passport up to twenty days any time they determined such measure
necessary in the interest of public order. Also, any worker who was controlled without the
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worker booklet was equated with a vagabond and as such, could be imprisoned for 3 to 6 months
(p. 35).
Conscious of significant fraud rates – or that there are enough loopholes in the system so
as to defeat its utility as a means to intercept those who might have a motivation to escape the
vigilance of law enforcement – authorities required that identity papers be issued only after
hearing the testimony of two witnesses known to the police, at least by their place of abode.
Those witnesses came to be known as authorized or licensed witnesses (“patented witnesses,”87
literally.) Concerns about fraud got to a point where central authorities instructed local ones not
to issue identity documents to anyone they did not know personally (p. 82). In 1858 already,
authorities demanded mayors and relevant local agencies that no identity paper be issued but to
the applicant in person. The situation reached a point where it appeared as if even law
enforcement could not rely on the identity papers – which they themselves required people to
carry – to prove anything about their holders.
By mid-century, both the worker booklet and the internal passport were required to be
stamped with visas which were more effective to keep track of the movements of their holders.
While roaming around within the country, internal passport holders were required to report at
specific places and collect a visa (just like the royal courier in the 15th century.) Workers moving
from one district area of the country to another were required to carry their worker booklet from
their origin district as a prerequisite. In April 1831 the prefecture of police in Paris took an
ordinance requiring workers to report to the prefecture for a visa when on their way out at the
end of a shift at the plant. (Idem, p. 36)
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I have not found any explicit or official regulatory provision for this category of witness-reference; it appears as if it
were up to the police officers whether they find acceptable the witness presented.
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The internal passport and the worker booklet were devised with a view to public order
and morality; they mostly served as a proof of honorability for people who were often away from
their usual residence areas and, as a result, away from people who could vouch for them. Those
documents were basically, and to some extent, social credentials of trustworthiness or
respectability. In addition to the multiplicity of documents, it is noteworthy that a document such
as the internal passport was not granted from one source of government agency but by different
authorities, from the central government to the local police station (Piazza 2004: 125, quoting
Gérard Noiriel). Towards the end of the 19th century both the internal passport and the worker
booklet faded away, with the latter being formally abolished by law in July 1890. (Idem, p. 39)
5.4.2

Functions of the NIC

Interest in some form of identity card emerged with the 20th century, but not directly in
terms of a national identity card. It was only progressively that the notion of an identity card for
nationals became clear after efforts to implement identity cards for particular purposes or groups
of people. In the name of protecting the society, that is, the national community as a whole, the
following populations were targeted in the official discourse for justifying identification
requirement, in chronological as well as logical order:
1. “Dangerous” people: Above all else, the first motivation and first line of justification for
the state apparatus to want to know the people within its boundaries is the existence of
“dangerous” ones and subsequently the need to protect public order and the good society
from their nuisance and malfeasance. These “dangerous” people are variably spelled out
as evil doers, criminals, ex-convicts, delinquents, recidivists, undesirables, vagabonds,
crooks, thieves, etc. (p. 63 and passim)
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2. Nomads: these are people without a fixed residency or away from their usual place of
abode. They are generally treated as foreigners, which then seems to include anyone
away from their home place, or unsettled, even if they were born on the national soil.
Over the heads of these nomads always hangs the suspicion of some threat (in that sense,
they are close to category 1 above). They include vagrants, peddlers as well as “gipsy,”
“Romany,” or “bohemian” transient populations. (Passim)
3. Foreigners in general, understood simply as non-nationals.
4. Nationals: this is the last category of people expressly targeted, as a positive subject of
identification, in the discourse of legitimation as well as in the experience of developing
an identity scheme for the populations under the control of the national state.
•

“Dangerous” people

The project of identification in the national context has been from the beginning a
security project. As such, protection against risk and danger was the first frame of justification.
An identification tool was meant first to detect the potentially dangerous people and to stop the
ones that have already committed a crime or an offense from reiterating it. The nature or level of
danger that is being targeted in this discourse is not always clear, but it appears to include a
danger coming from people who are not very familiar and have ways that are at odd with the rest
of the society so much so that they trigger suspicion as an obvious source of disruption.
In the process of identification, there are statements made by the identity subject (name,
age, etc.), and there are details that are provided by external observation. The description usually
given by the law enforcement agents includes color of the eye, shape of nose, size of the mouth,
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etc. Unfortunately these vary from observer to observer even among police agents, and unless
there is some feature out of the ordinary, they do not always help accurately establish identity.
In 1879, Alphonse Bertillon (1853–1914) who was a French law enforcement officer
particularly intent on tracking down alleged recidivists and on deterring ex-convicts from
becoming ones proposed his anthropometric methods of identification based on the reading and
measurement of certain parts of the body. This method was particularly targeted to recidivist
offenders and criminals. Tested in 1883, the use of anthropometry methods also known as
“bertillonnage” became a requirement in 1888 applicable to any suspect.
Bertillon strives to standardize anthropometric description, weeding out subjective
judgments and any particularism in the method. The qualities or marks to be documented as well
as their variability are definite and thus predictable. Their transcription must also be done
through a standard format using well defined and uniform abbreviations so as to be understood
by all law enforcements agents. This codification of the body then creates the conditions which
will make it possible for a process of recognition to take place even in a first-time encounter with
the authority.
Avec le bertillonnage, le corps physique disparaît et réapparaît sous la forme d’une identité objectivée
ramenée à un ensemble de critères écrits et graphiques logiquement élaborés. Le passage de la figuration à
la métrique devient alors possible : les signes sont résumés en un code verbal puis numérique. Le « portrait
parlé » apparaît comme l’aboutissement d’un tel processus. Il consiste en une description morphologique
exacte du visage d’après une étude analytique de ces trois éléments principaux : front, nez et oreille droite.
Les résultats obtenus lors de ces observations sont cotés selon des données chiffrées et abrégées pour
obtenir des formules courtes. (Piazza 2004: 104-5)

In translation:
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With bertillonnage, the physical body disappears and reappears in the form of an objectified identity that
boils down to a set of logically elaborated written and graphical criteria. The transition from figuration to
metrics then becomes possible: the signs are summarized in a verbal then numerical code. The “spoken
portrait” appears to be the outcome of such process. It consists of an exact morphological description of the
face based on an analytical study of these three elements: forehead, nose and right ear. The results obtained
with those observations are quoted [or coded] in numerical and abbreviated data in order to provide short
formulas.

Even when the photography was introduced in the mid-19th century, the law enforcement
parties only saw the opportunity to look for physiognomic patterns that (based on phrenology
theses of the time) they believed were the distinct signs of the deviants. The photography also
was adapted to the same analytical approach and policing needs following a specific protocol so
as to both standardize the way of taking a headshot (constant distance between the camera and
the subject, specific angles, etc.) and enable the reading of distinctive signs. (Idem, p. 108)
First meant to target serial offenders or criminals, the bertillonnage was eventually used
with any arrested suspect. Any individual suspect that the police get their hands on automatically
generates an anthropometric file, contributing to what Piazza calls the “memory of state”
(Alphonse Bertillon, see Piazza 2004: 99, note 133).
Pour chaque individu mensuré est établie une fiche anthropométrique. Elle comprend certaines de ses
dimensions corporelles, sa photographie de face et de profil, un relevé de ses marques particulières et la
description de son visage selon un procédé analytique précis. (Piazza 2004: 98)

In translation:
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An anthropometric index card is established for every individual measured. It includes some of his body
dimensions, his photograph from side and front views, a listing of his distinctive marks and the description
of his face following a precise analytic procedure.

This method gave confidence to the promoters of law enforcement that once a person’s identity
has been documented, that person has no way to allege a different identity any more, hence the
assurance that recidivists will have no escape. It appears as if the anthropometric/ID card was a
sample of the body in quantified measurements, as such the model body, and only it, will always
match the sample.
The application of the bertillonnage method was the first systematic approach to
identification departing from the traditional methods of eye-recognition of appearances. From
then on the police focused most of its attention on collecting and measuring the individualizing
characteristics of the body as well as on possible physical abnormalities. Maybe for the first time
in this odyssey of individual identification, there was the sense that biographical information
may not be all that important; the body can be objectively measured and tracked. In the eyes of
the police however, it appeared even better to link the two sets of information, civil status (life
events) and anthropometry, in order to be able to detect impersonators misappropriating
biographical data. Just like for the photography, rules and standards are put in place for the
anthropometric measurement procedures, including the instruments used (mainly, the height
gauge and calipers). Interestingly enough, with this instrumentation of the procedures of
identification, the interactions between police and suspects for the purposes of identification
became dispassionate, less of a personal engagement of the suspects. Henceforth, the job of the
police in this matter became similar to the exercise of a scientific expertise.
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While anthropometry studies and measures body parts or organs, dactyloscopy does
fingertip patterns. It was in 1858 (more than twenty years before anthropometry) that the first
large-scale implementation of dactyloscopy occurred in the British colonial administration of
Bengal in India (idem, p. 90). The potential of fingerprint materials for juridical evidence drew
further attention and research. Two noticeable examples of this include Francis Galton’s
attempts, from 1888 to 1891, at a mathematical model that would enhance the method as well as
the effective use of fingerprints for identification. Also in 1891 Juan Vucetich, a practitioner, law
enforcement professional in charge of an identification bureau in the Buenos Aires area, came up
with a classification scheme for all fingertip patterns in four categories. Subsequently, police
departments from several countries signed a convention at a scientific congress in Rio de Janeiro
in 1905 whereby they commit to using fingerprint techniques and enabling exchange of data so
as to achieve a comprehensive identification of all individuals deemed dangerous in their region.
(Idem, p. 97)
As early as 1910, the effectiveness of fingerprints enhanced by Vucetich’s method
superseded Bertillon’s anthropometry in police departments and in parlors of criminal justice
across the continents. Clearly, compared to dactyloscopy which only requires one imprint of a
thumb to begin to show results, the bertillonnage method was markedly intrusive, requiring the
examination and physical measurement of different parts of the body – the face, the skull, the
hands and the arms, etc. – and as a result, it obviously was more costly to manage. Furthermore,
while most anthropometric data are not stable during a lifecycle, at least not before twenty years
of age (Piazza 2004: 92), both the potential number of different dactyloscopic patterns across
population and the degree of stability of every individual’s patterns throughout a lifecycle are
practically infinite.
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… parce qu’ils forment des indices immutables, d’une absolue spécificité et d’une grande variété, les
dessins digitaux apparaissent comme des signes d’identité inscrits à même le corps, aussi significatifs que
ceux définis et relevés par le bertiillonnage. En effet, ils possèdent une fixité et une invariabilité qui, pour
chaque individu, demeurent depuis le sixième mois de sa vie fœtal jusqu’à sa mort. Seule la putréfaction
d’un cadavre et la destruction du derme qui s’ensuit semblent interdire leur lecture. Mais ni l’usure
physiologique de la peau ni les frottements, brûlures ou coupures ne peuvent véritablement provoquer leur
altération définitive. Même si certaines similitudes sont susceptibles d’être relevées entre des empreintes
différentes, il existe toujours des points caractéristiques qui permettent de les distinguer et de ne pas les
confondre. Leur grande diversité rend presque improbable le fait d’en trouver deux d’un modèle identique.
(Piazza 2004 : 91)

In translation:
… because they are immutable signs, of an absolute specificity and a wide variety, the drawings of the
fingertip seem to be identity signs inscribed on the surface of the body, which are as significant as those
defined and measured by the bertillonnage. In effect, they possess a fixity and an invariability which for
every individual last from the sixth month of his fetal life up to his death. Only the putrefaction of a corpse
and the subsequent destruction of the dermis seem to prevent their legibility. But neither the physiological
wearing of the skin nor the frictions, burns and cuts can really cause their definite alteration. Even if some
similarities may be observed between two different fingerprints, there always are characteristic points that
allow distinguishing and not confusing them. Their wide diversity makes it almost impossible to encounter
two of the same pattern.

While techniques such as anthropometry and dactyloscopy are initially deemed useful
and actually used to fight against recidivist “dangerous people,” no such fight for security would
be considered effective from its proponents’ standpoint until they find a way to anticipate and
prevent the danger, in the first place. It appears that the primary source of danger in this socio-
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historical context was believed potentially to be people who have no meaningful and longrunning attach to the place where their actions (and possibly misdeeds) may however take place.
•

Nomads and Foreigners

People who left their locale of origin or reputed place of abode are commonly held in
suspicion just as foreigners, in the usual sense, are. Mobility in general, and the fact that the
mobile person does not have local community ties, is basis for suspicion for one thing or another.
Chief among that category of people are the ones moving to the main cities, notably Paris,
without any attachment there.
Elle [la police] s’intéresse aussi de près aux habitudes et parcours des provinciaux nouvellement arrivés en
ville qui, parce qu’ils s’éloignent de leur milieu de vie habituel, de leur famille ou de leur voisinage
deviennent suspects. (Piazza 2004 : 31)

In other words:
They [the police] also take close interest in the habits and itinerary of people newly arriving in the city from
the provinces and whom, because they get far away from the usual environment where they live, from their
family or from their neighborhood, become suspects.

These presumptions apply obviously to those people coming from even farther, including
foreigners understood as non-nationals.
During the last third of the 19th century, the principles of nationality as a right are defined
(see section 5.5.2 infra). In June 1889, the law articulates the rules relative to nationality as a
juridical relation attaching every individual to one state (p. 40). A few months earlier, on October
2, 1888 a decree was issued requiring all foreigners to declare their identity and nationality to the
mayor office at their place of residence. These provisions will be confirmed and extended by law
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in 1893 (pp. 41-42). However, declaring one’s identity and nationality without any documentary
evidence eventually defeats the purpose of the law. Therefore, the declarant will be required to
provide supporting materials, and maybe more importantly the declarant will then be provided
with a document evidencing that he is in good standing with regard to the relevant legal
provisions. In cases where there is no documentary precedent but only evidence of a different
nature, this first document issued by the hosting state (in this case France) will therefore serve as
a documentary origin for the subject, i.e., his first biographical document, for want of their actual
“certificate of origin,” to paraphrase Charles Duclerc then “Président du Conseil,” that is, head
of the government in a 1882 speech at the House of Representatives. (Pizza 2004: 61)
At the beginning of the 20th century, the thrust of the debate around identification was
about repressing or suppressing vagrancy and begging, which was presumed to be mainly by
foreigners and nomad people, with lawmakers calling for the establishment of some
identification booklet or card for non-nationals. A legislation enacted on July 16, 1912 instituted
the anthropometric booklets for nomads (idem, p. 104 and 113 f.) That booklet was considered
“truly as a circulation and stay title” where local and territorial authorities shall affix the visas
necessary to justify the presence of the bearer at the location he finds himself by the time of
verification (idem, p. 112). Eventually, the resulting law of July 1912 did not address vagrancy
or begging but instead required nomads thirteen of age or older to carry an anthropometric
booklet or else. The booklet included the civil status information (name, birth date and place,
apparent age, profession, etc.) all ten fingerprints, the anthropometric measurements as well as
full-face and side view photographs (idem, p. 114). A summary sheet is created at every station
where the nomads are checked and issued a visa, recording the declared itinerary. This so-called
“mobile leaf” or “mobile sheet” is stored in a registry used for information exchange between
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law enforcement agencies. Soon enough, nomads constantly had to justify their schedule or
presence in a certain place, at some point, and they had the obligation to be able to prove their
identity. In that regard, having an expired booklet was considered exactly the same as not being
documented at all and was handled by law enforcement as no less, i.e., as an illicit case of
vagabondage.
Modalities of an anthropometric/ID card were still in the workings when the war is
declared in 1914. Then all foreigners are required to carry a passport with them. The justification
put forward was based on “the general mistrust of foreigners, the fight against spying, desertion,
enemy [conspiring] maneuvers, rationing of food supply” (quoting Egidio Reale, Piazza 2004:
120, see note 198). Five years after its launch (1912) the anthropometric booklet for nomads was
then extended to foreigners. Based on two bills introduced in the National Assembly in
December 1916 and in January 1917, the Minister of Interior signed a decree on April 2, 1917
mandating all foreigners fifteen of age or older to have an identity card (idem, p. 121). The 1916
bill provided for severe fines and even prison sentence (up to seven months of jail time) for a
person controlled without an identity card. It was also at the heart of the WWI turmoil that
policymakers start weighing the idea of an identity card for national as well.
•

Nationals

How is nationality proven, or rather, how does one practically discover the nationality of
a person with a reasonable level of confidence in the context of the 19th century Europe? Either
informally and culturally by observing that the subject looks, speaks, and behaves like a fairly
regular person from that place (and culture); plus, if the subject can demonstrate ties to a local
community or social group, this might be accepted as sufficient proof when there is no or little
documentary precedent. Or alternately through an institutional record that indicates or implies
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one way or another that the person is from the place in question. Among those records, an
official document declaring birth is probably the most valuable for the purpose of nationality.
Most foreigners on French soil could not provide a valid birth certificate, or chose not to for
various reasons including, understandably, resistance to control. Even if a person could exhibit a
birth record from a different country, by the end of the 19th century there were only three
countries which had a convention with France for the exchange of birth certificates. For people
who may be considered nationals, failing to be in position to show a birth record, there are other
documents such as the internal passport, the worker booklet, the military booklet, the family
booklet, the hunting permit, and a variety of other certificates issued by local authorities such as
the mayor or district police offices. While the latter documents do not directly establish
nationality, they may demonstrate long-standing community ties enough to grant naturalization.
Apart from security justifications to the project of identification, a new line of reasons
emerged by the end of the 19th century. In the 1880’s, concerns started arising about protecting
the domestic labor market as well as emerging social benefits or rights. Between 1893 and 1913
a streak of laws aiming at providing medical assistance to nationals as well as specific protection
to various social groups stated nationality as prerequisite (p. 41). Monitoring foreigners and
barring them from accessing privileges reserved to nationals, thus having to make sure that
foreigners do not abusively claim nationality, requires as a practical matter to put in place a
system allowing to accurately identify the nationals.
In order to be able to identify some people as foreigners, so that they don’t take
advantage of rights which only nationals are eligible for, in an international context where there
was no consistent ways of issuing identity papers to citizens in most countries and no framework
to exchange citizens’ identity information between countries, one is faced with two options
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mainly. The first will resemble something like this: shut down hermetically all the borders and
declare everyone inside the country eligible for the status of national except if proven otherwise
(and anyone who opts out from the concerned nationality will be deemed declaring himself as a
foreign national and will be considered as such going forward.) The other option will require that
the country that is keen on verifying foreigners’ identity just provides its nationals with a
credential they can carry with them and use to prove their nationality; in that case then, anyone
who is not in position to show their credential will be considered a non-national and therefore not
eligible for the claim at hand. The reader probably realizes that between those two options, there
is only one that is sane, and more practical and cost-effective to implement. The French
government did, too.
The first attempt at establishing a “reference model” of identity card, as Piazza aptly
labels it, intervenes in 1916 with the police prefect of Paris prohibiting police services from
recognizing any other card that does not conform to the reference model at the basis of the card
issued by police authorities to any citizen who applies for it. Furthermore private associations
issuing membership/ID cards must conform to this new standard in its material as well as in its
content format, if they want their members’ cards to be officially recognized as valid ID.
The question of a national ID card emerged on lawmakers’ agenda in 1916, too. In the
aftermath of WWI, in 1920, the Interior Minister called for stopping the issuance of passports
since border controls was not going to be as effective as they were during the war and proposed
to replace them by photo IDs instead so that police can still track the “bad guys” inside the
country. After the war, the question was debated again in 1921. The police chief in Paris put in
circulation an identity card for the voluntary adoption of residents in Paris and the department of
Seine.
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In September 1921, another circular from the prefect establishes that the current reference
model was simply going to be, from then on, the only ID card officially recognized for any
national residing in Paris and within the Seine (geographical) department. The subsequent
acceptance was rather quick: the government department of post and telegraphs adopted it for all
transactions, including financial ones and mail discharges, with the post offices; it was
compulsory for enrollment in schools and access to exams in the covered areas; the local Bar
Association took it upon itself to demand that their members request theirs; and other
professional associations facilitated the procedure for their members who were willing to apply
for one.

Cover page

“IDENTITY CARD issued by the Prefectural
Administration to French citizens”

Page 1:

French Republic; Prefecture of __ ; Identity card

Page 2:

Prefecture of__ ; Serial number; Photograph
Surname, First name, Date of birth, Place of birth,
Department, Address; Description (height, hair,
moustache, eyes, nose, general shape of the face,
skin tone); Particular marks

Page 3

Fingerprint; Signature; Place; Date; The Prefect
(stamp and signature)

Page 4

Change of address; Visa by police station

Table 5-2: Contents of the prefectural identity card as per the decree of August 1935, based on the original
reproduction of the Model number 4 by Piazza (2004: 132)

On August 8, 1935 an inter-ministerial decree provided for the regulations of movements
of French nationals as well as foreigners, the use of passports in war time, and the establishment
of an identity card under the jurisdiction of prefectures (p. 124). In 1937, the Interior Minister
proposed to adopt one and the same card model for all nationals by extending nationally the
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Paris-Seine ID card model (p. 131). However, by the time the war broke out, only a nonobligatory, prefecture-issued identity card was in circulation starting in September 1939 (Table
5-2). At that point the following credentials were still accepted for the purpose of official identity
verification: “cards issued by town or city councils, the Post, Telephone and Telegraphs identity
card, the veteran card, professional identity cards for itinerant salespersons or still pension books
or booklets issued by the Ministry of Finances and Pensions.” (p. 148)
Following is a description of the procedure for applying and being issued the prefectural
identity card.
Les commissariats reçoivent les demandes de cartes d’identité de Français. Afin de vérifier l’état civil et de
constater le domicile du demandeur, ils se font remettre différent documents : livret de famille, livret
militaire, quittance de loyer… En se référant aux indications qu’ils contiennent, les policiers remplissent le
bulletin de demande de sa carte sur lequel ils établissent rigoureusement son signalement. Sur ce bulletin et
sur la carte elle-même, ils collent les deux photographies qui leur sont remises en s’assurant de leur
conformité aux règles déterminées par le préfet de police : dimension de quatre centimètres sur quatre
centimètres, de face et sans chapeau, la tête devant avoir environ deux centimètres de hauteur. C’est sur ces
pièces qu’ils font également apposer à l’individu son empreinte digitale en veillant à ce que la phalange
entière de l’index de sa main gauche y soit impérativement appliquée à plat pour laisser une trace lisible. La
carte et le bulletin de demande qui y correspond sont ensuite envoyés à la préfecture de Paris. Un service y
a spécialement été créé. Après avoir effectué une enquête aux sommiers judiciaires, il remplit
soigneusement les rubriques de la carte à partir des informations consignées dans le bulletin de demande.
Ce dernier fait l’objet d’un classement dans ses archives alors que la carte, définitivement établie, est
réexpédiée au commissariat où son titulaire peut la retirer. (Piazza 2004: 159)

In translation:
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Police stations receive the applications for identity cards of French. In order to verify the civil status and to
check the place of residency of the applicant, they collect various documents: family booklet, military
booklet, receipts of rent payment… Referring to the information they contained, the police officers fill out
his card application form on which they rigorously draw up his description. On this form and on the card
itself, they stick the two photographs they have collected while making sure they conform to the rules set
up by the police prefect: four by four centimeters in dimension, full-face and no hat, the head having to take
about two centimeters in height. It is on those documents that they also have the individual affix his
fingerprints making sure that the entire phalanx of the left-hand index finger is imperatively pressed flat
thereto so as to leave a legible trace. The card and the corresponding application form are then sent to the
prefecture of Paris. A department has been specially created. After running a criminal background check, it
carefully fills out the fields on the card based on the information recorded on the application form. The
latter is classified in the archives whilst the card, definitely established, is dispatched back to the police
station where its holder can collect it.

While recognition grows around this single credential as reference, efforts are made to
counter forgery both by using materials that would make it harder to forge (paper, ink) and by
improving procedures such as having the official stamp and signature overlap the photograph. In
1921, the archiving of card requests was notably improved by assigning a sequence number to
every application which appeared both on the application form and then on the card itself. This
basically enabled the police to have a database made up of the duplicates (in terms of
information content) of all identity cards issued.
5.4.3

Challenges and limitations

LINKING VITAL RECORDS TO THEIR HUMAN SUBJECT: The original documents serving as basis to
warrant the issuance of an identity card to an individual include military booklet, marriage or
family booklet, birth certificate, voter card, bills or receipts, attestation or affidavit of residence
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address by one’s janitor of one’s, and even passport (during the first third of the 20th century.)
The family booklet was established shortly before the 20th century (around 1887). It was a
reliable source of birth and family information but it didn’t provide a reliable way of ascertaining
the identity of the bearer. But none of those documents provides evidence linking to the actual
person they relate to. The challenge remained to ensure that the subject referred to in a
fundamental biographical record is designated or described in a way that allows correlating with
his or her actual embodiment so as to discover whether the person who presents that record is or
not its legitimate holder, that is, the designee. There was no further elaborate verification other
than resorting to that which the new card was supposed to get rid of, that is, …oral testimony
through the two witnesses who will vouch for the applicant – “two serious and honorable
persons” as Piazza describes them (p. 160).
ORAL WITNESSES: The only solution that was found to address the above issue was to
resort to oral witnesses who will vouch for the identity subject. However, the basis for relying on
the quality of their testimony is left to be desired. Piazza (p. 143) reports news stories circulating
at the time, characterized by a corrosive sarcasm regarding the practice of authorized witnesses.
One scenario depicts a procedure at the town hall or the police station where the agent in charge
requires the customer to bring in the two witnesses as usual in order to “identify his signature.”
The author of the piece claims that even when the customer is escorted by a university professor
and a member of lawyers association who are willing to testify for him, the agent rejects that
alternative and demands the so-called “patented witnesses.” Eventually, the customer would go
out and recruit random witnesses among the neighborhood janitors and bar customers, none of
whom he ever met before, and they would be accepted as valid witnesses by the administration.
Apparently the licensed witness character enabled the emergence of a whole new business for a
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group of people. Another newspaper article deplores the growing business of the coalman and
the wine dealer around the corner of the police office, whom, for a small fee, would stand as
such witnesses and orally certify the identity of an individual they had never heard of before the
minute they cash in their fee (p. 161-62). Applicants may benefit from a witness waiver only if
they were personally known by the head of the police station.
ARCHIVING: Furthermore, there were challenges even to checking a person’s “civil status”
record which includes her birth data. Revolts, fire, flood and other calamities destroyed entire
archives of birth registries for millions of people (including then living ones) in the late 19th
century in Paris and suburbs (p. 76). Many people were unable to provide the birth information
or document, and even when they did the law enforcement agencies were unable to look up their
registries for matches. The classification schemes were as basic as, in the case of the capital for
instance, by district number only (for a total of twenty districts in Paris intra muros) while within
every district repository the registries just piled up in no particular order. Sufficed that someone
did not know their birth district and furthermore that they had a name shared by a few dozens of
other people, the search becomes simply unpractical. As a result, the registries were not much
consulted by law enforcement and people could rather easily get away with not disclosing their
birth information (whether they did not know it or they decided for whatever reason not to
disclose it) or even making false statements. To make things worse, an article of the civil code
made it possible for anyone with very basic biographical information about a person to request
and to obtain the full statement of the civil status or a copy of the act of birth pertaining to that
individual. All the while, death events were not even recorded or documented. As a result,
anyone may be using perfectly legit birth record of a dead or of another living person who is not
even aware of it (Piazza 2004: 76 f.)
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MAINTAINING THE LINK WITH LEGAL IDENTITY OVER TIME: One thing leading to the other, the
proponents of the prefectural ID card faced also the thorny question of ensuring that the
documented identity actually is the legal identity of the subject. This goes beyond the challenges
posed by the basic information/documents required in order to build an identity credential to
include the question of change of identity over time. This question is two-fold: apart from the
fingerprints, the body of the person whose identity the card is meant to represent may change
over time, hence the concern about how often the card should be renewed. While lawmakers
proposed validity periods ranging from one to three years for the prefectural identity card, the
Prefecture of Paris did not specify any validity period in its 1921 experiment. This led to another
round of sarcasm in a newspaper, stating that the card was a patent or certificate of eternal youth
(as in ‘fountain of youth’) and noting that if the only guidance is that the card should be renewed
every time the description of the subject changes, it should then be renewed every day, for
people don’t lose their hair or their teeth all at once but by bits every day. Some extrinsic
information about the subject, nationality for instance, may also change over time, and this may
even be of a greater concern. As far as documentary evidence is concerned, nationality generally
is only assumed for many people based on record of antecedents such as military service,
participation in past votes, etc. which they may present. While a certificate of birth makes an
even stronger case with regard to the nationality, as of 1917 lawmakers were still concerned that
they had no way of knowing whether a person born on the national soil has, in the meantime,
deliberately opted out in favor of a different nationality or not. All those issues hindered the
capacity of the state to operationalize in form of a material credential the legal identity of citizens
and to claim the monopoly of issuing authoritative identity credentials. As a result, all businesses
relying on a secure identification were to be better off to take any supplementary steps they
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might have found necessary in order to verify identity or attribute claims as relevant to their
business.
POPULATION PERCEPTION: The notion that a government-issued identity credential might
also be a token of honesty and respectability was undercurrent in the identity card discussions at
least since late 19th century. In 1883 as we saw earlier, an amendment was presented at the
House of Representatives which sought to achieve two things. On the one hand, it requires all
delinquents who were sentenced to at least one year of jail time to carry with them an identity
card that would include an abstract of their police/criminal record as well as their anthropometric
data. On the other hand, honest nationals were invited to request the same card. While
presumably for the latter, the area for the summary of criminal record was expected to be empty,
the 1916-proposed card also allowed including elements such as testimonials from one’s boss or
supervisor, awards and honors received for one’s achievements, any record showing one’s
sacrifices for defending the nation, as well as one’s status regarding tax revenue, military
obligations, etc. (p. 145). While the multiplicity of available identification means and alternate
practices may partly explain the slow adoption rate for the new card, the negative perception of
the card due to the initial conditions of its definition reinforced people’s reluctance. Initially
designed as the anthropometric card intended for evildoers and dangerous offenders, its nature
and subsequent stigma as a tool of criminal justice was not lost on the honest people.
5.4.4 Seeking national consent
According to Piazza, newspapers favorably echoed – to say the least – suggestions by a number
of officials to establish a form of national identification instrument. Even citizens, too, put pen to
paper and addressed support letters to government officials or to their representatives (pp. 139-
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40). A bill to that effect was on the legislature’s agenda by January 1934, and a political
assassination of a visiting sovereign on French soil by foreigners using forged passports was, it
seems, all what was missing for the government to move to the next phase. That precisely
occurred in October that year. In effect, the assassination of the king Alexander I of Yugoslavia
in Marseille revived the identity card debate against the backdrop of fear of a possible armed
conflict.
Le 9 octobre 1934, l’attentat perpétré à Marseille par des Oustachis croates munis de faux passeports
provoque la mort du roi Alexandre Ier de Yougoslavie et du ministre des Affaires étrangères Louis Barthou.
… Nombreux sont ceux qui se prononcent alors en faveur de la mise en place d’un titre d’identité
permettant aux autorités de connaitre avec davantage de précision non seulement la véritable identité des
non-nationaux mais aussi celle de chacun des membres de la population. (Piazza 2004: 138-9)

This translates as follows:
On October 9, 1934 the assassination attempt perpetrated in Marseille by Oustachis Croats carrying fake
passports causes the death of the king Alexander I of Yugoslavia and of the Foreign Affairs Minister Louis
Barthou. … Many then take party in favor of establishing an identity title enabling authorities to know with
further precision not only the true identity of non-nationals but also that of every member of the population.

In this episode of the debate, voices from the police suggested that the identity card be
required for any contract, whether public or private, notarial acts, wedding and so forth (p. 141).
One of the officials in the following discussion among government agencies noted that the
voluntary nature of a government-issued ID only makes it useful for people who might need it in
their interactions and transactions with various institutions. It will become useful to law
enforcement only if it is an obligation for all to acquire that ID card. In fact, he insisted, the

260
conditions should be created such that any individual who did not have a card becomes de facto a
suspect. (p. 138)
The government has engaged in a “strategy of consent” since 1916 involving press
campaign, in order to get French people’s buy-in. Among policymakers and legal experts, there
was a shared realization that incentives and benefits should be made clear to citizens. Going
forward, the advantages that the card could bring to citizens were highlighted. With the new
communication strategy, it was no longer about control (negative) but rather for the people to be
able (positive) to substantiate their identity information whenever they need to and wherever
required. Furthermore – and this can probably be appreciated only against the backdrop of police
methods at the time – the card was presented and even perceived as a mark of respectability (p.
141), the tool that enables one to be spared further police’s unwelcome interest and hassle.
Antoine Borrel, a Member of Parliament and proponent of one of the 1916 identity card bills, is
quoted for saying:
Dans quantité de circonstances de la vie publique et de la vie privée (à la poste, à la caisse d’épargne, dans
les banques, dans les mairies, les consulats, les commissariats de police, aux caisses publiques) on se voit
réclamer des pièces d’identité dont la nature et le nombre varient avec l’exigence des fonctionnaires ou
employés (enveloppes, cartes d’électeurs, actes de l’état civil, livret de mariage, etc.) ; avant de se présenter
dans l’un de ces bureaux, il est impossible de savoir quelle pièce sera exigée, – d’où des démarches
multiples, des pertes de temps. Quant aux femmes, aux mineurs, aux reformés, ils sont souvent dans
l’impossibilité absolue de justifier valablement de leur identité. (Piazza 2004: 142)

Translated, this gives:
In number of circumstances of public and private life (at the post office, at the savings bank, in the banking,
at the town halls, the consulates, the police stations, at the public funds offices) one is met with ID
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requirements the nature and the number of which vary with the demands of the functionaries and
employees (envelops, voter cards, civil status acts, marriage booklet, etc.); it is impossible to know which
documents will be required before showing up at one of those offices – hence multiple procedures, wastes
of time. As to women, minors, people declared unfit for service, they often are absolutely unable to validly
justify their identity.

In addition to favorable newspaper editorials, lawmakers, law enforcers and lawyers take it
particularly at heart to explain all the advantages that an identity card might bring its holder,
more specifically all the inconveniences or nuisances it might spare honest citizens. In 1921, a
lawyer writes:
Actuellement, on ne peut plus rien faire dans la vie sans avoir de papiers, et pour peu qu’on se déplace, il
en faut une véritable bibliothèque. La carte d’identité les résumerait tous. (Piazza 2004: 142)

In translation:
Currently, one can accomplish nothing in life without having papers [identity documents], and should one
travel the slightest bit, it will have to take a whole library. The identity card would sum them all up.

In a sort of counterfactuals – forecasting counterfactuals, I might add – all proponents describe
the hassle that could be experienced in this contemplated near future if one does not have the
new identity card, which people would avoid by requesting theirs. The cost of not having it
would be so great that everybody will want to have it. Even if someone who applied for the card
happens not to carry it while they are controlled, the fact of being able orally to provide details
that enable law enforcement to correlate with an entry in their registries (the related application
file kept with the police) could mean immediate release as opposed to being taken to the police
station for several hours until conditions are met for clearance.
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One particular nuisance that seems to elicit consensus against it is the practice of
“authorized witnesses.” While most of the other advantages may appear to be not only
hypothetical but conceptual (‘preventing from what might happen if…’), people dealing with
public institutions generally experienced (as we saw above) the obligation to bring in two people,
who are acceptable or recognizable by the administration’s agents, in order to endorse or confirm
their identity claims or attributes. Having a uniform or a reference ID card would have the
advantage of limiting the need to present witnesses only once, for such card would be accepted
as reliable by itself in further instances of identity control.
Finally, the sponsors of the 1916 bill88 also included a few incentives in their bill. The
allowance made for the record of professional references, awards and national service
achievements probably were also incentives for the people concerned. Cardholders were given
priority for jobs in the public as well as in the private sectors and were eligible for various
government subsidies. For a citizen in possession of the identity card and whose domiciliation
can be verified, one incentive consists of a provisional release if the person is involved in an
offense that could legally qualify for up to two years in jail (p. 144). In sum, the proposed card
would raise the threshold of police suspicion for the citizens who would have it, as anyone who
takes the necessary steps to get one is de facto presumed clean or at least forthcoming with the
law.
We may infer from reading Pierre Piazza (p. 14) that there are three sets of reasons why
French people came to accept to request and carry with them a national identity card (NIC)
without being formally coerced by the state apparatus.

88

These include Representatives Maurice Ajam, Jean Puech and Félix Bouffandeau.
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•

The people might have felt a sense of gratification and self-worth (impression of

recognition of their singular existence by the authority) with the opportunity to reclaim or
revive their connectedness with regard to a human community, at the time where the rise
of the modern state had seemed to dismantle the traditional relationships of individuals in
a community.

•

They might have considered the NIC as a practical solution to prove or

demonstrate their quality of French nationals in an increasingly complex context where
nationality (especially when documented) emerges as the overarching condition that can
guarantee some stability to one’s relationship with, and inclusion in, the prevailing
structure of human community.

•

A variety of measures that public authorities took in order to incentivize people

to get their NIC and carry it with a sense of pride, and use it as their preferred proof of
identity in most of their transactions, namely with the state agencies.
After diving into the history of the passport augmented with this particular historical case
of the French ID card, I will close this chapter by analyzing the core basic notions that enable the
state to issue these credentials.

5.5 Identity Primitives: A sociohistorical analysis and challenges
I call identity primitives (or identity primitive credentials), the last pieces of evidence left when
one seeks to get at the bottom of the pre-requisites of any identity credentials – in this context
particularly, those issued by the national state such as the passport and the national ID card. I
first address the question of “breeder documents” as an ambiguous label which seems to be
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based on a metaphor rather than on a clear concept. Chief of the so-called breeder documents is
the birth certificate; I subsequently discuss this credential. Then in the second part of the section
I address the concept of nationality in order to show that it is a legal construct that has a recent
history with social and cultural layers. Both birth and nationality certificates are identity
primitives that provide the authoritative basis for the national-state to issue its proper identity
credentials.
5.5.1

Breeder documents

While the phrase ‘breeder documents’ is used to refer to those basic documents such as birth
certificate generally required to issue other identity credentials, the usage as well as the
definition I have found at a number of sources appear to link this phrase to the notion of fraud.
For instance, the Oxford Dictionaries Online states that a breeder document is “a document,
genuine or fraudulent, that can serve as a basis to obtain other identification documents or
benefits fraudulently.”89 The fact is there is nothing in the term “breeder” itself suggesting that
negativity, all the contrary. I concord with John Mercer90 who contends that:
the basic process of identification starts with known, personal data which may be used to create additional
documents that confer additional privileges on their bearer. Thus, earlier documents ‘breed’ subsequent
documents.

Perhaps that ambiguity of the phrase comes from the fact that the documents might be breeding
other documents as much as they might be breeding some kind of people – both meanings being
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At http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/breeder+document
“Breeder Documents: The keys to identity.” Keesing Journal of Document and Identity. Issue 29, 2009 (p.14). Retrieved at
http://www.naphsis.org/NAPHSIS/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000001179/breeder_documents_the_keys_to_i
dentity.pdf
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totally in line with the spirit of the metaphor. I suggest the ambiguity could be resolved by
resorting to a more conceptual construct such as “identity primitives” or “primitive credentials.”
Declaring the birth of a newborn is the act par excellence of the bureaucratic birth, the
baptismal moment of a citizen’s lifecycle in the realm of the bureaucratic state. That act yields
the very first document that testifies to the being of an individual in the eye of the public office
or authority. In the United States that document, the chief of all identity primitives, is called
Certificate of Live Birth.91 The format of that document is under the control of the public
authority, as well as the information required to be documented. It universally includes the name
and the sex of the newborn, the place and the date of birth, the names of the parents, plus most
probably the person making the declaration and the authority recording it, and possibly the time
of birth and other information as required by the format of reference.
Apart from the sex of the newborn, all the attributes on a birth certificate are social or
cultural artifacts, in a sense that their value depends on some cultural worldview or social
arrangements. That includes even the calendar, as we know the Chinese calendar, to mention but
an example, is different from the Gregorian (or western) calendar which only dates back in the
16th century. The name may well be the primary identifier people use to relate to one another, but
that does not mean names have always been stable as we know them today. They follow
different rules and take various forms in different societies and at different periods in history.
Before becoming stable institutional identifiers, names were once left to local social and cultural
practices alone, without specific standard format or a system to record them. Contrary to the
view of names as standardized and legally-sanctioned identifiers, Caplan (2001) reminds us that
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Also called birth certificate, it is the first of life records including the marriage license and the death certificate. The
terms used in French are « Acte de naissance » or « Extrait de naissance. »
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historians (Lefebvre-Taillard 1990; Wilson 1998) have well documented the practices of names
in the West over the centuries, showing that it is not so much the initial purpose of names to
serve as strong and precise (thus legally reliable and regulated) identifiers than it is the law that
has made them so for its own purpose.
It is not simply the identificatory precision of the name that makes it into a legal object, but also the law
itself that demands and imposes this precision, and to that extent creates the name as a means of
identification. The legal seizure of the personal name in Europe is a recent and highly uneven development
that follows centuries of stabilization by usage and custom alone. (Caplan 2001: 54)

As I already mentioned in the previous chapter, the practice went from the three-part
name in the Western Roman Empire (Wilson 1998) to the single name, mostly baptismal name,
in the Christendom, before it was doubled by a second, then in some places today (e.g., middle
name in the US) a third, name.
From about the eleventh century, a second name or surname began to be added, as a kind of adjective
modifying and extending the limited stock of baptismal names. Surnames are normally distinguished by
genealogists and historians into four or five categories according to types, that is, filiation (patronymic),
place of origin (locative), object (toponymic), occupation, and sobriquet; but the process and pace by which
surnames became heritable and hence more stable as family names is not always easy to reconstruct.
(Caplan 2001: 54-55)

Nevertheless, it is clear that the stabilization around the patronym has introduced a
greater dimension of historicity in the individual identity, beyond the events within the
individual’s life. One suspects that this “genealogical identity” (Caplan 2001) had been a
characteristic part of naming practices in societies and times where writing as a mode of record

267
was not common and that the increasing scope and complexity of social interactions over time
led to the need to rationalize those practices and subsequent standardization.
The information provided in a birth certificate flows from the bottom to the top, from
private citizens to the state apparatus. The flow goes the other way around when it comes to
nationality. The national state bestows that attribute on the individual – the very attribute that is
at the core of the state becoming one of the most authoritative identity providers. In the
following sub-section, I account for the historical genesis of the notion of nationality and its
tensions.
5.5.2

Nationality or the paradoxical modernity of the state

The philosophy of Enlightenment has been recognized to be one of the defining sources as well
as manifestations of modernity (Harvey 1990) not only in the “Republic of Letters” but also in
the actual political republic which has been redefined by eighteenth century revolutions such as
the French 1789’s. Many thinkers from that century such as Hume, Kant, Diderot or
Montesquieu, sought to assert the preeminence of reason and culture over tradition and nature. In
effect, even social contract theories were the expression of the individual freedom to make
reasoned choice to join (or not to join) a polity outside any determinism imposed by God or
nature. However, the paradox I point to here is that the political institution of the state actually
followed a reverse course of modernity. At the same time that democracy rightfully requires the
state to bring people back in the business of government, the state apparatus had to espouse the
people (nation) for quite a different reason, at least at face value. The fact is that it was as if in
order to do that, the people had to be cast as a natural entity.

268
The territorialization of the (modern) state as formalized by the Treaty of Westphalia was
followed by a process of naturalization, a process of reciprocal identification between the state
and the nation. The Westphalian sovereignty may well have created the formal delineation of the
nation-state, but only the notion of nationality will give it its ultimate content as well as it will
make the nation-state real in the life of its individual members. Before nationality became the
operative (legal) category that can then justify the legal distribution of certain privileges and
exclusions, it established an organic link between the state and the nation. Here I draw on the
historical genesis of the concept conducted by Noiriel (1995) to argue that nationality is the
conceptual device that enabled the state to be effective in claiming the authority to know and
identify “its” people.
The idea of nationality was ambiguous in its origins, with a conceptual tension leading to
a dual development that still carries the sequels of that ambivalence. On the one hand, a literally
spiritual conception hinting at a mystical and sometimes mythological notion of the nationality
of a given people as a race or an ethnic group, and on the other hand an integrated community
that represents a progress over the multiplicity and the particularism of races or ethnic groups. In
any case, both alternatives seem to be predicated on the notion of race, whether to praise or to
transcend it.
Despite the antecedence of the terms ‘nation’ (substantive) and ‘national’ (adjective), the
other substantive indicating a quality – nationality – only appeared much later and started off
timidly as a neologism in a 1807 novel by Madame de Staël, a writer that personifies on more
than one account the cultural exchanges, antagonisms and ambiguities between the French and
the German imaginary, literary, and conceptual worlds (Noiriel 1995). Subsequently, the
semantic related to the term was at the core of an 1810 publication of Deutsches Volksthum by
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Friedrich Jahn. Considered as a forbearer of the German ethnography (Volkskunde,) Jahn coined
the term Volksthum92 [sic], which will later (1825) be translated to French as nationalité,
although the latter was at that point already rendered in German by a different term
(“Nationalität,” a lexical construction based on the French word.) In other words, for one French
term there were now two German equivalents to express the notion of nationality.
In any case, the two terms, nationalité and Volkstum, conceptually overlap to the extent
that they both capture the sense of nationality as the spirit or the character of the people, that
which gives a people its personality and common identity perceived as immutable. However,
there is more left in the French concept, or at least there has been a struggle over the meaning of
the idea of nationality, staking out a less racialized notion. According to Noiriel (1995), the lack
of that ambiguity in the lexical choice of Volkstum for nationality precipitated the “essentialist”
drift that occurred with that concept in Germany.
In addition to a few French historians such as Jules Michelet (as early as 1833) and
Augustin Thierry (in 1840), Noiriel notes that the term was mostly used by French-language
writers most versed in, or involved with, German culture, notably the Romanticist writers such as
Lamartine, Victor Hugo, Flaubert, and George Sand, etc. However, the term remained
ambiguous not only because of its novelty but in particular given the polysemy of the concept of
‘nation’ itself. Noiriel (1995: 10 and 13) registers phrasal uses including “Frank nationality”
(Augustin Thierry,) “feudal nationality” (Edgar Quinet,) “provincial nationalities” (Michelet)
and even “the principle of work nationality” (Proudhon) going as far as proclaiming that freedom
of enterprise, mercantilism and capitalism destroy the nationalities as well as the working class.

92

The German term for nation being the same as for the people: Volk. Noiriel’s piece includes two different
orthographies of this word as can be seen here in the next paragraph, thus the mention “[sic].”
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In debates following the 1789 revolution, the opposition of views stemming from
aristocratic conservatism on the one hand and from liberalism on the other brought the
politicization of the notion of nationality to a height. Aristocracy originally opposed the notion of
nationality seen as standardizing (creating a uniform people and culture) in favor of the notion of
race as lineage, for then their supremacy could obviously be justified on the basis of their
connection with the line of the conquerors (Frank) as opposed to the descent of the vanquished
people (Gaul). In other words, they tended to see nationality through the prism of ethnic warfare.
On the other hand, liberals tended to praise the rise of a nation as a process of unification (hence,
disappearance) of classes and other subcategories of less value in their view. Furthermore, while
most liberals argued for “national unity”93 as a progressive prospect already in process of
realization, a few of them (notably Augustin Thierry) preferred to read the Revolution as a
revenge of the Gaul over the Frank, countering aristocrats by means of their own martial
repertoire.
The term nationality gained currency in the era of the July Monarchy started with the
revolution of 1830 in France whereby a conservative monarchy led by a representative of the
House of Bourbon (Charles X) was overthrown by a more liberal branch of the kingly line
known as the House of Orleans. Replacing one constitutional monarchy with another one more
popular, Louis-Philippe called himself the ‘King of the French’ as opposed to ‘King of France’
which was the traditional designation, putting the emphasis on the people and popular
sovereignty. His rule will in turn be overthrown in the Revolution of 1848 that led to the Second
Republic.

93 Noiriel (1995: 11) notes that for the first time the term “nationality” was used to designate the French people as a
whole in a History authored by Francois Guizot in 1828. He conducted his research using a database of more than 3300
works of French literature from the 16th to the 20th century.
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In the meantime during the second half of the 19th century Paris became a hub for, and
the capital of, various groups of migrants from around Europe leading to a
translation/transliteration of the world into several European languages but also to a political turn
in its concept. The notion of free association around a common interest appears to override the
racial or cultural dimension in the definition of nationality offered by Leconte de Lisle: from a
linkage pertaining to cultural, ethnic and racial identity of a given social group, nationality had
evolved to become the political expression of the people, of the sovereignty of the people.
During the July Monarchy, the term ‘nationality’ was used by the officers of the Interior
Ministry, dealing with the increase of European migration and exile to France. Willing to grant
social services and aid to the exiles while keeping up with the need to keep track of the
expenditures and manage costs, the French government required the administration in 1833 to
maintain the list of individuals receiving aid by documenting their place of birth and
“nationality.” However, that usage was a practical one that was yet to be legally defined.
In 1848, the French administration started using “nationality” as a homologous term first
applied to populations of foreigners in France, and then used interchangeably with “the quality of
[people being] French.” This was particularly noted during the census of 1851 with regard to the
conditions required to vote as well as the need to get accurate statistics on the demographics of
the population. The first law on and of a “French nationality” dated in 1889. Before then and
since the practical use of the term at the government’s Interior department, other usages were
recorded including by lawyers in cases of private law or civil/common law (jurisprudence)
litigations involving parties of different countries. Noiriel (1995: 16) provides the time line of
notable legislations that make mention of any notion of nationality (Table 5-3).
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Table 5-3: Time line of French legislations related to nationality between the Revolution and the Second Empire
Date

Legislation

1790

Law providing for the requirements to fulfill in order to be “reputed French.”

1791

Constitution addressing the attribution of “quality of citizen.”

1793

Constitution spelling out the requirements for the exercise of “citizen rights.”

1795

Records refer to a “political state of citizens.”

1851

Civil Code: on conditions for obtaining or losing the “quality of (being) French” as opposed to
the “quality of foreigner/alien.”

1867

Law where the terms ‘French’ and ‘citizen’ appear in juxtaposition on the question of
eligibility to “all the privileges of the French citizen.”94

Based on Noiriel (1995) in French language. The texts above are not a direct translation of the original author but a
rendition that is meant to be accurate. The words in quotation marks are a translation of terms occurring in the
legislation referenced.

Thus, the legal appropriation and definition of the concept of nationality only began in
the late decades of the 19th century, particularly in the context of international law. At that point,
the left-wing forces that introduced the concept of nationality began to take their distance from it
in favor of a universalist trend, notably based on the fellowship of workers wherever they were
born, resided or worked, while conservatists grew fierce advocates of (French) nationality by
way of national particularism. The tables turned, but not quite symmetrically.
From the above historical recall, we can clearly see that the notion and category of
nationality was the outcome of a cultural and historical process. And yet, the national state

94 The French version literally reads: “To enjoy all the rights of the French citizen.” According to Noiriel, the encounter
of those two words (‘French’ and ‘citizen’) side by side is indicative of the fact that the juridical codification and
distinction of the related two concepts had not yet occurred at the time.
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practices of identification of people cannot be understood without it. It is only through that
constructed category that the citizen clearly becomes affiliated to the state body and apparatus de
jure. With such concept, national-states frame their relationship with people, making some of
them the people and the rest of the world foreigners to the state for each particular state. The
only attribute the central/national government is really authoritative to assert about the citizen is
his or her nationality, which despite its fuzzy sociocultural origins the state has made into a legal
category. That affiliation by nationality is the matrix from which all other relationships between
the individual and the state flow, as do all rights and privileges granted or recognized by the
state. In a sense, the emergence of the concept of nationality is a process of naturalization of the
state as well as a process of judicialization of the people: it is the locus where a people is
somehow wedded to that historical form of political institution – the result of which wedding is
literally the nation-state – and by so doing the state apparatus takes on a human content.
Moreover, by the very existence/creation of that category and by that wedding, the state acquires
the transformative virtue to recognize some people born in certain condition as nationals and,
otherwise, to naturalize some of the rest so that they become nationals. Once this conceptual
infrastructure of institutional and legal fictions has been put in place, it is only a matter of time
for a series of documentary practices to flourish, feeding into the newly formalized affiliation
between citizens and the state. It is also only a matter of opportunity for some of those
documentary practices to generalize or be standardized across all nation-states.

5.6 Conclusion
We have seen that the state ability and authority to identify its citizens has been a
historical process. Its early manifestations emerged under certain specific conditions several
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centuries ago, at a time when the boundaries of the nation were not that clearly defined as will be
the case for the modern state. The origins of the passport (the modern traveler’s passport as well
as its precursor trail of identity papers) clearly shows two distinctive tracks in the practices of
identification, one with a positive frame and the other with a negative one; in other words there is
the “good” and there is the “bad.” The bad (relating to the control impulse) included the practices
of listing names and creating records about the “unwanted” (e.g., the nomadic people who do not
dwell at a regular place or the already convicted) as well as the “wanted” who was sought after
with an arrest warrant. The good (relating to diplomatic correspondence) included the practice of
safe-conduct and letter of introduction.
The present configuration and scope of the authority exercised through passports is the
outcome of a process that has developed over a number of decades starting at the end of the 19th
century. Particularly, several countries led the initiative in the wake of WWI towards an
international-type passport through a process that has extensively been traced in this chapter.
Overall, it can be said that the passport system has been successful at a grand scale; there has
never been anything more universal and more effective in terms of identity credentials and
system, at least for its primary purpose of regulating people’s movements across international
borders.
Authoritative identity artifacts issued by the national state are built on basic credentials
that I have termed identity primitives: they include birth certificate and certificate of nationality.
The former symbolizes the inaugural sign of existence in the realm of state bureaucracy; as
formal as it may be today, the latter is the outcome of a highly contingent, sociocultural process.
Nationality is the central category that enables and organizes the modern state’s universal
capability to act as authority for individuals’ identity. First, after claiming and securing territorial
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sovereignty, the state managed to enact and formalize a strong affiliation with the people living
in the territory thus claimed through the concept of nationality. By the end 19th century, this
concept allowed tightly coupling the state to a nation, whether actual or ideally posited, and viceversa, a process which I have termed the naturalization of the state. Secondly, nationality then
became a core attribute framing the relationship of the individual to the authority of the state,
including the authority to assign an identity to nationals while providing them with new rights
and privileges.
Now that I have completed the two (past) historical cases, there remains the third case
about digital identity. But before I tackle it, I shall pause and draw together the main analytical
insights from the previous cases as to outline a framework that could the guide the analysis of the
last case study. This will be the task of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6

Building Digital Identity Infrastructure

6.1 Introduction
As we enter a new period in the history of record creation technologies, one where the activity of
writing and creating records is further mediated through a more complex device than previously
used, such as the computer, it is no surprise based on the outcomes of preceding analyses that the
question of identity within the new type of record is raised once again. While the main players
that drive innovations in computer technology might have been aware of this challenge in their
respective business, it has been less than a decade that an apparent consensus has emerged across
the industry on the need for a collective effort to develop and build the bases for solutions that
could work for all participants and activities that rely on computer-created records and Internetenabled transactions. It is probably too early in the process to expect that these efforts have
reached a final state where we could clearly see and investigate the critical differences and
novelties brought about by this new record creation and transmission technology. However,
enough discourse has been produced and activities carried out in order for us to discern the
directions things are going and perhaps to offer relevant and critical analysis if necessary so as to
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make the process more deliberate at all (or as many as possible) levels of consequences that can
be anticipated from a socially-oriented inquiry such as this one. With that in mind, the ultimate
goal of this case will be to address the following question:
How are social actors, events or processes leading to the possible emergence of authoritative
digital identity credentials for Internet end users at large?
The materials that provide the data needed to describe the different parts of the case are
found in a series of documents drafted and made publicly available by institutional (private
companies and government) as well as individual actors participating in the relevant design
efforts. Complementarily, I have conducted interviews with individual participants in an attempt
to collect further and up-to-date information about the ongoing endeavor they are involved in, to
fill possible gaps found as a result of consulting the available documents, and also to consolidate
useful background information this investigation might have needed to clarify in order to pursue
its arguments.95
As a result of this hybrid data gathering approach and regarding particularly the role of
human individuals as data sources, some of the data is from public record in which case the
source or author is named when the data is quoted or specifically referenced. These include
conference presentations, blogs, written/published materials and any subsequent email exchange
I might have had related to those publicized materials from identifiable authors. On the other
hand, the second category of data that has been collected from interviews has been de-identified
as generally advisable from data collection best practice in human subject research. As a
consequence some of the quotes (from public record) are associated with the actual name of their
95

See relevant paragraphs in chapter 3, section 3.4 regarding the different data sources, and Appendix B for the
interview protocols.
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author while some others (from interview) are not, even when the same individual has provided
information in both data categories.
To start investigating and studying this case, I first seek to gather a good understanding of
what digital identity entails and provide an overview of the contexts and rationale that shape the
efforts to create specific technology solutions for the problem of identity on the Internet. I then
present a number of said solutions that have been proposed so far in terms of specific designs
and/or implementations. After, I consider the broader efforts to institutionalize those
technologies by assembling a number of public-private partnership mechanisms and frameworks
intended, among other things, to foster consumer trust. I proceed to pinpoint a number of
challenges standing in the ways of those processes and the ultimate widespread adoption of the
technologies. Finally, I integrate the insights gained from this examination to the framework that
has been outlined from the previous historical cases.

6.2 Emergence of digital identity
In this section, I do not intend to establish a comprehensive, much less a definite history of digital
identity or the manifestation of whatever may qualify as pertaining to it. The focus of this chapter
being what has been called identity 2.0 (the most recent developments of identification protocols
through the Internet emphasizing the user and usability), I will start in this section by offering
bellow an expose and a discussion of the notion of digital identity in that context. I will then trace
the timeline of the evolving notion and practices related to digital identity in the industry and as
technological innovations emerge.
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6.2.1

What is in a digital identity?

To begin, I shall attempt to outline the conceptual antecedents of the notion of identity that is
implied in the context of digital technology. To that end, I refer both to available public records
and the interview data.
By 2006, a cross-section of Open Source and proprietary software industry actors
undertook in a broad online collaboration with all interested stakeholders the effort to lay out the
basic concepts for a digital identity framework. The Identity Gang, as they then called
themselves, developed a lexicon in order to ensure that participants and all stakeholders use (and
understand) the same language while discussing digital identity. From that lexicon provided on
the group website,96 it reads:
Digital Identity: A digital representation of a set of Claims made by one Party about itself or another
Digital Subject.

That basic definition is consolidated by a set of comments:
Comment1: A Digital Identity is just one set of Claims about a Digital Subject. For any given Digital
Subject there will typically exist many Digital Identities.
Comment2: A Digital Identity can be created on the fly when a particular identity transaction is desired, or
persisted [sic] in a data store to provide a referenceable representation.
Comment3: A Digital Identity may contain Claims made by multiple Claimants.
Comment4: A Digital Identity may be signed by a Digital Identity Provider to provide assurance to a
Relying Party.

96 Then at http://identitygang.org/moin.cgi/Lexicon, the Lexicon is now found at http://wiki.idcommons.net/Lexicon.
Terms that are underlined in the following two block-quotes are in the source material HTML links that direct to the
definition of those terms. It shall be the convention in this chapter that all quotes from materials treated as sources of
data in this investigation will be in italics; any terms in italics in the original materials will be underlined here instead,
unless otherwise specified (as I just did about the HTML links.)
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It is notable that ‘digital identity’ here is considered merely as a set of claims, i.e. one or
more properties, attributes or facts that can be asserted about some entity (a digital subject),
which may help determine its status vis-à-vis certain rights, privileges or capabilities. Any set of
claims is not meant to be necessarily self-sufficient for zeroing on a single entity as the unique
subject of said claims. The objective is first and foremost to determine whether the claims are
warranted with regard to the subject at hand. In other words, the substantive value of the link
between claims and the subject those claims are made about is more important than the
uniqueness of said subject (although it remains necessary that no subject can unwarrantedly
make and be granted claims, but this doesn’t require uniqueness as the same set of claims may be
warranted in the case of several subjects.) Further comments posted by participants in the
discussion read as follows.
Uniqueness is not an essential element of the concept of ‘identity’ as used in this Lexicon. As used here,
‘identity’ as a means to distinguish things is not essential; it is only secondary or anecdotal.
What's being developed here is a set of definitions that you may find diverge from certain common and/or
historical usages of the word and concept of ‘identity.’ While in some common uses and contexts ‘identity’
is assumed to imply some form of uniqueness, in this Lexicon a Digital Identity basically boils down to
nothing more than one or more properties of a Digital Subject. In this context, you can think of ‘Digital
Identity’ as simply being metadata – data describing a subject. In this Lexicon what ‘identity’ does is not
what most people in the world would consider as “identifying” a subject. What is intended by “identity”
here is what people would normally consider to be a ‘description’ of a subject. Of course, in some contexts,
a description (Digital Identity) may be specific enough that it can only apply to a single subject within that
context. In that case, the description would ‘identify’ the subject. [posted by Bob Wyman]97

97

In this block quote, the tags or annotations in square brackets are from the source of the quote, referencing the names
by which members of the group signed in and edited this collective work.
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Outside of the limited worldview of accountability, ‘identity’ is widely used to mean ‘stuff about you’ that
has nothing to do with uniqueness. Terms like ‘cultural identity’ and ‘national identity’ are what come to
mind for many people when considering ‘identity.’ One’s identity comes via the groups one ‘identifies
with’; this is the opposite of uniqueness. [posted by RL “Bob”]

Digital identity is basically a relation between a digital entity and a set of properties on
the basis of which relevant assertions or claims can be made in the environment at hand. The
question then, according to the Identity Gang, is not whether the attributes included are specific
(or individualistic) enough to single out the entity, but whether they accurately describe the
entity in the current context. From that broader perspective, digital identity is anything (role,
function, proper attribute, or other characteristic, etc.) that can be said to be “true” or accurate
about a given digital subject in a specific context. If Digital Identity as a concept comes with any
claim, it is not much to enable, ultimately, the specific identification of the whole of the digital
subject, but to allow for the assertion or discovery of the characterizations of a subject which are
necessary to check before certain procedure can be completed or in order to make the
determination as to what are the appropriate rules applicable to it. This notably enables granting
authorizations based on rules about the claimant (as known through its attributes) and the
resource or procedure being pursued.
The interview data also abounds in the direction of the claim being the central construct
of digital identity.
Identity is a set of claims. Authentication is a decision that is made by examining a set of claims... thinking
about what is in them and who’s made them. The natural person is not necessarily revealed by a digital
identity. Minimum disclosure reveals only what need to be revealed in order to get a transaction done.
[Res_G, 2011]
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More obvious in the digital realm than in the physical world is the fact that checking identity is
for the purpose of allowing a transaction or a communication to proceed. In such contexts, what
is at stake is not the accuracy of the objective representation and sufficient referencing of the
whole of an entity, but the accuracy of a characterization of it (of a statement about it), which
enables to decide whether a given procedure or transaction is permitted and may be carried out.
This is predicated on the ability to assess claims as to whether they are right or wrong, warranted
or unwarranted, true or false, legit or not. Users are making a claim whenever they’re trying to
assert that they control a given digital representation, and then that a digital representation which
they control should provide them with access to, with the right to move around, or with the
ownership rights altogether over a given resource, etc. In a number of digital transactions, selfasserted claims may be sufficient.
The question in any given case is: what are we trying to assert? That may not need as high level of
confidence as people may assume. [Res_D, 2009]

For transactions that required verified claims however, claims will be issued by an entity that is
the relevant authority for that particular claim (or the attribute implied.)
Claims … are often about authorization: you’re looking for the information in order to decide whether to
do a transaction or not. [Res_A, 2009]
… the relying party decides whether to believe [the claims issued by a given entity] or not.
Trust proceeds from the relying party. The relying party decides what’s true, and he evaluates who is
saying what about whom to decide whether to grant access. [Res_G, 2011]

We already knew that the question ‘who are you?’ is not as much transparent as it may
look at first, and answering it not as simple, for there is no one single and definite answer. Now it
is even less transparent in the digital and networked-computer world. Given the overlay of
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computer networks required with digital technology, one more layer of complexity adds to the
way identity is defined and handled: the issue no longer is just about identifying humans among
other humans by assigning them documentary credentials that include their individual
descriptions. It also and before anything else is about identifying, or at least qualifying or
labeling, data among data, that is to say, bits among bits, in a technological context where every
piece of information is encoded in a binary format. Arguably in those conditions, the question
‘Who are you?’ potentially means a different question in different contexts.
Depending on the context of interactions between the person asking and the person being asked and maybe
a third party who wanna know, you get a different question. (Res_H, 2011)

Different plausible answers may provide different levels of satisfaction or not at all,
depending on what is relevant for the context at hand. According to this expert, a lot of
assumptions are made about what it means to be a person. For him, digital technology leads us to
re-examine our notion of identity, including its social, legal and other components, which define
a variety of dimensions (and notions) regarding what a person is.
With digital identity you have to ask yourself what is identity? What is it you’re actually asserting when you
make a claim about someone’s identity? ... Are you saying this person is that person? What are the claims
you’re making about that person, and what are the claims they’re making about themselves? Is that really
[Mr. X]? What does that actually mean? What it means is:
Is this person the same person who has this bank account?
Is this person the same person who lives at this address?
Is this person the same person who has this DNA sequence?
Is this person the same person who is the father of these children?
Is this person the same person who just logged in to this website? [Res_H, 2011]
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In a keynote address delivered at th
the IPSI symposium,98 Stefan Brands considers identity
as
just an umbrella term that encompasses a lot of different concepts in technology that have been pursued for
many decades. The most important ones are authentication and data sharing.

Particularly in the Internet environment, those two conceptual pillars are related and yet they are
very distinct and need to be distinguished.
Authentication is all about ‘who are you?’ and in the online world, that’s not just who are you as human
but possibly also who iss this computer process, who is this application, some kind of notion of identity or
identifiers, in particular. That question of ‘who are you?’ turns out to be quite complex in its own right
because there’s no single answer to that; you may have different identities, or different manifestations of
your identity in different spheres of activity… The other part – data sharing – is all about ‘what are you?’
So, most of that is about personal information. …, more generally we refer to that as identity-related
identity
information. It may be de-identified
identified but it may still relate to you as individual, so it’s identity-related.
identity
[Brands_2010]

Figure 66-1: Simple structure model of the identity data

98

Research Symposium: “Developing a Tru
Trusted Cyber-Infrastructure
Infrastructure for Canadians” by the Identity, Privacy and
Security Institute (IPSI) at the University of Toronto, May 12, 2010. See
http://hosting.epresence.tv/KMDI/1/watch/748.aspx
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In the remainder of this section, I analytically elaborate on this important distinction
proposed by Brands above, echoing the conceptual interpretations I myself suggested earlier99.
To some extent, the above formulation – saying that authentication applies to ‘who you are’
(identity) as opposed to ‘what you are’ for data sharing – may mislead into thinking that there is
identity on the one hand and data on the other. That would not be accurate, for obviously what is
authenticated (‘who you are’) in this context is also data. In fact, the contrast here is between the
authentication of data on the one hand and the sharing of the data on the other (Fig. 7-2). In that
sense, the authentication mechanism applies to the amount of data which, once authenticated,
will allow the discovery or assertion of an identity, i.e. of a known entity – as per the
authenticated data and whatever defines an entity in the context at hand. Sharing applies to any
data; but the sharing is more meaningful when applied to data that can be linked to an identity
(“identity-related” data,) when the provenance and attributions of the data are known.
There’s a whole bunch of transactions, if you don’t know who made the transactions the data is less
sensitive. You may be able, just based on the knowledge of the transactions, to figure out who it is. But data
in and of itself doesn’t always map directly to an identity; an identity without data doesn’t tell you what
they do. [Res_H 2011]

As presented above, the question ‘who are you?’ is actually a referential question. It
possibly invites an answer based on either one of two reference planes. The first one, immanent
to the digital space itself, includes and designates that entity (‘you’) as represented within the
structure and syntax of (in this context) the computer communication system itself. A name, for
instance, may be a sufficient answer to that question on this plane, assuming that entities have a
name (a consistently designating string of characters) in the context at hand and that knowing a

99

I had already made a similar distinction between ‘who’ and ‘what’ (see chapter 2) by the time I became aware of
Brands’ presentation.
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name is sufficient to provide the system with the informa
information
tion it needs in order to determine how
to behave with the entity thus named. In that condition, the name is an identifier. Note that even
when the (referential) entity in question is an embodied human being outside the computer
system, the same still applies,
ies, as the human user interacting with a computer system will also
have to be represented in one form or the other within the computer system, which the system
“understands,” – in a sense, according to the system’s language and syntax. In the latter case, we
can talk about a second plane of reference which is the thick world of brick
brick-and--mortar, the
world in which the actual body of the human user resides. Either way, the question ‘who are
you?’ implies and requires the referential dimension of identity in order to be addressed; that
dimension may be located either within the space of the system of representation itself (here a
computer software system)
tem) or in the world outside that system,
ystem, in which both the entity-source
entity
for the data and the system itself m
materially stand.
Figure 6-2: A simple model of identity authentication

On the other hand, the question ‘what are you?’ is akin to ‘what data are you?’ or
‘what’s your data?’ In other words: In the domain at hand, what are the different pieces of data
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that relate to, or manifest the state of, this entity? Data flows on a network; at any given point in
time it is the manifestation of the state of the entity it refers to. It generally is less permanent than
the entity itself, and may sometimes be utterly transient, because the states evolve while the
entity persists. One may argue that the ‘what’ dimension also is referential, to the extent that data
relates to a subject. However in the case of the ‘who,’ the reference is ontological, while it is
only relational and contingent in the case of the ‘what.’
Moreover, the formulation of identity as combining the authentication of ‘who you are’
with the sharing of ‘what you are’ suggests a tight connection between authentication and
identity, so as to say: every authentication is one of identity. Any piece of data that provides
sufficient information to link it to a single known or knowable entity in a given domain is identity
data; authentication is the mechanism that demonstrates such link as accurate and certain
(according to the rules established in that domain.) In sum, the question ‘who are you?’
addresses the certainty or reliability of the referential dimension of the data (which entity does
the data exactly refer to, as its semantic source100, so to speak?) and the question ‘what are you?’
addresses the multiplicity of available data connected to ‘you’ – not only the data sui generis of
‘your’ actions and transactions, but also metadata level information such as labels, requirements,
rules and policies that are attached to the data and define the array of possible behaviors that data
may follow or treatments it may be subjected to. (Fig. 7-3)
Using the phrase ‘semantic source’ about the data subject also signals that beyond the
mere content of the data point at hand, the need to have some knowledge or definition of such
100

I am calling semantic source what is also called data subject, i.e., the source or basis of its meaning. In semiotics
terms, it is the entity which the sign (data) denotes. Any entity may be transmitting or processing personal data that is
not their own (e.g., a data controller dealing with its customers’ data), at which time they are source of the process that is
taking place, but not the semantic source of the data. I use the term ‘semantic source’ to distinguish the contingent
source that is responsible for the data being in the circumstances it is at a given point in time, and the source that is the
reference subject of the data, i.e. the very entity that the data is supposed to mean.
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subject as referent source for the data is an important piece in the identity processes, and a
semantic one by definition. As quoted above, one of the interviewees (Res_H) has made the
point that transaction data without identity does not mean much and identity without data does
not amount to much. This suggests that transaction data or identity-related data without the
knowledge of the relevant identity is not fully meaningful and both are needed to give full sense
to, and maximize the utility of, the data. In effect through the phrase ‘semantic source,’ I am also
arguing that while any data has its proper and objective meaning which is the state of things it is
meant to capture, the primary information it is meant to convey, its referent subject is also part of
its meaning when it comes to the notion of identity: in other words, knowing the data subject –
i.e., the semantic source of the data – complements the knowledge of the data object – i.e., the
meaning of the data content – to give the data its full meaning and utility as identity data. For
example, on its face a data piece may mean that an individual who is nineteen bought alcohol at
a given point in time. I cannot decide whether that is legal or illegal unless I know a little more
about that individual than the fact that he or she is nineteen (in other words, unless I know
beyond what the data says some other part of “who they are” in the actual world), even if I
myself live in a jurisdiction where that transaction would be illegal. The same would apply to a
variety of identity information, depending on the objective of the entity handling the plain data
initially available.
There are different requirements depending on where the emphasis lies, between data
sharing and authentication. Higher the need for security, stronger the authentication, and vice
versa. Conversely, where the main goal is to share data, then the solution adopted has less
stringent authentication requirements. Whatever the angle adopted, it should be possible to
combine different systems and solutions, taking into account the possibility to upgrade or
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emphasize capabilities and features related to one perspe
perspective
ctive and need at the expense of those
related to the other, as appropriate.
Fig. 66-3: Complete model of identity data

6.2.2

Why do we need digital identity?

The case for digital identity is not yet won in the eye of the average user, to say the least. This
may be observed through the first reaction and the reluctance to get beyond that whenever a
public newly comes to learn about digital identity blue prints. Even the US Government’s first
draft of the “National Strategy for Trusted Identity in Cyberspace” ((hereafter
hereafter NSTIC or the
Strategy) released by the White House caused some discomfort and even resistance.
resistance 101 It is
therefore a serious challenge for the designers to address the question as to why digital identity is
needed, and to convey a sense of its utility to various stakeholders. This section will outline the
main arguments coming so far out of this community of designers and developers.
developers
The final version of the Strategy lists a number of benefits of what it calls identity
ecosystem (see related section infra
infra),
), which are as many reasons supporting the need for digital

101

This could be noted at the roundtable organized at Syracuse University to discuss the draft Strategy on September 3,
2010: http://insct.syr.edu/insct_events.aspx?id=36507230109&terms=cyberspace
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identity. First, it must be noted that the document makes the claim that “[i]ndividuals are the
first priority of the Strategy” [gov_nstic, p. 21]. The benefits to individuals listed therein are
convenience, privacy and security. There will be less use of the “anti-pattern” [Res_B] formed
by the pair username-password with all of its flaws and limitations. The process of registering for
and accessing online services will be streamlined, less amount of information being collected at
every transaction. This in turn limits the exposure of user data and improves security. As to the
private sector, they will be able to innovate with new and more efficient services, increasing
customer enrollment and trust. And lastly, efficiency and transparency will be improved in
government services to the satisfaction of its constituents; these technologies will bring about
innovation and drive economic growth; and public safety will be improved with less cybercrime, better infrastructure protection and emergency response services.
There is a fair concordance across the experts interviewed as to why online identity
technology is needed. Data sharing is an important part of online transactions, particularly
including those transactions where PII is required. One expert emphasizes the virtue of
exchanging identity information in order to enhance data sharing at a variety of levels. In that
respondent’s view, we need large scale interoperable Internet identity systems “because identity
enablement makes it more practical to do selective sharing, and selective sharing is key to
privacy and security.” [Res_B, 2010]
Another one experienced the problem of identity as a loophole in the management of
citizens’ records by a state administration, in the early years 2000. He provides further details as
follows:
All of this started looking like we were asking the same question over and over again in a slightly different
guise. … In determining eligibility for certain benefit systems you couldn’t actually compare social security
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numbers because of, uh, federal laws, you know, regarding, you know, privacy of certain information. So it
turned out that you get people with multiple records in the system and no way to verify whether they were
the same person or not. And your trying to solve those kinds of problems was something that seemed to take
up a lot of time. [Res_M 2011]

Likewise, to the question about the circumstances that led him to get involved in digital
identity business, one of the respondents explained that the core structure of information in
digital format being as abstract as a series of 0s and 1s, there is something missing when
information of economic value and consequence is being transferred in digital media. According
to him, that component which is needed to structure the information and realize its utility for
backing up and carrying economic value is identity.
If you have an exponential increase in something, and it doesn’t have legal structure on it and that thing
has value, then there’s a missing component. The [missing] infrastructure around that information pile is
identity – that’s the skeleton necessary for the pile. Because identity, it isn’t just people, but it’s identity of
people and entities and things. [Res_L 2011]

Still in the same order of ideas, another interviewee pinpoints the critical need to be able
to overlay a meaningful structure on the huge amount of digital data that consumers now
generate and which is constantly flowing. On the one hand you have data, raw and amorphous
data in the sense that it is unstructured and makes little sense in terms of fully grasping its value.
On the other hand, identity is the notion that can structure and help release the full meaning,
value and implications of the data. Data without an identity construct can be anything; with an
identity structure, data takes on a specific value.
There’s a whole bunch of transactions, if you don’t know who made the transactions the data is less
sensitive. You may be able just based on the knowledge of the transactions to figure out who it is. But data
in and of itself doesn’t always map directly to an identity; an identity without data doesn’t tell you what
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they do. So you say, what’s their behavior? What’s their asset, what do they do online, who are they? It is
the connection of the two that’s explosive both in danger and in opportunity. So when you’re thinking of the
question of digital identity, to just think about it as identification of who this is, this isn’t sufficient …
Identity isn’t a sufficient construct on its own for describing the behavior of the system; you have to think
about it as personal data: digital identity plus data creating the union of the person plus the information
produced by and about them. [Res_H 2010]

More broadly, this interviewee adopts a societal perspective in order to highlight the value of
identity in human societies. Based on the idea that digital identity is a “representation of the
physical self” he points out the importance of individual identity historically, and therefore what
digital identity means to a digital society, a digital economy, and a digital culture.
Historically, part of what has allowed society to function is stable, legal and social identity: that you have
a name that is stable, that you have forms of identifying yourself through driving license and the rest, and
that you have legal personhood so that you can own property, you can be subject to certain laws and
constraints, and that you have unified enough identity so that you can be subject to social norms. So part of
what makes society function is that we have stable enough, and well understood enough, forms of identity.
So that happened in the pre-digital world. As we’ve moved now (inaudible) increasingly our work, our
play, our romance, our government, many, many spheres of human life have either a correlate online or in
some cases happen predominantly online. [Res_H 2010]

Here again, something has been missing in digital interactions, said my interlocutor, which is
identity – an identity that would be “stable enough, interoperable enough, and user-controlled
enough” but also open enough to realize the full promises of an agile flow of personal data. He
went on to stress how meaningful this is for the future of the society.
I think what’s important too is to think about the structure of what kind of society it is we wanna live in... so
that’s why these questions aren’t just commercial questions. And they’re not just governmental questions.
They are about the nature of relationship between the private sector, the public sector, and citizens and
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consumers. And so ... these are fundamental questions of political economy and civil society, as well as
they are commercial questions. And we’re at a point of history where all the industry is trying to work them
out. [Res_H 2010]

Equally important from a societal perspective is the need for “creating due process for
digital citizens” as another expert put it [Res_L 2011]. In a comparative perspective about law
and technology, he holds that specifications are for technology what laws are for people, both
enabling regularity for tools and humans, respectively.
The technology needs to be normalized. [Res_L 2011]
Technology is made regular by specifications, people are made regular by law. ... Those laws are statutory,
regulatory or contractual. That’s where duties come from, and duties regularize people’s behavior. [Idem]

That normalization occurs through specifications and protocol standards. As a result,
(normalized or standardized) technology changes “the risk profile of other people’s behavior” in
a given environment where they interact with each other using the said technology. In the end,
the parties to identity transactions are “paying for … the value proposition” which can be
formulated as follows: “the regularity and reliability of other people’s behaviors, and those are
behaviors with respect to data.” [Res_L 2011]
Through those conversations, we have learned that digital identity is a tool necessary to
put some meaningful structure on the flow of digital data. Without such structure, the data
flowing in between end user terminals is amorphous and of a limited value. What these
respondents seem to suggest is that a world of computer networks without any digital identity
scheme would resemble a physical world where human beings for instance had no name, not
even a substitute thereof (such as an identifier or a stable handle that can be recorded and
remembered), no record whatsoever associated with them (and how could anything even be
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associated with them if they have no name or substitute thereof?), a world where people have no
legal status and where they exist for others only when and so long as their bodies are exposed to
the immediate sight of those others, a world where there only are bodies without any information
of any kind linked to them. That information can be securely and stably linked to human bodies
and recorded as such affords the possibility to process that information on behalf of the related
human individuals without their involvement or even presence while throughout the process it
will still pertain specifically and exclusively to each individual it is meant to relate to.
Described that way, the situation may sound quite dramatic, and that might be just about
how it is in the eye of these technologists from their outlook on the potential for digital data
sharing and transactions. While the counterfactual above is based on a parallel with the physical
world as opposed to the digital world itself, it still is enlightening in that any entities moving
around and interacting within computer systems and networks are patterns of digital data and
vice versa, just like human beings move around and interact in the physical world of human
societies. Furthermore, I do not mean to suggest with that counterfactual that without a digital
identity-enabling framework, without digital identity infrastructure, no personal information
currently exists or can be recorded on the Internet (i.e., in digital form) about the end user, that
there is no way for Web services to assemble or to discover the identity of the user they are
dealing with (whatever identity entails in their context.) However, the existing processes and
patterns are neither streamlined nor secure. They lack of a common framework applicable to the
Internet as a whole. While every Web service may set up a sign-up mechanism that will provide
the users with an identifier/username and a password, one may note, first, that their utility to
protect valuable assets is critically limited (there is a reason why banks do not let their customers
access their bank account online in the manner they do their email account), and second the lack
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of common framework prevents the data to be transmitted still in understandable format from a
system to another.
The claim that without identifiable structure the data is just an indiscernible flow of
zeroes and ones may have been overstated.102 Such claim suggests that it might even be
impossible, certainly not practical, to see meaningful data patterns. How can one see patterns in
the flow of data if there is no clear attributable source and no (meta-) structure to help figure out
what this chunk of zeroes and ones are intended for as opposed to the next chunk? Arguably,
there are pointers of data source and destination such as IP addresses and other control data103
embedded in the data packets which could enable adding some value to the plain data stream.
However, data moves around ultimately on behalf of human beings, and not being able to record
and organize any identifiable information about the user and his or her intentions, the value that
can be gotten out of that processing and exchanging of data will be much less significant.
The technologists seem to agree that the fact of not having digital identity technology
drastically limits what could be achieved through computer networking, and that the cost of
doing it without such technology (assuming this is possible at all) is so high that it becomes a
substantial waste of opportunity in an increasingly digital data-intensive environment – a waste
that demands to be fixed.

102

The packets in every stream of user data or payload is affixed with headers and footers (control data or overheads) as
they go down the layers of the TCP/IP stack from and back up to the applications layer. As a result the data is
structured as far as computer devices are concerned but from identity standpoint, the data may need further structure for
human and meaningful usage in human identity-related functions and transactions.
103 Another piece of control data apart from the IP address is the media access control sub-layer address also known as
MAC address which identifies the computing device.

296
6.2.3

A tentative timeline

As rightfully noted by one of the interviewees and expert contacts during this investigation, the
need for identity systems is not particular to the Internet; “it exists across all media.” He added:
IdM [identity management] systems exist and will continue to evolve. New ones will emerge. IdM systems
are a distributed, autonomous global phenomenon. [What is currently needed is] to facilitate more
interoperable IdM systems… [Res_J 2011]

In effect, as we have seen in previous chapters different technologies and media have historically
raised the problem of the identity of all entities that can act or conduct some form of transaction
using those media. In order to address the problem specific and different solutions are produced
based on the capabilities the technology at hand affords.
That being acknowledged, the focus of this investigation is on how the same challenge is
being dealt with in open TCP/IP networks as epitomized by the Internet, after two decades of use
by the broad public and availability to commerce without any consistent protocols for user
identification. The latest iteration of efforts to solve the identity problem in this global medium
would have started a little more than a decade ago:
Identity [in this context] is an umbrella term that was coined in the late nineties. Actually I do believe that
Microsoft started that; they called it Network Identity in the late nineties when they were pursuing
something called Passport. And then in 2001 a light goes off called Liberty Alliance. Actually I believe they
introduced the term “digital identity.” Certainly it became popular around that time. [Brands_2010]

Within that timeframe, I put further the emphasis on the latest surge of industrious activities that
led to a new generation of protocols, which I locate around 2004-2005 when the talk of “usercentric identity” started moving from conference hallways to the main stage [Res_M].
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While there had been a number of individual or isolated efforts on the issue of digital
identity before 2005, that year seems to mark a turn opening a period where identity concern in
computer networks regained momentum particularly in the related US-based industry. One of my
interlocutors involved in state government work around 2001-2002 recalled how often in his
professional conversations then identity would come up as a challenge to the management of
information flows in computer networks, be it the identity of people or that of things such as
vehicles (e.g., car titling) etc.
Forums such as the Digital ID World conference, which launched in October 2002,
particularly focused on identity within organizations. However, informal talks begun then about
personal or user identity at large [Res_M]. It was a time that saw the early trial of various URLbased identity systems (i.e., using a website address as user identifier) while opening the
discussions about token-based systems. Following that gestation period, the first Internet Identity
Workshop was organized in May 2005 in Berkeley, California.
Later in August that year at a different event, Dick Hardt, an entrepreneur in the field,
delivered a keynote presentation104 on what he then called “Identity 2.0” focusing on user-centric
identity while attempting to sketch out the recent history of Internet-based identity
technologies.105 As is often the case, the pair of username and password commonly used for
authentication online is both the start and the problem in this story. Being able to provide the
appropriate pair of logins only proves that an individual is a directory entry, to use the

104 “Identity 2.0” keynote address at the O’Reilly Open Source Convention (OSCON 2005.) The presentation used to be
available at http://identity20.com/media/OSCON2005/
105 This first proposed historical outline was then extended in the author’s sequel presentation at ETech 2006 “Who Is
the Dick on My Site?” (Hardt_2006) which used to be available at http://identity20.com/media/ETECH_2006/
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presenter’s words, which he characterized as the gist of “identity 1.0” and described in the
following terms:
It’s directory-centric, it’s an opaque trust decision, there’s a single authority, there’s no credential choice,
it’s not portable, it’s all in a silo. (Hardt_2005)

In the periodization offered by Hardt, the identity 1.0 paradigm developed during the
1980’s. It was dominated by X.500 directory services standardized at the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Standard Organization (ISO), and the
Directory Access Protocol (DAP) which was rather heavy due to very detailed features. In that
model, identity verification simply requires to demonstrate to the system that one has knowledge
of certain information which is pre-recorded in the system. In other words, ascertaining identity
is completed through a test whereby the subject shows that he or she is in possession of some
information which, it is assumed, only the rightful subject would have. That test takes place
when the subject presents herself to the system, one way or the other. It is in fact only an
authentication test that pulls or activates the user’s identity, which is made of all the data the
system has gathered and stored about the user.
Verified digital identity is not anything you can give to the site, but it’s what a website knows about you.
(Hardt_2005)

In that sense, there is no portability: the user has no ownership of identity and cannot leverage it
for further transactions away from the site where it is built. As the presenter elaborates, there is
no way for the user to move her eBay reputation score over to Amazon.com or her purchase
history from the latter over to Barnes & Noble’s web site or to her favorite book club’s site.
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The next decade allegedly tilted the balance in the opposite direction. It brought the
revenge of what the digital identity entrepreneur calls the “KISS crowd” (KISS for ‘Keep It
Simple and Stupid’) which provided the lightweight version of DAP, the standardization of
which was championed by the Netscape company at IETF. The result was a number of iterations
of LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol.) Based on that standard, Microsoft was able
to build Active Directory service and came up with Passport for consumers. [Hardt_2006]
According to Stefan Brands the same decade was driven by a great deal of efforts and
enthusiasm about strong cryptographic techniques, namely with the public key infrastructure
(PKI) and smart cards. It wasn’t until late in the decade that PKI started receding to the back
seat.
In the late nineties, PKI was widely declared dead… PKI certificates… it’s one particular way to issue
statements. Particularly what was called an identity certificate – who are you? – and this was standardized
through a very long process. And ultimately, the biggest adoption there is SSL106 certificate, which was just
a tiny niche of the overall space of applications where it could be used. In the late nineties actually, the
industry started pursuing something called Attribute Certificates which was intended to solve the data
sharing problem on top of the identity or identification problem. [Brands_2010]

In the meantime, proliferation of applications and corporate acquisitions created the need
to operate or virtually merge multiple directory services, which requires meta-directory and
virtual directory technology (still domain-centric models.) Ultimately, federation was the answer
to the need to enable the management of resources shared across multiple domains, which is
“identity 1.5” in Hardt’s grading. SAML107 was the key piece of that identity framework, which

106

Security Socket Layer is a protocol for encrypting information transmitted over the Internet.
Security Assertion Markup Language was the alternative adopted by Liberty Alliance and implemented with
Shibboleth, a digital identity solution for education institutions.
107
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creates a common token to move between domains and requires trust between sites. Eventually,
federation emerged in the early years 2000 as a model for the management of identity data flows.

6.3 Design and architecture
In this section, I propose to learn about basic identity management models and the design
principles derived from the goal of building a digital identity infrastructure and systems centered
on the user.
6.3.1

Two models for managing identity across domains

If federation is the first step away from the “identity silo” model, with the result or maybe sideeffect to reduce the login burden for the user, the user-centric model will be the second one, with
the aim to put identity credentials squarely in the hands of the user.
Federation identity
In the digital identity context, federation is a group of organizations running similar or
compatible identity systems insofar as their respective systems and domains recognize each
other’s credentials: a legitimate user authenticated on one of the systems need not authenticate
again on any one of the member organizations’ system before they have protected access as
appropriate.
Another expert appears to corroborate the same view regarding the timing of the
emergence of federated systems. He describes Microsoft Passport as the first attempt at identity
federation solution for the users, albeit a “monolithic federation” [Res_G]. Actually launched in
1999, Microsoft Passport was “a single-sign-in and wallet service for communication and
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commerce on the Internet.”108 The challenge was mainly twofold: other commercial entities had
to rely on Microsoft for identity transactions with their (prospective) customers, and privacy
concerns regarding the company’s access and handling of the user’s data. In reaction and as a
counter-weight to Microsoft’s Passport, Liberty Alliance emerged in late 2001 with the goal to
realize a fully federated (and distributed) model of identity management based on open identity
standards for strong authentication.109
Federation however only expands the boundaries of the domain where the identity
solutions are applicable, with the size of the federation depending on business decisions made by
the member organizations. The model doesn’t change much the equation for the user; it does not
scale up based on the user needs.
In a closed environment, say, Identity Management for all employees in a single company domain, a backend-centric identity solution may be just fine. [Brands_2010]

What about the open Internet and the end user at large? That approach does not offer an identity
solution to the user, but only a solution to organizations for streamlining their identity
management processes and maybe reducing maintenance and transaction costs. It does not bring
a solution that might enable the users to go about their own identity-bound business around the
Internet. Outside work transactions, the user is left with very little option in terms of using and
managing their digital identity.
…The user has no choice for their identity provider, which is actually okay in a work persona because
you’re acting on behalf of the enterprise, so of course they should be able to control that. But what about
your other personas? You know, what if you work on your retirement plan, your 401K, your health plan?
108

See http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/1999/10-11passport.mspx
Liberty Alliance is a consortium of companies and other stakeholders forming a “standard organization with a global
membership.” See http://www.projectliberty.org/
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Do you want your identity provider to be your employer? Who’s liable? What if something bad happens?…
[Hardt_2006]

In some ways however, federation is considered to be a first step in the recognition of
identity as a platform service, at the infrastructure level [Brands_2010], for it takes identity
management out of the silo where it was confined by involving more parties and enabling more
transactions. But there is a need for further steps. It appears that in order to leverage identity
management solutions for addressing user needs across the Internet, the model and mechanisms
of those solutions will have to be centered on the user.
In case of a single infrastructure that anyone can use in the online world, user-centric identity is the only
scalable approach – federated IdM [identity management] a la the Liberty Alliance work does not scale,
and has many privacy and security (vis-à-vis insider) problems. [Brands_2010]

The insistence on the need to provide an appropriate solution whereby the user will be able to
take their identity with them wherever they need to will lead to advocating for user-centric
identity.
User-centric identity
This phrasal designation might have been inspired by the difference noted between online
and off-line identity models and practices. While the online practices generate a “silo model” of
identity verification/management (your identity is “what the website knows about you” which it
keeps for itself), in the physical world one practically owns one’s identity credentials and can
carry them around to use as needed, wherever needed. In other words, the portability of the
identity assertions via credentials, and thus the availability of the latter to the extent needed by
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the user for identity transactions,, is the cardinal goal as well as the main empirical indicator of
the user-centric model.

Figure 66-4: User-centric identity transaction matrix

A central claim of the user
user-centric
centric model therefore is that digital identity has to shift from
the one-to-one
one silo model (or from the federated ‘one-to-many’ model where the “many” is just a
larger “one,” pre-arranged
arranged by mutually agreeing parties) to a truly ‘one-to-many’
many’ model where
the identity provider and the relying party in a transaction may be completely unrelated.
unrelated These
do not need to have a pre-defined
defined or pre
pre-arranged relationship; they may be loosely
osely coupled or
completely independent. I represent that model with a diagram I call the identity transaction
matrix for user-centric identity (Fig. 77-4). The matrix displays the three roles or logical functions
in an identity-based transaction derived fr
from experience in the physical world:
-

Identity subject: the human
man individual whose identity needs to be verified (this entity is
also called ‘User’ particularly in the Internet context)
context);

-

Identity provider:: the entity that issues identity credentials to identity
tity subjects;
subjects
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-

Identity verifier often referred to in the current digital identity design context also as
Relying party: the entity that requires proof of identity or identity verification in the
current instance of transaction.
To explain user-centric identity, one of the experts has provided a very instructive

metaphor: a model of identity management is as user-centric as a car is driver-centric.
We all think of cars as driver-centric: a car doesn’t do anything that you don’t instruct it to do. But there
are identity systems which are just like having a robot driving your car. ...Or better yet, that would be like a
bus system or train system, right? Those systems, someone else is doing the driving. You’re getting some
place you wanna go but you’re doing it on a system designed by others, that’s being operated by others, for
which the pathways are limited. Whereas when you put yourself… when you are the driver of the car, you
go where you wanna go. It doesn’t mean there aren’t speed limits and, you know, and roads, and other...
other natural limits. You have the maximum degrees of choice. And no one else is coercing you into, uh,
where you can go. [Res_E 2010]

Another analogy is that of “neighborhood watch,” for user-centric identity “empowers
people so that they can recognize what looks odd.” This participant notes that it would be more
practical and effective to adopt a user-centric approach for a global and interoperable digital
identity system. In a world where every day several entities move billions of dollars each through
identity transactions, it is too cumbersome to create a system of enforceable obligations. He
rather sees the “neighborhood watch” approach as the only practical way to avoid that burden
while enabling identity transactions.
My mom has to be able to look out and see when something looks funny on an email, she has to be able to
say, be familiar enough with the system to say, oh that looks odd and then have a mechanism to be able to
report it in some way. And so in a sense you’re creating an immune system for the entity. So yeah user-
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centric is inevitable just in terms of the energy requirements of making the system work... and, and it’s the
right thing to do. [Res_L 2011]

In the case of this participant, user-centric identity is not so much about control over the
availability or even communication of personal data, as it is about enabling the user to detect
identity-related threats.
If people want control of data about them, that data is not just gonna be available only from them, it’s
gonna be available from the cloud generally. Because, again, everything that I’ve ever done is now data
somewhere. Or not, right? I mean, if it’s not stored somewhere then it doesn’t matter to anybody. And
everything I’ve done that is stored somewhere is potentially networkable now... [Res_L 2011]

Yet another security-related argument has been made for why user-centric would be a
better model to implement. Federated systems multiply vulnerability points while the usercentric model may narrow the attack tactics to luring the user, which admittedly brings a whole
other set of challenges in itself.
User-centric federated identity solves a lot of problems that non-user centric identity systems face. For
example, uh, non-user centric systems when they try to federate essentially end up with ways for… or
channels for fraud to occur that get closed off once the user is involved. Uh, you know, because, there is no
way for people to collude [inaudible] user doing something. … So now it’s back to ‘we have to trick the
user,’ which is always gonna be true. I mean,… in a lot of federated systems, you don’t even have to trick
the user, you just have to have a couple of colluding people at various organizations and they can do what
they need to do. So I actually think user-centric offers enough significant benefits that it’s going to
eventually be the system that we use for federating identity even between organizations. [Res_M 2011]

There are still nuances is the interpretation of the ‘user-centricity’ which is now a term
some of the players are increasing less inclined to use. Every now and then, the question of the
relationship of the subject with her personal data is raised: Does the data subject own her data as
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a property? On one end of the spectrum, there are those who think of the user as literally owning
their personal data.
At [software company], everybody understands users own their own data, that’s a principle, a norm. They
are committed to full disclosure to the user about what’s happening. They would still like to be at the center
as much as possible. As a counter measure, they now understand they should use anonymization and other
privacy-enhancing technology while being at the center. [Res_G 2011]

On the other end of the user-centric spectrum, a number of participants feel that overemphasizing the user (from their perspective) might be either counterproductive or even
misleading. It might be counterproductive because such emphasis on protecting the user might be
missing the mark when it comes to the prospect of ripping the fruits that may come out of digital
identity technology and innovations. As a result while one may agree on the principle of user
control, protecting personal data should not be in their view the primary, much less the exclusive,
way of framing the identity solution efforts for Internet transactions.
We definitely want to protect people but we also want to create incentives in the ecosystem for companies
and government to operate in a way that... people having control over their identity, ... control over their
personal data benefits everyone: you can think of it as a win-win-win scenario where governments are able
to deliver better services, to be able to protect the rights of individuals and groups, or corporations are
able to be free from onerous regulations because they’re good actors (inaudible), and have a more efficient
marketplace because people data is flowing more freely as [than?] they do now because ....(inaudible)
controlled, and individuals can participate in online life both as consumer and producer economically, and
as participant in civil society and politics. All of that, in my view, relies on an identity that has not been
given to you by someone else, purely, but one that you have the ability to control and curate… [Res_H
2010]
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Further in that direction, others think that the “centricity” of the user might be misleading
because the user does not exclusively hold the data and may not have total control over its
availability.
Is the user really truly in the center of where the data is, or are they ... is the data sitting on their finger tips
and they’re moving it out in spokes, akin to the old school centralized enterprise model? And the answer is
no. They may be... in control of where the data is moving, but they’re not sitting on the data. So instead of
using the term user-centric identity, uh, we’re gravitating towards using the term user-managed. And usermanaged identity is where the user just simply has control of where their data flow, but they’re not actually
holding it in their pocket, as happens in the spoke model. So it’s been a useful shift to move from usercentric to user-managed. [Res_F 2010]

So far, there is no legal regime that defines a form of property rights over one’s own
personal data. Due to the (non-excludability) nature of information and in the absence and
perhaps the impossibility of defining any viable form of property rights over personal data, the
data subject is no more entitled to full ownership (as with a piece of property) of personal
information than the data controller (the entity that collects and stores the data) or any third party
who gets to have access rights to the data, including the possibility to process it. Even in policy
regimes the most friendly to the rights of the data subject, such as the EU’s, those rights do not
define legal property as in the ownership of tangible goods. Only by virtue of duties of
transparency and notice required of the data controller towards data subjects, the latter are given
some control over the collection of their personal data (need for consent), the status of their
personal information (right to update) and its use. These rights afforded to the data subject are
based, I would submit, on the recognition of, and the need to protect, the individual’s autonomy,
that is, the capability and the freedom for oneself to be the author of decisions and actions
affecting one’s fundamental attributes or standing, or to consciously delegate that authority
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otherwise. Ultimately and based on the above, the legal status and qualification of the
relationship between an individual and her personal data only manifest through the consequences
of the misappropriation and misuse of the data by another entity, and the harm that might result
from that.
The fading of the term “user-centric” from the discourse of the designers may be a
symptom not only indicative of the lack of active user participation in the design deliberations,
but also signaling difficulties encountered with user adoption regarding a technology that is
designed in such a way as to raise the profile of user’s rights or capabilities.
There was no advocate for the end user; that’s the problem of the user-centricity. [Res_G 2011]
In an enlightened society, government should be advocate of the end user… we will ultimately see that.
[Idem]

We may well see that, ultimately. In the meantime however some path-dependency may set in, as
the implementation of some critical user-friendly technologies and features may be abandoned
due to lack of interest and adoption from the end user.110
Whether the phrase ‘user-centric’ or ‘user-managed’ is employed to frame the identity
management model aimed at, all the differences of view within this community of actors for now
seem to harmonize around the need to provide the user with more choice in the communication
and use of their identity data, thus more tools that allow increasing the user’s awareness of their
digital footprint. In fact, the elaboration of the design concept of identity metasystem provides a
fuller insight into the principles being assumed by way of the label ‘user-centric identity.’
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For instance in February 2011 as I was wrapping up this case study, Microsoft announced that it will no longer
support Information Card, its exemplar of user-centric identity selector: read Eve Maler’s blog at
http://blogs.forrester.com/eve_maler/11-02-24-cardspace_is_dead_long_live_back_channel_access
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6.3.2

Identity metasystem architecture

By 2005, efforts to enable future generations of digital identity solutions to interoperate across
protocols, platforms and services were well underway, as manifest in the formulation of the
design principles for the architecture of a universal identity metasystem (Microsoft 2005;
Cameron and Jones 2005). The identity metasystem does not imply the replacement and
integration of all existing identity systems into one; not even for voluntarily participating
systems. Rather, it is intended to be a “system of systems” – those in existence and future ones.
There still will be different applications and systems with which the user will register and which
will handle the maintenance of the user’s identity information. It is rather about integration at the
“meta-” level in order to enable backend compatibility and interaction (in fact, seamless
interoperation) between systems, as transactions will require. This is to ensure that there are
common meta-standards for the different identity management systems in place, the latter being
based on different protocols and technologies, so that they can communicate with one another
while providing “applications with a technology-independent representation of identities”
(Microsoft 2005: n. p.) and enabling the user to enjoy a consistent experience across systems.
Cameron and Jones (2005) use a revealing analogy to capture the end goal driving the project of
identity metasystem.
Before 1982, the networking world was fragmented. If you wanted to write a network-enabled application
you had to choose what network to write it for: Ethernet, Token Ring, Arc-Net, X.25, etc. The invention of
a Network Metasystem, the Internet Protocol (IP), changed all that. It made it possible to write networking
applications that worked across networks without knowing the particulars of each network. It even enabled
those applications to work with new networks that hadn't been invented yet, such as 802.11 wireless
networks. Digital identity is similarly fragmented today. If you want to write an identity-enabled
application, you have to choose which identity system to write it for, such as Kerberos, SAML, X.509,
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Liberty, custom username/password systems, etc. The Identity Metasystem is intended [to] change all that,
just as IP did for networking. It will make it possible to write identity-enabled applications that can work
across multiple identity systems and can even use new identity systems as they are invented and connected
to the Identity Metasystem. (Cameron and Jones 2005)

In order to do this, the stakeholders must agree upon a number of basic architectural
principles. As it turns out, following multiple and long-ranging discussions among the computer
industry and identity community participants, notably in the “blogosphere” and at conferences,111
those principles have been formulated under the title: “the 7 Laws of Identity” (Cameron 2005).
The identity metasystem is intended to be universal to the extent possible involving all potential
parties that can make use of digital identities in any ways, whether they are natural individuals or
organizational entities, government or nongovernmental, profit or nonprofit. Following is brief
exposé of those seven Laws.
1. User Control and Consent: Technical identity systems must only reveal information
identifying a user with the user’s consent.
2. Minimal Disclosure for a Constrained Use: The solution which discloses the least
amount of identifying information and best limits its use is the most stable long term
solution.
3. Justifiable Parties: Digital identity systems must be designed so the disclosure of
identifying information is limited to parties having a necessary and justifiable place in a
given identity relationship.
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See Kim Cameron’s, the Microsoft Chief Identity Architect, weblog at http://www.identityblog.com/?p=354 where
introducing the output of that process, he writes: “We have undertaken a project to develop a formal understanding of
the dynamics causing digital identity systems to succeed or fail in various contexts, expressed as the Laws of Identity.
[…] Those of us who work on or with identity systems need to obey the Laws of Identity. Otherwise, we create a wake
of reinforcing side-effects that eventually undermine all resulting technology. The result is similar to what would happen
if civil engineers were to flaunt the law of gravity. By following them we can build a unifying identity metasystem that
is widely accepted and enduring.”
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4. Directed Identity: A universal identity system must support both “omni-directional”
identifiers (same identifier usable across contexts) for use by public entities and
“unidirectional” identifiers for use by private entities, thus facilitating discovery while
preventing unnecessary release of correlation handles.
5. Pluralism of Operators and Technologies: A universal identity system must channel
and enable the inter-working of multiple identity technologies run by multiple identity
providers.
6. Human Integration: The universal identity metasystem must define the human user to
be a component of the distributed system integrated through unambiguous humanmachine communication mechanisms offering protection against identity attacks.
7. Consistent Experience across Context: The unifying identity metasystem must
guarantee its users a simple, consistent experience while enabling separation of contexts
through multiple operators and technologies.
Once those high-level principles are in place, a number of decisions or steps need to
follow for the enablement of the identity metasystem. A dozen of them are identified as follows
(Cameron and Jones 2005). First, in order for the metasystem to be able to integrate a variety of
systems interoperating between each other, it requires an encapsulating protocol capable of
handling and transmitting all different formats of identity data from any one system to any other
system. This means the encapsulating protocol is different and independent from the “identity
payload formats” and can use them all (idem, p. 7).
Second, because any identity metasystem-enabled solution must accommodate a portfolio
of different identities possible for any given user, it requires for each relevant platform some
software that will present the user with the available portfolio of identities and let him or her

312
choose one of them for the transaction at hand. That software is name the Identity Selector. “A
key decision was to implement an Identity Selector that is independent of any specific identity
provider, technology, or operator” (idem). During the transaction, the Identity Selector
establishes communication with the identity providers using standard protocols.
Third, the portfolio of identities to be presented by the Identity Selector is based on the
“Metadata Store,” which is “the store of configuration info telling the identity selector how to
contact an identity provider to obtain actual identity information” as well as the graphical
elements representing each identity. While the metadata store software may have provided for
the identity selector user interface, both are decoupled in order to enable more flexibility: the
selector can run on several devices and the metadata store can repose at any location of the user’s
choice (including in the cloud.)
For various reasons (e.g., audit), a consistent handle/designation associated with each
identity in every instance of use may be needed. The use of the same handle across instance may
not be desirable as different relying parties among themselves or both relying parties and identity
providers may collude in order to share data tracking the same user. In order to avoid that, or
minimize that possibility, different handles or identifiers may be used for different relying parties
(and possibly for different sessions.)
A design decision was to mitigate this danger by supporting the use of “unidirectional identifiers” (see Law
4) so that the identifiers given to each relying party can be distinct from the identifiers given to others. The
system is able to automatically generate pairwise identifiers for each combination of identity provider and
relying party that is used. No common URL, GUID [Global Unique Identifier], etc. is sent that could serve
as a correlation handle between sites. (Cameron and Jones 2005: 8)
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Fifth: the selector keeps a memory of what information has previously been released to a
site with the user’s consent so that the same information will readily be released to the same site
whenever requested. The expected benefit of this design decision is to remove the burden of
continuously storing, between uses, the user information with the cost of maintenance and the
risks of data loss to both relying parties and users. The sixth decision states that “the metasystem
design verifies the cryptography but leaves trust analysis for a higher layer that runs on top of the
identity metasystem” (idem, p. 8).
In the identity exchange process, it should be noted that the requirements pertaining to
the human token may be different from those pertaining to the computational token, as the
human user needs to be able to make sense of the bits that are being exchanged, in terms of
identity information, between computer systems in order to make informed decisions. This
means the identity selector should be able to display claim values in human readable language,
which is a challenge given that the claim values come in different formats and languages, none
of which the selector is necessarily meant to understand. The seventh design decision consists in
having
identity providers send claim values both in their native format and in a human-readable format (the
“display token”), with the two sets of values cryptographically bound together to allow auditing of an
identity provider either by users or by relying parties that understand the claims. (Idem, p. 8-9)

Eight, a distinction is made between auditing and non-auditing identity providers. In
effect, some transactions with a number of financial and government institutions may require an
audit log of the sites visited by a particular identity. The identity metasystem is designed in such
a way that the identity of the relying party is released to the identity providers that require
auditing while that capability is disabled for providers with no such requirement.
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The identity of a site should be proven to the user before the user is required to supply
identity information to the site. This notably addresses phishing. Microsoft, VeriSign and other
certificate authorities have joined efforts to develop a new type of stronger X.509 certificates to
that end. These are supposed to compensate for the limitations of SSL.
Tenth, in order to improve security it is important to minimize uncertainties and the
possibility of hazard. The pathway of interactions between the user and the identity metasystem
must be made “as simple, familiar, self-explanatory, and predictable as possible” (idem, p. 9).
At June 2006 “Identity Mashup” conference hosted by Harvard Law School’s Berkman
Center, leading players including Microsoft, IBM, Novell, The Higgins Project, VeriSign,
NetMesh, Cordance and Sxip agreed to set up the OSIS working group, committing to promote
the identity metasystem design principles through their respective projects and to collaborate in
order to ensure the interoperability of their different technologies (Recordon and Reed 2006).
Two years later, a call for participation112 was issued in order to form the technical committee on
identity metasystem interoperability set up at OASIS113 (not to be confused with OSIS). In July
2009, the technical committee concluded its proceedings114 with the completion of the current
version of the identity metasystem interoperability standards. The identity metasystem is built
using Web Services (WS-*) protocols, notably regarding trust (as related to the “encapsulating
protocol used for claims transformation within the metasystem,”) metadata exchange, security
and security policy (idem, p. 7). Now let us considered more closely individual releases of digital
112

See http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/tc-announce/200808/msg00004.html
Founded in 1993, this industry consortium was initially called “SGML Open” dedicated to promoting interoperability
across products based on the Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML). It became OASIS (Organization for the
Advancement of Structured Information Standards) in 1998, reflecting the broadening of their mission scope.
Nowadays, the banner on their website (http://www.oasis-open.org/org) reads “OASIS Advancing open standards for
the information society,” marking an inflection towards open standards (see ‘About Us’ at http://www.oasisopen.org/org).
114 See http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/v1.0/identity.html
113
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identity technology so as to exhibit the emerging functionalities it may afford and deepen our
understanding of this technology.

6.4 Description of digital identity technology cases
I am now going to expound a number of specific software technologies or applications that have
emerged over the last few years as instances of digital identity technology and detail as well as
analyze their features and specifications. This is meant to provide the reader with awareness and
understanding of the technological capabilities available so far or in the process of being
implemented. In that sense, whether these technologies have been rolled out or whether their
originator has stopped supporting them (such as in the case of Microsoft with the information
card), it still is relevant to understand them and the potential they make available to date, as their
capabilities are still out there for developers to build on.115 Furthermore, this investigation having
been historically framed, it is critical to document every notable output of the processes at work
and the social actors involved, whether those outputs eventually prevail or are abandoned. For by
providing a well-documented backdrop with the full range of capabilities and options that were
once available, they will help better understand the ultimate solutions that will be retained – and
why those solutions have prevailed.
6.4.1

CardSpace and Information Cards

Windows CardSpace (initially referred to by the code name InfoCard) has been the main
implementation of Microsoft’s broader project or ambition to create an identity metasystem as a
unified, secure and interoperable identity layer to the Internet. It is a technology that enables
115

As an indication of this, the fact that Microsoft has decided not to ship the next iteration of the information card
technology did not necessarily cause the dissolution of the Information Card Foundation which still is about promoting
that technology and its underlying design principles.
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users to store and manage various digital identities which they can use to communicate claims
and assertions about themselves in order to complete any relevant transaction online. During
transactions on enabled sites, when the user is requested to provide personally identifiable
information, the CardSpace takes over with a pop-up window providing the user with options of
digital identities or virtual information cards to choose from (each card represents an identity.)
CardSpace is also called identity selector. It includes the CardSpace store (where the information
cards are stored) and a complete self-issued identity provider which enables the user to run his or
her own identity provider service for basic claims that do not need a third-party assurance.
CardSpace has been designed for use on any machine running any operating system and
to operate across systems. It uses any form of security tokens. Security tokens are an important
notion in the area of digital identity and they are used in all related technologies. They are meant
to convey the assertion that is being made along with a form of proof regarding the validation of
that assertion or claim.
[W]hen transmitted on the network, every digital identity is represented by some kind of security token. A
security token is just a set of bytes that expresses information about a digital identity. … With most security
tokens, some information is provided in order to prove that these claims really do belong to the user who's
presenting them. One simple (and currently very common) way to do this is to send a password along with
the claims. A more powerful approach is to digitally sign all or part of the claims by using a private key,
and then provide the corresponding public key, perhaps wrapped in a certificate.116 (Chappell 2006: para.
10)

In fact, all Internet users are familiar with security tokens, just in one particular form.
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From this point on, the description, based on the then beta release of CardSpace, mainly draws on Chappell’s
“Introducing Windows CardSpace” retrieved from http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa480189.aspx, which is
the source of all the quotes in this section. I will therefore only specify the paragraph number for the quotes, as it is an
HTML text.
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The most common kind of security token on the Internet today is just a username. The most common way
to prove that a username is really yours is by providing the password associated with it. (para. 29)

While none of the traditional formats of a security token (i.e., username or any text string,
X.509 certificates and Kerboros tickets) is designed to allow for the transmission of any random
claim, SAML now provides the capability to generate security tokens that include any claims as
needed. This makes it possible not to confine identity information to any arbitrarily preset
attributes as was traditionally the case, but to open the field of what claims or assertions may be
included in digital identity.
Even though they're called "digital identities," there's no requirement that they must contain any
information at all that can actually be used to identify a particular user. For many uses, all that's needed is a
way to assert a claim, such as being 21 or older, that's backed up by a trusted authority. (para. 51)

CardSpace can handle not only the traditional token formats mentioned above but also
SAML tokens or any other format. And yet, the user is spared the needless complexity stemming
from that variety of security token formats through a graphic interface that is stable and intuitive
(consistent with the user’s experience of the appearance of a card), thus making the process more
intuitive for the user.
In a typical online transaction involving the user, a relying party and an identity provider,
the user interacts with the relying party’s website or application (web server) through a web
browser. Using the appropriate protocols (HTML, HTTPS, SSL, and WS-* protocols), the clientside application (browser) discovers from the relying party’s policy statement what the security
token requirements are in order for the requested transaction to be carried out. The browser then
passes on the requirements information to CardSpace which then requires the proper token from
a qualified identity provider. Finally, CardSpace receives a digitally signed token containing the
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values for the set of claims requested, hands it over to the browser which transmits it to the
relying party (Chappell 2006).
As to how the information cards are actually installed, first, it is up to each identity
provider to settle on the mechanism through which the cards will be delivered to the user,
depending on what is the most appropriate in the current context.
However it's acquired, each card (even one created by the self-issued identity provider) is digitally signed
by the identity provider that issued it, and it comes with the identity provider's certificate. This signature is
used to verify the identity of the identity provider itself. Once the card is on the user's machine, doubleclicking it brings up a screen that allows the user to install this card into the standard CardSpace store. This
is also when the user must approve the identity provider as a source for security tokens, as described earlier
(although this approval isn't required for information cards created by the self-issued identity provider).
Once the user has done this, the card can be used to request security tokens. (para. 55)

By default, the identity of the relying party is not revealed to the identity provider in
order to protect the user’s privacy (just as the stores or services where one uses a governmentissued physical credential are not communicated to the government.) However, this may be
required by some identity providers and it is up to the user to accept such policy depending on
their need for enrolling with that provider. There is no sensitive data included in the information
card and as a result, such data is never stored on the user’s device for the purpose of operating
CardSpace, but remains with the identity provider.
As an additional protection, the user may add a personal identification number (PIN) to
be required before a card can be used. Apart from PIN, some identity providers may also ask for
a password or a smart card at every instance of use. A stolen card for instance cannot be used
without that additional secret or the smart card which must be in the possession of the legitimate
user. Additionally,
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CardSpace creates a private Windows desktop for the identity selection screen that lets users choose a card.
This is similar to the mechanism used to isolate the Windows login screen, and it prevents attacks by other
locally-running processes. (para. 27)

In order to enable roaming, it was planned to augment the CardSpace package with a
portable USB-based device in order to enable the installation of CardSpace as well as a complete
self-issued identity provider in mobile conditions. Following are a few examples of use cases.
Rather than authenticating users with passwords, a relying party such as a website might instead
authenticate users with security tokens. For example, a company providing a family of websites might also
offer an identity provider, running on some machine and accessible from any client, that is capable of
issuing tokens that are accepted by all of the sites in that family. This approach minimizes the use of
passwords, and it's certainly an option that can be used with CardSpace. Still, it's applicable only for a
specific set of sites, since there's no single identity provider that all websites would accept in order to issue
security tokens. (para. 31)

As Chappell recognizes, the constraint resides in the fact that there is no third-party entity that is
commonly accepted as legitimate, authoritative, competent or whatever is required in order for it
to be accepted as issuer of security tokens on any random website.
There are many more examples of how Windows CardSpace and the identity metasystem might be used. A
provider of mobile phone service might offer an information card that its subscribers can use to charge
online purchases to their phone bill. An employer might give its employees multiple digital identities, each
with its own information card, for use on the company network. One identity could be used for normal
access, while another, perhaps stripped of everything other than the fact that this person is an employee,
might exist solely for the purpose of making anonymous suggestions to company management. Just as
identities in the real world carry different information and are used for different purposes, digital identities
can also be used in a variety of ways. The goal of CardSpace and the identity metasystem is to make this
broad use possible. (para. 52)
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The phishing problem requires further actions, since through graphical manipulations
users may be lured into directly giving away sensible information other than an Internet
account’s password, for instance a credit card number on the wrong website. This is the identity
problem applied to the website. In addition to the easiness to confuse the user with the graphical
appearance of a website, both authentic and imposter sites “can even use SSL to secure the
communication, since phishers can acquire certificates just like anybody else.” (para. 39)
Today, a website typically proves its identity with the certificate used for SSL communication. This is
better than nothing, but SSL certificates actually prove only that a given site has a particular DNS name.
There's no assurance that this DNS name corresponds to the information displayed on that site. A phisher
might use a certificate issued for a DNS name that he owns, for example, to secure communication with a
site that's been carefully crafted to look just like your bank. (para. 41)

Microsoft and other players in the industry have been seeking a certification solution of a higher
level of assurance. “This higher-assurance certificate will also be a more authoritative source of
information because it’s more difficult to get, requiring a stronger agreement with the authority
that issues it.” (para. 42)
6.4.2 U-Prove
U-Prove is a cryptographic technology that makes use of digital credentials in order to help
prove attributes or assertions in the context of identity and access management.
Digital Credentials are basic cryptographic constructs, much like digital signatures but much more
powerful. They are issued to applicants by trusted parties, referred to as Credential Authorities. Each
Credential Authority has its own key pair for digitally signing messages. When issuing a Digital Credential
to Alice, the issuing Credential Authority through its own digital signature binds one or more attributes to a
Digital Credential public key, the secret key of which only Alice should know. The whole package that
Alice receives is called a Digital Credential…” (Brands 2002)
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U-Prove tokens are data devices117 serving to carry digital credentials around and to present them
either individually or in bundle. In this particular context, credentials are pieces of information
such as identity attributes or assertions, which are signed by an entity that supposedly is to be
trusted to provide accurate identity information. As such, they enable making and verifying
identity-related claims.
In what ways are digital credentials more powerful than digital signatures118? Elsewhere,
we read that digital credentials are “much like digital signatures and equally efficient, but with
much greater functionality” (Brands 2004: 3). Arguably, the value proposition of U-Prove
technology is to tap into the greater strength of digital credential – as opposed to mere digital
signatures – in order to build an identity management solution that is centered on user choices
and reconciles the traditional tension between security and privacy.
U-Prove is an innovative cryptographic technology that enables the issuance and presentation of
cryptographically protected statements in a manner that provides what is known as “multi-party security:”
issuing organizations, users, and relying parties can protect themselves not just against outsider attacks but
also against attacks originating from each other. (Brands 2010)

The whole of the token is signed by the Issuer applying its private key. This signature
ensures the authenticity of the token. It assures of two things: first, the exact entity that issued the
token and second, that the token’s content has not been tempered with.
•

Each U-Prove Token consists of one or more attributes (which can represent any kind of information), a
unique public key for the User of the token, and a digital signature of the Issuer on the token contents.

117

For this point on, I’ll refer to digital devices since the primary focus here is identity on the Internet; however, UProve tokens may be embedded in physical devices, too. As of 2007, the type of tokens made with U-Prove technology
was trademarked as ‘ID Token’ by Credentica Inc. (Credentica 2007). However, Microsoft has acquired the technology
since 2008 and the term ‘U-Prove token’ is more frequently used instead.
118 You may refer to Appendix D for an explanation of how digital signatures work.
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•

Each U-Prove Token public key corresponds to a private key that is known only to the token's User; it must
be applied in order to perform the presentation protocol.119

The sequences of digits that make up the public key and the signature can each time be
randomized during the exchange in such a way that the Issuer cannot know which User receives
which sequences, while at the same time the User (who can perform the randomization and
“blind” the credential’s public key as well as the Issuer’s signature) cannot however alter any of
the attributes encoded by the Issuer into the digital credential or the token (Brands 2004).
The basic roles of user-centric identity as we’ve seen, namely the Issuing Party, the
Identity Subject (User) and the Relying Party, become in the context of U-Prove the Issuer, the
Prover (User) and the Verifier, respectively. The issuance and the presentation of U-Prove tokens
follow specific protocols.
The issuance protocol enables taking in the information to be encoded into the token and
applies a cryptographically original signature algorithm.120 The presentation protocol enables the
transmission of a number of elements to the Verifier. These include the token attributes, the
Issuer’s signature, the Prover’s token-specific public key, and her response to the presentation
challenge obtained by applying the token-specific private key to the presentation challenge,
which is proof that the Prover was in possession of that private key without revealing it.
Upon presentation of a token, a transcript may be generated showing the execution of the
presentation protocol between the Prover and the Verifier. Such transcript is “a cryptographic
proof that the presented U-Prove token, including the disclosed attributes, was presented by a

119

See http://www.credentica.com/unique_features.html (as of 02/01/2012)
This signature is different from the traditional DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) standard for digital signatures and
from the RSA algorithm for public-key cryptography.

120
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party knowing its private key” (Brands 2010: 9). As it is unforgeable even by the Verifier and the
Issuer working in collusion, this transcript is an important piece of the audit log and can be
verified by anyone at a later time. Furthermore, Prover and Verifier may add a presentation
message to the transcript which may include relevant information with regard to the application
or transaction at hand. In addition to presenting a U-Prove token as an identity token to a Verifier
(thus in an interactive mode), one may also use the token to digitally sign any sort of data such as
documents, web form, etc. (a more unilateral mode of use.)
The U-Prove tokens may be transient or long-lived. In the former case, it is issued on
demand during and for a specific transaction only.
Transient ID Tokens [U-Prove tokens] must be obtained from their Issuer on demand while interacting with
a Verifier and can be used only with that particular Verifier for the duration of the session. Long-lived ID
Tokens are stored by their Users upon issuance and can be used arbitrarily many times until they expire or
are revoked, unless limitation measures are taken at issuing and/or presentation time. (Credentica 2007: 1).

Each U-Prove token bears a random token identifier. The latter is “computed as a
cryptographically secure hash of the U-Prove token’s public key and the Issuer’s signature”
(Paquin 2011: 9). As a result, the identifier is universally unique. This furthers management
capabilities relating, for instance, to the token’s lifecycle, revocation and several other functions.
However, it is up to the Prover to choose repeatedly using the same token with the same Verifier
enabling a continuous relationship, or using different tokens for different transactions so as to
avoid any tracking and minimize also the prospects of identity theft.
In addition to the information encoded by the Issuer, the User may further “encode
application-specific attribute information into User Extension field” before presentation” (idem,
p. 5). However at presentation, the User has (in addition to the selective disclosure feature) the
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ability to conceal any subset of additional information encoded by the Issuer. As a result, while
the additional information encoded by the User for the purposes of the transaction at hand will be
disclosed to the Verifier at token presentation, it may be hidden from the Issuer so that he cannot
perform any correlation between the presented token and its issuance.
The type of information the User may encode into the token includes human readable
attributes or an encryption key. The possibility for the User to intervene in the encryption of the
token between the Issuer and the Verifier is useful on at least two accounts: it makes it possible
for the User to add transaction-specific or ad hoc information that may be needed which was not
disclosed or stored with the Issuer (or which the Issuer needs not to be aware of,) and to include
an encryption of the Verifier nonces121 so as to “prevent Verifiers from covertly encoding
messages for the Issuer into them” (Paquin 2011: 15), while preventing these nonces from
serving as correlation handles.
One main aspect of U-Prove is to seek to reconcile the traditional tension between
security and privacy. The features enabling stronger privacy than usually seen in identity design
cases include the properties of untraceability, unlinkability and selective disclosure.
Additionally, the ability for the User to supplement and edit information as needed or as
desirable through the token’s information field further contributes to making this technology
user-friendly or “user-centric.”
Instances of use cannot be linked in that for each and every piece of data they handle or
have access to, no participant in the chain of disclosure can aggregate the information and
reconstitute the identity of the User. This unlinkability feature makes this technology dossier-

121

“A nonce is a random number, the concatenation of Bob’s name and a counter, or any other fresh data provided by
Bob.” (Brands 2004: 4)
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resistant while still allowing for accountability. As designed, U-Prove tokens are also inherently
untraceable, for they exclude any handles that may enable a statistical correlation between
issuance and use. Verifiers can only see, and make inferences from, the disclosed attributes at
token presentation as well as from “any application-specific attributes that may have been
encoded into the token information fields” by the User (idem, p. 11). While anonymous and
pseudonymous uses may also be securely accommodated in this technology, they are not
necessary in order to ensure that identity transaction flows are not traceable.
This untraceability property holds unconditionally in the following sense: the Issuer and all Verifiers
cannot learn even a single bit of information beyond what can be inferred from the disclosed attributes in
presented U-Prove tokens, even if they would collude from the outset (indeed, they may be the same entity)
and would have unlimited computing time and resources at their disposal in a coordinated attempt to (1)
build cryptographic backdoors into the Issuer parameters, (2) strategically deviate from the U-Prove token
protocols, and (3) analyze the resulting protocol data flows. In other words, each Prover need merely trust
the proper behavior of his or her own computing device. (Brands 2010: 11 and Paquin 2011: 12)

As to the security aspects, this protocol is designed with a view to protecting the tokens
against unauthorized uses. Following are baseline protections that are built into this technology
while more security measures can be enabled depending on the application.
•

Integrity and source authenticity: Each issued U-Prove token contains an unforgeable digital signature of its
Issuer on the entire contents, created by the Issuer by applying its private key. The Issuer’s signature serves
as its authenticity mark on the U-Prove token; it enables anyone to verify that the U-Prove token was issued
by the Issuer and that its contents have not been altered.

•

Replay attack prevention: Each issued U-Prove token also contains a token-specific public key that is
known only to the Prover. The Prover randomly generates it during the issuance protocol, together with a
corresponding private key for the U-Prove token. In contrast to the token’s public key, this private key is
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not part of the U-Prove token; the Prover never discloses it when using the U-Prove token. (Brands 2010:
5-6)

There may be further security measures pertaining to either software or hardware. There
are software capabilities to revoke tokens or users and to prevent reuse as well as the transferring
of tokens to other entities. Transferring of U-Prove tokens to another user is discouraged. One
way this technology enables doing that is that the cryptographic design of its protocols requires
that for any bit of encoded information to be used, the alleged Prover has to know the values of
all attribute fields, whether they are required by the current transaction or not. One intuitive
method suggested for discouraging the transferring of U-Prove tokens is to encode into the
attribute fields some information that the Prover has a high or significant stake at keeping
private, such as a credit card number. Additional measures will need to be taken in order to deter
User from impersonating others by misappropriating their tokens, or from giving copy of their
own tokens to others.
A token or a particular user may be revoked. This may be accomplished by blacklisting
the universally unique identifier of the token or the targeted user (for instance, if he or she has
abused the system.) The User can also self-revoke a token. When traceability is not an issue, the
Issuer may also encode into the token information field of each token a value that is unique
either to the token itself (much like the token identifier) or to the Prover. That value can then be
blacklisted (the same way as the token identifier would.) Verifiers may also resort to requiring
new on-demand (short-lived) tokens. It is also possible with this technology for the Issuer and
the Verifiers to revoke long-lived tokens despite the fact that they are unlinkable and
untraceable.
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It is necessary to prevent a token from being re-used. The number of uses can be limited
for both short- and long-lived tokens by keeping track of the number of presentations.
Particularly with long-lived tokens potentially dealing with a variety of Verifiers that cannot be
specified upfront, the Verifier will be able to perform a real time lookup of a database that
records the number of times a token has been presented (the database need not to include
information about where or by whom the token has been presented, that is, to whom it has been
issued.) Furthermore, the “U-Prove technology also allows long-lived U-Prove tokens to be
issued in such a manner that they can be traced if and only if they are used more times than
allowed” (Brands 2010: 15).
Hardware-level measures are another set of security options. One may consist of splitting
the private key of each token between the User’s terminal and a trusted computing device which
may provide, for instance, biometric access control. The trusted device may be set up so as to
resist any unauthorized use or manipulation of the relevant tokens by the User or another party to
the identity transaction. In addition the trusted device may include features that enhance the
software-based security spelled out above.
Furthermore, the trusted device could enable dynamic policy enforcement locally through
an application-specific message included in the Verifier’s challenge – which will prove to be
necessary anyway if the trusted device (designated bellow by “Device” with capital D) is used
for a variety of tokens with different security characteristics.
In a Device message a Verifier can specify, for example, a security policy, some of the data transmitted by
the Prover, (e.g., attribute information encoded into the U-Prove token), U-Prove token protection
characteristics (encoded, e.g., in the Token information field), and Verifier-specific information (e.g., the
Verifier’s identity). The Device can inspect this data to make a policy decision as to whether or not to assist
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the Prover in using the U-Prove token. In case of non-compliance, the Device could enter into suspension
mode. (Paquin 2011: 19; see also Credentica 2007: 9)

The trusted device may also be used to keep record of the details of the tokens and relevant
activities for audit purposes. It would overall improve security as opposed to relying totally on
the User’s terminal.
6.4.3 OpenID
The origin of the OpenID authentication protocol goes back to mid-2005 (Recordon and Reed
2006). Since then, individuals and small enterprises have collaborated to improve the original
protocol. Particularly, starting from 2007 this protocol has picked up momentum and
progressively gained the support of the industry with corporation such as Symantec, Microsoft,
AOL, Sun Microsystems, Yahoo!, MySpace, PayPal and Facebook, to name the most known,
many of them accepting OpenID credentials and some of them becoming OpenID providers.
However, it has also had its critics due to limitations in security.
OpenID122 is a lightweight and decentralized authentication mechanism, one of the first
to outsource login credentials (username and password) to a third party, that is, another website.
It helps with the management of multiple usernames and passwords and with reducing the
number of sign-on requests that the user has to submit to. Here is the characterization given of
OpenID by the General Services Administration’s (GSA) Office of Governmentwide Policy
(OGP), responsible for the coordination and oversight of the government-wide Identity,
Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) initiative:

122

Unless otherwise cited, I have largely consulted the following websites in order to provide this description of the
protocol: http://openid.net/ and the ‘OpenID’ article in the Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org. See also
http://openidexplained.com/
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OpenID 2.0 [the latest version of the protocol] authentication provides a way to prove that an end user
controls an Identifier. It does this without the RP needing access to end user credentials such as a password
or other sensitive information such as an email address. Implementation-wise, OpenID is a set of protocol
specifications that facilitate portable identity through the most open set of specifications and technologies
possible. (ICAM 2009: 7)

The user may register their identity details including a username and a password among
other relevant attributes with an OpenID provider chosen from a list of available providers. The
user may register more than one identity with different providers, as he or she wishes (but then
again, registering as many OpenID identities as one might have password-based logins would
defeat the very purpose of OpenID). It is a DNS-based identity mechanism in that the
registration creates an identity URL123 of such form as
http://myusername.myopenidprovider.com/, assuming ‘myopenidprovider.com’ is the provider
with whom the user registered for an OpenID (more precisely its domain name), where the user
can log in in order to enable an identity exchange with another site. Typically, logging in enables
the OpenID provider to confirm to the third party (the web site or service the user is trying to
access, a.k.a. the Relying Party) that the user is who/what he or she claims to be as well as to
forward, upon the user’s approval, specific attributes that the third party may request.
One possible – perhaps the most likely – way the OpenID flow goes is that the need for
identification or for logging in occurs while the user is browsing the OpenID-enabled website of
the RP. The user will then chose the OpenID as opposed to, say, the password-based logins mode
(there may be other options, possibly) by typing in his or her OpenID, e.g.,

123 Actually, the OpenID identifier is more generally a URI (Hardt et al. 2007). In effect, it may also be considered a
name (thus, a URN) and not only a locator (URL). Furthermore, the OpenID identifier may take the form of a
resolvable address based on XRI, a resolution protocol for higher-level (more abstract) identifiers which applies to URIs
as well as to internationalized resource identifiers (IRIs) based on a universal characters set (as opposed to the ASCII set
only).
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‘myusername.myopenidprovider.com’. Once the user’s OpenID is entered the browser redirect to
the user’s OpenID provider website (there is a backend mechanism for the former site to
discover, based on the provided OpenID string, the actual URL of the latter site, which could be
something like: http:// myopenidprovider.com/openid-auth.php). At this point there is a series of
query exchanges between the two sites initiated with a request that basically goes like this:
“someone claiming to have this OpenID identity attempts to enter my protected domain; do you
know her?” The user then has to log in to the OpenID provider site using the traditional
username-password logins or possibly other mechanisms such as a smart card or biometrics,
which enables the provider to acknowledge the claimed identity in response to the RP’s query.
Furthermore, there are variants of the communication protocols between the two sites:
one may include the end-user while another may be automatized between the two sites. It is also
possible that the two sites establish a shared secret beforehand in order for the authenticating site
to verify that the user’s credentials are coming from a legitimate source; otherwise further
queries may be needed. While the background queries are ongoing, the OpenID provider
presents the user with the different pieces of identity-related or personal information that the
protected site is requesting in order for the user to approve communicating them to the latter if he
or she so chooses. Assuming this is approved by the user and after the necessary identity
information has been communicated to the RP satisfactorily, the user is redirected to the RP
website in order to carry on there with his or her original business. Alternately, the OpenID flow
may originate from the provider with the user already signed in to his or her OpenID account
before attempting to access a third-party website (the RP to be). If that party supports OpenID,
then a background exchange of messages will take place between the two sites. As a result, the
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user will be able seamlessly to gain access to that third-party site which becomes the RP in the
current transaction.
6.4.4 OAuth
OAuth is an authorization delegation protocol that allows the user to share her protected
resources stored on a server with a third-party application without giving away her credentials
(usually username and password) to the latter. Access conditions such as the scope as well as the
validity period can also be controlled by the user. “Allowing one party to access someone else’s
resources on their behalf is the core of the OAuth protocol and the void it seeks to fill.”124 It is
based on a three-legged scenario of delegated access including the server hosting the protected
resources, the client requesting access to those resources and the user who is the owner of those
resources. The growth of distributed Web services and cloud computing has made the
development of this protocol a necessity. The first iteration of OAuth was developed out of two
proprietary protocols implemented with Flickr’s API Auth and Google’s AuthSub. The purpose
of tackling the OAuth protocol was to address “the common problem of enabling delegated
access to protected resources” [RFC 5849].
The way the OAuth protocol is described implies that before this specification and its
implementation, end-users would have had to give to a third-party application their credentials
(generally a username and a password) enabling it to access their resources stored on a given
server, if they wanted that application to use some of those resources in order to deliver a
service. For instance, the user’s protected resources may be photographs stored on the server of a
photo sharing service and the third-party application may be a photo printing service. Without

124

See this website by Eran Hammer: http://hueniverse.com/oauth/
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OAuth, the Internet end user would have to authenticate herself on the photo printing service
page and the latter service will then present the authentication credentials thus collected to the
photo sharing service in order to access the user’s photos. In those conditions, the third-party
application is in possession of the user’s credentials and as such, it de facto has all the privileges
of the actual user once it gains access to the user’s protected resources. OAuth makes it possible
not to have a third-party service collect the user’s access credentials and also for the user to
specify the scope and the timespan of the access granted to such service. Instead, the user is
represented to the third-party website by a token, making it possible to manage the authorization
process (e.g., revoke the authorization) without ever having to change the user’s credentials.
“The decoupling of the User’s username and password from the Token is one of the most
fundamental aspects of the OAuth architecture.” (Hammer, http://hueniverse.com/oauth/)
The purpose of the token is to make it unnecessary for the resource owner to share its credentials with the
client. Unlike the resource owner credentials, tokens can be issued with restricted scope and limited
lifetime, and revoked independently. [RFC 5849, p. 4]

In the OAuth protocol’s language, the client or consumer is the third-party service that
needs to access the user’s protected resources and the server is the place where those resources
are stored and which requires OAuth authentication (it is also referred to, at times, as service
provider.) Synonymous of the user, the resource owner is defined as an “entity capable of
accessing and controlling protected resources by using credentials to authenticate with the
server.” Credentials are “a pair of unique identifier and a matching shared secret” commonly
known as username and password, respectively. There are three types of credentials in OAuth
serving to identify and authenticate the “client making the request” (client credentials), “the
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authorization request” (temporary credentials) and “the access grant” (token credentials).
[RFC 5849, p. 4]125
A token is
A unique identifier issued by the server and used by the client to associate authenticated requests with the
resource owner whose authorization is requested or has been obtained by the client. Tokens have a matching
shared-secret that is used by the client to establish its ownership of the token, and its authority to represent
the resource owner. [RFC 5849, p. 5]

In other words, tokens are mainly used, along with a secret, in order to authenticate requests on
behalf of the resource owner (request token) as well as the authorization granted by the resource
owner (access token). Those tokens along with their pairing secret constitute what the OAuth
protocol calls temporary credentials and token credentials, respectively.
HTTP redirection is, among others, just one way of provisioning token credentials on
request. The client obtains temporary credentials from the server, which credentials are used to
identify and authenticate the access request. Once authorization is granted by the resource
owner, the temporary credentials are used to request token credentials from the server; the latter
credentials are used to identify and authenticate the access authorization. The temporary
credentials must be expired as soon as the token credentials have been provisioned or issued.
In the photo example, after she uploaded her pictures to the photo sharing
service/website (A) the user would go to the photo printing service/website (B) where she will
initiate the printing ordering process. As it turns out, B supports importing photos from the
user’s A. This implies that B has obtained client credentials from A in order to use them to

125

See http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849
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authenticate itself when interacting with the A’s OAuth-enabled API. Once the user has chosen
her A among the list of services supported by B and clicked ‘Continue,’ a redirection takes place
and the user will find herself at the login page of her A. What happens during that redirection is
that B requests from A a Request Token which prompts A’s login page to open (at this point the
Request Token is user-blind.) The user then enters her logins in order to authenticate the request
as initiated by her. After she logs into A, she is informed of B’s access request and asked to grant
the type or level of access requested. Presumably here, she will have a number of options in
order to specify the conditions of access (e.g., limited time of access, number of photos that may
be downloaded, no editing, etc.) or to deny the request altogether. Once the user approves of the
access request, the Request Token will be marked as user-authorized for that specific user. The
Request Token thus marked can now be exchanged with an Access Token which is returned to B
while the browser is redirected (from A) to B so that the latter can proceed with accessing the
authorized resources for the requested service.
There are a number of security concerns listed in the RFC 5849. They include, in part, the
following:
-

Spoofing: the protocol does not ensure the authenticity of the server, and as a result

requests may be intercepted and misleading responses returned;
-

Nothing guarantees that the client application originates from a well-protected and trusted

system, therefore the secrecy of the client’s credentials may be compromised, and additional
verification measures should be used in order to verify the identity of the client;
-

Phishing: depending on the level of awareness and vigilance, resource owners may be

victim of this practice which redirects end-users to fake websites where they are asked to enter
their logins;
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-

Scoping of access rights: it is up to the implementers of this protocol to give the resource

owner all relevant options of access rights that may be applicable to the resources being
protected, and the resource owner needs to be educated about the implications of the access they
are granting;
-

Denial-of-service or resource-exhaustion attacks (in case of massive amount of incoming

requests) may also work to the extent that this protocol requires significant computational
capacities for a number of operations (e.g., signature verifications, tracking used nonces, etc.)
-

The hash algorithm SHA-1 has proven to present cryptographic weaknesses that may lead

to collision attacks.
All the protocols and technologies that have been presented above may have changed
since the time when the sources used for these findings were published, as generally their
proponents keep improving on their features and trying to close damaging loopholes to the extent
possible or practical. However, the functionalities described here characterize those technologies
and most of them are likely to be carried over and adapted as those applications evolve taking
into account market demands and constraints as well as technological innovations.
The above implementations or specifications of digital identity technology are the most
concrete description of that technological phenomenon so far. They are meant to provide the
reader with more clarity and specificity regarding what is designated under the phrase ‘digital
identity.’ A definition of the concept and the description of management models may not be
enough to appreciate the potential impact of those technologies. Their capabilities and the
options they create for addressing identification needs and managing identity communication
flows are such that we may be dealing with a new notion of identity, which might require a
revision of the prevailing, pre-digital concepts of identity. In any case, it is important to
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understand those are the technologies the social actors here are involved with; they are what
specifically further shape their intention and drive their actions beyond mere technology as they
try to enable conditions conducive to those technologies being adopted, spreading and becoming
a seamless part of our digital environment. Now I am going to turn to procedures and processes
that span beyond technology specifications to involve institutional work.

6.5 Enabling digital identity operation and rollout
In this section, I am going to present operational and even broader institutional processes through
which the social actors are trying to bring to fruition the effective rollout as well as widespread
adoption and use of digital identity technology. These efforts, which purport to favor user choice,
go beyond building the technology pieces and will eventually lead to the U.S. administration
defining the “National Strategy for Trusted Identity in Cyberspace” (NSTIC).
Beyond the specifications of individual technologies and before embedding this digital
identity technology overall in institutional processes, operational issues need to be addressed,
particularly in this context where specific technologies or applications are meant to be
interoperable. At the operational basis of any identity system is the problem of registration which
possibly involved authenticating the reference of the identity being registered, that is, the original
entity or individual represented by that identity. I will examine how that issue is addressed in the
context of guidelines provided by the U.S. government to federal agencies, particularly while
dealing with contractors.
The phrase “identity ecosystem” surfaced in the process following the call by US
government for the private sector to build the identity and authentication technology that is
needed in order to support the online delivery of government services. One of the main elements
in the outcomes of that public-private partnership process is the model of Open Identity Trust
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Framework (OITF), also referred to hereafter as ‘Trust Framework.’ Eventually, it appears that
this model is the first instance or the embryo of what is named in the NSTIC document the
“identity ecosystem.” I will describe the OITF model and examine its first implementation which
still is underway at the time of this research. I will then proceed with the broader, national
Strategy under which those operational mechanisms are intended to be deployed. While its
outcomes are still in the making, the NSTIC may already be considered a landmark in the
historical emergence of digital identity as a consumer product or technology in the U.S., as it
endorses that technology as a viable way to enable the user to conduct identity transactions
online, including with the government. I will briefly introduce the Strategy before closing this
section by identifying a number of notable issues and challenges that remain to be addressed. But
to start, I am going to address for this context and in some detail the procedures and requirements
that must be at the basis of any digital identity mechanism, that is, the registration and
authentication procedures.

6.5.1

Registration and authentication

Back in 2003 through a memorandum emanating from the Office of Management and Budget
under the Executive Office of the President, the government already provided some guidelines
for e-authentication for federal agencies [gov_omb04-04]. The focus of those guidelines was on
risk assessments regarding electronic transactions, with a view to promoting a consistent
approach across government.
This guidance requires agencies to review new and existing electronic transactions to ensure that
authentication processes provide the appropriate level of assurance. It establishes and describes four levels
of identity assurance for electronic transactions requiring authentication. Assurance levels also provide the
basis for assessing Credential Service Providers (CSPs) on behalf of Federal agencies. [gov_omb04-04]
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Further:
This guidance is intended to help agencies identify and analyze the risks associated with each step of the
authentication process. The process includes (but is not limited to) identity proofing, credentialing,
technical and administrative management, record keeping, auditing, and use of the credential. Each step of
the process influences the technology’s overall conformance to the desired assurance level. [gov_omb0404]

This memo stirs an effort started a year earlier (2002) with the NIST Special Publication 800-30
that focused on methods of risk assessment and mitigation across information systems in use in
the government [gov_nist800-30]. That document already pointed to concerns about information
or IT systems assurance, but no specification profile or standard indicator regarding
identity/authentication assurance was yet spelled out. That work will only start with the 2003
memo and will continue in another NIST Special Publication of 2006 [gov_nist800-63].
Each assurance level describes the agency’s degree of certainty that the user has presented an identifier (a
credential in this context) that refers to his or her identity. In this context, assurance is defined as 1) the
degree of confidence in the vetting process used to establish the identity of the individual to whom the
credential was issued, and 2) the degree of confidence that the individual who uses the credential is the
individual to whom that credential was issued. [gov_omb04-04]

After outlining potential harm, impact levels and categories of harm, the document provides a
characterization of the potential impact level in each category of harm which could result from
possible authentication error. The four levels of assurance (LOA) deriving from that are
described in Table 7-1.
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Table 6-1: Registration levels of assurance and their baseline requirements for identity proofing

Level 1 - Little or no confidence exists in the asserted identity.
•
•

Credentials may be anonymous (if applicable, level of proofing must be consistent with the
requirements for the identity credential of level 1)
The name associated with the subscriber is provided by the applicant and accepted without
verification

Level 2 - On balance, confidence exists that the asserted identity is accurate (fair confidence)
•
•
•

•
•

Anonymous credentials (level of proofing must be consistent with the requirements for the identity
credential of level 2)
Applicant supplies at least his or her full legal name, an address of record, and date of birth.
Records of registration (including the individual’s identity information and the procedure used for its
verification) shall be maintained either by the Registration Authority (RA) or by the Credential
Service Provider (CSP), depending on the context.
The name associated with the subscriber may be pseudonymous but the RA or CSP must know the
actual identity of the subscriber
Both in-person and remote registration are permitted

Level 3 - High confidence in the accuracy of the asserted identity. People may use Level 3
credentials to access restricted web services without the need for additional identity assertion
controls.
•
•

•
•

Applicant supplies at least his or her full legal name, an address of record, and date of birth.
Records of registration (including the individual’s identity information and the procedure used for its
verification) shall be maintained either by the Registration Authority (RA) or by the Credential
Service Provider (CSP), depending on the context.
The name associated with the subscriber must be meaningful.
Both in-person and remote registration are permitted

Level 4 - Very high confidence in the accuracy of the asserted identity. Users may present
Level 4 credentials to assert identity and gain access to highly restricted web resources, without
the need for further identity assertion controls.
•
•

•
•

Applicant supplies at least his or her full legal name, an address of record, and date of birth.
Records of registration (including the individual’s identity information and the procedure used for its
verification) shall be maintained either by the Registration Authority (RA) or by the Credential
Service Provider (CSP), depending on the context.
The name associated with the subscriber must be meaningful.
Only in-person registration is permitted

Abstracted from NIST-SP 800-63 [gov_nist800-63]

NIST provides a detailed view of the specific actions that must be taken by the RA for
verification and which are requisites for issuing credentials by the CSP in order to execute these
assurance requirements, both remotely and in-person [gov_nist800-63, pp. 22-24]. These
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measures range from inspecting the appropriate ID number and account number check as well as
running record checks for accuracy (remote) to inspecting a physical photo-ID and checking the
accuracy of the information on that ID (in-person). The verification procedures and the
credential-issuing justification are increasingly complex from level 2 to level 3 (remote) to level
4 (in-person). If carried out remotely over a communication network,
the entire registration transaction between RA and CSP shall be cryptographically authenticated using an
authentication protocol that meets the requirements for the assurance level of the registration, and any
secrets transmitted shall be encrypted using an Approved encryption method” [gov_nist800-63, p. 20].

Furthermore, all personally identifying information collected in these registration processes must
be protected against unauthorized access or alteration.
The authentication process assumes that the concerned entity has already been registered
and issued a token. Here again, four assurance levels are defined increasing from 1 to 4 with the
strength of the technical requirements for authentication. Successful authentication using secure
authentication protocol is proof that the claimant controls the token. Further details about
credential or token status and lifetime, acceptable assertions, and protection of long term shared
secret complement the basic requirements in Table 7-2.
6.5.2

Open Identity Trust Framework: The model

As we saw previously, the basic model that enables the scalability of identity transactions
between perfect strangers requires three parties: the two direct parties to the transaction and a
third party that vouches for one of the first two by making the identity assertions included in the
credential presented by the latter. Particularly in the context of the Internet, those three parties
are often labeled the ‘user’ whose identity attributes needs to be ascertained, the verifier or
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‘relying party’ who actually is the beneficiary of the identity verification and generally is a
service provider, and the ‘identity provider’ who makes the identity assertions (through a proper
credential) on behalf of the user.
Table 6-2: Authentication requirement levels. (After NIST-SP 800-63)
Level 1 Authentication requirements
• Assurance that the same claimant is accessing protected resource
• Claimant shall prove, through a secure authentication protocol, that s/he controls the token
• Cryptographic methods required but shall not block offline analysis by eavesdroppers
• Any cryptographic techniques may be used
• Long-term shared authentication secrets may be revealed to verifiers
Example: Password with a challenge generating an authentication reply
Level 2 Authentication requirements
•
•
•
•

Accommodates a wide variety of authentication technologies, including password and level 3 or 4 tokens
Eavesdropper, replay, and on-line guessing attacks shall be prevented
Approved cryptographic techniques are required
Long term shared authentication secrets, if used, shall not be revealed to any party except the subscriber and
CSP (however session/temporary shared secrets may be provided by the CSP to independent verifiers)

Level 3 Authentication requirements
•

•

Based on proof of possession of a cryptographic key using a cryptographic protocol in order to protect the
primary authentication token (a secret key or a private key) against compromise by the following protocol
threats: eavesdropper, replay, on-line guessing, verifier impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Two-factor authentication (the key plus password or biometric to activate the key)

Level 4 Authentication requirements
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Level 3 requirements
Only hardware cryptographic tokens are allowed
Strong cryptographic authentication (public key or symmetric key technology) of all parties and all sensitive
data transfers between the parties
All sensitive data transfers shall be cryptographically authenticated using keys derived in the authentication
process
Approved authentication techniques shall be used in all operations
Token shall protect the secret from compromise by malicious code attacks
Long-term shared authentication secrets, if used, shall never be revealed to any party except the claimant and
CSP (temporary shared secrets may be provided to verifiers or relying parties by the CSP).

In the online world however, as scalable as it might be the three-party model may be only
reliable if the identity provider specifically is in position to control reliable user data and if the
relying party has reasons to trust the assertions made by the identity provider on behalf of the
user. In other words, regardless of how robust the technology in use actually is, or is claimed to
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be, there must be some arrangements that give the identity provider its capacity vis-à-vis
vis
both the
user and the relying party, as part of the social antecedents required to complement the technical
tools and operation. Those arrangements will organize the conditions in which each party may
depend on the other parties and expect they perform their functions as they claim and commit to
do, and with the appropriate care.
re. That is the purpose of the trust framework.

Figure 66-5: Trust framework flowchart
Constructed aafter the OITF Model description [priv_oitf]

Following is a summary description of the actors involved in the trust framework model
and their roles [priv_oitf]:


Policymakers “set out the technical, operational, and legal requirements for exchanges
of identity information over which they have authority” [priv_oitf, p. 5] or on behalf of a
group of social actors which they govern. They author the trust framework and make its
rules. [priv_omsa]
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The OITF Provider is basically the administrator of the framework: the entity that
implements the decisions and requirements settled on by the Policymakers towards a
functioning trust framework. Based on those requirements (which it can complement with
additional conditions of its own) it establishes the criteria for entry and operation
applicable to the other actors below. It translates “the requirements into a blueprint for a
trust framework that may include additional conditions of the OITF Provider. The OITF
Provider vets identity service providers and relying parties and contracts with them to
follow its trust framework requirements when conducting exchanges of identity
information” [priv_oitf, p. 4]. As a result, it “typically operates a certification listing
service that indicates which identity service providers and relying parties have been
certified by which assessors, for which criteria, and for which trust frameworks”
[priv_oitf, p. 3]. Elsewhere, it also reads: “The job of the TFP is to list assessors who
meet the IT compliance auditing requirements of a particular trust framework at a
particular LOA and/or LOP126.” [priv_omsa, p. 6]



Assessors are the participants who carry out the certification of identity providers and
relying parties, making sure they operate under the conditions and by the criteria
required. They conduct an examination ex-ante, generally only once before the concerned
operator joins the framework. Assessors perform their examination and certification
against specific requirements for a number of Levels of Assurance (LOA) and Levels of
Protection (LOP). A Special Assessor is the initial assessor in position to verify the

126

Level of Assurance and Level of Protection
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qualification of those entities who will become Listed Assessors (or plain Assessors) who
will then carry out the certification of identity service providers and relying parties.127


Auditors may be called to audit systems and actors for the same purpose of compliance,
but ex-post. This may happen on a regular basis, possibly discretionarily, or based on a
critical event. They may also do so during an investigation in order to help uphold and
enforce accountability measures.



Dispute Resolution Service Providers will try and resolve any potentially legal
conflicts. These constitute a third-party entity distinct and independent from the OITF
Providers.
The trust framework is a broad multilateral arrangement built on a set of bilateral

relationships (Fig. 7-5). This OITF model makes it clear that authority emanates from the “trust
community.” The Identity Provider is no more than a particular kind of service provider
performing on behalf of the Trust Framework Policymakers, as do all the other participants in the
framework. While the participants are autonomous from one another, their functions and
relations within the framework suggest a hierarchical role structure. Both aspects are captured in
a layered diagram of the same model (Fig. 7-6). In order to live up to its purpose (trust), OITF
rests on more than technical requirements; it also includes operational requirements for both
transaction and maintenance procedures as well as legal requirements for handling rights, duties
and responsibilities of all the parties in the framework and towards each other.

127

It should be noted that the OITF Model [priv_oitf] does not mention the Special Assessor, but only its first
implementation (OIX) provides some details [pric_omsa, p. 8]: A Special Assessor is “a party who both OIX and the
Trust Framework publisher agree has the qualifications and experience to evaluate other Assessors for that trust
framework. Note that, to avoid conflicts, a Special Assessor may not also serve as Listed Assessor for the same trust
framework.” However, the notion of TF publisher introduced here is still not clear as opposed to the TF Provider (here
OIX).
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To enable large-scale
scale networks of trust, the solutio
solution
n proffered is an Open Identity Trust Framework (OITF)
– that is, a set of technical, operational, and legal requirements and enforcements mechanisms for parties
exchanging identity information. [priv_oitf, p. 2]

Figure 6-6: A layered model of the Open Identity Trust Framework (including the three
three-party
party identity transaction
matrix).. After the OITF Model description [priv_oitf]

The trust framework constitutes the immediate environment fostered by the three-party
three
identity matrix and their transaction flows. It resorts to contractual provisions in
n order to solidify
the commitment between the parti
parties and ensure accountability. Pairwise contracts would
significantly increase the burden and the transaction costs every time at least a third
thir party is
involved, which is inevitable considering the basic identity transaction matrix. They would mean
that for every single user, all the contractual terms between the user and the identity service
provider, between the identity service provider and the relying party, as well as between the user
and the relying party would have to be agreed upon separately,, leaving the door open to changes
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and instability every time a new pair forms, that is, every time a new entity joins the relationship.
This is hardly an efficient approach for a system predicated on a utility positively proportional
with the degree of its scalability. The goal of an identity trust framework is to enable and provide
a standard of trust which can then facilitate identity exchanges to scale rapidly among players
who commit to the same quality standards and share the same expectations.
There are five categories of legal agreements (Fig. 7-7) that structure the Open Identity
Trust Framework:
1. Service Agreement between Policymaker entity and the OITF Provider where all the
basic requirements of the OITF (namely technical, operational and legal) are clearly
formulated.
2. Identity Service Provider Certification Agreements are contracts with the OITF Provider
whereby the latter attests that a certain Identity Service Provider (IDSP) complies with
the applicable requirements of the service agreement. In cases of pre-existing relationship
between Policymakers and the IDSP, these agreements may not be required.
3. Relying Party Certification Agreements are contracts with the OITF Provider whereby
the latter attests that a certain Relying Party (RP) complies with the applicable
requirements of the service agreement. In cases of pre-existing relationship between
Policymakers and the RP, these agreements may not be required.
4. Assessor Agreements: Assessors have two types of contract on their hands. They first
sign a contract with the OITF Providers where they agree to follow certain procedure in
order to certify whether an IDSP and/or RP candidate to service the trust framework
satisfy the required conditions. Then they sign contracts with these latter entities in order
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to be able to carry out the evaluation and certification procedure. It is possible for some
entities to self-certify if Policymakers so decide.
5. Terms of Service (TOS) Agreements address certain rights and responsibilities for the
users within the current trust framework. Unless those rights and responsibilities are
already provided for in pre-existing TOS agreements between the user and the IDSP on
the one hand, and the user and the RP on the other hand, “OITF Provider might
promulgate a set of model terms to be included by identity service providers and relying
parties in their TOS agreements with users.” (p. 7)
Based on the information provided for the OIX instance of OITF, we can state that the
certification process for identity service providers and, to some extent, the relying parties may
include the following number of steps:
i)

Prepare the evidence of compliance with the trust framework’s requirements for the
target Levels of Assurance or Levels of Protection as applicable;

ii)

Allow a Listed Assessor to conduct the assessment of the evidence provided and the
related objects;

iii)

Upon successful assessment, document and submit a Membership Listing Application
Form to the TFP;

iv)

After verification of the Form by TFP, the listing including the new member will be
published in the TFP Listing Service.
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Figure 6-7: OITF contractual structure.. After the Open Identity Trust Framework Model [priv_oitf]

This document [priv_oitf] promotes a number of principles for openness. The parties to identity
exchanges within this framework are subject to the jurisdictions where such exchanges are
conducted. Parties should avoid any ot
other legal agreements that may “compromise the integrity
of the commitments under the trust framework” (p. 12) and disclose any potential conflict of that
nature the earliest possible. OITF Providers should make sure governments designate
independent ombudsmen
men in countries where they do business. “If the law requires the sharing of
identity information … without the informed consent of the person in question, parties to the
OITF who are ordered to share this information must involve the ombudsman” (idem). OITF
OI
Providers must ensure to widely publicize through a website the OITF mechanisms for
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accountability. Particularly, they “must ensure that all agreements under the OITF afford the
parties an effective right and mechanism to seek redress.” (Idem)
Since it is up to different stakeholder groups to set up their own trust framework and its
requirements, the so-called Open Identity Trust Framework becomes in a sense an open market
where the user can shop for trust. As one of the respondents put it, market can be seen as a
decision mechanism that allows for more flexibility and diverse outcomes, as opposed to the
political decision-making process. Following in multiple statements is the way he expressed that
notion. For him, the market is the
expression of preferences by stakeholders in a coordinated fashion…
In a market (and when I say market, again, it’s not just commercial) you do have expression of preferences
by groups of people through different mechanisms…
Market is what you do when you have a lot of variability and a dynamic situation [Res_L 2011]

In other words, voting may work well in the political democratic arena where only a single
outcome is required. In a situation where a variety of outcomes must be catered for, the fitting
decision mechanism is the market, according to this respondent.
After describing and analyzing the blue print of what appears to be the central piece of
the construction in progress of an “identity ecosystem” according to NSTIC, let us examine how
the implementation might look like. In effect, there is already an experiment underway with the
Open Identity Exchange.
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6.5.3

Open Identity Trust Framework: An implementation

The OITF Model has so far been implemented in one instance, which is the Open Identity
Exchange (OIX). As President Obama took office in 2009, his administration signaled its interest
in further promoting and implementing e-government services, especially but not exclusively in
healthcare services. Then the Administration
asked the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) how to start using open identity technologies to let
the American public more easily, efficiently, and safely interact with federal websites such as the National
Institute of Health (NIH), the Social Security Administration (SSA), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
[priv_omsa, p. 3]

However a fundamental question quickly arose: if identity proofing and authentication
technology and mechanisms were going to be outsourced, then what guarantee does the
government have that the technology as well as those mechanisms will be reliable and compliant
with all relevant laws and regulations applicable to government operations?
In April 2009, government and relevant private sector started a dialogue to explore and
address the set of issues that may stand in the way of availing digital identity capabilities to
citizens in order to foster the delivery of government services online. The parties to that dialogue
were represented for the US Government by an interagency coordination effort and structure
called Federal ‘Identity Credential and Access Management’ (ICAM)128, and for the industry by
the Information Card Foundation (ICF) and the OpenID Foundation (OIDF). The question put
forth by the government before the two entities was: “how public/private partnership could best
provide open identity solutions that could serve all members of the public while still meeting the

128

http://www.idmanagement.gov/
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identity assurance and protection requirements of U.S. government websites”? [priv_tfpas, p.
2]. Their effort also includes research and planning.
Nine months of talks, research and planning led to the definition of an open identity trust
framework model and the establishment by early 2010 of Open Identity Exchange Corporation
(OIX) as the implementation of the model thus defined. OIX is a non-profit organization that was
incorporated in Washington State on 3 February 2010. It is intended to be an international
organization with appropriate status in all applicable jurisdictions; in the case of U.S., it operates
under 501(c)(6) tax-exempt status. This is the outcome of resolutions adopted by the Board of
Directors of both ICF and OIDF in January 2010. The articles of incorporation list five Board
members as OIX founding Directors [priv_oixinc, articles 6.1 and 6.2].129
The organization has two-class membership: executive members and general members.
Likewise, the Board of Directors includes from four to twelve Executive Board Members and
from two to six At-Large Board Members. Those numbers may be changed at any point by
super-majority vote of the standing board members. Every one of the executive (organizational)
members can appoint one Executive Board Member. The Executive Board Members designate
and appoint by a majority vote the initial At-Large Board Members. The Board may form
temporary or standing committees as well as advisory committees. [priv_oixbyl, particularly art.
3.4, 3.5 and 3.12]
The OIX Trust Framework was approved for LOA 1 by ICAM on 15 February and begun
operations on 3 March 2010 [priv_omsa]. In order to become a trust framework provider for
ICAM on behalf of the government, OIX was required to document a number of items (Table 3),

129

Those directors are affiliated to organizations such as OIDF, Equifax, Google, PayPal and VeriSign [priv_tfpas]. A
sixth director and organization (Verizon) is listed in the latter cited document.
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based on the requirements formulated by the government in the document titled: “Trust
Framework Adoption Process for Levels of Assurance 1, 2 and non-PKI 3” [gov_tfpad and
priv_tfpas].
Table 6-3: Information required by the federal government from TFP applicant (case of OIX)

1.

Applicant legal status

2.

Appropriate authorization to operate

3.

Legal authority to commit the Applicant to conducting assessments and certifying Identity
Providers on behalf of the Federal government

4.

Financial capacity to manage the risks associated with conducting assessments and certifying
Identity Providers on behalf of the Federal government

5.

Understanding of, and compliance with, any legal requirements incumbent on the Applicant in
connection to conducting assessments and certifying Identity Providers on behalf of the Federal
government

6.

Scope and extent of implemented security controls (e.g., access control, confidentiality of Identity
Provider information)

7.

Documentation of policies and procedures

8.

Proof that Applicant practices are consistent with documented policies and procedures (e.g., via
independent auditor reports, if required by LOA requirements)
Adapted from [priv_tfpas]

As a matter of general procedure, relevant entities must first become OIX general
members in order to qualify and become OIX-registered assessors and identity service providers.
Candidate assessors submit their application requirement packages to the Special Assessor to
become Listed or Registered Assessors while identity service providers (IDSPs) submit theirs to
Registered Assessors. The qualification procedure for operating in an OIX trust framework
includes the following steps:
1. The policymakers of the trust community (ICAM in the case of OIX) formulate the
requirements for the role of Special Assessor, the entity that is going to verify the
qualifications of other assessors before they are listed.
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2. The Special Assessor is appointed by OIX, the trust framework provider.
3. The applicants submit their application form along with an executed (signed) copy of the
Membership Agreement. The latter legally binds the signatory applicant to the OIX
Operating Rules as well as the rules of any specific trust frameworks for which they
register (an implication of the general rule stated above is that IDSP applicants can only
apply after applicants are successful in becoming registered assessors.)
4. Once the information is verified and their application approved, applicants become OIX
General Members.
5. This is followed by the application procedure for servicing their selected trust
frameworks at specific levels of assurance.
6. Special Assessor or Registered Assessors conduct the evaluation of the applicants.
7. Upon successful evaluation, Assessor and IDSP are required to submit further
information about any specialized areas of competence they may have.
8. OIX verifies the whole process and information submitted and updates their listing with
the new registered members/operators.
6.5.4 The “National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace”
As an outcome of its partnership with the private sector aiming at developing and promoting the
adoption of digital identity solution, the U.S. government released in April 2011 its final draft for
the “National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace.” The thrust of the Strategy is to lay
out what it calls the “Identity Ecosystem” – interestingly enough, the document qualifies the
ecosystem as “user-centric” (p. 2), claiming that “individuals are the first priority of the
Strategy” (p. 21). This is a blueprint to create an environment where a certain number of actors
playing their respective roles based on shared standards and policies will enable an environment
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of trust, especially with regard to authenticating the digital identities of one another as well as
those of affiliated users.
The Identity Ecosystem consists of the participants, policies, processes, and technologies required for
trusted identification, authentication, and authorization across diverse transaction types… All of the roles
may be held by public or private-sector organizations or a combination of both, and single organization
may provide services that cross multiple roles. [gov_nstic, p. 21]

This framework accommodates all identity transactions, “from anonymous to fully-authenticated
and from low- to high-value” (idem, p. 2). Adoption of the technology solutions will be
voluntary and will reflect the four core principles of the ecosystem: privacy-enhancement,
security and resiliency, interoperability, as well as cost-effectiveness and ease-of-use. The
document enumerates a number of participants which it also names “execution components” of
the ecosystem.130 Among them are the individual, the subject of a transaction, attribute, digital
identity, credentials (“the information objects used during a transaction to provide evidence of
the subject’s identity”), relying party and participants (“refer to the collective subjects, identity
providers, attribute providers, relying parties and identity media taking part in a given
transaction.”) In addition to those, one may notice the emergence of the notion of non-person
entity131 (NPE) applicable to “organizations, hardware, networks, software, or services [which]
are treated much like individuals within the Identity Ecosystem.” An identity medium and an
attribute provider are also added to the ecosystem. An identity medium is defined as:
a device or object (physical or virtual) used for storing one or more credentials, claims, or attributes
related to a subject. Identity media are available in many format, such as smart cards, security chips
130

All the following definitions and quotes about the ecosystem participants or “execution components” are found on
pp. 21 and 22 in the NSTIC document.
131 The designation of non-person entity might be misleading as there exist the notion of legal personhood for
corporations and even a debate in the US about whether corporations are people. Instead, I suggest using any relevant
combination of the following terms: non-natural or non-biological with individuals or persons.
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embedded in personal computers, cell phones, software based certificates, and Universal Serial Bus (USB)
devices.

An attribute provider is in charge of identity attributes throughout their lifecycle,
including validation, update and revocation of related claims. It is also worth noting that the
“identity provider may also verify the identity of and sign up (enroll) a subject” although a
different entity may also play the role of enrolling agent. And finally a “trustmark is used to
indicate that a product or service provider has met the requirements of the Identity Ecosystem,
as determine by an accreditation authority.”
Table 6-4: The policy foundation of the identity ecosystem

Policy component

Role

Identity Ecosystem Framework

“overarching set of interoperability standards, risk
models, privacy and liability policies, requirements,
and accountability mechanisms that structure the
Identity Ecosystem.”

Steering Group

“will administer the process for policy and standard
development for the Identity Ecosystem Framework
in accordance with the Guiding Principles in this
Strategy… [and] also ensure that accreditation
authorities validate participants’ adherence to the
requirements of the Identity Ecosystem
Framework.”

Trust Framework

“is developed by a community whose members
have similar goals and perspectives. It defines the
rights and responsibilities of that community’s
participants in the Identity Ecosystem; specifies the
policies and standard specific to the community;
and defines the community-specific processes and
procedures that provide assurance.”

Accreditation Authority

“assesses and validates identity providers, attribute
providers, relying parties, and identity media,
ensuring that they all adhere to an agreed-upon trust
framework.” It “can issue trustmarks to the
participants that they validate.”

Trust Scheme

“combination of criteria that is measured to
determine service provider compliance with the
Identity Ecosystem Framework.”

Abstracted from the NSTIC (2011)
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The other important part of the Identity Ecosystem is comprised of the components of its
policy foundation as shown in Table 7-4 (quoting from pages 24 and 25 of the Strategy.) The
Ecosystem’s goals and objectives are reflected here in Fig. 7-8. Finally, the Strategy outline an
action plan including the establishment of an interagency office within the Department of
Commerce: the National Program Office will be “charged, consistent with statutory authorities,
with achieving the goals of the Strategy” [gov_nstic, pp. 38-39].
Following is an excerpt (p. 39) describing the mission of the Office.
The NPO will lead the day-to-day coordination of NSTIC activities, working closely with
the Cybersecurity Coordinator in the White House. The National Program Office will:
• Promote private-sector involvement and engagement;
• Support interagency collaboration and coordinate interagency efforts associated with
achieving programmatic goals;
• Build consensus on policy frameworks necessary to achieve the vision;
• Identify areas for the government to lead by example in developing and supporting the
Identity Ecosystem, particularly in the Executive Branch’s role as a provider and
validator of key credentials;
• Actively participate within and across relevant public- and private-sector fora; and
• Assess progress against the goals, objectives, and milestones of the Strategy and the
associated implementation activities.
I have documented above the basic operational requirements for setting up a viable digital
identity mechanism which would be acceptable to the U.S. government and other potential
relying parties. Those requirements mainly relate to registration and authentication of identity
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subjects. I have then presented and analyzed the model, followed by an implementation-case,
implementation
of
the social mechanism that is being proposed as trust
trust-enabling
enabling device in order to support the
rollout of the technology.

Figure 6-8: Goals and objectives of the
he identity ecosystem (NSTIC)

After the NSTIC (2011)

Finally, I introduced above the basics of the U.S. national Strategy for making digital identity
happen in the life of consumers while helping to make the Net somewhat more reliable and
maybe more secure for communicating identity data
data. At the time of conducting this research,
those elements constitute the state of play as to the efforts made to bring the technology of digital
identity as well as online identity transactions into eve
everyday
ryday practice. So far, what we have seen
play out still are institutional processes between technology designers and companies, business
stakeholders, government and sometimes civil society advocates and researchers. Market rollout
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for individual consumers is yet to be seen and will probably come with its train of challenges and
further issues to be resolved. In the meantime, I will point out below a few of the issues and
challenges that I draw from analyzing the above operational and institutional processes.

6.6 Issues and challenges
I will here review a number of persistent challenges including outstanding objectives that are still
to be achieved, issues of trust, liability, regulation and the politics of technology design.
•

Outstanding requirements

While the Trust Framework model is a start to address institutional issues related to the
deployment of digital identity technology and solutions, the work of building the actual
infrastructure has hardly started. The latter is required for the TFs to function well and achieve
their purpose. The stable interconnection and interoperation of all the moving parts of these
systems, including the client-side components in both software and hardware, all require wellintegrated mechanisms and infrastructural components. One interviewee emphasizes that without
the parts of the technology through which the user will interact with the infrastructure, digital
identity technology is unlikely to “happen.”
… [I]t’s primarily a matter of having secure clients available on the majority of software and hardware
platforms that individuals use. The identity ‘big bang’ will not happen until this is well underway. [Res_I,
2011]

Before these digital identity technologies can be widely implemented and used by both online
businesses and users,
[t]he secure client problem needs to be solved first, by way of practical solutions that are in the hands of
sufficiently many internet users. [Res_I, 2011]
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This requirement applies whatever the contexts. Even if stakeholders decide to use governmentissued credentials highly relied upon for legal identification purposes, that would not be
sufficient; it would even be useless if the client-side security cannot be ensured to an acceptable
degree of reliability and assurance.
One of the hard parts is for the big players to agree on building the right infrastructure pieces on the client
side, especially when client-side security is generally low. [Res_I, 2011]

Overall however, there are many other parts that also need to be put in place before an
effective and functioning infrastructure of user-managed identity systems emerges. Some of
those components and capabilities have been mentioned by the interviewees as follows132:


More consistent protocol environment spanning the global coverage of the Internet
infrastructure and smoothly integrating the variety of systems and the different
stakeholders’ needs (not unlike the infrastructure of payment instruments). This issue also
includes working on technical standardization in support of interoperability.



Portability or roaming capability: according to one of the respondents, the lack of
convenient solution for this is probably one of the reasons why passwords are so
successful (possibility to log in to one’s account from wherever and through whatever
device one is connected to the Internet.)



A significant amount of cryptography is required and proper technology, security and
policy solutions need to be figured out for the storage of the cryptographic keys, whether
on the client side or with the intermediaries that enable diverse systems to interoperate
(identity providers, claim transformers, etc.).
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Some of these have been provided by Stefan Brands in the above referenced keynote address
(http://hosting.epresence.tv/KMDI/1/watch/748.aspx)
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Addressing the problem of “root credential” (the basic credential than can be used in
multiple domains with the capability to link identity across them if desirable) in a way
that will be secure against spoofing and other ill-intended manipulations.



Integration capabilities between mobile and non-mobile forms of online identity, between
mobile phone numbers and Web-based identity, especially given the prevalence and
growth of mobile as platform for interacting with people as well as with the Internet
infrastructure.
Overall, there still is a long way to go, and it is not unusual in conversations with these

designers to hear someone state that the technical challenges are the hardest with this technology,
and later on in the same conversation the same person states that social issues such as norms and
practices are harder to address. This is probably indicative of the level of difficulties faced at
once from various fronts. As a matter of fact, resolving the technological challenges is part of the
conditions of possibility that anything happen at all. One may interpret the fact of saying those
challenges are the biggest as expression of the fact that they are the most pressing, in terms of
immediacy and requirement for getting things moving, until they get resolved. After all,
technological innovations generally happen first before the society can fully realize the scale of
their impact and begin to substantially address related societal concerns. Until there is a technical
solution for every basic requirement for this technology to be successfully implemented, it is
normal that what will appear most challenging for technologists can only be a part of their action
items, themselves a subset of all items for which they are competent. However, as soon as one
starts thinking carefully about implementation in the broader social environment, which is the
case once comes the time to start concretely planning for rollout, one may realize that social
requirements for widespread adoption might be daunting. Not only is there always the threat of a
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gap between the designers’ assumptions about user behavior and the actual user behavior, but
nothing guarantees that the preferences of all or most stakeholder groups involved in the design
process are consistent among themselves or with the overarching norms that bind the social
setting at hand.
•

The limits of Trust Frameworks

As previously described, the Trust Framework (TF) is enacted through a set of legally binding
agreements which also include the relying party (RP). This implies that unless the RP is part of a
multilateral contractual relation with the other participants in the Framework, it won’t be party to
a transaction using a credential originating from the Framework (at least not as far as the
contractual provisions for that trust framework is concerned). Why should the RP be party to the
set of agreements that hold the TF together? This is due to the need to ensure that the user’s
identity data, even when stored with the RP, is handled according to specific policies, especially
as regards their proper protection to the extent desired and stipulated by the concerned TF. Can
this (ensuring the RP commitment to the TF policies) be achieved through other means? If not,
what if the user needs to share data generated from a transaction within a TF with an external
party (RP) from another TF, or an entity that is not party to any TF at all? What if there is a
legitimate ground and a business value for a RP in a TF to share the user data with another
relying party in another TF or outside any TF?
If physical government-issued identity credentials are of any lesson, this model of Trust
Framework may limit scalability, based on the issue pointed out above, as the number of RPs
will be limited upfront to relevant entities that are parties to the contractual agreements in place.
The question is: Is the Trust Framework model just another type of federation (potentially larger
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than the original federation model)? Will there be a way to establish bridges between
Frameworks or will these prove just to be larger silos than those enabled by the set of passwordbased logins? Is it possible to accommodate relying parties that are not part of the trust
framework prior? One understands that the online identity transaction processes are different
from face-to-face ones, and once the RP has access to the data, they have it for good as there
always is a trail of the information left in computer memory. Subsequently, the RP is in position
to use the data as much as it wants thus, the need for this model to have the RP abide by certain
requirements, notably the levels of protection (LOP) requirements, whatever they are within the
framework at hand.
The risk of isolation of each TF and the resulting potential challenge to the OITF model
may find an answer in the possibility and the technical capability to establish a “root credential.”
In an email interview, one respondent wrote that the power of digital identity infrastructure
cannot be unleashed unless a resolution is found to the problem of root credential. In a follow-up
email exchange we had on that point, he further explained as follows:
… if two organizations want to be able to securely share information about a person between them,
whether via the individual or directly, then a common identifier for that person will need to be established
across the two organizations. Unless the person can be trusted, that [identifier] will need to be issued in the
form of a “credential” for the person. In part of the financial sector, the use of an SSN [social security
number] serves this purpose; for certain healthcare services in many countries it is a health insurance
number. These can be thought of as “root credentials” for a collection of services. There would be no need
for them if all individuals would never try to defraud the system, but from an organization security
perspective that is not a reasonable security. Note, in this example, that there is no secure way for a
person’s data to reliably make its way over from a financial service to a health service, unless in some
manner a link between the two credentials is established by some trusted party; that in effect creates a new
“root credential” across the two service domains. BUT, note that there is no need for individuals to show
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that master root credential to all services in the two domains. … Nonetheless, a root credential has been
created, and for organization security this is inevitable - otherwise users could collude and transfer
privileges, entitlements, and other personal information between them.
What I am advocating is NOT a global root credential. In contrast, I am advocating that a root credential
should only be created for each collection of services that have good reasons for needing to be able to
reliably share information about an individual… [Res_I 2011]

This expert specifies that whenever appropriate, the root credential should be used with an
existing technology that allows the user not to use the credential directly with service providers
but rather to use it first “to obtain unlinkable authentication and attribute tokens” leaving to the
user alone the capability to link her various activities across service domains.
On condition that those provisions are institutionally secured, the OITF model may have
the potential to be sustainable and to expand. The possibility to bridge TFs and, particularly, to
enable root credentials for various collections of services provides the opportunity for a real shift
away from the silo model, however large the silo. Trust frameworks should be able to form other
higher-level trust frameworks or federation of trust frameworks, some sort of meta-frameworks
of trust.
Whatever the case, the designers recognize that trust is critical for this infrastructure, as
we can presume it generally would be for any human relations-supporting technology. The need
for trust here is ubiquitous, both as requisite and as outcome, both enabling and enabled by the
use of the technology. With that in mind and the proposed Trust Framework model, by enabling
stakeholders who share the same norms and the same goals to come together in the same
framework, is meant to foster trust networks which will support the confident use of digital
identity credentials within each network domain, and thus to foster safer digital identity
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transactions. As one of the respondents suggests, for online processes as well as in the physical
world, trust or at least the assumption thereof is a social lubricant absorbing or minimizing a lot
of potential frictions as well as transaction costs.
It’s gonna be the same thing that has over, you know, centuries produced the world’s financial systems, the
banking system, and more recently in the last, you know, 40-50 years, the credit card system, um... and has,
you know, at least produced the first 2 layers of the internet. Um…, they’re not without security hazards.
But still we have a functioning internet today and I think it’s gonna keep functioning. That’s because we’re
able to, uh…, you know, it’s the same thing that holds together the fabric of society... It rips (inaudible) in
various places. There are wars and major conflicts, but overall, what holds society together is we’re better
off with trust than without it. And so, we’re going to build successfully functioning digital identity networks
because they provide superior trust: everyone wins, it’s not just government, it’s not just business, not just
users. Everyone wins. [Res_E, 2010]

He goes on to elaborate further based on the OIX implementation of the trust framework model.
The OIX framework provider – which he refers to as an “open industry foundation” – is:
… an open approach to say: there is no one authority that is going to edict what trust has to look like on
the Internet. It allows every community of actors to become a trust community that wants to say we have
our requirements for determining trust levels of assurance - actually, levels of assurance, levels of
protection, levels of controls - and those requirements, um…, they can then turn into trust framework to
which OIX will oversee a certification process. OIX doesn’t actually do the certification; it just hosts a
certification listing service and, uh…, essentially it’s a backbone against which assessors can be enrolled
to provide certification against any particular trust framework…
… In a lot of ways I use the analogy: If the network of identity providers is like the banking system, then the
third party we’re talking about is a little bit like, uh…, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC (inaudible)
assurance, uh..., assurance wouldn’t be part of it... You basically just need a backbone for the banking
system so that all the banks, uh, can be trusted that they’re, you know, protecting people’s money, in this
case it’s protecting people’s identity.” [Res_E, 2010]
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Eventually, authority emanates from shared goals and interests, and one of its fundamental
functions in this context is to foster trust. But in the end, it is up to real individuals to exercise
trust and as such, there are factors that may incline them to trust and others that may challenge
their trust. The notion of the risks attached to identity transactions and the absence of clarity
regarding the distribution of responsibilities in case of failure are part of the latter set of factors.
•

Liability: a limit to trust
When comparing the prospective identity credentials in the digital world to the past ones

in the physical world with regard to the liability issue, it may be tempting to say: when frauds are
committed with government- or state-issued credentials (which happens, obviously), those
issuers are not made liable for the harm caused in the process, and yet people still widely use and
continue to rely on those credentials. Therefore, the private entities issuing digital identity
credentials should be held to the same standard. Unfortunately, such comparison and argument
do not achieve much in favor of the adoption of these technologies as long as this depends on
user choice and confidence, in addition to the fact that they lead to a flawed conclusion for the
reasons that follow.
i.

The need and capacity to enable private business and transactions has never been

part of the government’s initial drive to fashioning identity credentials for citizens and nationals.
As a consequence, it generally was neither a requirement nor an expectation that those
credentials be used to conduct private business, certainly not financial transactions. Even if in
some apparently limited cases such as in France, government strongly suggested to private
organizations to encourage one way or another their staff or members to apply for their national
identity card as a tactic to stimulate adoption, this was neither a requirement nor an expectation
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for such private organizations to actually use or rely on that card in their own processes, but only
a way for government to enlist the help of third parties so that the maximum number of citizens
have their identity documented and their card available in case government needs to check their
identity. The use of those credentials was not meant to provide any profitable business
opportunity to their issuer, or ultimately increase its bottom line, so that there might be a reason
for potential issuers to compete (e.g., several governments competing to issue to any citizens
their passport, regardless of their nationality.)
ii.

The government or the state designed ID credentials first and foremost for their

own purposes. It is reasonable to assume, based on their initial goal, that they would have been
fine with people using passports only to cross national borders, or national identity card only to
authenticate their identity when dealing with government agencies, or driving licenses only to
drive and show the police upon request in case of violation of the traffic regulation or if they are
involved in some other traffic incident.
iii.

As initially designed, the use of government-issued identity credentials does not

automatically lead to storing or aggregating data about their holder or her transactions. When I
use one of those credentials to buy alcohol at a liquor store, there normally is no data trail about
me being at that store on that date at that time, of me buying alcohol such many times in that
month or that year, or of any of my identity attribute being stored at the point of verification in a
way that is easy to track or correlate with other records.133 Likewise, in developing (and possibly
some of developed) countries where the police patrols have no computer in every car, while a
random identity check may be a possible deterrence against unlawful deeds, it is a mere
ceremony that provides the law enforcers with some reassurance only on a limited number of
133 Again, I am referring here to the desiderata specified or embedded in the design of those credentials. Admittedly, this
has changed overtime with the development of electronic networks with more and more opportunities to collect and
retain identity data along with the growing amount and diversity of transactions.
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facts (e.g., that the individual being verified holds a proper government-issued ID and, possibly
but not necessarily, that in addition the photograph and the description are roughly believable to
be of that individual.) While the development of electronic technology has made it easy to store
more and more data (e.g., controls at countries’ ports of entry have involved collecting
information, matching some of it to pre-stored data and possibly storing further data collected at
every control) those capabilities were not present at the time the passport was invented and did
not motivate its design, which limits any attempt to assimilate the risk profile and resulting
liability regime between nineteenth century passport and future digital identity credentials.
Furthermore, respondents have suggested that the reasons why the user’s counterparts in
Internet identity transactions – the ones that would be called relying parties within the new
framework – might accept this emerging framework and its principles (even if that means giving
up their capacity to collect and leverage the user data at their own guise) primarily include:
cost, liability, and goodwill issues associated with protecting such data against breaches and dealing with
inadvertent leakages [Res_I 2011].
Reduced liability and compliance requirements are the two reasons that will drive internet-businesses to
accept this identity technology. [Res_G 2011]

This rationale raises a question, though. How can liability be a deterrent for online merchants to
keep them from collecting and managing their customers’ PII when at the same time, the
designers or proponents of these technologies consistently place a bold emphasis on disclaiming
liability for potential identity providers who are precisely supposed to take over the custody and
maintenance of those customers’ identity data? As often recognized by the technologists in this
context, the issue of liability, in cases including but not limited to system failure, proves to be
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probably the thorniest of all non-technical challenges facing the rollout of digital identity
technology.
It is not clear whether commercial entities would be readily convinced to let go of their
compulsive consumption and control of the user’s personal data, even if presented with the
prospects that this might somehow be better for business on the long run. Businesses’ voracity
for personal data, as any user can experience daily on the Internet, is a matter of culture at this
point and it might require more than one or two lines of rational argument to change it. However,
it is not impossible that if that argument is consistently supported by empirical evidence over
time, that business culture might change. But is it supported by such evidence? For now, more
avenues need to be explored for new business models around personal data and identity
technology so as to change the above mentioned business culture.
•

Insurance: trust-enabler and response to the burden of liability
At present, it is abundantly clear that the Internet presents severe challenges to the user’s

confidence, and no one can seriously claim that there are no more risks on the Internet than in
face-to-face interactions generally (at least this has not been evidently established, despite what
any technologist may claim.) Those risks and challenges were the motivation for building digital
identity technologies, in the first place, and that is why TFs have come about. At start and
comparatively to the physical plane of interactions, there is a trust deficit on the Internet.
Considering that relative deficit, is it even possible then to enable or enhance trust on the Internet
while doing away with the institutional provisions (such as the FDIC’s) that were needed for
trust in the world of brick-and-mortar (and without validly replacing them)?
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It shall be noted that one of the key actors who, as a respondent in this investigation, has
analogized the goal of the Trust Framework with the banking system’s backbone provided by
FDIC quickly subtracted the insurance component from his conclusion, despite the fact that his
own premises imply that component. In effect, the definition of the acronym FDIC (Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation) seems to indicate that insurance is its main purpose or
instrument thereof and thus, a main part of its mission; in that context insurance appears to be a
tool for enabling trust. In any case, one may wonder what trust in the banking system would have
been, or whether it would have been possible at all, without the insurance component of the type
of FDIC. When I visit my bank, I regularly notice a plaque at the desk of every teller where it
reads: “Deposits are federally insured to $250,000 backed by the full faith and credit of the
United States government.” It is reasonable to presume that for the federal government to feel the
need to step in and reassure depositor with such promise, it is because without it banking might
not have worked as successfully as it did, particularly in the initial stages – and without a
thriving bank industry the financial sector would not be as vibrant and thus, not as supportive of
the economy.
Even beyond the analogy and considering the large socio-technical systems that rely on
public trust or have become overtime trustworthy in the eyes of the public, this might not have
happened if the user or customer was left all by him- or herself to make the determination
whether those systems are trustworthy or not, and whether to trust them or not. Generally,
individuals know that if they were to be victim of a disaster due to a system failure of the power
grid, there are institutions and mechanisms that will help them deal with the situation in one
manner or the other; in some ways and through appropriate mechanisms the society as a whole
will be involved in dealing with the consequences alongside with them. Individuals know that a
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plane crash is not something they will have to face in isolation only surrounded by their
surviving loved ones, and that it will be a matter of concern for the society as a whole and as a
consequence, the society has preventively put in place mechanisms and institutions in order to
minimize the chances of that happening, and to help deal with the consequences if it ever
happens nonetheless. In sum, the determination as to whether such systems are trustworthy or
not, and the decision whether to use and rely on them or not, are never made by the individual in
isolation or exclusively based on the technical characteristics of those systems. Some people
make such determination and decision clearly knowing their risks and recourses and assessing
that, in balance, their chances are good getting through the risks. Others, maybe the majority, use
the adhesion of a critical mass of people (or rather their experience living in a society where
people and organizations are generally held accountable both to certain quality standards and
legally)134, that is, the apparent consensus that the system may be relied upon, as a proxy for
trustworthiness and then make the decision to actually rely on it.
Contrariwise, as far as people can see around them in terms of risks to personal data and
identity records, it appears that individuals are mostly left to themselves in order to fend off the
consequences of related incidents when they occur, even when those consequences may
jeopardize their livelihood. They may report to the police which may open a routine
investigation, but until a definite resolution is found – which will most likely take years – the
victims’ experience generally suggest that there is no socially shared sense of the crisis they are
going through and the associated burdens,135 as would be the case in a plane crash or (less

134

That common experience enabled by shared values leads a significant portion of the population to trust any assurance
given by concerned institutions, thus the notion of critical mass here.
135 As anecdotal evidence, a report was recently broadcasted on a national news cable about young children who are
already plagued of considerable debts due to loans that they never took (car credits, home mortgages, etc.) and just
because some unscrupulous individuals have managed to get hold of their SSN. The cable channel was able to trace
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spectacularly) when a bank goes bankrupt in which latter case they might still recover the totality
of their deposits if these amount to $250,000 or less. It is no surprise then that no one nowadays
really thinks twice as to whether their deposits will be safe or not before they open a bank
account. They may worry about many things but the safety of their deposit generally is not one
of them, while they would be more than reluctant in thinking that a new Internet technology will
make them safer with regard to the protection of their personal data just because someone has
said so. A great deal of effort will need to be put into demonstrating to them that this technology
is a game changer, not just by itself but also in terms of how it shifts the attitude of the society as
a whole towards related issues and potential consequences. Those elements of the social
environment, those accompanying institutions are essential ingredients for enabling the public’s
trust in technologies and other institutions which users and customers at first might otherwise see
as fraught of risks for themselves. To date, digital identity design activities do not provide any
clear answer as to whether a functional substitute of insurance, in case something goes seriously
wrong, will kick in to help alleviate the user’s burden or harm. That being said, the governance
structures and mechanisms136 are still emerging and it is to be hoped that a viable solution to the
burden of liability will also emerge.
•

The role of government and regulation
In addition to user adoption concerns, several experts have emphasized the role that

government could play either as regulatory policymaker or as a large customer and early adopter.
First, the two sides of government intervention effects are acknowledged: potentially negative

down those individuals but they were still running free and thus far never got to be worried by the police. Other adult
victims spend a lot of time and still their own money over many years in order to clean up their financial and even
criminal records, with a considerable moral distress.
136 Such as the Identity Ecosystem Steering Group, http://www.idecosystem.org/ (as of August 2012)
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and potentially positive. The actions of the government may consist of “its ability to help both to
set up identity but also to perform in ways that are not necessarily the best (eavesdropping etc.)”
[Res_H 2010]. Then there is the view that public policy may steer incentives in the right
directions due to “commercial incentives for providers to not be good actors in the systems,
(inaudible) which need to be altered by policy” [Res_H 2010]. At the same time, others
recognize the difficulties for policy to play any significant role at this stage in altering the
distribution of incentives.
In private-sector use cases, there are many incentives for businesses to not play nice with other parties, and
public policy to deal with bad incentives will be a daunting challenge. [Res_I 2011]

The same would however welcome the role of policy to steer standard-setting efforts through the
definition of a single, overarching protocol that will provide a consistent logical infrastructure for
all varieties of Internet identity systems.
Here, policy is particularly important, and can be very effective, in driving industry-wide efforts in (de
facto) standardized protocols and other infrastructure elements. [Res_I 2011]

This expert concludes that there is a need for a “single protocol guided by government, by
legislation and policy, because ultimately identity is rooted in law and policy.” [Res_I 2011]
This may be comparable to the air travel industry where air companies are owned by
private entities, even airports may be operated privately, but within a broad interoperable
regulatory framework agreed upon by national governments (e.g., security standards and various
policies regarding the operation of aircrafts, luggage handling, and travel documents). Clearly
the work of harmonizing regulations in order to create a comparable regulatory regime in support
of this interoperable, global digital identity infrastructure has not even begun. It is not even clear
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whether the sate actors see the need or relevance for this dynamic to start or whether it will result
de facto from the dynamic created by the U.S. Strategy and the one that will follow the European
Union’s regulation (OECD 2011, European Commission 2012 and [gov_nstic]). For now, the
technology designers are facing what appears to be “inconsistent regulatory frameworks between
jurisdictions” [Res_H 2010].
As it stands right now, a major barrier to adopting a fully interoperable data flow, transborder data flow,
personal data, [is] government regulation that prevents the flow of data, in a way that is clearly understood
enough between jurisdictions that it can happen, in realistic way. [Res_F 2010]

This expert sounds rather optimistic about the technology, although he also recognizes the
challenge of user adoption. Is it enough for government to simply open the personal data
floodgates for transborder flow – and the technology as well as the social and market forces will
take care of the rest?
The technologies are already there, they need to be stitched together, they need to be cleaned up, they need
to be profiled in more effective ways, but it’s regulation and user adoption… (inaudible) Of course by
enterprise interest, I mean, you know, there has to be economic interest to do so, but I think that’s clear. I
think people understand that when personal data flow freely money will follow, money will be made.
[Res_F 2010]

It is not always clear to all the stakeholders where that money will go or which one(s) of them
stand(s) to benefit the most from it and which one(s) might not, or what actions need to be taken,
if any, in order to make sure all stakeholders benefit from it to the extent possible.
•

The politics of technology
Part of the non-technical challenges that may be daunting to resolve include the politics

implied in the design of something as sensitive as identity, among the actors involved in that
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process. One of the individual actors acknowledges that “ultimately the fact that these
infrastructures do create tremendous shift … in control [and] power” and that they raise
concerns over “privacy and autonomy considerations..., that may be the biggest thing that has
stood in the way of adoption so far” [Brandt_2010]. Concerns of power and control are not
governments’ only. They also involve economic, commercial and any other social actors based
on their particular interests. It is no surprise that all the big players controlling and trading with
consumer data (Web portals with email service, social network platforms, credit reporting
services, etc.) are represented in these digital identity processes; it is a sound business
intelligence practice for them to stay abreast with any dynamic that could have a dramatic impact
on their industry and try to make that potential impact positive for them. The question is: to what
extent the fundamental principles that have been laid out – such as the guaranty of assurance to
all stakeholders, including protections for the individual users, the principles of user-centric
identity and the Seven Laws of identity – can resist the tensions between diverse and sometimes
divergent or competing stakeholder interests?
Any digital identity mechanism requires technological innovation upfront. The players
involved in that work of innovation are private actors, that is, actors who invest private capital in
R&D and business operations related one way or the other to that process. The expectations of
reward as a consequence of their investment have implications for the outcomes. How possible is
it then that the actors involved agree on an outcome that would live up to the design principles
proclaimed upfront? What really are the incentives for doing so, if any? We previously saw the
limits of the liability and cost argument as a deterrent. At this point, it appears that nothing will
substantially change unless a remarkable shift occurs in business models and practices (although
it is not clear how), or a set of reforms are put in place by a commonly accepted authority such as
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the government, or there is at least some coordination process led by both government and the
private sector towards the desired outcome.
Furthermore, the potential implications of this technology command the involvement of
social actors beyond the computer industry.
The big industry players will need to agree on all the important common elements to be brought in place
for an internet identity infrastructure. This is a debate that is not just of a technical nature, it should
include representatives from all relevant stakeholder communities, including privacy proponents and civil
liberties organizations. [Res_I, 2011]

In that regard, the fact that there are mechanisms and entities that sit in the middle of anyone
else’s communications and transactions may be troubling if there is no transparency about what
the technology enables the intermediaries (or anyone who has some control over it) to do and,
above all, what they are allowed to do – particularly if it is true that, as another respondent
claims, these efforts to build a digital identity infrastructure are about “creating due process for
digital citizens” [Res_L 2011]. If that is the case then the infrastructure must not only
accommodate strong authentication solutions in order to enable a secure correlation of identities
with actual individual users, but some protections and recourses must be afforded to the citizens
as well with regard to their personal data. It only makes sense that such protections and due
process requirements be secured beyond any one organization’s terms of service for consumers.
All the above concerns can only increase in magnitude as soon as one considers that the
potential market for these technologies is global, and not only in terms of markets and
consumers, but also in terms of jurisdictions and citizenry. In the “Cyberspace Policy Review”
(USG 2009), it has been recognized that the US need to work with other countries in their efforts
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to strike out solutions for securing the cyberinfrastructure. As follows, the document raises a
question to be considered:
One area needing further study is whether and in what ways elements of the information and
communications infrastructure ought to be treated as a global commons.(USG 2009: B-4)

As I wrap up this investigation, the Department of Commerce has put forwards a set of
recommendations for establishing a governance structure for the “identity ecosystem.” Without
commenting on the exact content, a few questions come to mind: From a governance
perspective, to what extent will the “identity ecosystem” be treated as a component of national
(security) policy and to what extent will it as a component of “global commons”? To date, USG
is still in a unique position with its capacity to control the logical infrastructure of the Internet
through its exclusive oversight of ICANN and the IANA contract 137, and that situation has
presented some tensions with other governments around the world. With the governance of the
“identity ecosystem,” are we headed in the same direction, even if unintentionally? The fact that
the largest software and Internet companies are concentrated in the US and, as a result, have to
work with USG and submit to the laws, policies and regulations of the U.S. only sharpens the
issue of how to define the future relations between national jurisdictions in the context of this
potentially global digital identity infrastructure.

6.7 Conclusion
In this Case III, I have investigated the present history and process of emergence of
digital identity technologies. I have examined a number of sources offering insights into what

137

The contract that gives ICANN the authority, among other tasks, to manage the assignments of the Internet domain
name suffixes and the allocation of Internet Protocol addresses (every Internet-connected device receives one) and
Internet traffic routing numbers.
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digital identity entails, including the social actors involved in the process of bringing about its
technological implementations. From that a clearer understanding of digital identity has been
gained (compared to what could have been assumed based on past historical experiences), as
well as an awareness about its potential utility and the implications of its handling. I have
presented four identity technology innovations illustrating the variations of the design models
that have been developed so far, including OpenID, CardSpace/ Information Card, U-Prove and
OAuth. I also have described the institutional and policy initiatives that have been taken in the
U.S. – such as the Open Identity Trust Framework model, the Open Identity Exchange and the
“National Strategy for Trusted Identities in the Cyberspace” – in order to accompany the
technology innovation and support the implementation and adoption of the emerging
technologies and systems. Those elements provide a state-of-the-art view of the digital identity
innovation processes at the time of this investigation, both from the side of mere technology and
from the social side.
As those processes are still ongoing, the analysis has at first focused on the gaps,
challenges, potential or outstanding issues still to be resolved two prominent of which include
trust and liability. Based on an analogy outlined by one of the respondents interviewed during the
investigation and pushing further that analogy, I suggest that the notion of insurance is one that
wed together the notions of trust and liability and that looking at liability challenge through those
lenses, it may stand better chances to be worked out in a sustainable manner. Other issues
include the possible divergence of interests among players who are in position to impact the
development and implementation of the technology, as well as concerns about national
regulations as the emerging technologies are meant to be interoperable over the global Internet.
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Now that we have thoroughly surveyed the historical fields of these three types of
identity and authentication mechanisms – medieval seals, passport and government-issued ID,
and digital identity – I now propose to deepen the analysis while trying to elicit their potential
relationship in broader terms.
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CHAPTER 7
Causal Mechanisms and Analytical Explanation

7.1

Introduction

I have now completed the three large historical case studies: Case I, Case II and Case III. In
those cases, I have traced with much detail the history of medieval seals, modern passports
(appended with a case of national ID) and digital identity credentials in terms of their historical
emergence as identification mechanisms. Those three large cases have been designed and
executed in order to address the general research question as applied to the three historical
sequences and identity artifacts.
I now propose in this last chapter before conclusion, first, to take stock and bring the
main insights to bear on addressing the specific research questions for each one of those three
identity mechanisms (see Table 3-2 recalled below). The second major content this chapter
contributes is the depiction of diverse patterns of adoption, from deliberate tactics used by state
actors in order to make the government-issued identity credentials an accepted necessity to the
ambivalent implementation-adoption trajectories of digital technology torn between a userchoice orientation and the comfort of automated processes. While I am at it, I outline a large
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range of rationally possible scenarios that can be derived based on this historical investigation in
terms of how an emerging identification mechanism might become authoritative in general, and
particularly in the present time. As the third and last major item to be found in this chapter, I sum
up the main analytical outcomes in an effort to provide a fitting causal explanation within the
framework of sociohistorical inquiry and discourse. Stated otherwise, this chapter is not a repeat
of the histories already told in the previous ones although it builds on it. Instead, I go over those
histories now less interested by the actual contexts and their specific time-space dependencies
than I am interested in the analytical value of the relevant narrative components and their
potential to yield both an enlightening comparison between the three mechanisms and further
characterization of each – more as a type or a model than as a particular. I abstract those
components from the three Cases, and synthesize them in an effort to assemble an explanatory
discourse of these mechanism-process phenomena.
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Table 3-2: Research questions and design

General
Question

General Q
sequencing

How do social actors, events or processes enable the historical emergence of authoritative identity credentials for the
public at large?
Historical Case I

Historical Case II

Historical Case III

In what circumstances did the challenge of
reliably representing individual identity
within written records emerge in the
Middle Ages and how was it resolved?

How did identity credentials issued by the
national state historically emerge and
become authoritative?

How are social actors, events or processes
leading to the possible emergence of
authoritative digital identity credentials
for Internet end users at large?

Specific research questions
Specific Q.1

Specific Q.2

[I.1] How were individuals led to use that
solution to authenticate their own identity?

[II.1] How have individuals been led to
use government identity documents as a
means to authenticate their own identity?

[III.1] How would Internet end users
come to use digital credentials to
authenticate their identity online?

[I.2] How did social actors come to rely on
that solution for authenticating the identity
of their individual counterpart in a
transaction?

[II.2] How have social actors come to
accept government identity documents as
a reliable way to authenticate the identity
of their individual counterpart in a
transaction?

[III.2] How would independent third
parties come to accept a given digital
identity technology or credential as a
reliable mechanism for authenticating the
end user’s identity online?

Causal mechanisms and pathways in the historical emergence of identification systems
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7.2 Addressing research specific questions
I am, in the following, going to address precisely the overall research question by
providing answers to the two specific questions for each type of identity mechanism
investigated.
7.2.1

Medieval seals

I will start with the first specific question applicable to medieval seals formulated as
follows:
[I.1] - How were individuals led to use that solution [seals] to authenticate their own
identity?
The process that led individuals to rely on seals as a mechanism to authenticate
their identity is based on a belief system that involves a religious worldview. I have
extensively analyzed the predicates of that belief system based on theories and doctrines
articulated by social actors of the time as well as on more fragmented but insightful clues
drawn on analogies made by the same actors between seals and sacramental signs. As to
the process itself however, it remarkably proves to be devoid of decision moments
whereby a uniform rule was established regarding seal requirement for authenticating
identity in transactional records or whereby a procedure was defined as to how to acquire
authenticating seals for individuals. Rather, mutually reinforcing socio-cultural practices
and doctrinal discourse shaped the use of seals as identity tokens in the Middle Ages
from late 11th century onward. As a result, I argue that the process that led individuals to
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use seals as authoritative identity mechanism is twofold. I distinguish first a cultural
moment and then an institutional moment.
In effect, the outcome of using seals as authoritative identity tokens depended
upon the cultural phenomenon of generalized seal ownership and the belief system
underlying that. By later 11th century, individuals from all strata of the medieval society
were using seals as identity tokens in their personal and transactional records, and there
was a widely shared belief that the seal may signify the seal owner, just as any sign links
a signifier to a signified. Culturally, the constant association of seals with the authority of
documents on the one hand and with a personified source of that authority (e.g., the king)
on the other hand created the conditions for believing that seals were an effective
mechanism to represent a person. It is never an easy task to delineate exactly the origins
of cultural influences from a historical period that is so remote, but it has been suggested
that the use of seals by early Merovingian rulers might have been modeled on Byzantine
practices.138 I would also add that the early Augustinian doctrine of signs (4th – 5th
century) also had an impact on the thinking and practices of the medieval elite society,
including rulers, theologian-philosophers and legal scholars, as to how they referred to
signs in general, and particularly to the signs of authority. On the long run, those elite
practices might have served as a model for the layman’s practices from the society at
large.
As to the institutional moment, the Church developed a series of practices for
establishing transaction records which are authenticated/validated using particular marks

138

“Its use imitated the usage of the Byzantine imperial chancery; to seal a document was, for the Merovingian
kings, to behave as a ruler.” (Bedos-Rezak 2000: 1512)
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and signs including the appendage of seals that represented the parties to the transaction.
By so doing, not only the Church put in practice the notion that seals may signify
individuals, but it also sanctioned the idea that seals could be used to authenticate identity
per se. The Church thus provided the basis for legitimizing a presumed ontological
correspondence between the seal and the seal owner and brought that process to
completion, with theological doctrines and religious discourse cementing that belief by
linking it to the sacred foundations of medieval institutions.
The Church personnel, theological thinkers and entrepreneurs, elaborated a
narrative drawing on sacramental doctrines, particularly pertaining to the Eucharist and
the Trinity. That narrative entertained the worldview whereby God remained the absolute
reference and ultimate origin of any truth and authority. However, God did no longer
have to be the direct and authoritative source of the signification of all signs. That
narrative and legitimation in turn reinforced private practices that were already common
among the few literate as regards personal correspondence. While two private individuals
conceivably could still enter in contract their own way and without sealing any document,
they might at some point have wanted however to operate by the norms of the Church
institution. That would most likely have been the case for high value transactions, in the
view of at least one of the parties involved. They could have wanted to proceed by the
protocols of the Church institution because: i) the Church was visibly the largest normsetter and rule-maker of the time with significant enforcement capacity and leverages
(including a court system) and yet still close to people, ii) the Church was for the society
at large the best possible moral guarantor and referee who could step in and mend fences
in case of conflict, including outside formal court proceedings, and iii) many transactions
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were already conducted with the Church using the same protocols, notably donations
made for the purpose of securing the salvation of one’s soul in the afterlife, which was an
issue of extreme importance in the eye of the faithful at that time. In effect, the monopoly
then retained by the Church as information broker and service provider in matters of
afterlife, which constituted a strong incentive for donations and bequeaths to the Church,
also helped spread those practices of record-sealing in the public at large.
At the first layer, the authority/authoritativeness of seals conceptually stems from
the authentic relation between a sign and its referent. Authoritative identity then implies
first and foremost personal authority over one’s own representations, based on an alleged
ontological correspondence between the person and the seal-object via its figure-image.
That correspondence is both enabled and captured in the figure-image which inscribes the
“ego” of the seal owner in the matter and substance of the seal. At the second layer, the
authority of signs was founded on the relationship of likeness between God and his
(once) living “signs” or manifestations (Christ on one side and the human being on the
other), and authoritativeness was achieved in any pair of signifier-signified mimicking
that likeness.
[I.2] - How did social actors come to rely on that solution [seals] for authenticating
the identity of their individual counterpart in a transaction?
We can distinguish mainly two use categories for medieval seals by the general
public: personal communications and binding transactions. In personal communications,
counterparts were other individuals who adhered to the same belief system as described
above and participated in the same cultural practice that preceded any discursive
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articulation of its foundations. In binding transactions, there were first and mainly those
conducted with the Church itself which was the leading player to be concerned with
written records in general, and particularly with those transferring property rights to the
Church and with other contractual documents. In effect, one should note that the Church
being often at the receiving end of important transactions such as land donations, it is
literally the first stakeholder in the reliability of the applicable identification mechanisms
and the necessity that all other stakeholders buy into that reliability (or belief thereof).
As a ubiquitous institution with the largest intellectual capital of the time, the
Church provided the most competent personnel (as scribes and notaries) not only to
create written records, but also to attend to the specification of the protocols that
organized related practices as well as to their validation and their curation or custody.
Based on the facts that on the one hand the Church was the predominant rule-maker, from
the judiciary to record-making and documentary validation, and on the other hand it was
the largest counterpart in sealed identity-bound transactions, it set the norms and the
template to be followed by all potential institutional counterparts.
The specific innovation of the 11th century was to create the symbolic and
conceptual conditions but also the institutional environment leveraging the generalized
practice of sealing, or simply seal ownership, in order to enable its systematic use as a
stable and reliable identity tokens by any interested stakeholders. This was not achieved
because an authority centrally defined the material specifications of seals and their
validity as identity tokens. Rather and as was previously established, this was achieved
by the fact that the most ubiquitous authority of the time shared that practice and even
promoted it by producing a discourse that endorsed, justified and legitimized seals as a
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general mechanism for authenticating identity. This made most potential stakeholders
confident in relying on it. In so doing, the Church as an effective political, economic,
social and religious force contributed mostly to formalizing and institutionalizing the
authoritativeness of seals as identity mechanism for the people at large. In that sense,
seals were not only de facto, but became also de jure (normative) mechanism for
authenticating identity.
Now I will turn to the specific questions pertaining to the second historical
episode and type of identity credential, that is, the passport and more broadly,
government-issued identity documents.
7.2.2

Passports and national ID

The first specific question applicable to passports was formulated as follows:
[II.1] - How have individuals been led to use government identity documents as a
means to authenticate their own identity?
In the passport case, the acceptance and use of this credential or a substitute in
due form (e.g., a safe-conduct) by individual citizens for the purposes of traveling
resulted from a mandate. They had no choice if they wanted to travel outside the country
they found themselves living in after the passport requirement was enforced, although the
weight of the mandate arguably is not as heavy at the exit of one’s country of legal
residence as much as it is at the entry of a foreign country.139 In that sense, the first
reason for a traveler to get a passport is that without it, he or she may not be able to enter
the territory contemplated for a visit or for migration (except in cases of bilateral or
139

As early as the first Passport Conference in 1920, the League of Nations recommended the abolition of the
exit visa (League of Nations 1920 and 1922).
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regional agreement on a passport waiver program.) In the most common case of a visit,
this also applies to the return trip back to the country where the travel originated, as that
country will need some evidence of the prior relationship between the traveler and itself
in order to let him or her back in.140
The passport’s international requirement or mandate was enabled by a three-prong
arrangement. In a given group of countries, virtually all the entities controlling the
resource the passport was supposed to provide – i.e. access to foreign territories, with
each territory being foreign to all the others – agreed on:
i)

a shared policy of passport requirement as a pre-condition for access to
territories by non-nationals in general,

ii)

common specifications of passport components and format, and

iii)

issuing a passport to their own citizens at an affordable cost, as a
prerequisite for them to be able to access other territories.

Note on the national ID card:
As for the national identity card, the role of the issuing state in citizens using that
credential is more direct. In some cases, the mandate to carry it around with oneself may
be by law. But in the case I have considered in this thesis (France) legal mandate only
applied to foreigners during the period investigated. Adoption by nationals was enabled
through a series of incentives and policies that put an increasing burden on the citizens
without a government ID, while making things easier with the state bureaucracy for
individuals holding one. In effect, the state took a variety of measures in order to
140

“Aliens had increasingly come to be seen as lacking any prima facie claim to access to the territory of a state
other than their own.” (Torpey 2000: 120)
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encourage individuals to apply for and carry their government-issued ID and the other
institutions to request their members or customers to do the same. The approach was
gradual. For instance, at some point the government decided first to recognize only
identity documents that have been issued by whichever structure as long as it was done
according to a format and guidelines the government itself set forth, and then later on it
moved to only recognize documents directly issued by itself in lieu of the variety of
private and sometimes ad hoc identity artifacts that were previously in currency. To that
end, the government sought to incentivize organizations whose membership card was
previously accepted in public administrations as identity credential so that they encourage
their member to apply for the government ID instead, if they were to continue enjoying
the same service from the part of those administrations.
[II.2] - How have social actors come to accept government identity documents as a
reliable way to authenticate the identity of their individual counterpart in a
transaction?
Before WWI there was no internationally uniform policy of passport requirement,
a requirement which, for that matter, was unevenly implemented, if at all. During and
after the war, passports were nationally re-enacted or maintained in the concerned
countries, and then reinforced internationally through a common framework
recommended by the League of Nations. It was never to recede again from the
international landscape as a continuously growing number of countries progressively
converged in their agreement on the recommended framework.
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In the wake of WWI, all leading countries had security concerns, and there
appeared to be a consensus that being able to control the identity of foreigners coming in
and going out of a country was a necessary means and a good way to mitigate national
security risks. However, a unilateral national policy can only ensure that citizens residing
in a country be issued a passport by the government making such policy, which defeats
the purpose of controlling visitors. As a consequence, a coordinated effort was needed in
order to enable an international policy of passport requirement.
Furthermore, due to the principle of reciprocity most countries had an interest to
participate in the process of establishing basic rules for an international-type passport,
whether by contributing to define those rules or by implementing them. In effect, by
default governments are expected to allow their citizens to travel at will. As a result, they
should not take or fail to take any measures, which would either way result in barring
their citizens from traveling (otherwise, this would clearly constitute a breach of the
freedom of movement.) Likewise, they have a stake in their country being open to foreign
visitors (e.g., growing tourism industry, international cooperation). In those conditions,
the only way for a country to avoid the burden of having to address a wide variety of
specifications of the passport requirement from all the other countries which its nationals
may want to visit is to enable reciprocity, starting with creating and adopting shared
standard practices in that regard as much as possible.141 The level of burden imposed by a
government of a given country onto visitors from another country (hence onto the
government of those visitors) is expected to be commensurate to the level of burden

141

National security which is today the big discriminating factor in passport and visa requirements was already
cited as a possible ground for exception from the first Passport Conference (League of Nations 1920).
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imposed on its own nationals (hence onto that government itself) when they in turn visit
the other country.
As a result, governments were willing to find an internationally shared solution to
enable traveling across countries while providing a means to mitigate national security
risks and, maybe most importantly, quiet down their security concerns in the wake of
WWI. The same three-prong approach outlined above led to a consensus among
governments, resulted in the expansion of the passport worldwide. Coordination of
passport requirement policies through collective resolutions including recommendations
of common guidelines and basic specifications enables most of the states to issue a
credential that is globally accepted by other governments for the purposes of international
traveling and border-crossing, and to recognize passports issued by the other
governments.
As to the acceptance of, and reliance on, passport credentials by non-state actors,
it is predicated on government recognition and acceptance. In a foreign country, the
passport is the default identity credential until one has stayed long enough in that country
to be assigned a local identifier due to one’s transaction needs or until one has built a
durable institutional affiliation. In the meantime, a foreign passport duly stamped by
customs services is good for an identity credential authenticating the individual foreigner
with any stakeholder/verifier within the concerned country. However, one may note that
if applicable, those counterparts and relying parties may favor a credential issued by a
local or national authority over the foreign passport, although not necessarily always. I
explain this by the notion that it is more feasible to deal with an authority within reach or
easier to reach than an authority out of reach or more difficult to reach. It is more cost-
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effective to interact with the former than with the latter. This is particularly the case for
entities of narrower scope than national-level authority vis-à-vis a foreign national
government.
From the domestic side and concerning nationals, resorting to a passport for
identification may be considered as using a hammer for a scalpel, if only because the
expectation of holding a valid passport solely applies to people traveling overseas
(generally further than the countries next door). Presumably, at any point in time within a
country the proportion of people who have applied for a passport within the last three to
five years (depending on the validity timespan of a passport in that country) is still
notably lesser than hundred percent of that country’s population in most countries. For an
individual holding a passport however, this would generally be accepted by counterparts
in identity transactions as authoritative identity credential, in lieu of any other nationallyrecognized identity credential, based on three factors:
i)

The passport is issued by the same authority as a national ID card

wherever available, that is, by the highest national authority. In other words, the same top
national authority vouches for the identity of the citizen in either case.
ii)

To the possible exception of the one’s address, the basic identity data that

is displayed on any alternate nationally-recognized identity credential is generally
included in the passport as well, for whether leaving the country or staying inside, the
government is consistently interested in the same set of identity attributes about the
individuals.
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iii)

Finally and more particularly, counterparts will accept the passport to the

extent that the identity attribute they might be specifically interested in, if any, also
features on the passport based on reason ii) otherwise we are back to reason i) above.
Note on the national ID card:
1) The commandment of sovereignty: Since the Peace of Westphalia from the midseventeenth century (Croxton and Tischer 2001), which resulted in the partitioning of the
world space into national territories sharing equal power of sovereignty, the state has no
legal competitor for wielding authority within the territory under its control. It is in a
unique position, at the top of the authority pyramid which includes all other institutions
that operate within that territory. In those conditions and in terms of the level of
effectiveness/authority of identity credentials, an identity document issued by the
government holds sway over any identity document issued by any other institution or
organization in the same jurisdiction. The latter is usable across all institutions that come
under the national jurisdiction and in every one of the subordinate jurisdictions, whereas
a credential issued by any other organization or institution of a lesser scope is most likely
to be usable with that entity alone or along with a limited number of affiliated structures.
In any case, its use scope would be much narrower than the national jurisdiction.
2) Authority to make and enforce laws: Related its capacity to wield the powers
of sovereignty, he government makes and enforces the law to which every inhabitant in a
given country is subject to. This implies that if any stakeholder has been harmed or
abused as a result of a transaction with an individual, in any case if an offense or crime
occurs, the alleged victim would be more effective at finding and holding the responsible
accountable if it were able to identify the suspect(s) to the state – i.e., the law enforcer –
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using the very identifier that the state itself has provided than it would trying to do it
using other identifiers that are foreign to the state apparatus.
3) One person, one identity: Finally, a factor that plays into bringing other social
actors and various entities to rely on government identity documents is, in a sense, their
standard and monolithic nature in defining every individual with one limited, fixed and
stable set of attributes. Every individual within the jurisdiction is potentially subject to
documenting the same set of attributes and ideally every set of documented attributes is
persistently linked to one and the same individual over time.
Lastly, I am going to address the latest and contemporary experience of identity
mechanisms in emergence and address the specific research questions regarding digital
identity.
7.2.3

Digital identity technology

With regard to digital identity, the answers to the specific research questions will be
tentative, and at times resorting to informed conjectures, as we are not yet at a stage
where authoritative identity credentials are in use online and the processes that might take
us there are still ongoing. But before I address the questions, I suggest noting a
development that occurred in the digital identity industry as I was investigating this case.
Microsoft made public its decision not to ship the then awaited release of
CardSpace and thus to discontinue the development of the Information Card technology,
which is considered one of the most user-centric identity technologies so far, during the
2011 RSA Conference (a cryptography and information security annual gathering in San
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Francisco) from 14 to 18 February.142 The company posted the news on its blog on
February 15, which reads in part:
Windows CardSpace was initially released and developed before the pervasive use of online
identities across multiple services. Perhaps more importantly, we released the user component
before we and others had delivered the tools for developers and administrators to easily create
claims-ready services. The identity landscape has changed with the evolution of tools and cloud
services. Based on the feedback we have received from partners and beta participants, we have
decided not to ship Windows CardSpace 2.0.143

By this, Microsoft admits that the value proposition of digital identity as an end in itself
for the end user, even with the outmost focus on the user’s preferences, is marginal. It
may satisfy the mind but the user doesn’t have much opportunity to use it, neither is
he/she ever compelled to, therefore it is not a sustainable business proposition. The above
interviewee (who broke the news to me at this occasion) expresses the same order of idea
as follows:
User adoption is gonna be driven exclusively by the feature domain of the applications they wanna
run. And if those applications require a user-centric ubiquitous identifier approach then that’s
what they will have… identity systems are just not big enough for users to care about them. … It
really comes down to: what do users go online for? And they don’t go online to create accounts,
they go online to go to particular websites. They go online to get something done, right? They’ve
got a job that they need to get done… If you help them achieve that purpose or complete the task
better, then they’ll do it. … But identity systems themselves are just too small to provide that kind
of value to users; they’re enablers rather than the things that really provide value to users. The

142

I first learned of this development while interviewing one of my respondents for the digital identity case less
than a week after it was announced.
143 See http://blogs.msdn.com/b/card/archive/2011/02/15/beyond-windows-cardspace.aspx
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applications layer has to demand them. …That’s something that has to be architected in. (Res_M
2011)

Eve Maler, a notable voice in the digital identity, access management and
computer security industry writes this on her blog in reaction to the CardSpace news:

The CardSpace model had nice phishing resistance properties that cloud-based identity selectors
will find hard to replicate, alas. But without wide adoption on the open Web, that wasn’t going to
make a dent anyway. We’ll have to look for other native-app solutions over time for that.144

I will revert to this recent development with CardSpace and to the current trends
regarding possible alternate solutions later on as I address the specific research questions
applied to digital identity, starting with the first as follows.
[III.1] - How would Internet end users come to use digital credentials to authenticate
their identity online?
With the particularity it has to ship most of the meaningful exchanges relating to
identity mechanisms from the physical world to the electronic medium, the Internet may
present its own and maybe adoption pathways145 or what I also refer to as an
implementation-adoption trajectory. In effect one may notice an emerging pattern in the
choices that are being made by Internet businesses and Web service providers in order to
bring the user to adopt or at least to make use of digital identity technologies that might
be available. This is so because it is becoming increasingly clear that identity per se does

144

See http://blogs.forrester.com/eve_maler
The term “pathway” applies specifically to adoption, that is, how to make the technology become part of
individuals’ routines as Internet users. As such, it must be distinguished from its use in my later effort to
outline scenarios toward the future emergence of possible authoritative identity systems/credentials themselves
(see section 7.3)
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not constitute a compelling sales pitch to the user; an identity service must relate to
something else that is valuable to the user. For the user, an identity technology can only
have the value that those other things may hold or offer. This may well be a factor in
what led to Microsoft’s decision above regarding CardSpace.
Early user-centric technologies such as Info Card are clearly predicated on a user
that is as fully aware as possible, thus on her autonomy and ability to make informed
decision. While that pattern of adoption seems to be losing steam at this point, instances
of it may still be possible in the future (using for example U-Prove). In her blog146 Maler
further elaborates on her diagnosis of the state of affairs offering some prospective
thought:
More significantly, I think neither CardSpace nor its IMI [identity metasystem interoperability]
protocol have lived up to the “claims-based identity” mantra anyway, being too focused on fixed
aggregations of claims from a single source. A more productive future path will be the OAuth
pattern, of which Facebook Connect and Twitter are familiar examples. In this pattern, relying
parties can score user-delegated access directly to each source of truth on a secure back channel,
and can continue to pull fresh data even after the user disconnects.

In effect, the course of events is showing the emergence of a trajectory of
implementation-adoption that is quite different from the promises of CardSpace. This
latest trajectory reflects the Facebook-Connect (‘f-connect’) or the OAuth pattern. It
consists of an implementation that bypasses (the self-aware involvement of) the user – if
not completely, at least significantly – whether that is specifically the intention or not.
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http://blogs.forrester.com/eve_maler
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This is done by automating the communications required between servers using back
channels, that is, by taking the user out of that communication loop.
It is hard for any attentive observers not to see the Microsoft’s decision about
CardSpace, one of the most user-centric instances of digital identity design and
implementation, against the backdrop of the perceived success of the OAuth pattern
through the proxy of Facebook-Connect and more generally the business success of
Facebook and Twitter. One respondent refers to that model as a “Trojan horse for this
user-centric identity system.” [Res_M, 2011]
OAuth enables websites to seamlessly share data on the user’s behalf at
differentiated levels of access depending on the data to be shared and on user choice – at
least ideally. It enables a smooth data exchange between sites and services on the Web at
a one-click request of the user without the latter having to take any further action. We
may experience this protocol with Facebook-Connect (or ‘f-connect’), which is a nonstandard version of the OAuth protocol, designed for data sharing between the social
network and third-party sites or applications. That protocol is typically used for a totally
automated access control by either a one-click sign-in to third-party site with one’s
Facebook account/credentials or by clicking on a sponsored link from within one’s
Facebook account. Generally, the user is not made aware of what exactly is taking place
between Facebook servers and the other sites, other than (when accessing a sponsored
link within own Facebook account) a dialog box that asks the user to confirm whether he
or she wants to proceed to the external site. At the beginning, very few users might have
understood the implications of this choice. Today, most probably understand that the
other site has some level of access to their data, but it is not clear they understand exactly
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what access level (does that include their name, their email address, their pictures, their
residential location, their visited locations, their whole account history, or only their
‘likes’ with or without any PII?), whether they can decide that, and how to choose and
make the system behave in a way that exactly reflects their preference. In the meantime,
Facebook users are expected to log into their account as human individuals using the
“anti-pattern” [Res_B, 2010] authentication procedure based on username and password,
and not via some software automated procedure or other improved (more secure)
protocols which would be agile enough to capture a wide range of user preferences
upfront.
In a nutshell, Internet users may be led to use online digital identity credentials
seamlessly, basically the same way they have been using the Internet so far, with various
processes taking place during browsing without the knowledge of the user even if they
involve her personal data. We all are well too familiar with click-through agreements
users have to adhere to for online services. Those so-called agreements spell out in
legalese the terms of services as a full-fledged contract which no one but a lawyer would
actually understand, let alone the average user. With such practice, if a company comes
up with an online service that users are massively interested in and the company requires
the use of a given digital identity system to access the service, chances are a great portion
of the potential customers of that service will resolve using that identity system. At that
point, the level afforded to user choice and the protections built in for the user may not be
the factors determining adoption but the value of the service to be accessed (in the eye of
the user) and the simplicity of the identification requirements (e.g., one or two clicks, and
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the rest be left to automated, back-channel communications.) However, that solution
alone does not make an identity system authoritative as I have defined in this dissertation.
[III.2] - How would independent third parties come to accept a given digital identity
technology or credential as a reliable mechanism for authenticating the end user’s
identity online?
In effect, in order to realize the goal of authoritative identity credentials must be
usable with entities other than their issuer. Here is how a respondent describes the shift
from a historical context where identity did not require documentation to one where it
eventually did.
Um…, if you think about how people have done identity, even before computer existed, uh… You
know, my grandfather probably didn’t have much in way of identifying documentation, and
probably didn’t need much. Uh…, you know, most everybody he dealt with had known him his
whole life, and... You know, he probably had a driver’s license, which was issued by the state, but
I think people mostly thought of it as a driver’s license; they didn’t really think of it as identity.
But, you know, somewhere around the middle of the last century, people started more and more to
deal with people who they hadn’t known for a long time. And, so they looked around and said,
well… can’t do. It turned out driver’s license was… maybe the most obvious way to start thinking
about identity. And so the driver’s license, at least in the United States became the de facto
identity document… In fact most drivers’ license bureaus… still vehemently deny that they were
identity documents. … But nevertheless, that was a very small foundation provided inadvertently
by the government that allowed a fairly robust and workable system of identity to develop in the
real world. Online I don’t think there has ever been any organization with sufficient authority or
ubiquity to serve as that foundational identity system the way that driver’s license did. I think it
would’ve been nice if somehow we were able to do that but it never did happen and I don’t think it
ever will at this point. And so people have been searching for twenty or thirty years for ways to
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essentially bootstrap a trust framework for online identity systems, and… and without something
like the driver’s license it’s really hard. We may eventually get credentials that are relatively
strong and backed by an organization with sufficient clout of trust but until that time we are left to
solve the problem on our own, and people have tried a lot of different things… (Res_M 2011,
emphasis added)

It is hard to cite any exception to the fact that other institutions including private business
have piggybacked government-issued IDs in all countries (see section 7.2.2). Although in
the countries where formal ID documents were the earliest introduced in history,
governments clearly designed identification systems essentially for their own use, those
artifacts have become everybody else’s way of identifying individuals. National ID
documents, driver’s license and even social security numbers, all have followed that same
pattern. Why? Because: 1) those tokens are generally fixed and maintain a stable and
persistent link to the same individual over time, 2) they were established with the
authority of the law enforcer to whom everybody else in a given society is legally
accountable. The state is in that sense ubiquitous in the socio-physical world and
certainly has a clout of authority, if not trust, as far as discovering the identity of people
is concerned. Therefore, everybody leverages the identity documents provided by the
government in order to conduct their transactions. Could that sort of things happen on the
Internet?
The same respondent seems to suggest that this might not be possible with the
Internet. Raising concerns about the same issue, he emphasizes the trust (and authority)
requirement for a working solution.
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I think the systems that we’ve seen spring up over the last, uh…, 5 or 6 years, particularly things
like Information Cards, which… Microsoft’s said they’re no longer supporting, provided at least
the technical framework for those kinds of systems of trust to take hold. You can imagine a world
where something like Info Card is widely accepted and used by enough organizations with enough
clout and standing to become, you know, a kind of foundational element for an identity system…
But absent that, you know, in the world where things like OpenID are the de facto standard, I
think it’s very hard to get any kind of system of trust that leads to a real link to a person’s identity.
Certainly the fact that I have a Google account and that I’ve used that account for twelve years,
you know, gives that account some standing, but there’s no way to actually link that account to
me. And so we’re kind of left with more ad hoc scenarios people are gonna continue to develop.
And frankly we’ve developed business models that don’t depend as much on strong identity as they
might. You know, every time I log in to my online banking site it frustrates the heck out of me
because I just know there is a better way than what they’re doing but, you know, it’s just what
we’re stuck with at this point.” (Res_M 2011, emphasis added)

In other words, no technical system has risen up to the authoritative status that may
constitute virtually a breeding ground for a root credential or for the trust and reliance of
a significant portion of digital identity stakeholders, whether organizational or individual.
But beyond the analogy with society in the physical world, are there any other
possible ways proper to the Internet to achieve the same goal? Maybe. We previously
saw how technology may help online service providers spare themselves the need for a
fully self-aware user adoption regarding the identity management component of their
service. Here on top of technology, business model may possibly be the driving force to
adoption by other social entities. We have had a glimpse of that with a notable number of
websites that have sprung up, which display the ‘f-connect’ sign indicating that the user
can log on to their servers with her Facebook logins (in one click if they are already
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logged onto Facebook.) Whether that number of third-party websites is now stagnant,
decreasing or still increasing in the particular case of Facebook is immaterial. The fact is
a Web service may reach a point where many other Web sites or services may find it
acceptable, even attractive, to accept the former’s identity credentials as a way of
managing access to their own site or service. One may note that among those third-party
sites are many that did not previously and may still not require logging in but will
nevertheless prompt for Facebook logins if for some reasons147 they “think” the user of
the computer requesting access is a Facebook user. This shows that the existence and
popularity of platforms such as Facebook may generate new business models and perhaps
alternate trajectories and opportunities for the emergence of authoritative identity
systems.
Furthermore, it is remarkable that government is at this point among the first
movers on the customer side of this technology. This suggests at least that there is a clear
need and demand for identity technology on the part of the government. Based on the
history of the passport and its legacy to date, it should not come as a surprise to anyone
that government is a big consumer of identification tools. While in the context of digital
technology and networks, government is not the maker of the identity credentials, its
demand and promotion of these may have, intentionally or not, the same effect that
government-issued physical identity credentials have historically had.
If the US government adopts these technologies it’s going to have a major impact on the market
both because [of its] seal of approval and because US government is a major consumer. [Res_H
2010].

147

First of those reasons is that a Facebook account is already open in the same browser on the same
computer. Potentially some sites may also use cookies to track possible Facebook users and ask for their logins.
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If government-citizen business use cases take off first, however, business uses will naturally
piggyback on the emerging identity infrastructures. [Res_I 2011]

Clearly, it is not only the individual users’ adoption that might be impacted and
fostered by government early adoption; this might also drive other organizations to rely
on these identity technologies, which in turn might amplify user adoption. To the extent
that it is only a handful number of companies that will be building the digital identity
infrastructure and systems, end user adoption and business adoption are in this context
interdependent. If organizations and Web services do not adopt the technologies,
particularly as relying parties, then users will have very little opportunities to use them,
unless the vendors of these technologies are also online service providers so that they can
directly enroll their retail customers to use their systems with their (providers’) own
Websites. This obviously is not a formula for a widespread implementation of the
technology, although some level of acceptance of the technology might still occur even in
those conditions.
Concerning the argument made earlier (section 6.6) about business adoption
based on the incentive of being relieved of the burden and the risks of managing users’
personal data, some organizations may be more receptive than others to the cost
component. In other words, they might want to be ridden of the costs of storing and
managing their customers’ personal data, assuming those costs outstrip the revenue they
may get from trading that data, as most of them do. These organizations may include
universities, hospitals or government agencies. But what about large commercial entities:
wouldn’t they want to keep dealing with every aspect of their business related to their
customers’ personal data and therefore also become identity providers for their own sake
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and that of their customers? This necessarily is neither a hindrance in itself nor a highly
unlikely scenario since governments, too, initially provided identity credentials for their
own sake and specific consumption.
The fact is that there will not authoritative digital identity systems unless there is
an infrastructure enabling interoperability between digital identity systems. Just as a form
of “interoperability” had to be negotiated between governments through policy
recommendations, interoperability must be negotiated among private business actors and
designers through standards. However, one layer that adds more complication to the case
of interoperable digital identity – which was different from the passport case – is
competing business interest. While for that reason, some technology solutions may
emerge as more attractive to the consumers than others depending on a number of
variables (other than technological ones) such as quality of service, variety of services
and marketing effectiveness, etc., the lack of interoperability is definitely limiting for a
few number of systems to become authoritative. It shall be noted that interoperability is
not just a technical (infrastructure) problem but also a business problem as Web services
will need to agree that they do not all necessarily have to issue credentials and yet accept
credentials issued by others among them. In such technical and business condition, the
market may move gradually toward a handful number of most fitting solutions. In that
respect, it is important that the initial offering be diverse enough and able to cater for all
normative preferences and the whole spectrum of user choice. The issue is that nothing
guarantees that, as not any entity can set up the necessary infrastructure to compete. For
instance, will consumer associations be able to establish their own TF and enroll a TF
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provider and other businesses that will be willing to subscribe to the policy requirements
of such associations?
In this section I have addressed the specific research questions regarding the three
historical sequences of identity mechanisms. In the following I am going to try and
complement this picture with a number of scenarios that can be drawn on the insights
gained so far from studying the three cases.

7.3 Scenarios and pathways to authoritative digital identity
In this section propose possible pathways deriving from the holistic and contextual
understanding of the sociohistorical processes that have led to the emergence of past
authoritative identity credentials. Those are hypothetical scenarios in that each one
implies an hypothesis about what might be in the near and medium-term future, as the
processes to bring about authoritative digital identity credentials evolve. The result is a
set of five possible pragmatic-logical148 scenarios (which I also call pathways) in
anticipation of how future identity mechanisms (in this case, a digital one) could emerge
and become authoritative. There are three categories of scenarios: the first two derive
each from the two types of credentials investigated from past history, that is, the seal
(pathway 1 and 1bis) and the passport or government-issued ID (pathways 2 and 3), and
the third includes projections (pathways 4 and 5) inferred from the identity-related
change patterns that have been observed through history. All are described as follows.

148 By that I mean scenarios that are logical in that they relate in some rational way to antecedents that are
defined in time and space – as a consequence, their rationality takes into account the pragmatic circumstances
of their antecedents. In contrast, these scenarios are not the result of a mathematical combination ran over a
finite set of entities or variables; they are presented with no claim whatsoever to exhaust all abstract-logically
possible combination or configuration of any set of variables.
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Pathway 1: An institution of a large scope149 and with a significant control over
norm-setting in a social context endorses an existing likely mechanism, backing it
with its value system, and prescribes the use of said mechanism to represent
individuals and authenticate their identity in records that are meant to be
(legally) binding.
We might consider the following as a variant of that scenario:
Pathways 1bis: An institution of a large scope, which can exercise influence
through the technology infrastructure or through rulemaking, co-opts an existing
likely mechanism (which already appears to be credible to most potential
stakeholders as a reliable identification mechanism), or approves of new ones by
actually accepting them in its own transactions for the purposes of authenticating
individuals.
This scenario is modeled on the example of the western medieval Church providing the
normative and conceptual basis that justified and reinforced the belief that seals
represented or signified the identity of their owner and, as such, they were a reliable
instrument for the authentication of the latter. This scenario still is plausible in any
updated form. For instance, a public institution that exercises authority through
rulemaking or a private business entity controlling a significant portion of the Internet
infrastructure or having a dominant market position in some type of Web services may,
by adopting a particular digital identity technology, accelerate its rise to authoritative
identity mechanism. As a matter of fact, it is the first closest scenario to the current
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By this, I mean an institution whose role and influence in the social setting under consideration goes beyond
organizational and proprietary boundaries – in other words, with which the public at large has to deal with.

408
developments for digital identity. The US government, law maker and enforcer, has given
its approval to emerging digital identity technologies with its willingness to adopt them
for its own transactions with citizens. With such endorsement by the government as early
adopter, the industry may hope to get a critical mass of customers using those
technologies so as to make them viable or to render them attractive to other institutions
and more users.
Pathway 2: The currently predominant identity authority (issuer of authoritative
identity credentials) takes the necessary measures to digitally replicate existing
identity mechanisms which are based on physical credentials and to issue a
digital form of those credentials or a digital equivalent online.
This scenario is based on the idea of a rather mechanical replication in digital form (or in
any other applicable virtual form) of what already exists in physical form. It draws on the
fact that the most widely recognizable identity authority being a public authority
institution – particularly the national state with regard to the passport150 – authoritative
digital identity credentials may just be a digital reproduction of the same mechanisms and
credentials as designed by the state. Necessary measures shall be taken with regard to the
technological infrastructure so as to provide at least the same level of security as with
government-issued physical credentials. This scenario is highly unlikely in the U.S. in
any foreseeable future due to its clear private sector orientation and the dynamism of its
information technology market, but it may not be excluded for every country in the word.

150

Plus the national ID card in many places outside the US, and within the US, the individual states for the
driver’s license.
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Pathway 3: The cyberspace infrastructure, the digital identity infrastructure, or
more generally the infrastructure supporting or enabling the type of resource to
be controlled, is partitioned into domains each under the control of a single
authority. All such authorities then cooperate towards a common framework of
rules and procedures for issuing an identity-bound credential that addresses a
shared concern or need. This enables them to recognize each other’s credential
issued according to protocols defined by the common framework. That credential
is then required of the customer in order to access the controlled resource.
This is based on the passport pattern where authoritative identity is enabled through
coordination and agreements between authority counterparts among which all the
resource space available is partitioned. In the case of passports, the protected resource is
territory of which the access by individuals was regulated through the passport
requirement. Generalized to any kind of resource controlled by a definite number of
entities, the latter may follow the template of the process that led the governments of the
world to converge over time toward a common passport framework and policy, which has
enabled that travel document to become as authoritative as it is.
The scenario described in Pathway 3 is the second most likely given the current
trends of digital identity processes, although it requires some more elaboration on their
current state. If the OITF model works on the long run, from the standpoint of identitysecured Internet, the Web will stylistically take the form described in Pathway 3: it will
be a digital domain partitioned between TFs. Then TFs might negotiate a broader
framework in order to enable interoperability of their credentials across their boundaries.
The notion of identity metasystem interoperability makes this even more plausible.
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However, there is a notable difference as well: the possibility to still browse the Web
anonymously – or whatever remains of anonymity – in any case without explicit
identification requirement.
Pathway 4: Online digital technology becomes the predominant mode for recordcreation, record-keeping and record-retrieving as well as the medium for most
administrative functions carried out by public authority institutions, chiefly the
national state administration at present. At that point, the relevant body of the
highest public institution in a given social setting issues identity-bound digital
credentials which may then be accepted as digital identity credentials by an
indefinite number of other entities, by virtue of the fact that that institution’s
authority supplants these entities’ especially when it comes to rule-making and
enforcement.
This is a projection based on the idea that the national state had come to issue identity
documents after it mastered to a high degree the writing technology as a technique of
administration (bureaucracy). And then the fact that any other organizations and
institutions are subject to the national state jurisdiction has contributed to governmentissued identity-bound credentials becoming authoritative identity credentials. Hence if
the authority in charge of public affairs in the future comes to do business mostly through
the computer medium, then it might produce credentials that may serve or be adopted by
most of the stakeholders as authoritative identity credentials in that realm. As a
projection, this scenario is a fiction with regard to the current state of affairs in digital
identity.
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Pathway 5: New authorities emerge due to their relevance and critical functions
in the operation of the Internet and the provision of Web services. In that sense
their authority will first derive from the fact that they are instrumental for access
to the global Internet infrastructure and related services and that as such they
happen to control large bases of user-specific data generally, and users’ personal
data in particular, due to innovative services that they provide. This may further
create emerging needs, applications and business models for which those
providers may act as authoritative sources of identity information.
This scenario is in a sense an alternate to the previous one, with this time new digital
authorities emerging. It also is a projection scenario predicated on the prospect that
electronic data may increasingly become an important part of individual and
organizational assets, enabling further social and business transactions of increasing
value through computer and communication networks. This will call for assembling and
maintaining a cyberinfrastructure or data infrastructure that will support those
transactions as well as future innovative and trusted services. Then new authorities may
emerge due to their prominent role in enabling the data infrastructure. Their authority will
be based at least on the de facto relationship that their operation or control of the
infrastructure creates with the user, possibly supplemented by further mechanism in order
to enhance the user’s confidence and the level of assurance with regard to the
representation of personal identity.
While the scenario in Pathway 5 is as fictitious as the one in Pathway 4, it might
be more plausible or likely than the latter. Pathway 4 is a projection that still looks
backward in that it basically transposes a past model into a future context, while Pathway
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5 is forward-looking, as it makes allowance for further innovations and for the emergence
of new types of actors and authority.
At this point in the dissertation, I have addressed all the research questions
formulated in chapters 1 and 3: the general research question as applied to the three
historical sequences investigated as well as the two specific research questions for each
one of the three cases. For this last section of this last chapter before concluding the
dissertation, I seek to offer in more abstract terms an explanatory formulation of the
mechanisms-processes that have been previously described in more time-space
contextual and specific terms. In outlining this history-based causal explanation, my
intention is to fulfill the commitment I articulated in chapter 3 (section 3.3) with regard to
scholarship in sociohistorical inquiry.

7.4 Mechanism-process explanation
In this section, I will abstract from the previous narratives elements of explanatory
relevance and reconstitute an explanatory discourse of the mechanisms-processes at work
in the historical events that unfolded as part of the phenomena this dissertation has
investigated. I first address the use of medieval seals under the rule of the Church,
identity documents under the rule of the national state and digital identity in an era of
competing private actors.
7.4.1

Seals and the rule of the Church

Past the first millennium in Western Europe, the size of the population still was rather
small. People lived in relatively stable settlements and by a community lifestyle built on
personal ties and allegiances implying direct contacts with, and interpersonal knowledge
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of, one another. Most traveled very little, and only short distances when they did. The
serfdom regime at the time might have created situations that sometimes pushed people
to move in search of a new settlement with better conditions of land tenure. However,
they wouldn’t move to faraway distances even by 19th century’s standards. Most were
exposed either to regular interactions with the Church, which was a “transnational”151 and
ubiquitous institution, or at least to the gaze of its authority as long as they lived a regular
life. In all of those conditions, the Church had no need for assigning identity credentials
to people for them to carry around.
Furthermore, most transactions between people might have customarily been
conducted face to face, in any case orally, as one would expect before writing and
literacy was popularized. Even the Church could have contented itself with oral promises
and commitments, based on the fact that people were always within its reach and
potentially under its command, even if the risk that they may sometimes default is not nil.
So why record and seal?
1. Recording transactions: Why?
The drive to write in general, and particularly to record transactions or
commitments, is a response to the challenge time and distance pose to human endeavors,
in other words, a means for managing time and distance, especially by institutions. First,
the technology of writing with its capability for record creation enhances the human
notion and experience of time through an objective and artificial memory. What could
have been only said orally, and thus would have become completely elusive once uttered,
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Here ‘transnational’ means literally across nations in the sense of peoples, and not across national state
borders, as that kind of state did not exist then.
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can now be consigned in writing and referred to in the future with much higher
confidence in its accuracy as opposed to oral reporting. Writing contracts or abridges the
time; it brings back to the present a time that is long gone.
Secondly, writing quickly proved to be an arm to domesticate distance, a tool to
resolve or at least contain the challenges posed by spatial extension. It has made it
possible to communicate at distance by one’s own words. Writing can carry the “voice,”
the speech or language of a person or entity to a physical location which that person or
entity is otherwise far from. Appending his seal to written words, a 12th century
gentleman or clergyman could practically delegate himself to a meeting without being
physically present (of course with the limitations that he could not respond to follow-up
interactions at the place and time where his speech was meant to be delivered.)
As for the reasons why the Church recorded transactions, there are two salient
factors to take into consideration in a possible explanation (apart from the fact that the
technology of writing itself was already available then.) First is the gravity in which the
Church held perjury and any failure to honor debts or contractual obligations. In that
context, it could only be useful to reinforce the oral commitment with a consigned and
(presumably) faithful memory of it through an accurate transcription in order to limit the
opportunities for, and to deter against, blatant repudiation of commitments, which
repudiation might have likely been all the more tempting that the stake in the transaction
was high.
Second and maybe most importantly, the Church then was already a large and
formal institution. It did not limit itself to the diocese and its local priest who de facto
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was part of the community and, as such, participated in the personal connections and
inter-knowledge that link every member of the community to other members. The Church
was a large organization, the head and lungs of which were in Rome. As we saw in
chapter 4 the wealth of the Church including estate transactions and payments of any
taxes related to its business were under the control of Rome. Writing down transactions
was also a way to overcome or control the distance between the center and the periphery,
between Rome and the diocese. It enabled or made it easier for Rome to claim the wealth
of the corporate Church without depending on the contingencies of the relationship of a
priest with members of the community he served – which could have been otherwise a
comparative advantage for the local clergy relatively to an emissary or a collector sent
from Rome. Arguably, we begin to see emerging here the feature shared by large
administrative institutions which as such cannot sustain dealing with their constituents
based on personal ties but have to develop alternate, impersonal mechanisms (such as a
record system as an instrument of bureaucracy) in order to handle and sustain the
business of their large and growing base of customers or patrons. In other words, the
practice of recording transactions of all sorts which the institution engaged in was one of
the mechanisms that facilitated the scaling of bureaucratic action and the permanence of
the institution through the permanence of its recorded transactions with its customers as
well as of their outcomes.
2. Binding persons to records: identity as a technique (Why seal?)
In this historical context, people were largely identified based on their community
ties and locale reputation. Literacy and the use of written artifacts were limited. The
scope of individuals’ agency was closely tied to their physical or geographical situation.
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As a result, there was no requirement for documented identity credentials, nor was there
the need upfront for institutions to collect personal data that may have been used for
identifying individuals (although the Church might have had records about people
regarding their religious practices such as baptism and confession.) Then the primary
objective of using seals was not for a party with no prior interaction with a person to be
able to discover or ascertain who that person is according to an identity scheme designed
and documented by some authority. Rather, the main objective was to secure parties’
relevant commitments and other expressions of will through formal and reliable records
and, in the process, also to ascertain the consequences of those commitments and
expressions by enabling proper attribution and thus compelling accountability.
Understandably, the primary practical concern of the Church was to ensure the security of
transactions involving property rights as well as other contractual obligations. Therefore
the first challenge to resolve was how to make sure commitments made with the declared
intention to fulfill them remained binding in the future to the extent applicable and vis-àvis the organized Church as a whole. In that sense, the seal was not much an instrument
for proving an embodied identity as an end in itself, as much as it was for manifesting,
asserting, committing or binding identity as personhood (in the medieval language) of the
seal owner or more precisely the sealer in every use instance whereby the sealer is the
enunciating subject, the source of some speech.
More than anything else, the seal was an instrument of agency. It was a response
to the following question: “How to be present outside the visible body? How does one
represent oneself at distance, in absentia, but with the full force of one’s presence?” It
was a token of identity conceived of as a replica of the self and meant to engage or bind
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the personhood of the sealer. And as such, it could carry out on behalf of the individual a
mediated but direct discourse as well as be the vehicle through which the individual can
delegate some of his or her performing capacity to documents, a vehicle which links the
individual to the written expression of his or her will. The seal also was the selfmessenger, a self-token that performed as a messenger.
While the Church was instrumental as authority in the formal and institutional
relevance of seals for the society at large, the first characteristic about the
authoritativeness of seals was not due to the prescription of an external authority but to
the strength of the link it was able to establish between artifacts and a human source of
speech, decision, commitment and action expressed in those artifacts. The
authoritativeness primarily resided in the conditions and the efficacy of that linking. Any
intervention of an external authority was only relevant to the extent that, on top of
anything else, it supported, upheld or reinforced those conditions – as did the Church
through its own narrative.
The medieval moment in this investigation represents the first logical response (or
step in the response) to the mediated identity challenge in any new form of record
medium, that is, identity as a technique of binding persons to records in that new form of
medium. In this case, identity itself is not yet a document – at least, not a uniformly
defined document by design as we will come to know it in a later period – but a notion
which is enabled through a cultural object. For now, identity is a material sign, a token
materializing and meant to signify the presence of its referent, which is affixed to the
document in lieu of said referent itself. As such, the seal was a necessary component in
the makeup of certain categories of documents, particularly documents that required
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commitment from any entities or individuals, hence depending on a secure and reliable
(i.e., on an authenticating) representation of their person.
Once a mechanism for binding people to records was figured out, this form of
identity mainly needed to be asserted wherever the participation or commitment of the
seal owner was specifically to be conveyed through written records, following the
appropriate procedure required to that effect. The show or assertion of identity by means
of seals occurred by replicating in some material form (e.g., waxen imprint) the original
token representing the individual (seal-matrix) and, as need be, placing such replica
within another material (the record to be sealed) which had its own form and purpose, i.e.
another artifact designed to accomplish something else than demonstrating identity per
se.
Verification of identity could occur afterwards in a process of auditing the
records, for example in order to confirm the actual involvement of the parties when new
claims arose. The seal image (made of symbols and emblems) which constituted the
operational category of seals as far as identity was concerned, displays an iconographic
system that was partly the result and the reflection of a social order and partly the result
of private and somewhat contingent choices (otherwise all people of the same social
status and/or professional group would have had the same seal image.) As a consequence,
identity could not be verified based on the accuracy of the seal image, meaning whether
that image exactly “portrayed” its subject referent. Such notion was not much relevant in
this context – which is not to say that those emblems and symbols had no precise cultural
significance in relation to the referent subject. As I stated before, recognizability of seals
(that is, of seal images) and subsequently their proper attribution to a source was
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predicated on their reputability in the social context of use, notably with the target public
or the recipients of the sealed artifacts.152 However, when challenges occurred regarding
the authenticity of the sealed act vis-à-vis the transacting parties, the image of the seal
was not by itself good enough a probative device enabling to quell any doubt or dispute
about who the referent subject actually was (and subsequently who exactly was to be
ascribed which obligations). In such cases, one referred back to relationships and
commitments in the actual world outside the sealed documents, as well as to the social
capital and reputation of the parties involved.
To the extent enabled by our historical investigation, I have explained above the
workings of medieval seals and sealing. Now let us turn to the modern means devised by
the national state to establish and authenticate identity. It is a process explanation that
will take us through different phases and the way they interrelate to constitute a
compelling explanation of the conditions of emergence as well as the mode of operation
of those credentials.
7.4.2

Identity documents and the rule of the State

In an era where writing and written records have become the central tools of public
management and state bureaucracy while the population has grown in literacy, passports
and identity cards respond to the emerging basic need for the state to control territory as
well as people living in and moving across that territory. I provide here an explanation
regarding the mechanisms that resulted in and characterized the state need to document

152 Referring specifically to the authentic seal, Bedos-Rezak writes: “By the thirteenth century, when jurists
attempted to provide the authentic seal with a broader sociopolitical conception, they insisted that for a seal to
function as an authenticating device, it must be well known. … they recognized that the meanings and agency
of seals depended on local custom.” (2000: 1514)
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people’s identity. I also pinpoint factors that make up the mechanism of governmentissued identity credentials.
1. Emergence of the state’s need to identify people
Three factors stand out in the shaping of the identification rationale of the state. They
include the need to control a territory, progress in the means of transportation and
increased scope of mobility as well as the growing social role of the state. All three
produce a demand driven by the state need to control people.
i) Territorialization of the state
Following the end of the medieval regimes of political rule the modern state
becomes the central sociopolitical authority characterized by ideally well delineated and
codified territorial limits. That work of codification historically began with the peace
treaties of Westphalia in the 17th century. The Westphalian principle of sovereignty
entails that political authority is rooted in territory and that the world is partitioned into
national states equal in sovereignty (thus the second principle of non-interference in
domestic affairs by non-national agents). The people living in a territory thus delineated
are supposed to form a nation (regardless of how culturally diverse they are) and the state
jurisdiction scope is meant to extend to the confines of such nation’s boundaries as well
as of the state territorial borders. Beyond those limits another state takes over with the
same prerogatives, resulting in a series of concurrent and contiguous national
jurisdictions.
ii) Transportation infrastructures and population mobility
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In the late Middle Ages, trade-based growth enabled towns to multiply and to
assert their autonomy vis-à-vis medieval structures of authority and allegiance. In the
same time the development of trade and the bases of mercantilism also drove the
development of transportation infrastructures over the second millennium of this era,
which has progressively increased the mobility of people and goods. With the continuous
improvement of transportation means, capacity and performance, more and more people
traveled farther and farther, crossing the space of different sovereigns and multiple
jurisdictions. By the modern times, the increasing mobility of people projected the topic
of immigration on the public policy agenda, leading policymakers to thrive to appropriate
the concept and define the boundaries of nationality. In addition these development
regarding transportation and mobility added their fair share of growing security concerns
just a few decades away from a half-century of two of the largest wars between national
states. A particularly marked progress in air transportation during the 20th century has
only accelerated that trend, dramatically increasing the flow, speed and reach of
international migration and transit, just as it raised the state security concerns. It was
already clear that by itself one state had no viable mechanism for keeping under control
the growing ranks of migrants and other travelers, bringing government focus, after the
boundaries of nationality were clearly defined, to the need to collectively regulate
corresponding territorial borders and access as well.
iii) People, rights and the social dimension of the state
Concurrently to trade growth the population also grew remarkably throughout late
medieval centuries, presumably because the economic growth led to an improvement in
living conditions. By the time the modern state appeared to be viable, the social
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configuration of local communities began to change under considerable demographic
pressures as well as stress from the emerging state institutions and their power to effect
social changes. The improvements in the transportation sector did not only increase
international transit but did domestic mobility too, which also was a concern to
authorities in a period where the national state was still young and its national identity or
cohesion fragile. In other words, at a time when strangers coming and going was not an
ordinary fact or a salient feature of everyday social life, the sudden arrival of unfamiliar
faces on a local scene, regardless of whether they hailed from another national/domestic
location or from a foreign country, could equally arouse the suspicions of law
enforcement. Furthermore, increasing mobility compounded with the increase in the
population size of city dwellers brought about more and more anonymity among local
inhabitants. In the same time, the role of the modern state in shaping the society through a
number of policy instruments grew larger. As it turned out, the modern state, which was
born on democratic promises, proved to be a consequential social player taking on the
form of welfare state, as it not only created obligations but it also assigned rights. It then
becomes a necessity for the state to know the people within its jurisdiction as its
interactions with them multiplied.
2. Rationale for authoritative credentials
The partitioning of the world space into territories of exclusive sovereignty
exercised by the state, plus the ability of the state to make and enforce the rules of law
(rules of the highest force/authority and the largest scope applicable to all inhabitants in a
state territory) are determinant factors that both put the state in need to control people as
well as territory and put the lower-authority entities within the national jurisdiction in
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such position as to depend on identity credentials issued by the national state, particularly
the ones designed for domestic use. One should note that in situations where the national
state is a federal system like the United States and where the principle of subsidiarity
defers law- and policy-making authority to the member states in relevant areas of
competence, what I just described about the national state in general then applies to the
individual states in those issue areas, safe the exercise of national sovereignty. In other
words, in the US where there is no national ID card and where the state is the authority
issuing an identity-bound credential (i.e., the driver’s license), such credential will tend to
be relied on as authoritative identity credential by all other stakeholders, just like the
national ID card in places where available.
In fact, any credential issued by the state – national or otherwise – which includes
enough information in order to enable the legal identification of its bearer is or will
inevitably become an identity credential with potentially the largest scope and of the
highest authoritativeness within that national or state territory. Otherwise stated, any
identity-bound credential issued by the national state, or whenever applicable by a
member state in a federal system, tends to become an authoritative identity credential
usable by all stakeholders who are subject to the jurisdiction of such state.
For instance, while from the outset the primary goal behind the notion of passport
was to control people’s movement (therefore applicable only to the minority that could
afford traveling long distances then) as opposed to establishing their identity per se, it has
logically and inevitably become an identity credential, even if it is a requirement only for
one purpose. To the extent that as a travel document the passport included the description
and details of every single individual it applied to (even in the case of family passport as
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was initially the custom), and more importantly, to the extent that a passport eventually
became a credential exclusively granted to a single individual at a time, it inevitably is an
identity credential at least as much as a national identity card could be wherever
available. Another example is the driver’s license, particularly in the case of the US,
which I have not examined in this thesis. The driver’s license was most probably not
designed to prove identity but as a credential for the lawful capacity to drive. It has
inevitably morphed however into an authoritative identity credential pure and simple, in
the issuing state and sometimes beyond it but within the boundaries of the national state.
3. Making a document out of a person, and an identity out of a document
As we saw earlier, the control of a territory deemed national has become a
defining component and the central concern of the dominant authority that is the national
state. However, a territory cannot be controlled if there is no way whatsoever to control
the people living in and using as well as the people who might enter that territory. With
remarkable developments in transportation and the continuously improving access to
traveling, it also becomes increasingly challenging to carry out and maintain an effective
control of population movements. In effect, the marked progress of transportations only
magnified both population’s mobility and subsequent anonymity in growing cities,
making the identification of people a problem at a larger scale than in previous eras.
Documenting the identity of citizens is an important way for enabling such control. With
state-issued identity documents such as the passport and the national identity card,
identity is now meant for control and to be controlled, as an end in itself. Authentication
takes up a new meaning: verify or match up an identity that is already documented by the
authority with its source, i.e. the identity subject.
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The process whereby identity directly takes the form of a document amplifies
with the modern state and its institutional drive to control territory and people. Physical
individuals are verbally “translated” into documents and hence become documented
identities as well as identity documents.153 Because the purpose of these documents
inherently is to achieve identification, and to that effect identity has beforehand been
established and documented to the extent necessary, the utility of this form of identity is
tightly linked to its verifiability as an end in itself, which requires accuracy in its content
as well as in its mapping to its referent. This has to rely on a referencing technique or
method that is stable and objective enough in order to ensure concurrence and
consistency in verification outcomes (between several verifying agents or by the same
agent at different times). Examples of such technique include standardized description of
bodily features and marks, objective measurements (anthropometry and dactyloscopy),
mechanized representation (photography), etc. The show of identity by means of this
credential is made by exhibiting the document that it is, simultaneously with the
“measured body” – first at the verifying gaze of human law enforcement agents and
possibly other interested third parties, and nowadays at the gaze of a technological
apparatus (e.g., scanners connected to computer databases.)
4. Nationality: a framing attribute (people, rights and obligations)
The drive for identification and control is reinforced by the state social role by
means of regulations entailing the allocation of rights/privileges as well as obligations.
The rise of the welfare state is an ultimate consequence of what I have termed the
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Despite a rough start regarding the correspondence between humans and documents, this is even truer
today with biometrics embedded in identity documents.
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naturalization of the state, that is, its identification or assimilation not only with a
territory but most importantly with a people, a nation. In that context of rising welfare
state, the increasing mobility of people and the fluidity of population movements in
general consolidated the need and the rationale for the state to develop schemes in order
to identify people. Linking effectively a people and a state, as per the ambition at the core
of the nation-state building project, requires more than a decree; it requires actual practice
and experience realized through interactions between the people and the state apparatus.
This leads the state to create frameworks, incentives and opportunities for these
interactions to take place, all of which in turn become also as many occasions for the
state to assert its authority.
In order to manage the allocation of those rights/privileges and obligations, the
state crafted a framing attribute to define a relationship posited as natural between itself
and a category of people. The term ‘nationality’ legally re-conceptualized appeared in the
19th century to be opportune and fit for capturing and characterizing that naturalizing
connection between the state and people who are deemed to belong to the state land.
Nationality proved to be the single one category capable of serving both to sort out the
people who, due to the location of the place they can call home, may one way or the other
lay claim at least on parts of that very territory which the state means to control, and to
regulate future claims particularly for access as well as other rights and privileges related
to the same territory. As a consequence, nationality is not just a simple attribute like
another. Rather, it frames the possible relevance, scope and meaning of other attributes
and can enable further attributes, particularly in relation to rights and privileges granted
by the state. The concept of nationality allows at a minimum the state to define and
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categorize the people it might want to command by the very fact that they live or may
aspire to live in its territory (with the expectation that the rest of the people not living
there will be under the command of another peer authority); it frames the actual or
potential relationship of any individuals to the space the state claims and strives to
control.
Nationality has become a core identity attribute as more and more rights – ones
which only the state can provide, guarantee or enforce – become tied to it and more and
more claims become dependent upon it, as the welfare utility of the state has kept
growing larger and larger over time to the benefit of the national membership under its
rule. It has then become increasingly necessary to distinguish who does, from who does
not, belong within the boundaries of nationality, which could not – and can even less in
this global age – be done at a glance. Therefore individuals’ national identity has to be
documented, and the ability to move across (not just physical territorial borders but also)
those national boundaries protected, on a continuous basis if it were at least to be used to
support or to deny any claims based directly or indirectly on nationality.
5. Rationale of adoption patterns
I have observed mainly two different patterns in the process towards ownership or
acceptance of government-issued identity credentials by stakeholders, particularly the
individual identity subjects. As I already clarified, at individuals’ level passport is a
mandate for the purpose of travelling in areas where, as is the case for a given country in
relation to most of the other countries around the world, there are no bilateral or regional
arrangements to waive the passport requirement involving the country of issuance. A
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corollary of this is that adoption was primarily a question for the state to deal with, not
the individual. In this case, government is both provider and adopter. In fact, the
government even drove the demand of the passport, and as a result adoption was not
really an issue, only the harmonization of related practices. That harmonization occurred
through the same three-prong approach referred to earlier on (section 7.2.2), which
includes government convergence on passport requirement policy, common format
specifications and readiness to supply to own citizens at an affordable cost. The first two
elements required an international process while the last one was a decision for
governments to make individually. The international process unfolded over time through
cycles of proposed resolutions followed by feedback from individual states and by
incremental efforts to agree on core principles (e.g., affordability, improving access to
passport service, etc.) and to adjust to material specifications. In any case after WWI and
since then, no government has been on record for contesting the utility of passports.
As shown by the French case for domestic identity schemes, their emergence and
acceptance reveal quite a different pattern. Due to the government’s security concerns
generally at the origin of identity schemes (passports as well as ID cards,) the process of
going from the state (condition) of non-identified to the state of identified individuals
starts off on a negative motive, at least from the standpoint of the identity subjects, and
then proceeds through less negative to a more positive one.154 The state identification
project first targets the “bad guys,” it means to reveal or expose the human vectors of ills
which the good society or the honest people need to be protected from. It firstly applies to
the “other” – the criminal, delinquent, illegal alien, etc. – starting particularly with those
154

This is one possible pathway to implementation-adoption; mandate could be another one just like for the
passport.
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already having a police record (recidivists). At a second stage, it includes populations that
present in the eye of the government some risks of feeding or falling into the first target
category, that is, foreign vagrants and then all foreigners. Lastly, it is extended to all
people, including the honest citizens and nationals, first as a supported option and finally
as a requirement or an expectation for all.155 Overall, the process first consists of securing
the buy-in of the majority of its constituents, or perhaps simply the portion the state
considers the most valuable (nationals and law-abiding citizens) by claiming that the goal
of identity policies is to protect them against the dangers posed by foreigners as well as
alleged or potential offenders and criminals. Then the process catches up on the rest of
the population, nationals and law-abiding citizens included. At that point, the predicated
national identity now becomes an established and important element of the affirmation
and recognition of self-identity. In social context and terms, that affirmation and
recognition operate on the basis of a meaningful relationship individuals experience with
the social collective materialized by the state institutions. The latter provide plenty of
opportunities to self-identify through the lens of national identity and by means of a stateprovided credential which is also a proof of the individual’s membership of that
collective.
The above mentioned difference in (domestic vs. international) pattern of
emergence and acceptance can be explained as follows. In a given space it is more

155 This is the same pattern the UK government has decided to follow for its national identity scheme, starting
with foreign nationals, then with workers on security-sensitive jobs such airports, and then incentives may be
put in place for voluntary take-up by nationals. “They [opponents] accuse the government of incrementally
chipping away at opposition by slowly bringing everyone in to the register over a decade, without having to win
a debate over its actual merits. People with the least power to complain are being used as "guinea pigs" for an
untried and controversial system.”
(See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7634744.stm)
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challenging to implement control over people who already live in that space, than it is
towards people from outside when they move into that space, assuming that the latter are
in much lesser number than the former and that the boundaries of the said space can be
reasonably well monitored by the entity that seeks to control who is/comes in that space.
Most people regularly living in a territory before the implementation of any such control
measures would tend to think of themselves as “naturals” of that land (especially if their
ancestry in that place runs several generations back) and new control measures would
appear to them to be “foreign” and obtrusive. On the other hand if the territory is already
under the domination of some authority that has the resources to monitor compliance
with its rules and control people before they step in, then it is more feasible to ensure that
those people comply (particularly with the conditions set forth by said authority as a
prerequisite before they can get in). In that sense, it is normal that the passport
implementation is completely a top-down process, while something like a national ID
will be more complex and take more time to fully implement and be adopted at home.
Overall, we can infer from this investigation that the following factors have been
determinant in enabling the acceptance of government-issued identity documents by any
other counterparts whom citizens may be involved in identity transactions with:
a)

The state or government is the law enforcer and therefore the identity

recognized by the state (and used by the state itself to enforce the law and citizens
accountability) is expected to provide reasonable security in ensuring that the bearer can
be tracked down and held accountable if need be (which would be of primary interest to
any third party relying on it for any significant transaction.)
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b)

The state in its various manifestations is the one entity that has the basic

and most common identity information of the largest portion of the national population
from the earliest time in their life and over the longest period of time. Hence and in
combination with the preceding point, the state is the most likely to have the most
complete and current information156 relevant for legal accountability including the record
of any serious offenses (the awareness of which may be of interest to a number of
potential relying third parties.)
c)

As the operative hand of the state commanding the national jurisdiction,

the government is in a better position for issuing identity credentials that will be
applicable across a wide variety of domains and contexts all operating under the same
national state jurisdiction, in comparison to any other credential issued by any one
particular of all the other institutions in that jurisdiction. By issuing official identity
credentials to its nationals, the state puts itself in position of practically vouching for all
of them to any entity that recognizes the state jurisdiction. As a consequence, to the
public in general (including all stakeholders) the state is a universal default reference for
individual identity.
d)

For a credential that requires recognition by other identity authorities as

equal players, such as the passport, coordination towards consensus on common
guidelines and procedures eventually leads to a result that is accepted by all parties to the
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The situation might be more complex with the federal government in the US due to a regime of personal
information privacy that leaves a lot of leeway to the private sector (amplified by several order of magnitude
with the advent of the Internet) while being more prohibitive to the federal government. However, one may
also note that federal law enforcement agencies are more and more using shadowy practices of online
surveillance and data mining afforded by the Internet, e.g. social networks or the Internet domain name
database WHOIS (on the latter, see Mueller and Chango 2008). In the end, this argument may still apply to the
amount of reliable information detained by all public authority offices combined, from the local police to the
Department of Motor Vehicles to the administration of entitlements programs to the federal law enforcement
agencies.
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process. Governments accept the passport issued by another government because they
have agreed to have equal sovereignty de jure and they have participated in setting, or
have approved of, the passport policy, procedures and requirements, which the other
government has also accepted to abide by (and vice-versa).
•

Representing people’s identity within record artifacts
In the era of writing on paper, from handwriting with the earlier forms of paper-

like surfaces to the print and typing techniques with flat and thin paper, we have seen two
main mechanisms of authoritative identification. At first, the identity issue was just about
being able to represent human individuals in specific instances within written records.
The medieval West responded by putting in place an apparatus of specialized personnel
to constitute in due form the record of commitments made by individuals and, by
subsequent necessity, to fashion a binding representation of such individuals. This is a
mechanism that responds to the need to control the information generated by individuals
in a new medium,157 in the sense of having control over the value and use of that
information, particularly whereby that information commits the said individuals. It is a
situated need and response related to identity. In the historical case of medieval seals
investigated in this thesis, it was driven by an important increase in high value
transactions between parties. Those transactions involved a large and distributed
institution that had mastery in the manipulation and control of that type of materials and
surrounding practices. More than the seal in isolation, it was instances of its use based on
fundamental beliefs (themselves grounded in religious doctrines) and specific protocols

157

What I mean by new medium, in a generic sense, is not necessarily a new technology. Written contracts may
have once qualified as a new medium in a given sociohistorical setting while writing was nothing new in itself.
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which produced authoritative identity. In addition to the specialized personnel mentioned
above, the general protocol included the layout of the page, written signs and formulas as
well as witnesses.
Authoritative identity by medieval seals was generated as part of a document of
its own kind: a charter, a diploma or a deed. It was the identity of a signatory of such
document. Once produced, it was generally stored away and was not expected to be
carried around as a piece of evidence for proving one’s identity. While this is a distinctive
feature of identity-seal in relation to later identity credentials, I nevertheless note that it is
one particular manifestation of a common underlying pattern shared by all identity
mechanisms: the need to create such mechanisms is always caused by a condition of
cleavage, difference, gap, break or departure from a base or initial conditions of full
presence and perfect (because unmediated) knowledge of the subjects to be identified.
The need to use seals to authenticate identity only aroused when and because people
needed to be made or to make themselves “present” – to be presented – in places where
they actually were not present. In that sense, sealing enabled a form of mobility, a virtual
mobility applicable not to the embodied individual but to the sealed artifact, the
possibility to extend (a form of) oneself from oneself, from one’s embodiment. It appears
that the signed and sealed document was not self-sufficient in itself for the authentication
of its signatory. Even used in private correspondence, the seal token relies on memory, if
only under the guise of some level of prior knowledge related to features such as the
symbolism of the seal or the style of the writer or other distinctive marks. But even more
importantly, sealed deeds draw their capability to authenticate their signatory’s identity
from the memory of that which links the seal used to the seal owner as well as from the
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memory of the actual act, that is, the foundational moment of (performing the ceremony
of) signing and sealing the document – that moment when the signatories were bodily
present, expressed certain will and such expression was witnessed and recorded. Seals
and other related marks were devices to keep the signatories “present” in some form
within the document thus produced, next to the written words that recorded the
signatories’ expressed will. That ‘capacity-of-making-present’ enabled such expression
of will, and the commitment it may generate, to be retained and re-actualized every time
the deed could be exhibited and for as long as its validity was still current.
•

Representing people’s identity by record artifacts
When the development of transportation means and infrastructures critically

changed the population’s patterns of mobility, the nature of the need for identity
representation also changed. Now the identity challenge came from the increasing
mobility of actual people, that is, of human bodies. It became a different situation
altogether when the identity issue turned to be one that referred to people with increased
capacity to move across locations and many jurisdictions away from their community –
as opposed to people simply projecting their will in time and space but under the same
jurisdiction and even within the same physical and cultural setting. Now the focus, as it
turned out, was on being able to know a minimum about an otherwise perfect stranger
who at any time could anonymously show up in a new location. Identity then needed to
be proved with regard to the embodied individual and thus, to be documented
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beforehand. In this context of human mobility, an identity credential was also meant to
bear witness of the provenance or origin of its holder.158
In order to expect now increasingly mobile individuals to be ready to prove their
identity upon request and wherever, such identity needed to be made portable so that they
can carry it with themselves as they move around. It shall be noted that none of those two
things – provability as an end in itself and portability – was required with sealing written
records even though seals were portable. This trend did not start with the modern state,
however. It was already in motion from the late Middle Ages as soon as lists of names
were being established in order to control nomads, vagrants and other loose groups of
people. This mode of identity is recognizable whenever the purpose of identity is thought
of in such a way that it can be exhausted with this one question: ‘Who are you?’ and the
expectation that the answer come not directly from you (who are a stranger and may not
be trusted) but from statements by a (trusted or at least recognizable) third-party about
you. This mode of identity has only been dramatically improved by state bureaucracy, if
only by giving it a standard material form. Its utility is significantly enhanced by its
standard form as well as by its portability.
7.4.3

Perspectives on digital credentials

At this point in history, the development of digital identity capabilities responds
to the need to represent people within record artifacts, as I have characterized above with
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We may also want to recall here the diplomatic correspondence dimension of the passport – echoing the old
royal letter of introduction granted to envoys and diplomats, etc. – whereby the authorities of a country request
the authorities of another country to provide protection to a country fellow citizen traveling to their land. See
Robertson (2010)
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regard to seals. Computer technology has brought about a new way to create records, a
new form of records.
Within physical communities, people are known by other people at various
degrees. They are related to some by family or household, by friendship or neighborhood,
by acquaintanceship or work relationship, etc. They are integrated in the community
through all those relationships that implicitly or explicitly vouch for them (in small
communities, that vouching may not even be needed, as everybody knows everybody.)
But as communities grow larger and larger and their boundaries become more porous and
less defined, the need to document identity becomes more apparent – at least identity
ceases to be readily available knowledge and requires to be authenticated by some
procedure, if it were to be treated with assurance.
Now, that trend is taken to yet another level when we leave the geophysical world
inhabited by embodied individuals for a world of artifacts. Human beings are not actually
present in artifacts, only signs are. In the world of artifacts, meaning comes from signs
(words and nonverbal signs alike). Thus in the world of artifacts – i.e. records in this case
relating to written artifacts – the question is how to use signs to represent identity and
how to use signs to make that representation reliable. The two past-historical cases that I
have investigated show that signs and artifacts need the mediation of authority to perform
those tasks. In one case the operator of that authority is faith and in the other it is the
force of the state (which is no other than the social entity that has successfully claimed
the monopoly of the legitimate use of force, according to Weber.) What about the digital
case? Where will digital signs derive their authority, their capacity to make identity and
to make it reliable? If we retain the totality of our historical experience as source for our
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potential hypotheses, we will have to answer: faith or legal mandate. But what do our
contemporary observations suggest?
From the development of digital identity processes so far, it appears that a legal
requirement for individuals to use any given digital identity mechanism is highly unlikely
in the US. That is because first of all, even in the physical world the idea of requiring US
citizens to hold a federal government-defined ID159 for certain procedures has appeared in
policy-making only over the last decade and has not been successfully implemented due
to a long tradition of zero-ID requirement from government (and therefore less tolerance
for government IDs). Secondly, digital identity is a private business sector in an emerging
and competing Internet-based market, and as such, the government would be hardpressed to regulate it, let alone to impose any particular solution or even a set of solutions
by law to Internet users.
On the other hand, we know that the Internet is a medium made possible by a
whole host of intermediaries and a place where users go voluntarily to carry out a variety
of tasks (which is possible thanks to those intermediaries.) Furthermore, the execution of
those tasks over time often creates a data relationship between the user and those
intermediaries, meaning the latter have the capacity to know a broad range of facts about
the user through the data that her activities generate and which they collect about her.
Could any one of those intermediaries (access and service providers alike) achieve a
position where they will be able to lend such authority to any digital identity system that
end users and third parties will want to rely on it? In the end, the main authority factors
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that can variably combine to bring about authoritative digital identity systems include:
faith, law and technology.
i) Faith: While this was obvious in the case of medieval seals, I also pointed out in
chapter 5 that as initially designed, nothing prevented anyone who physically resembles
enough another individual to identify themselves to a stranger using the other person’s
passport. Nevertheless, even those early passports did the job because beyond certain
threshold of acceptance or once there is a mandate, most people in mainstream probably
wouldn’t even think of the option of gaming the passport or ID system, and most of those
who might have thought about it would probably believe that it’s still in their best interest
to do the right thing. Only a minor portion of people would go all the way to actually
game the system and that is, in no small part, one of the factors that have made large
identity systems work so far. Will that be true of the Internet, too? – Most likely. As
surprising as that may be to hear this, of all those systems I have investigated, the Internet
is the most opaque to the average user/customer/patron. Even if that statement is not
factually true from a hypothetical panopticon perspective that can embrace the totality of
history in a single gaze, the average Internet user is probably as clueless when it comes to
cryptography, for instance, as was the illiterate medieval individual with regard to the
procedures and elements that went into an authentic charter or deed. Most Internet users
will have to believe the assurances given to them by designers and institutions for the
project of authoritative digital identity systems to come through.
ii) Law: the backing of the law and the prospect of legal punishment (a powerful
deterrent) was instrumental in the medieval context as well as in the modern state context
for making seals and government documents sustainable in achieving their identification
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purposes. Without credible signs of that backing and ability to redress and hold evildoers
accountable, technology designers would be hard pressed to implement robust and
authoritative Internet identity systems.
iii) Technology: some technology was involved in sealed documents and passports.
This is even more the case today with a more technology advanced medium. And because
the sources of authority are now multiple and they are competitors, technology will play
an even greater role not only in defining standards but also in making a difference
between services and business value through innovation.
•

Causal sequence and mechanism
In order to organize the different factors playing out in these phenomena with a

little more clarity, I have attempted to categorize and order them in tables. The first table
(7-1) identifies and orders a variety of factors into a sequence of causal chain toward the
formation of authoritative identity credentials. The second table (7-2) abstracts and
exhibits two clusters of the main factors that generally contribute, first, to the historical
emergence of identity credentials and, second, to their authoritativeness. In the former,
the main categories include basic conditions, critical conditions, outcome-enabling
conditions, and outcomes. They respond to the questions included in the following
paragraphs. While this categorization scheme has been constructed firstly based on the
national state case of identity credentials, I subsequently propose to organize along the
same lines the insights gained from the experience of medieval seals as well as from the
emerging digital identity processes, too.
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Table 7-1: Causal sequence and mechanism for authoritative identity: Cases I, II & III

Critical conditions

Medieval Seals

 Church as monopoly of pure
credence good (salvation of
souls in the afterlife) and as
local actor involved with people
 Church as large formal structure
with centralized authority and
legislative & judicial powers
(re. property rights, perjury,
debts, etc.)

 Investiture controversy and
production of normative
discourse (doctrines of Trinity
and Eucharist)
 Increase of valuable transactions
with the Church
 Need to secure donations
against perjury, succession
disputes, etc.

 Territorial sovereignty defining
national jurisdiction
 Concentration of executive,
legislative and judicial powers
in a central government

 Dramatic increase in the
mobility of people due to
improvements in transportation
infrastructures
 National security concerns
 Need for proper distribution of
rights and obligations

Digital Identity

Basic conditions

National ID
Credentials

Upstream causal path

 Open and global Internet
 Virtual mobility through
Internet transactions
 Anonymity by default in the
Internet

 Harm to users and hindrance to
commerce & trust (ID theft,
data breach, etc.)
 Cybersecurity concerns
 Need for proper attribution and
legitimate appropriation of
rights

Downstream causal path
Outcome-enabling conditions

 Belief in the sacred status of
writing (deriving from Holy
Scriptures)
 Church as de facto monopoly of
literacy and record-making
techniques (chancery personnel
and procedures)

 Centralized state bureaucracy and
its procedures
 Nationality (linking state to
nation)

 Technical protocols and
infrastructure of interoperable
digital identity systems
 Trust framework enabled by
technology and institutional
provisions

Outcomes

 Seals as authoritative
identity token

 Passport
 National ID card

 Authoritative digital
identity credentials
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Table 7-2: Drivers and factors in the emergence processes of identity mechanisms

Drivers causing the emergence of the need for identity mechanisms

 Emergence of a new record-creation technology (RCT) or Formation
of a new virtual space (1)
 Need to secure transactions enabled by enabling RCT or in such
virtual space, which result in transfers or alterations of rights
 Need to address security concerns resulting from the movement of
people or goods or from virtual mobility
 Need for an authority to assign and manage rights and obligations,
especially over a wide scope or a long period of time

Factors contributing to making an identity mechanism authoritative
 Designed by the authority (2) of reference in the jurisdiction at hand
(or by the highest authority whose jurisdiction everyone else is
subjected to.)
 Embraced and legitimized by the authority of reference, e.g. by using
the mechanism in transactions where it has a stake of its own.
 Trusted by all stakeholders in the system (widely shared values,
cultural beliefs and assumptions, or contractual obligations)
 All issuers also are the very actors who need to rely on the
mechanism for its defined purpose, and they agree on the same set of
rules to apply to that end
 The issuer has the most relevant, comprehensive and accurate record
available about the individuals to be potentially identified

(1) A virtual space is a nonphysical space produced by any record-creation technology that is used to enable further interactions beyond physical encounters
either between humans or between humans and non-human entities. More precisely, the virtual space is the realm or the plane of all the interactions thus enabled.
A virtual space may result from the emergence of a new RCT or from new applications and uses of existing RCTs.
(2) Authority here refers to an entity which is the main rule-maker and rule-enforcer in a given domain or jurisdiction. If those functions were to be separate, the
entity in question must at least have ultimately the power to enforce rules. The meaning of rule here is generic and may run from statute or law to private contract
policies, etc. Alternately, authority may be an entity that stakeholders in a subject matter trust or defer to make decisions on that subject matter.
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Basic conditions: Before emerges the need for identification, what are the main
characteristics of the environment, which might be of any relevance to the issue/phenomenon at
hand?
I have extensively discussed these conditions with regard to medieval Church and seals
as well as the state and government ID. With the Internet era, a new record-creation technology –
electronic records as opposed to paper-written records – along with the storage and transmission
capabilities of computer networking have created a virtual space that has no boundaries but
global. What makes Internet global is precisely that it is continuously open to further
interconnection with any Internet Protocol networks that come along regardless of their location.
The transmission capabilities of records in that space define what I call virtual mobility (see table
7-2) as such records may be used to effect changes in the life of the actual individual. A defining
aspect in that space is the notable vacuum regarding the means to ascertain the identity of
communicating parties: we are in a situation where the default is anonymity and identification is
mostly voluntary and based on self-assertions. Those features characterize the environment
where the need for some form of reliable identification systems has arisen, and form the basis of
the rationale for pursuing such endeavor.
Critical conditions: Are there any specific circumstances that precipitate the
manifestation of the problem (reasons for the need for identification) and press for a response?
The above initial conditions – but more particularly the global nature of this virtual space
and the default anonymity that it affords to users – lead to further issues and concerns. Mainly,
these follow from challenges to accountability thus created by the basic conditions. They include
issues such as identity theft and data breach, which may harm both commerce and individuals,
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cybersecurity threats, and ultimately the difficulty of reliable attribution with regard to the users
and their actions, rights and obligations.
Outcome-enabling conditions: Are there any antecedents leading up to the outcome?
The path to a solution and to the desired outcome starts with putting in place an
infrastructure that enables identity transactions beyond the native system where the digital
identity credential will be issued; that is the requirement of interoperability. That goal faces a
basic challenge which is recognized as a trust issue: trust is a necessary ingredient at all levels,
starting from adoption by end users to interoperability to authoritative credentials. It has
technical components that need to feature in the technology by design but it also has institutional
components which the user can relate to. The different digital identity technologies I have
described in section 6.4 include elements designed to provide choice and protections to users and
possibly to win their trust. At a more social/institutional level, the designers and other relevant
social actors have started tackling that challenge by setting up a model and an implementation of
a trust framework. That process is underway and it is too early to predict its chances to success.
Outcome: What is eventually the solution adopted or implemented?
Obviously, digital identity credentials that are widely used, accepted and relied upon are
the desired outcome. However, my thesis is that they will only be realized along with the ability
to locate clearly where authority lies among the stakeholders, which itself is needed to bring
about trust beyond the boundaries of a private contract and its terms of service. Put otherwise, it
is necessary to locate the main authority operators or enablers including faith, law and
technological innovation.
•

Factors for emergence and authoritativeness of digital identity mechanisms
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We have seen that the need for an authoritative identity mechanism stems either from the
fact that people can move (their body) in the physical space across jurisdictions (under the
modern state rule) or from their capacity to enact their personhood and agency in a virtual space
(e.g., under the medieval Church rule). By virtual space, I here do not particularly mean the
space created by digital networks, such as the so-called cyberspace. Rather, considering that the
physical space is the one in which embodied individuals operate, move around, meet and speak
with one another face to face, a virtual space is any nonphysical space produced by any recordcreation technology that is used to enable further interactions beyond physical encounters either
between humans or between humans and non-human entities (e.g., institutions). The virtual
space is precisely the realm of those alternate-level interactions. The changes effected in such
space are made mainly by creating, modifying or moving records that include a representation of
a source of agency. I use the phrase ‘virtual mobility’ as a conceptual category to capture the
idea that physical individuals may remain relatively immobile and yet still be impacted (and their
life circumstances changed) due to records being altered and moved around – just as could
happen through physical mobility.
Any technology enabling a new mode of record-creation and a new plane of
interaction/transaction opens up a new space of agency, that is, the above defined virtual space.
To the extent that that space is accessible to the public at large, it will sooner or later require new
and proper mechanisms of identification in order to regulate some aspect of human activity
enabled by and in that new space, that new interaction plane, and in order to enable a proper
control of the record thus generated. This is not an absolute necessity, for the new space may
remain a place where only ad hoc solutions are fashioned in case of need and for one context at a
time, or where only interactions that do not require a significant level of assurance vis-à-vis the
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identity of the interacting parties are carried out. However, the provision of such mechanism will
be a condition for further enabling consequential transactions and activities that require a higher
level of control, trust or reliability of interacting parties and relevant stakeholders. Following
this, I identify as follows the factors that bring about the need for an identity mechanism (table 72).
1) Emergence of a new record-creation technology (RCT) or Formation of a new virtual space
This criterion applies to digital identity. The basic technological infrastructure where the need for
digital identity plays out is made up of computers and their connectivity (computer networks,
and particularly the Internet). Computers have introduced a different record-creation technology
and the Internet has enabled further interactions between agents through the use of electronic
records. The digital space, also referred to as cyberspace, is in effect a nonphysical space
produced by computers the networking of which enables further interactions between humans
and beyond physical encounters.
2) Need to secure transactions enabled by such RCT or in such virtual space, which result in
transfers or alterations of rights
The Internet is a network of transaction highways (to use an old metaphor) as much as it is a
gigantic storage facility. We have learned from some of the interviewees that digital identity is
an effort to structure massive data flows (transactions) that are otherwise unstructured and much
less meaningful as a result. The main structure in this context is one that enables the computer
system to securely and consistently attach to a digital representation (‘who you are’) all the
digital objects (‘what you are’) and only those that relate to it and the value and contexts of that
relation. In that way, the implementation of digital identity technology secures transactions of all
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sorts – all the information flows it applies to – including transactions that might result in
transfers or alterations of rights, which are among the most prominent in the motivation of
creating the technology. The emergence of the need for robust digital identity technologies was
driven by the trust and security problems posed by the Internet’s original design, including
identity frauds and other harms that jeopardize or unduly alter users’ rights. The fact that the
Internet can be used as a medium to alter legitimate claims or make false claims and to
(mis)appropriate rights is at the center of the effort to develop adequate identity technologies.
This translates the importance to secure Internet transactions that can impact the existing and
proper attribution of rights, in other words, to secure accountability at all relevant levels.
3) Need to address security concerns resulting from the movement of people or goods (e.g.,
national security concerns)
While no government representative has been interviewed, there are a few indications that the
currency of digital identity topic on government agenda is also related to cybersecurity concerns.
For instance the NSTIC is clearly a spin-off of the White House’s 2009 “Cyberspace Policy
Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure”
(USG 2009) which calls for immediately starting a dialog on cybersecurity in the US.160 Digital
identity issue falls under the action line 10 (table 7-3), and in the document, it is listed as one of
the areas where the government is meant to encourage innovation (USG 2009: 33).
4) Need for an authority to assign and manage rights and obligations

160 Following the release of the Review, Howard Schmidt (former eBay Chief Security Strategist) has been appointed in
December 2009 the US Cybersecurity Coordinator and, as such, one of the President’s National Security as well as
National Economic Council staff. He has also been the point man in the White House administration for the
development of the NSTIC. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity and also
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/22/introducing-new-cybersecurity-coordinator
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The leading role taken by the current US Administration in the adoption of digital identity
technologies suggest that the rights and obligations of US citizens may be managed online using
digital identity-related technologies. We can see how existing rights and obligations may be
managed in new ways through the technology. The question is whether we will see the
emergence of new, digital rights granted or secured, as well as digital obligations assigned, by
Internet-borne authorities – whether those rights and obligations are to be limited to the
cyberspace or they may be effective in the socio-physical polity as well.
It is clear that some of the traditional rights of individuals (privacy, notably) are being
strained by a combination of technological capabilities and business models and practices, such
as social networks’, where the main feature that makes those models profitable resides in
monetizing access to the users’ personal data through advertisement as well as applications. In
that sense, the boundaries of individuals’ rights are shifting as corporations are gaining new
terrains in the control of data in general, and personal data particularly. If anything, new regimes
of rights may be emerging de facto from commercial practices.
Of the five contributing factors that have been identified in table 7-2, four do not seem to
apply to the digital identity case. These technologies have not been designed by the government
(and clearly there are multiple potential digital identity providers, not just one); there is no
evidence that trust prevails among all stakeholders including the user; and all the potential
relying parties are not set to become identity providers. Furthermore, to date there is not a single
entity that can uniformly be said to have the most comprehensive and accurate digital record
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Table 7-3: US Near-Term Action Plan for cyberspace policy (excerpt from the White House “Cyberspace Policy
Review”)

1.

Appoint a cybersecurity policy official responsible for coordinating the Nation’s cybersecurity
policies and activities; establish a strong NSC directorate, under the direction of the cybersecurity
policy official dual-hatted to the NSC and the NEC, to coordinate interagency development of
cybersecurity-related strategy and policy.

2.

Prepare for the President’s approval an updated national strategy to secure the information and
communications infrastructure. This strategy should include continued evaluation of CNCI
activities and, where appropriate, build on its successes.

3.

Designate cybersecurity as one of the President’s key management priorities and establish
performance metrics.

4.
5.

6.

Designate a privacy and civil liberties official to the NSC cybersecurity directorate.
Convene appropriate interagency mechanisms to conduct interagency-cleared legal analyses of
priority cybersecurity-related issues identified during the policy-development process and
formulate coherent unified policy guidance that clarifies roles, responsibilities, and the
application of agency authorities for cybersecurity-related activities across the Federal
government.
Initiate a national public awareness and education campaign to promote cybersecurity.

7.

Develop U.S. Government positions for an international cybersecurity policy framework and
strengthen our international partnerships to create initiatives that address the full range of
activities, policies, and opportunities associated with cybersecurity.

8.

Prepare a cybersecurity incident response plan; initiate a dialog to enhance public-private
partnerships with an eye toward streamlining, aligning, and providing resources to optimize their
contribution and engagement

9.

In collaboration with other EOP entities, develop a framework for research and development
strategies that focus on game-changing technologies that have the potential to enhance the
security, reliability, resilience, and trustworthiness of digital infrastructure; provide the research
community access to event data to facilitate developing tools, testing theories, and identifying
workable solutions.

10.

Build a cybersecurity-based identity management vision and strategy that addresses
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available on most Internet users. While it is clear that users leave a huge amount of data behind
them in their Web browsing trail, any entity that would claim to amass all the data possible about
all users (even from US citizens only) will be subject to the objections of other entities which
might claim the same (thus, they won’t agree on who will be the authoritative source) and to the
contingency that in a given population there will always be a non-negligible number of people
who have never signed up for an account with that entity or Web service.
Embrace and legitimization of the authority of reference
The only relevant contributing factor here is that the government has embraced these
technologies by adopting them for its own transactions with citizens. In so doing, the government
projects the notion that these technologies are reliable; this potentially legitimizes them in the
eye of the public as online identity mechanism. This will get at least a portion of the citizenry to
start using the related credentials. If they are satisfied with their government online service
experience thus enabled, those citizens may be more inclined to use these technologies in some
of their other identity transaction domains.

7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have addressed the specific research questions deriving from the main research
question and the definition of the central concept I have used to frame it. Particularly, I have
pulled together the results of the analysis of the three cases in order to respond to relevant
variants of the following question formulas: first, how are individuals led to use the emerging
identity mechanism at hand to authenticate their identity? And then: what are the processes that
lead transaction counterparts to relying on the emerging identity mechanism for authenticating
individuals’ identity? I have then identified different approaches to implementing the various
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identity systems – especially government identity documents and digital identity technologies –
and to enabling adoption. With digital systems which are still evolving to provide a stable and
recognizable configuration of digital identity credentials to be widely used by Internet users at
large, I have pointed out shifts and differences that may indicate potential or actual tensions with
that technology. I have complemented that picture with history-supported scenarios and rational
projections defining foreseeable pathways toward any possible configurations of authoritative
identity mechanisms.
Lastly, I have pulled together the main analytical outcomes of the case studies in order to outline
causal mechanisms characterizing the emergence of authoritative identity systems or the
discursive formation of their project. First, focusing separately on each one of the three histories
I have isolated main events and historical features into four sequences of explanatory factors,
which include: basic conditions, critical conditions, outcome-enabling conditions and outcome.
The top two categories form the upstream causal path while the second half constitutes the
downstream causal path leading to the identity solutions eventually adopted. Secondly, I have
explained in more general terms why the need for such systems emerges, by identifying four
drivers, and how they become authoritative, by isolating five factors contributing to that. With
that, I will now proceed to conclude this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion: Key findings and Recommendations

In closing this dissertation, I shall highlight the key findings, their implications, the limitations of
this inquiry and prospects for possible future research. While outlining the implications of this
research, I also put forward a few recommendations for policy and technology design.

8.1 Key findings
Before highlighting key contributions, following is the outline of what this investigation has
accomplished in substance.
8.1.1

Summing up the cases

I started this investigation with the motivation to inform current efforts to build a digital identity
infrastructure with a view to uncovering the social antecedents required to enable Internet-based
identity management systems which most stakeholders could readily rely on, at least as much as
they do physical identity credentials. Giving the paucity of information and relevant research
available to provide a clear path from the current situation to the realization of the envisioned
digital identity framework, I made the research design decision to start this inquiry with the
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formulation of the following general question: How do social actors, events or processes enable
the historical emergence of authoritative identity credentials for the public at large?
No theory is found in the literature at this point to help anticipate the answer to that
question and define a pathway to a solution for the practical challenge faced by technology
designers. Otherwise, such theory could have been applied directly to the digital identity
phenomenon, if not to fully test the theory (which may not be possible since the emergence of
digital identity systems is still unfolding), but possibly to anticipate and recommend to designers
and policymakers the next moves towards a successful outcome, according to the hypothetical
theory. Instead, I have opted for the use of history in lieu of a theory yet to be found or to be
developed, if at all possible. In order to address the general research question, I have divided
history in three big chunks sliced around what appears to be historical manifestations of the same
generic phenomenon. First, there is the present which holds the particular phenomenon that
includes the unknown I seek to explain or specifically apprehend – that is the sequence of digital
identity systems. Second, there is a past history that still is very much in contact with our present,
a history that has produced outcomes that still shape our present experiences of authoritative
identity credentials – that is the sequence of government identification documents, particularly
the passport. Third and lastly, comes a more remote and even apparently alien past but which
contains the potential to speak to us about the challenges of establishing an identity mechanism
within the means of a new type of medium or a technology of record creation (new if only in
ways it is being used) – that is the sequence of medieval seals. As a result, this dissertation has
investigated in this order the use of medieval seals, the advent of the passport as well as the
continuous efforts to build digital identity systems that share meaningful objectives with the
previous systems.
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The first historical case has addressed the following question: In what circumstances did
the challenge of reliably representing individual identity within written records emerge in the
Middle Ages and how was it resolved? The examination of this case through historical accounts
pertinent to the use of seals in the 11th and 12th centuries in the medieval West has exhibited a
number of historical facts. The dissemination of seals as identity tokens was enabled by a process
that ran from top (rulers) to bottom (laypeople and the society at large.) Regularly, the agential
capacity and authority of the rulers, notably but not exclusively through documents, was visually
associated with the symbols of their seals and ultimately with the seal device. Those were signs
of power – not only the political power in the narrow sense but the power to make something
happen in the world. The literate elite in the medieval West adopted the same device to link
themselves to their own writings, lending to the latter the authority that may have been theirs in
person. Eventually, the population at large embraced the practice of owning seals either by
simple mimicry (which could also be justified by the fact that the mere possession of a seal in
itself then became a material attribute of personhood) or by the growing likelihood that one may
sooner or later need to engage one’s own agency through written records. That growing
likelihood itself occurred at a time where both the institutional authority and the organizational
structure of the Church reached a height, in the wake of the Investiture Controversy against
secular rulers. The Church truly became an economic power, and revival in Roman law studies
increasingly ventured beyond Canon law to produce a growing corpus of legal rules which are
put to task on civil matters throughout a Church-enabled court system.
In the same time the Investiture Controversy brought about among the social actors a
debate about signs and their power, leading to an update of the doctrines in currency within the
Church. In that process, explanations were offered on the mode of operation of seals as identity
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tokens. As it turns out, that mode needed to be coherent with the mode of signification of signs in
general, as churchmen had previously theorized. Eventually, the operational mode of seals was
predicated on the efficacy of sacramental signs in play within the Trinity and the Eucharist,
according to the doctrines. Humans were in essence linked to their seal-matrix which could then
be replicated in multiple waxen seals in the same way that in God, the Father is linked to the Son
through whom humans, God’s creatures, relate to the Father. The Trinity of the divine person as
well as the possibility availed by the Eucharist to change substance while retaining identity
justified in the Church’s discourse the possibility that waxen seals may stand as identity tokens
for human beings and, as a result, they were used to authenticate their identity in written records.
The second historical case has traced the process of emergence of the passport and its
evolution into an internationally accepted identity-bound credential, particularly for the purpose
of traveling. I have examined this case with the aim to answer the following question: How did
identity credentials issued by the national state historically emerge and become authoritative?
The analysis has shown that the road of the modern state towards its apparent status of the
highest and ultimate identity authority actually was a historical process strewn with
contingencies, the central legal concept of nationality being one of those. After early
developments featuring in parallel diplomatic practices of letter of introduction, safe-conduct and
laissez-passer on the one hand and, on the other, policing practices of writing down and listing
names for reasons of security and legal accountability, the need arose for authorities to issue
some kind of documents enabling them to control the movements of some categories of
profession. These notably include the itineraries of royal couriers and soldiers’ discharge and
leave from duty stations. Since then, the early form of passport and then other identity papers had
been progressively expanding to the people at large but unevenly across European nations until
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WWI, after which a consensus emerged among leading governments to start an international
policy process of passport requirement and harmonization. Even then, the passport was believed
to be a temporary solution to mitigate legitimate security risks and concerns caused by the war; it
was hoped to expire as the world would return to total peace. But instead from conference to
conference and through cycles of recommendations and feedback, not only was the passport
requirement renewed, but the consensus among governments on that requirement only got
reinforced over time and its scope extended to further populations (e.g., passport or identity
document to immigrants and people without effective nationality). Overall, the passport has
become a universal artifact enabling the authentication of individuals’ identity worldwide, an
identity-bound credential that is needed in general as a prerequisite for traveling internationally.
Finally, in the last historical case I have addressed a phenomenon presently still
developing but whose design objectives are clear and significant aspects already known. Broadly
speaking, this case tackles the following question: How are social actors, events or processes
leading to the possible emergence of authoritative digital identity credentials for Internet end
users at large? I have presented the context of emergence and the case made by a number of the
social actors involved as to why these digital identity systems should be built or implemented. I
have also introduced the reader to a range of specifications and functionalities known to date
through a few identity management technology cases, and then proceeded to outline the broaderscope social processes that have more recently begun to take place in order to create the
conditions for a widespread adoption whereby authoritative digital identity credentials may come
about and be usable. There are still enormous challenges to be addressed, however.
After the investigation of the three historical cases, I sought to pull together the analytical
insights into an overall explanation of the causal mechanism at work in those historical
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processes. I started with the first two phenomena which already have completely unfolded. I
have identified the main features that historically bring about the need for identity credentials
and those that characterize their authoritative formation. From the rich histories that this inquiry
has brought into focus, I have pinned down defining events which I have abstracted and phased
into a sequence of conditions forming the causal mechanism leading to the outcome of
authoritative identity credentials. I have finally used this analytical framework to further analyze
the case of emerging digital identity. In the process, I have outlined different adoptionimplementation strategies and trajectories taking into account differences and similarities
presented by the three phenomena in their respective historical contexts.
8.1.2

Contributing to knowledge

Knowledge contributed through this research is of three kinds: empirical, conceptual and
method-theoretical. I briefly summarize here those insights and knowledge outcomes.
This research has first and foremost clarified and expanded our understanding of identity
and its underlying processes. It has led to a more potent reformulation of the concept of identity
in the sense of an artifact reliably representing a person.
Identity is a mechanism for binding to data any single one of a collection of entities in
such a way that the result consistently enables the discovery of the specific entity thus
bound.
Individuals may exercise their agency through artifacts or media that are used to
represent such data. In that sense, identity is an information artifact that is structured so
as to enable its consistent and reliable association with a given entity and only with that
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one, as well as to enable the reliable attribution of further relevant information to the
same entity if and only if applicable.
While in general terms, as the definition of a concept should be, by focusing on information
artifact or the binding to data the above definition has the advantage to provide a clear
delineation of scope so as to avoid philosophical and psychological wanderings about identity.
With that definition, the concept of identity may become more visible and easier to recognize as
object of social sciences and information studies.
Still, the concept definition by itself is silent about where the information artifact comes
from; it does not instruct any more about who defines the mechanism and protocols for binding
individuals and data than it does about what the purpose would be. The investigation however
has shown that empirically identity has most of the time been defined in a form including a set of
characteristics that enable the authority of reference to achieve certain goals. Medieval Church
used seals as identity tokens in order to secure deeds and donations under terms and conditions
that were consistent with its ideology and interests. National state defined individuals’ identity
through terms or attributes over which it had already secured some control, that is, birth data and
geo-physical location. After defining identity as any set of attributes about a subject, identity
technologists have moved to increasingly define it as a set of claims, thus reflecting their concern
with identity which is to enable the sharing of data (hence, the need to assess the truthfulness of
claims to access to data.) As a result, the goals of the designers/issuers have historically included
ensuring compliance, accountability, integrity of rights, fulfillment of duties, ascertaining the
truthfulness of claims, etc.
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It follows that an identity scheme is not a given; it is defined and designed in a way that
fulfills the needs of the entity that requires it. In that sense, individuals resort to an identity
credential only when they are required to use it, or they find some interest in using it. They may
be required to use it not only by the issuer, but also by other social entities that find it useful to
their business to piggyback on such credential in order to authenticate the identity of individuals
they deal with. Obviously in that case, the credential in question becomes a strong one which I
refer to as authoritative identity.
On the other hand, rare are the occasions comparatively speaking where individuals by
themselves find it necessary and relevant to establish a means for proving or authenticating their
own identity. When they do while they are not obliged by any legal requirement, it is generally
in response to an entity they depend on to achieve some objectives they are interested in. While
both institutions and individuals may detect the need for such mechanisms, institutions are first,
if not the only ones, to demand a standard mechanism of identity. Institutions need memory; they
are great consumers of memory-making or record-creation technologies. This is an important
factor in the way they persist overtime as institutions. Important amounts of records relating to
people eventually require an adequate identity mechanism. It follows that formal institutions are
also great consumers of identity technologies and mechanisms. In that sense, the record-making
practices of the medieval Church provides a preview of the modern state bureaucracy.
The implications for digital identity is this: either an established authority which most
Internet users in a given context have to deal with requires and provides a presumably secure,
usable and functional digital identity solution in their dealing with the public online (the early
adoption by the US government may eventually exemplify this model), or some innovation in
online services including a digital identity solution leads to a massive adoption by Internet users,
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in which case the built-in identity solution might naturally tend to spread online and across the
industry (Facebook-Connect has given a glimpse of that model). At this point in time, it is too
early to say whether any one of those models is going to prevail or whether either would be
sustainable on the long run, as online technologies can be volatile with quite dramatic changes
due to unexpected innovations.
A notable empirical item of knowledge this dissertation has uncovered is that what we
generally consider as identity mechanisms (documents, artifacts or credentials, etc.) are less
rather than more often mechanisms actually designed to prove identity as an end in itself. At the
notable exception of national identity cards where available, they are generally designed for
other purposes defined by the designers or authority of reference and seem to fulfill plain
identification function only as a secondary effect and more so with third parties (not involved as
issuers of the identity mechanisms concerned). The passport is a credential enabling one to cross
borders and driver’s license is a credential to prove one can lawfully drive a vehicle on the public
ways. Even the investigation of medieval seals suggests that it is an object that had had multiple
purposes before and along with its use in the 11th century as identity token in the process of
authenticating sealed acts and, as a result, the identity of the individuals represented in those acts.
To the extent that a credential is bound to individual identities, it simply becomes, even
unintentionally, a full-fledged identity credential for many actors who rely on the source of that
credential for reasons I have explained in the previous chapter.
The paradox, and challenge to digital identity, is that it is the monolithic authority behind
seals and passports which made those mechanisms reliable and credible. If those sources of
authority are dismissed in the context of digital identity, what to replace them with? Who is the
powerful authority, or rather, who are the prevailing authorities that can make digital identity
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credible, believable? What would be the relationship between such authorities, if they were to
exist, so that digital credentials can truly be authoritative (be used and accepted beyond settings
controlled by the originating authority only)? Past credentials were objectively flawed in that
nobody could seriously claim that they could not be forged or used to misrepresent. What made
them work within acceptable limits was the power of their proponent, backer, designer or
sponsor, and the latter’s command over potential users or its presumed trustworthiness. In the
absence of such authority for digital identity, can the mere technology provide authority and
trustworthiness? One of the critical contributions of this research is to have shown that
authoritative identity systems only based on technology, on material capabilities, are no more
likely today than they were in the 11th century. Rather, there are three factors that variably
combine to enable authoritative identity systems – the authority factors – which include faith,
law and technology.
First of all, technology is involved in any record-making and identity system: paper or
parchment, ink, stylus, type, print, booklet, computer, codes are all technological objects at
various levels of complexity. Then faith most visibly applies in the case of medieval seals but so
too does law. While the basis of the medieval Church was religious faith, its normative discourse
and ruling exceeded religious doctrines and Canon law to cover civil and criminal matters
(especially economic crimes), all in a context of monopoly for wielding such powers and
authority, particularly in the wake of the Investiture Controversy. The force of law is most
visible as authority factor in the case of government identity credentials. However, everybody
holding on to their government-assigned documents does not do so by fear of the law. Past some
initial much needed cultural adjustments to the notion that it is possible and legitimate for
government to define individuals’ identity on a piece of paper, most people eventually identify
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themselves to those documents (not in small part thanks to the notion of nationality which
emerged in the 19th century as a politico-legal fiction.) The belief that every member of the world
population belongs to a specific nationality legally controlled by a government, that individuality
can be uniquely captured by the government using a narrow set of attributes and that, as a result,
everyone would better off relying on government-issued credentials to authenticate people’s
identity is part of what has made those credentials work so well.
What about the Internet? At first, it appears that technology is driving everything in the
case of the Internet. There might even be a claim out there on the part of technology designers,
certainly a suggestion, that technology by itself can command trust, which brings to mind a
related question: can technology establish authority? That is, in a sense, the life-scale hypothesis
that is waiting to be tested by the outcome of the current process toward authoritative digital
identity without Church and without Government, unless private Corporation takes on some of
the functions of either one of those institutions with regard to driving, backing and enabling the
operation of identity systems. But we already see that even in the US where that would normally
be unusual, the government has stepped in to accompany the process. Still, we shall not prejudge
the ultimate scope or configuration of the role of the government but shall wait and see how that
plays out. In addition, while technology in a competing market place can innovate and transform
institutions, the opacity of the medium, that is, the Internet for the average user is a feature that
requires such user’s “blind” trust in order to proceed using the technology– which resembles an
attitude closer to faith than, say, the fact of writing on a piece of paper and handing it over to
another physical individual. It is possible that beyond the technology as such, most Internet users
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will just have to believe the assurances given to them by designers and institutions161 for any
materialization of authoritative digital identity systems to come through.
In terms of expanding our comprehension of identity processes, this research has helped
us understand that while identity credentials enable and expand agency (individual level), they
also enable structures (institutions) to act upon individuals, to restrain or expand the array of
possible courses of action available to them. Government-issued identity documents are a perfect
example of that, particularly the passport. As Stefan Zweig (1964) shows in his autobiography,
the world does not look the same when one can go anywhere one pleases and can afford, without
the burden of procuring documents and submitting to all manners of control, as when one must
undergo those constraints. Identity credentials change people’s behavioral patterns; they augment
the possibilities or capabilities of some people or entities while decreasing some others’. While
digital identity may seem neutral at first because traditional structures of authority are not
replicated, the complexity of the technology constituting the medium may be source of
discrimination among users. This includes the emerging inclination of technology designers to
favor innovations that take the user awareness, and sometimes consent, out of the equation.
This inquiry has also produced a general but clear definition of the concept of virtual
space and proposes the term ‘virtual mobility’ as an analytical construct. A virtual space is a
nonphysical space produced by any record-creation technology that is used to enable further
interactions between humans and beyond physical encounters. More precisely, the virtual space
is the realm or the plane of all the new interactions thus carried out. Based on this, virtual
mobility is mobility through virtual space, that is, the capacity to enact change at a distance,
which is done by creating records or moving them around. In other words, while physically
161

Analyzing the discourse of such assurances might prove as interesting as the analysis of the medieval discourses on
the efficacy of signs.
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immobile, an individual may go to places and do things by browsing the Internet or by sending a
written note. That is a virtual form of mobility (which is not limited to digital technology.) While
it is empirically clear that the mobility of people in the physical space was, as this research has
shown, the most potent drive for the emergence of the state’s need to require people to bear
passports and other identity documents, that could not be transferred to the Internet, nor to
medieval charters and diplomas for that matter. The analytical construct of virtual mobility
enables us to frame and analyze the need for identity in all three cases in relation to the category
of mobility and the reaction of control it can elicit.
This investigation has uncovered a number of factors driving the emergence of the need
for identity mechanisms. They include:


Emergence of a new record-creation technology (RCT) or formation of a new virtual
space



Need to secure transactions enabled by emerging RCT, which may result in transfers or
alterations of rights



National security concerns (territory, people and virtual space)



Managing the distribution of rights and obligations by the authority expressing the need

Contributing factors for rendering emerging identity mechanisms authoritative include:


Designed by the authority of reference in the jurisdiction at hand (or by the highest
authority to whose jurisdiction everyone else is subjected to.)



Embraced and legitimized by the authority of reference, e.g. by using the mechanism in
transactions where it has a stake.
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Trusted by all stakeholders in the system (either based on widely shared values, cultural
beliefs and assumptions or on contractual obligations)



All issuers are also potential relying parties and they agree on the same set of protocol
specifications



The issuer has the most comprehensive and accurate record available about the
individuals to be potentially identified
This dissertation has made the case of a relationship between trust, insurance and

liability. On the one hand, in this identity business it would be neither fair nor realistic to have
the identity provider solely be liable for the breakdown or the failure of a system for some
reason. On the other hand, trust – an outwardly yet personal disposition – cannot occur in a
context of impersonal processes unless it is based on experience (same as between humans) or
aided by a number of devices. The notion of insurance is one that allows allying trust and
liability in a way that might alleviate the burden or limitations of each one of those items taken
separately.
From a methodological standpoint, I propose a general framework for analyzing
phenomena that occur over large historical sequences. The framework comprises four
breakpoints distributed in two parts: the first part constitutes what I call upstream causal path and
the second is the downstream causal path. The upstream causal path includes two sequences:
basic conditions are relevant to understanding the context that makes it possible for the issue to
emerge and critical conditions precipitate the issue into clear focus. The downstream causal path
also includes two sequences: outcome-enabling conditions and finally the outcome itself. These
different categories of factors respond to the following questions:
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Basic conditions: Before emerges the need for identification, what are the main characteristics
of the environment, which might be of any relevance to the issue/phenomenon at hand?
Critical conditions: Are there any specific circumstances that precipitate the manifestation of the
problem (reasons for the need for identification) and press for a response?
Outcome-enabling conditions: Are there any antecedents leading up to the outcome?
Outcome: What is eventually the solution adopted or implemented?
With all of the above, this dissertation has illuminated several fundamental yet
theoretically undeveloped aspects of identity mechanisms and the various processes involved in
assembling an identity infrastructure. These include preliminary results, new concepts, ideas, or
principles aiming to advance and deepen our understanding of identity management systems. I
have identified emerging patterns of implementation-adoption and proposed a series of historybased projections as hypothetical pathways toward authoritative identity systems in the future.

8.2 Recommendations for policy and design
This sociohistorical inquiry has been conducted within the context of public policy scholarship in
Internet studies. As such, it is good practice to offer a few policy recommendations as part of the
research outcomes. Given the contemporary circumstances of the phenomenon, I will outline
below a few guidelines, principles or recommendations that might be of interest to policymakers
and designers alike. Additionally, civil liberties advocates and prospective future users of digital
identity may also benefit from being informed by these outcomes. I shall note that due to the
practical nature of recommendations in general, the ones I offer below are the result of both the
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research findings strictly speaking and insights gained from my overall experience in the course
of this investigation and beyond the only data that specifically address my research questions.
First of all, the Internet could well remain as it currently is, blossoming of free Web
services continuously competing for new ideas in order to get the user’s attention and personal
data. Some will argue that that is precisely what makes the Internet such an innovative force. Is
then the idea that the Internet needs some robust identity scheme a bad one? From the array of
identity technologies described in chapter 6 and their functionalities, this research rather
indicates that it might be a good thing to implement an Internet-level identity system. Because
first of all, they can cater for a wide variety of use cases, from the user self-issued identity tokens
(not unlike the medieval seals) to third-party certification schemes and to secure yet untraceable
and unlinkable credentials, all taking advantage of the latest advances in cryptography and finer
awareness of user needs. Of course, nothing is hundred percent full-proof in the absolute,
especially when it comes to security – in this case, security of the user personal data with
authentication capabilities. However, some of those technologies demonstrate that it is possible
to have a digital identity system that operates past the security threshold people have come to
expect in the physical world. Undoubtedly, they can deliver much better security than a set of
username and password, let alone multiple sets to be maintained by the same user. However, the
problem for the Internet is that the more things are ‘open’ the more they demand the cooperation
of the user in order to work at their best. That principle raises two main challenges: i) it tends to
increase the number of moving parts that need to be integrated, even synchronized, for an
optimal behavior of the system, ii) it also seems to go against the marketing principle of keeping
simplicity always on the side of the user/customer.
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Another challenge is also that there is no sufficient user advocacy involved during the
design phase so that the design choices that are made will inevitably tend to tilt notably toward
‘what sells better’ at the expense of ‘what would protect the user’s personal data better’. This can
only get worse as companies and designers come to the realization that identity in itself doesn’t
sell well to the user. The question becomes: identity for what? What could make identity
marketable to the user? Generally, the standard answer to any marketing question in the context
of prevailing Internet business model is ‘indirect marketing’: offer some service that a great
number of users might want, for free, and then monetize their attention and personal information,
preferably without telling them about it. If identity itself cannot be that capture-service –
because the user doesn’t see the purpose – then what could be it? It will have to be a service that,
in addiction to attracting the user, will
i)

yield information or data that advertisers might be interested in

ii)

provide useful information or data that can help establish and manage identities

Experience shows numerous instances where the first two requirements (attracting users and
advertisers) are easily met. The latter requirement is the most uncertain at this point. In the
current state of affairs, services that are most likely to address that one requirement include:
email service; social networking and merchant sites (sites that have regular financial transactions
with users.162) Of the three, email (webmail) and social networking services are probably the

162

One might immediately think about banks. However, banks don’t appear willing to deliberately take on the business
of providing online identity services to their customers for other purposes than their own online banking services.
Therefore I will stick in this discussion to those native online services that could and would be willing to address the
three requirements. There is also the hybrid or rather intermediary case of PayPal (between the user and the merchant
and the bank) which I will not discuss here as it seems to be a relatively isolated model.
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most common and the most interested in addressing potential digital identity demand.163 That
was what led Microsoft to contemplate the .Net Passport service, and that is part of the reason
why social networking sites (Google+ and Facebook) have been seen lately pushing for a ‘real
name’ policy, that is, a policy that requires or strongly suggests to users to use their formally
documented name on their account.
However, nothing guarantees that, because by name I have presumably been using an
email account for a decade, that account is linked to me for certain. And a lot of people can still
sign up for a social networking account with a name of their fancy. That is not to say those
services cannot enable identity transactions; they still can on behalf of whomever holds or is
using the account. That will be however only for a limited set of identity use-cases. From all of
this, I can see going forward options for two distinct major digital identity frameworks.
First, either Web companies approach digital identity as they do now with Webmail and
social networking accounts. In that case, it will all come down to how far they can reach with
‘marketing seduction’ techniques with the great mass of users who think they have no choice, or
do not care, or are just clueless about what is being or can be done with their personal data on the
Internet – which in total is most of us. Those companies will keep competing on the next big idea
that would bring masses of users to subscribe, betting certainly on network effect and maybe
continuous innovation to keep them around, and hoping that other Web services will eventually
recognize and adopt their digital identity solutions (even if the main reason for this is access to
customers more than any merit of the identity technology.)

163 Large merchant sites such Amazon.com have seemed generally content with getting paid for what they sell to users
(using credit card details, mostly), although they also might be bundling and trading their customers’ shopping and
preference lists.
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The second major alternative would be that those companies are willing to openly accept
their role and responsibilities as authority. This means they will have a more direct relationship
with their users (at least within a given national or regional jurisdiction at a time), be able to
communicate, for instance on phone, with their user outside the boundaries of the online services
they offer, and make sure there is a framework in place for their users to get in touch with them
(whether online or off line) with confidence that their issues will be addressed fairly. Those
companies might even want to be at maternity bedside when there is a newborn in order to
collect vital data, with the parents’ consent, and maybe offer some future service in exchange
(after all, Facebook displays at the bottom of their user’s ‘timeline’ page the image of a baby
with the birth date or at least the birth year provided by the concerned user.) We might also
remember that before the national state and public administration take custody of vital records
with the enactment of the civil status, those records were to be found with the Church which
previously was the sole authoritative source for such data about people. Without necessarily
suggesting that Corporation is next in line for the exercise of sovereign authority, certain forms
of relationships with constituencies or customer bases, which include the implementation of a
few basic public responsibilities, can make it easier for users to get the sense that they can expect
some kind of accountability. It suggests that their relationship with the company (potential
identity provider) is not limited to the terms of service which generally convey the sense that
they are rather designed to protect corporate interests against potential lawsuits.
In the former scenario above, the road will remain as uncertain as any Internet innovation
that rises to popularity (and business success thanks to advertisers), then is taken over by the next
big thing (in terms of technology that addresses the identity issue on the Net, even if that issue
will not go away.) In the latter scenario, there may be an opportunity for a more stable
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framework, more trustworthy in the eye of the user. Perhaps in this case, a few of the companies
in place will get themselves a very good reputation for managing digital identity and grow strong
enough to become more and more seen as authoritative in the matter.
Following are a few other recommendations or issues to be considered.
As early adopter, the government has the responsibility to demonstrate best practices in
relevant use-cases as well as in every aspect of digital identity transactions it is involved in.
Generally, government services are ones that only governments provide. By being an
early adopter while the identity solution is delivered by the private sector, this presents a
tremendous opportunity for users to test the waters and for providers to improve on their
capabilities in real-time uses. This could be a pilot case for incrementally building the digital
identity infrastructure.
For a successful adoption, it must be clear not only for the designers but for the users as well
that these efforts address due process for citizens.
Unless it is clear to the users that new standards are being set and are implemented, not
only technically but in business and institutional processes, they are unlikely to change their own
assumptions whether positive or negative. The citizens may need to know that their rights are
clearly at least as protected online as they are off-line. The user may need to see some
compelling evidence that there is a fundamentally new framework in which the government is
resolute to do a serious job as user’s and citizen’s advocate, instead of giving the impression to
be complacent with, and only protective of, commerce – as the perception may be.
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While technical specifications may be left to those who have the technical capacity to
contribute, the technical design process should be accompanied with an institutional
framework design process which government and civil society participate in. The decisionmaking process should be truly multi-stakeholder and a fair hearing given to the inputs and
concern of all stakeholders.
The users may not readily content themselves with the information that protocol drafters
and software designers and programmers take the user interests at heart. Most importantly, as
one of the experts himself suggests, government need to be the user’s advocate. This is a real
opportunity for government to play that role as it is in a relatively neutral position. The
government both supports commerce and understands like most stakeholders now that the user
buy-in is necessary for these systems to work. Government is also chiefly concerned about
cybersecurity and it is increasingly understood that privacy and security do not necessarily make
for a zero-sum game. By any account, the credibility of each stakeholder group will be greater in
an open and multi-stakeholder process that includes business, civil society and government.
While avoiding undue regulation, a public office should be established where government and
civil society representatives can come together with Web companies and businesses in order to
develop principles and guidelines on critical aspects of digital identity management.
As innovative services and use-cases emerge, it is important to maintain a set of
principles that can frame the operation of the technology in new ways, on the basis that identity
technology is not like any other of the technologies users can shop around for. In some cases, the
office might need to issue advice before a technology is implemented or after. This is not meant
to be legally binding but to serve as a public compass for stakeholders. Companies may still
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innovate, propose alternate routes and let the market decide (provided that they accurately inform
the public.)
The industry and policymakers should cooperate in a way that promotes innovations as well as
a variety of models of identity transactions and value-adding services for the end user.
Needs and uses shaped the emergence, evolution and stabilization of the passport with a
practically universal adoption. That type of adoption may be the long-term goal for the digital
identity infrastructure (while maintaining competition and innovation at the level of
interoperable systems and digital identity services.) It is more likely that digital identity will also
have to go through a number of trials and emerging use cases while adjusting overtime to the
needs of the stakeholders, including consumers.
Government, business and civil society stakeholder should join efforts to participate in the
definition of a framework protocol for digital identity – the overarching single protocol that
will define the infrastructure while accommodating a diversity of systems.
Based on the fact that rules and claims are at the core of digital identity systems, identity
management will very much be policy-driven. Stakeholders should be involved in defining the
ground rules and specifying as much as possible the different types and levels of transactions.
The framework protocol should allow for updates and upgrades as the technology evolves with
implementation. This Protocol is different from the principles or guidelines referred to above.
This is about the design of the infrastructure and much of it is technical. At this level however, it
should be possible to describe the technical functionalities in human-understandable language so
that all stakeholders can engage in a meaningful conversation.
Ensure user awareness
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While actors who are in charge of organizing the relevant space clearly see the pertinence
of identity capabilities, the user does not necessarily. Users and citizens need to be equally aware
and educated about the promises and potential benefits as well as about the risks of digital
identity technology. It is unlikely nowadays that a fairly educated user who is not well aware
about an emerging Internet technology will start with the assumption that it is largely risk-proof.
Therefore, she might as well be given accurate information, which may inspire trust rather than
mistrust or suspicion. Moreover, the user may be making the sweeping assumption that
conducting business online is systematically more perilous than engaging in any off-line
transactions where they can rely on physical or material cues (except that the former is more
convenient). And yet, the fact that online interactions lack of many of those cues does not make
online transactions necessarily riskier.
Notwithstanding how robust and user-friendly the technology and how rich the
capabilities, it is hard to see how this can change the users’ assumptions and attitude if they are
hardly aware of the existence of the said technology and what it positively does for them. The
user education component is the social complement of the technical issue of client-side security.
It is all the more critical that if technologists succeed in building the right infrastructure, most of
the attackers’ attention may converge even more on the users and ways to trick them.
An identity technology is not an end in itself, unless it is to be mandated. Voluntary identity
mechanisms require incentives to be built in upfront for the user: value-adding services,
privileges, rights, etc.
In itself identity technology may not be a valuable service in the eyes of the user. First of
all there always is the danger for an identity system to be misused and to become an instrument
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against individual rights and civil liberties. Second, even assuming a well-functioning
democracy, identity technology will appear valuable to the users only if it enables them to
accomplish certain tasks more effectively, if it enhances their existing relationships, or if it
enables new relationships and services they are interested in having. The value-adding aspect for
the user needs to feature upfront and be demonstrated.
Demonstrating utility for improving adoption: as a corollary of the above, the technology
needs to demonstrate utility from the user’s standpoint other than enabling identification.
The technology need to offer use cases that demonstrate trustworthiness, utility and
response to user needs. It seems unlikely to get a positive user response in change of habits and
attitude, without demonstrating any added value. The research shows that utility may also be
demonstrated negatively based on the distribution of incentives/disincentives. If the burden of
not using a credential increases, the chances that it is used increases as well. However,
perception of risks and liability could be strong disincentives and should be addressed with clear
commitments. There must also be a demonstration of a net plus regarding usability and privacy.
Designing a more usable and intuitive user interface always enhances adoption and use.
Regarding privacy, simple declarations may not suffice.
In order to promote scalability in the “Identity Ecosystem” solutions should be explored so as
to enable business without overburden between a User and a Relying Party even if they were
not initially in the same Trust Framework.
Relying Parties may have digital identity technology-related agreement templates that they
execute beforehand. Provided that they have the appropriate infrastructure and operate at the
levels required (levels of assurance, etc.), they may then be able to service the identity
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credentials of a customer issued from any of the Trust Frameworks, by just checking the relevant
statements in the agreement template.
Linking the Trust Frameworks
The TFs are not the final answer; otherwise they will be reproducing the silo effect that
needed to be removed. Linking them may necessitate a root credential, which takes us back to
the problem of authoritative identity. This in turn demands a concerted effort towards
infrastructure design as opposed to individual systems and applications. However, this
infrastructure must be designed and built in a way that protects against linking and tracing use
instances unless the user has opted for that.
Building the digital identity infrastructure
An all piecemeal approach to this endeavor may not be the best solution for the realization of its
goal. Some overall framework may need to be pursued not only in terms of national strategy but
in terms of the Internet infrastructure itself. Technology players should seize the interest and
involvement of the government to set an agenda for R&D initiatives to that end.
Those are a few recommendations and propositions design stakeholders might consider if
their goal is to achieve an interoperable infrastructure for identity management on the Internet,
and possibly the implementation of identity systems that might become authoritative. To close
this dissertation, I will now pinpoint a number of shortcomings in the outcome of this endeavor,
and indicate different directions that are worth considering for future research.
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8.3 Limitations and future directions
To conclude, I will pinpoint some aspects where this dissertation could have produced a better
research outcome. Following that I will indicate two or three avenues where it could be taken
further, and then close with a few remarks.
8.3.1

Research value and limitations

The first limitation – in fact, challenge – of this research is in the conditions of the phenomenon
of digital identity technology. This still is an evolving phenomenon, a moving target. As a
consequence, information that may have not been available at the time of research design might
have become so before the research concluded. In fact, it was the case that when this
investigation started the energy and attention of the designers were more focused on clarifying
the technical requirements and building the small pieces of the infrastructure to come. Very little
was said about the broader, social requisites and implications of that project.
However by 2010, there was a momentum in the production of information addressing
the larger social and institutional context thanks, among other things, to the interest of USG to be
an early adopter and promote the implementation of those technologies. At this point there is
enough relevant information coming from the actors involved in order to write a single, in-depth
case dissertation on the institutional challenges to the emergence and deployment of digital
identity technology.
Instead, this dissertation has reached for a very broad scope in an effort to find in history
a sort of Archimedean point from where to comprehend the contemporary phenomenon. This
gives an exploratory aspect to the research which focuses more on understanding and analyzing
in detail the phenomena studied as well as their historical contexts and less on theory.
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Regarding particularly the medieval part, limitation of resources have not permitted a
direct examination of some original materials and artifacts; only accessible secondary sources
were used, albeit it was fortunate enough that relevant materials in French were covered and
translated. However, I feel that being able to investigate archival materials would have helped
gained further insights into the material culture and the local economies surrounding the
production of seal. The results might have been richer, if we could better understand who made
the seal, how the seal-maker profession was exactly organized, how the production was
organized, whether it had any economic significance, how they were designed (the choice of the
images, symbols), what the scope (and possibly other aspects) of the relationship between seal
and seal owner was outside sealed deed and letters, etc.
The timespan of the phenomenon investigated is also a challenge. A researcher can more
easily make false assumptions when trying to understand the dynamics of a social context several
centuries away. However I am here in good company with other researchers more qualified in
the historical field; I have only taken the risk to build a careful reasoning from as straightforward
a reading as possible. Nevertheless, comparative case studies in social sciences would generally
address cases that are instances of more obviously similar phenomenon or, in historical case
studies in particular, close enough time-space settings that comparisons are more straightforward
and richer. It is quite a wager to undertake a comparison of an 11th century phenomenon with a
21st century phenomenon. The task is undoubtedly daunting for a gain that was not certain, or
might be too little to be worth the effort.
In the end, this investigation has the potential to bring together a couple of different
disciplinary discourses including history, anthropology, semiotics, information science and even
international relations and political economy. Within the boundaries of available sources, the
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individual cases have been thoroughly investigated which is the expectation for specific history
as well as for situational history (recall Table 3-1 from Hall 1999). With the exception of
radically new facts or findings emerging from relevant literature that would have escaped not
only my attention but that of the historians referenced, further research of the same question
should not yield contradictory results.
The components of the emerging analytical framework have themselves emerged (in my
mind at least) very late in the research process. An interview protocol tightly designed to elicit
responses about those factors would have made the interview data more valuable for the analysis
of the third case and increase the value of the case findings. However, the overall data that has
been used in Case III and the diversity of sources and types of data present a solid and
convincing case description (Golden-Biddle and Locke 1993). I hope the reader gets the sense of
the authenticity of my account, as I have been observing these processes and talking first hand to
the actors for the last few years. Plausibility is the next criterion put forward by Golden-Biddle
and Locke to evaluate the convincing quality with ethnographic texts. Case III has been
documented in such detail so as to provide the reader with a full sense of the reality being
described, without any gaping hole or overstretch that would leave a hint of unreal-ness.
Criticality is the third and last criterion: while I find these processes interesting to investigate, my
analysis in the latter part of the chapter 7 strives to recognize challenges and shortcomings in the
steps taken so far by the actors without being overly unrealistic. In the end it is up to the reader
to make a determination about this work against those evaluation criteria, or any other criteria of
scientific import as long as it is applicable to this scholarship and could make this research
better.
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Finally, the analytical framework based on causal mechanisms proceeds from contingent
generalizations (George and Bennett 2005) which are more bounded and contextual. This may
further enable an analytical generalization, which could have been completed if the third case
was fully constituted and hypotheses could be formed and tested through comparison.
8.3.2

Future directions

I anticipate future research building on this wide-ranging investigation which could be thought of
as laying the groundwork. I wish to connect this inquiry and its gains to two theoretical fields:
the institutional and the sociotechnical.
The so-called ecosystem with the Open Identity Trust Framework model, for instance is a
mechanism to watch closely with a thought on institutional processes, while the process of
assembling the digital identity infrastructure might probably be rich in puzzles for sociotechnical
scholarship, and vice-versa.
I also intend to keep following the developments of digital identity efforts and pursue the
conversations with the expert practitioners not only in order to collect their feedback, but also to
get them further interested in the potential contribution of social sciences to their endeavors and
perhaps foster research partnerships.
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Glossary
Terms
Attribute

Definitions
Naturally occurring, assigned or reputed characteristic of an entity /
Reputed, assigned or naturally occurring characteristic of an entity

Authentication

It is the procedure or the act of seeking or providing evidence in order to establish the
truth about a claim or the authenticity of an artifact. It entails some type of verification
and, if conclusive, leads to the validation of a claim in any form.

Authenticity

Quality of conforming to one’s real identity or true nature. Quality of an artifact truly
being what it is claimed to be.

Authoritative identity

Identity that has been issued by an identity authority or, in other words, by any entity
considered a reliable source of identification by most actual and potential stakeholders.
An authoritative identity requires both authenticity and reliability.

Claim
Confidence
Digital identity

Identification

Identity
A mechanism for binding
to data any single one of a
collection of entities in
such a way that the result
enables the discovery of
the specific entity thus
bound. Individuals
exercise their agency
through artifacts or media
that are used to represent
such data.

Identity Authority

Trust

Assertion of a fact generally associated to oneself in the context of identity
Quality of a human subject who believes with assurance in something or someone
• Identity is an information artifact that is associated to an entity and structured so as
to enable the attribution of further information to the same entity if and whenever
applicable
• Digital identity encompasses a variety of rules and mechanisms that enable to
reliably relate a piece of data to a specific digital entity if and whenever applicable.
The challenge remains the link between that digital entity to the physical entity it
pertains to if applicable.
•
•
•
•

Demonstrate identity
Register an identity
Authenticate identity
Verify identity

• Collection of information or set of data that is sufficient to clearly discern, in a given
context, an individual entity from a population of similar entities.
• Complete set of pre-defined data entries documented about a specific individual.
(The data set is designed so as when fully documented, it enables to single out one
individual among a population of entities).
• Any form of evidence that enables ascribing an action to the legal person who is the
author of that action, or a change in the state of a record to the single autonomous
individual whom that change pertains to.
• Identity is an information artifact that is structured so as to enable its consistent and
reliable association with a given entity and only with that one, as well as to enable
the reliable attribution of further relevant information to the same entity if and only
if applicable.
Any entity:
• who defines the requirements and components of an identity schema
• who performs original identity proofing or authenticates original identity attributes
in order to issue a credential, or
• whose assertions about a party in an identity transaction is relied upon by some other
party as proof of identity
Relationship of a subject to any entity in which the subject provides whatever might be
asked of him/her and expects that subsequent course of actions or events will unfold as
planned or as stated on behalf of the entity.
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Source (and date)
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(OITF) Model

Open Identity Exchange,
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Feb. 12, 2010
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Certificate of Incorporation to Open
Identity Exchange
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Bylaws of Open Identity Exchange
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Overview.

Kantara Initiative, http://kantarainitiative.org
Feb. 26, 2010
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Process

US Government, http://www.idmanagement.gov
Sep. 4, 2009
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Risk Management Guide for
Information Technology Systems
(NIST Special Publication 800-30)

National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/80030/sp800-30.pdf
July 2002

gov_omb04-04

E-authentication Guidance for
Federal Agencies (Memorandum M04-04 to the Heads of all
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Executive Office of the President, Office of
Management and Budget,
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Dec. 16, 2003
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(NIST Special Publication 800-63)

NIST, US Department of Commerce
Apr. 2006
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Appendix B: Interview Protocols
Dissertation Research Interview Protocol on Digital Identity
(Final version: February 2011)
Mawaki Chango
Syracuse University, School of Information Studies
Note: The conversation may get into more detail on some points or be cursory on some others, depending on the area
of expertise, the experience or the role of a given respondent in relation to the topic.

I.

In your opinion, what have been the major advances (technological and otherwise) in the
development of digital identity technology in recent (10 to 15) years?
a. Would you say there is today a consensus in the Internet industry on the need to create a framework
enabling various Internet identity systems to interoperate globally?
b. If so, could you briefly tell me, according to you, the events and reasons which led to that consensus?

II.

So, do you personally think we needed to create new systems for identity management on
the Internet? Why?

III.

In your opinion, to what extent do we need these systems to be interoperable?
a. Seamlessly all across the global Internet, or should they be limited within some narrower boundaries
(national, organizational, other geographical or non-geographical scale)?

IV.

What model of identity management do you think is best suited for interoperable identity
systems on the Internet? Please explain.
a. Examples of models include, but are not necessarily limited to: Fully centralized, decentralized,
federated, user-controlled, etc.

V.

To what extent do you think digital identity systems on the Internet really establish
identity? How is this technology function different from authentication or access control?

VI.

What might motivate Internet-based businesses to accept an identity system that would
ultimately take away their ability to collect and store their own customers’ identity data?
a. Do you see any ways market forces might lead to that outcome? Please explain.
b. Can public policy play a role here? Please explain.

VII. Do you think we might soon reach a point where Internet-based businesses will largely
expect or require their customers to establish their identity (prove their identity assertions)
by using the emerging digital identity technologies?
VIII. In your opinion, what features of digital identity technology are likely to drive end user’s
voluntary adoption?
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IX. What other (extraneous) factors would be necessary to enable voluntary adoption by end
users? (e.g., the role of government, market mechanisms, and possibly others.) Please briefly
explain how that might work.
X.

In order for digital identity to have the same level of authority in online identity
transactions as the passport or a national ID card in the physical ones, does it need to be
based on data derived from these official documents (or from the same pieces of evidence
that are used to issue them)?
a. Physical identity documents typically include baseline data such as names, date of birth, and some
form of affiliation (nationality, employee, student, etc.), plus any particular attribute of relevance.
Does digital technology allows breaking away from that paradigm while still retaining the capability
to ascertain legal identity?
b. Do we need innovative sources of identity data, and new forms of authority for the cyberspace?

XI.

In order to achieve most reliable identity transactions online, what do you think the
mechanisms should be for authentication and registration of the identity subject?
a. Please specify the nature and scope of the relationship between the identity subject and the entities
ensuring those functions

XII. Which entities do you think are best suited to carry out those functions (in the context of
digital identity services for the general public)?
a. Do market forces contribute to define those players? How?
b. Is there a role for public policy in this? Which one?
XIII. What should be the main characteristics of the governance structure and mechanisms for a
digital identity infrastructure?
a. For examples: To whom will the operators or players be accountable? What recourses should the
users and the relevant players have if the system fails?
XIV. In summary, what in your opinion are the fundamental challenges that still remain in the
way of a successful implementation of globally interoperable digital identity systems?
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Interview Protocol
Pilot version: October 2009
Mawaki Chango, Syracuse University iSchool, PhD Program

For how long have you been involved in digital identity business?
In what roles?
Is your role or interest rather:
( ) Technically oriented? (e.g., developers, programmers)
( ) Socially oriented?
( ) Both?
Is your affiliation primarily in:
( ) the proprietary software industry?
( ) the open source software industry?
( ) other: specify _______
Are you a participant in any of the following projects or products (check all that apply)?
( ) Higgins framework
( ) Identity metasystem interoperability
( ) i-Card
( ) U-Prove
( ) ITU Identity Management activities (Focus Group or otherwise)
( ) Other (specify) __________
I want your opinion on a number of questions as follows. There is no right or wrong answers.
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AUTHORITY
Specifications of digital identity systems and governance refer to entities such as Certification
Authority or Credential Authority:
1. How would you define the notion of authority in this context?
2. What are the different ways Digital Identity systems being developed can become
authoritative?
3. What would be the basis for that authority?
4. Is there any difference, in your view, between Identity Provider or Issuing Party on the one
hand, and Certification or Credential Authority?
5. If so what is it?
6. What are the conditions required for the public to rely on Identity Providers or Issuing
Parties as authoritative?
7. What are the different steps that can be taken to get there from here?
TRUST
1. What is the role of trust in this process of establishing authority for identity providers?
2. Do you generally trust government-issued identity documents?
3. Do you think people in general trust government-issued identity documents?
Why?
4. In the narrow sense technologists talk about trust systems and credential authority: What
does trust have to do with authority in your opinion?
5. Is trust (as in ‘trust system’) a necessary condition to generate authority?
6. Is trust sufficient to generate authority?
7. In the context of digital identity more broadly, is trust a:
( ) a technological problem
-

Is it essentially enabled by cryptography?

( ) a social problem

498
( ) both technological and social problem
8. What else could you say in definition of trust?
RISK
It is a common wisdom to think that faceless transactions are more subject to deceit than face-toface ones.
1. Is that a fair assessment in your view today?
2.

How do you compare the risks of deceit and fraud between off-line physical and online
digital identity transactions?

3.

What is the highest risk presented by Digital Identity compared to traditional physical ID
tokens?

In an online secured transaction based on a validated and verified credential provided by a
Credential Authority:
4. What are the types of risks, if any, that still persist for fraud?
5. How should we approach the problem of liability for a Certification or Credential Authority
should its certified credentials be tampered with leading to a fraudulent transaction?
6. Would you say the system is completely safe, in the sense that even if forgery or attempt to
deception occurs, they would be detected somewhere down the process before a transaction
is completed?
7. Are the risks of fraud or forgery higher or lower with off-line government or state-issued
identity than with digital identity?
8. To what extent or in what ways will identity metasystem interoperability be universal?
9. How does it compare with payment card networks? What is similar and what is different?

499

Appendix C: Interview and other records
Interviews Conducted
Interv.#

Month and Year

Format

Ref. Code

1

November, 2009

Face-to-Face

Res_C

2

November, 2009

Face-to-Face

Res_D

3

November, 2009

Face-to-Face

Res_B

4

November, 2009

Face-to-Face

Res_A

5

August 2010

Face-to-Face

Res_F

6

August 2010

Face-to-Face

Res_H

7

August 2010

Face-to-Face

Res_E

8

October 2010

Written

Res_B

9

January 2011

Phone

Res_G

10

February 2011

Written

Res_I

11

February 2011

Phone

Res_L

12

February 2011

Written

Res_J

13

March 2011

Phone

Res_J

14

March 2011

Phone (non-recorded)

Res_K

15

March 2011

Phone

Res_M

16

April 2011

Phone

Res_N
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Appendix D: Digital signatures (reading notes)
A digital signature is a two-phase process whereby a file is generated which allows
authenticating communications; contrary to manuscript signature which is meant to be stable and
fairly identical over time, digital signature is a unique and different file issued at each iteration of
use, based on the main file to which it is affixed. First, the original file or communication content
is algorithmically processed into a value known as hash value, in such a way that the change of a
single character in the text being signed would yield a different hash value: "Hashing is a
technique by which electronic information can be reduced to a unique fixed-length code: if even
a single character in the file is modified in transmission or storage, the resulting hash value will
change. By comparing the original hash value with the current one, one can determine whether a
document has been altered or not" (Dekeyser 2002:81). The hash value is also dubbed the digital
fingerprint of electronic files. Second, the original hash value must be encrypted for the result of
the verification to be reliable and meaningful; that way, it is secured against any unauthorized
manipulation so that while the initial document may still be tempered with, the original hash
value will remain consistent so as to show in that case that the output document is not the one
originally signed (its hash value would not match the original one.) Encryption transforms a
transparent, legible text into a cipher text, that is, a series of characters that cannot be made sense
of by any natural linguistic or semiotic system. Before one can make sense of the result of an
encryption, one must use a software device called key in order to reverse the encrypted or cipher
text into a plain text. There are two main modes of encryption: symmetrical and asymmetrical.
The former allows the two ends of the communication, and ideally only them, to share the
encryption key, while the former is based on pairs of keys proper to each user with one out of a
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pair being public and the other one secret. In the case of symmetrical encryption, the system is
secure as long as the key is not known to other illegitimate parties and none of the two parties
tries to impersonate the other using the shared key for illegitimate purposes. The asymmetrical
encryption mode enables to overcome those risks. Here there is a split regarding the appropriate
key to use for encryption, which may be the sender's private key or the receiver's public key,
depending on where the assurance emphasis is placed. The former assures any receiver of the
truthful source of the communication while the latter assures the sender that only the intended
recipient will access the communication.
To sum up, digital signature based on asymmetrical encryption allows one: i) to send
someone a message that only they can decrypt and access (when their public key is used to
encrypt the message), and ii) to assure the recipients of a message that a specific person has
indeed sent it (while the said person uses her private key to encrypt the message).
As noted by Dekeyser (2002), hash values as well as public and private keys are not
proofs of identity: "these are just numerical values. In this sense, the term digital seal would be
more accurate for that technology" (Dekeyser 2002:81, emphasis added). The assurance is that a
message decrypted with a given public key has certainly been encrypted by the corresponding
private key, thus by the owner of that private key, to the extent that the latter can be known. But
the system does not provide that knowledge by itself.
In open network environments, like the Internet, a public key infrastructure must be in place in order to tie
public keys to the identity of their rightful owners.
A public key infrastructure offers a number of services related to digital signatures. Firstly, the service of
creating key pairs with which digital signatures can be placed. A second service is public key certification,
whereby the link between a public key and its rightful owner is published for the benefit of recipients of
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signed documents. Depending on the type of certificate, the owner's identity is checked more or less
thoroughly. Typically, a directory is kept of all certificates issued as well as revocation list, which is
important in the case of the theft of a private key. Lastly, time-stamping is an important service, as it is
necessary to know whether a digital signature was placed before or after the revocation of a public key
certificate. (Idem)
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